2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/x509.h>
162 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
163 #include <openssl/dh.h>
165 #include <openssl/bn.h>
166 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
167 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
169 #include <openssl/md5.h>
171 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
173 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
175 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
176 return(SSLv3_server_method());
181 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
183 ssl_undefined_function,
184 ssl3_get_server_method)
186 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
189 unsigned long l,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
190 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
193 int new_state,state,skip=0;
195 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
199 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
201 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
202 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
204 /* init things to blank */
206 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
210 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
220 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
222 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
226 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
227 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
230 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
232 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
237 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
239 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
241 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
246 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
254 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
262 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
264 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
265 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
267 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
269 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
270 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
271 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
275 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
276 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
277 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
278 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
282 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
283 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
286 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
287 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
288 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
289 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
292 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
295 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
299 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
300 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
301 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
304 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
305 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
308 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
312 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
313 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
314 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
315 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
318 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
320 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
324 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
325 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
326 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH */
328 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL)
329 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_kPSK))
331 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
332 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
336 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
340 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
341 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
342 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
344 /* clear this, it may get reset by
345 * send_server_key_exchange */
346 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
347 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
349 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
351 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
352 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
353 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
354 * be able to handle this) */
355 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
357 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
360 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
361 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
363 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
365 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
366 * message only if the cipher suite is either
367 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
368 * server certificate contains the server's
369 * public key for key exchange.
371 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
372 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
373 * hint if provided */
374 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
375 || ((l & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
380 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
381 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
382 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
388 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
389 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
394 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
398 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
399 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
400 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
401 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
402 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
403 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
404 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
405 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
406 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
407 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
408 * and in RFC 2246): */
409 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) &&
410 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
411 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
412 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
413 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
414 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5)
415 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
416 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
417 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_kPSK))
419 /* no cert request */
421 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
422 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
426 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
427 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
428 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
429 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
430 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
432 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
433 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
439 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
440 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
441 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
442 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
443 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
444 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
448 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
449 /* number of bytes to be flushed */
450 num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,NULL);
453 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
454 num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio);
455 if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; }
456 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
459 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
462 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
463 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
464 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
465 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
469 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
471 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
473 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
474 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
477 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
481 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
482 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
483 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
488 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
489 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
490 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
491 * message is not sent.
493 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
498 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
501 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
502 * a client cert, it can be verified
504 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
505 &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
506 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
507 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
508 &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
509 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
513 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
514 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
516 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
517 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
518 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
520 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
524 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
525 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
526 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
527 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
528 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
532 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
536 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
537 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
539 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
540 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
541 { ret= -1; goto end; }
543 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
544 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
546 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
547 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
550 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
551 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
559 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
560 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
561 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
562 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
563 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
564 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
565 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
566 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
568 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
570 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
575 /* clean a few things up */
576 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
578 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
581 /* remove buffering on output */
582 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
586 if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
588 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
589 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
593 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
595 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
597 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
599 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
607 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
613 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
617 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
622 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
626 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
633 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
637 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
641 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
645 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
647 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
648 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
653 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
654 /* number of bytes to write */
659 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
660 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
663 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
668 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
669 * so permit appropriate message length */
670 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
676 if (!ok) return((int)n);
677 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
678 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
680 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
681 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
682 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
683 * when a handshake is not completed ... */
684 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
685 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
687 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
688 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
696 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
698 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
699 unsigned int cookie_len;
702 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
704 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
707 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
709 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
710 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
711 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
712 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
715 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
718 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
720 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
721 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
722 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
723 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
724 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
727 if (!ok) return((int)n);
728 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
730 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
731 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
732 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
735 if (s->client_version < s->version)
737 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
738 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
740 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
741 s->version = s->client_version;
743 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
747 /* load the client random */
748 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
751 /* get the session-id */
755 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
756 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
757 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
758 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
759 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
760 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
761 * an earlier library version)
763 if (j == 0 || (s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
765 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
770 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s,p,j);
772 { /* previous session */
779 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
786 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION)
791 if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
792 s->d1->send_cookie == 0)
794 /* HelloVerifyMessage has already been sent */
795 if ( cookie_len != s->d1->cookie_len)
797 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
798 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
804 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
805 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
806 * does not cause an overflow.
808 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
811 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
812 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
816 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
817 if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
820 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
822 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
824 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
827 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
828 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
829 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
832 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
834 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
835 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
837 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
838 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
839 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
848 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
850 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
851 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
852 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
857 /* not enough data */
858 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
859 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
862 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
869 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
870 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
873 id=s->session->cipher->id;
876 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
878 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
880 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
882 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
883 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
893 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
895 /* Very bad for multi-threading.... */
896 s->session->cipher=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
900 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
901 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
902 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
903 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
913 /* not enough data */
914 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
915 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
921 if (p[j] == 0) break;
928 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
929 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
933 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
935 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
937 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
939 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
940 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
944 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
945 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
950 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
951 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
952 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
953 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
954 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
955 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
956 { /* See if we have a match */
959 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
962 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
975 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
981 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
986 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
987 s->session->compress_meth=0;
989 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
991 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
992 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
993 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
996 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
997 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1001 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1002 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1006 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1007 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1010 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1014 /* Session-id reuse */
1015 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1016 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1017 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1018 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1020 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1022 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1023 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1025 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1026 if (c->algorithms & SSL_eNULL)
1028 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1032 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1033 else if (ec != NULL)
1034 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1036 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1040 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1043 /* we now have the following setup.
1045 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1046 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1047 * compression - basically ignored right now
1048 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1049 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1050 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1051 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1058 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1061 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1065 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1068 unsigned char *p,*d;
1070 unsigned long l,Time;
1072 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1074 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1075 p=s->s3->server_random;
1076 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1078 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1080 /* Do the message type and length last */
1083 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1084 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1087 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1088 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1090 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1091 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1092 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1093 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1094 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1095 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1096 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1098 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER))
1099 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1101 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1102 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1104 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1108 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1111 /* put the cipher */
1112 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1115 /* put the compression method */
1116 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1119 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1122 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1124 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1125 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1127 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1130 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1132 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1140 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1143 s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
1144 /* number of bytes to write */
1149 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
1150 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1153 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1157 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1159 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1162 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1167 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1168 /* number of bytes to write */
1173 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
1174 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1177 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1179 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1183 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1186 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1189 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1190 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1191 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1194 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1197 unsigned char *p,*d;
1207 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1208 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1210 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_MKEY_MASK;
1215 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1217 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1218 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1221 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1223 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1224 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1225 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1228 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1237 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1243 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1247 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1248 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1251 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1252 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1253 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1254 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1257 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1262 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1269 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1271 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1276 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1277 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1278 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1280 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1282 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1289 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1290 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1291 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1292 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1294 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1304 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1305 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1307 const EC_GROUP *group;
1309 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1310 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1312 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1313 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1314 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1318 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1319 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1323 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1325 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
1326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1330 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1333 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1336 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp))
1338 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1343 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1344 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1345 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1346 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1348 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1350 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1355 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1356 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1357 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1363 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1364 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1366 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1370 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1371 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1372 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1375 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1382 /* Encode the public key.
1383 * First check the size of encoding and
1384 * allocate memory accordingly.
1386 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1387 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1388 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1391 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1392 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1393 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1394 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1396 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1401 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1402 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1403 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1404 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1406 if (encodedlen == 0)
1408 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1412 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1414 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1415 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1416 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1417 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1422 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1423 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1431 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1432 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1433 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1435 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1436 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1439 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1441 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1445 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1447 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1451 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL)
1452 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_kPSK))
1454 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
1457 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1460 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1468 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1470 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1473 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1476 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1483 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1484 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1486 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1487 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1488 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1489 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1490 * the actual encoded point itself
1492 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1500 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1501 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1503 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1508 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1509 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1511 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1512 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1513 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1514 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1521 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1522 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1523 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1524 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1528 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1530 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1531 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1532 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1533 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1534 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1535 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1536 (unsigned int *)&i);
1540 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1541 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1543 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1551 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1552 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1555 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
1556 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1557 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1558 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1559 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1560 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1562 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
1570 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1571 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1573 /* let's do ECDSA */
1574 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
1575 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1576 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1577 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1578 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1579 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1581 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
1590 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1591 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1592 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1597 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1600 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1606 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1607 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1608 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1610 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1612 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1613 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1614 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1616 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1620 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1622 unsigned char *p,*d;
1624 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
1628 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
1632 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
1634 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1636 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
1645 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1649 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
1651 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
1652 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
1653 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
1655 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1658 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
1659 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
1662 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1669 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1670 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
1676 /* else no CA names */
1677 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
1680 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
1681 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1684 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1689 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1690 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
1693 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1700 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
1703 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1704 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1709 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1715 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1717 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1719 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1723 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1725 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1727 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1728 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
1729 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
1730 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
1731 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1734 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1735 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1736 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
1737 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1741 if (!ok) return((int)n);
1742 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1744 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
1746 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1749 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
1750 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
1752 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
1753 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
1754 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
1755 * be sent already */
1758 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1759 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
1766 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
1767 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
1768 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
1769 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
1771 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1772 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
1779 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
1784 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
1786 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1796 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
1800 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
1802 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1803 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
1806 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
1808 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
1809 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
1810 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
1811 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
1812 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
1814 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
1815 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
1816 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
1818 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1819 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
1821 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
1822 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
1823 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
1824 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
1825 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
1826 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
1827 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
1833 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
1834 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
1835 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
1837 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
1838 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
1839 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
1840 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
1844 s->session->master_key_length=
1845 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1846 s->session->master_key,
1848 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1852 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1853 if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
1858 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
1860 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1870 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
1872 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1873 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
1878 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
1880 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1881 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1885 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
1888 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
1891 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
1895 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
1899 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1903 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
1908 s->session->master_key_length=
1909 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1910 s->session->master_key,p,i);
1911 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1915 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1918 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
1919 krb5_data enc_ticket;
1920 krb5_data authenticator;
1922 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
1923 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
1924 EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
1925 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
1926 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
1927 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
1929 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
1930 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
1932 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
1934 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
1937 enc_ticket.length = i;
1939 if (n < enc_ticket.length + 6)
1941 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1942 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1946 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
1947 p+=enc_ticket.length;
1950 authenticator.length = i;
1952 if (n < enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)
1954 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1955 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1959 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
1960 p+=authenticator.length;
1964 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
1967 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
1970 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
1972 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1973 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1977 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
1978 enc_pms.length + 6))
1980 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1981 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1985 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
1989 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
1990 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
1992 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
1993 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1994 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1999 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2000 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2002 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2003 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2006 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2007 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2009 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2010 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2011 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2016 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2018 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2023 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2024 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2026 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2030 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2032 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2034 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2035 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2038 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2039 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2041 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2042 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2045 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2047 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2048 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2051 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2053 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2054 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2058 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2060 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2061 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2064 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2066 s->session->master_key_length=
2067 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2068 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2070 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2072 int len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2073 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2075 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2076 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2081 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2082 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2083 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2084 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2088 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2090 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2091 if ((l & SSL_kECDH) || (l & SSL_kEECDH))
2096 const EC_GROUP *group;
2097 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2099 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2100 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2102 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2103 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2107 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2110 /* use the certificate */
2111 tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
2115 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2116 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2118 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2121 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2122 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2124 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2125 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2127 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2132 /* Let's get client's public key */
2133 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2135 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2136 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2142 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2146 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2147 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2150 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2152 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2154 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2155 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2156 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2157 * never executed. When that support is
2158 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2159 * received in the certificate is
2160 * authorized for key agreement.
2161 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2162 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2165 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2166 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2167 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2171 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2172 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2174 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2178 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2182 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2183 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2185 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2188 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2192 /* Get encoded point length */
2195 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2196 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2202 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2203 * currently, so set it to the start
2205 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2208 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2209 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2210 if (field_size <= 0)
2212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2216 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2219 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2224 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2225 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2226 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2227 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2228 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2230 /* Compute the master secret */
2231 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2232 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2234 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2239 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2242 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2243 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2244 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2246 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2248 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2253 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2254 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2257 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2259 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2260 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2263 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2266 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2270 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2271 * string for the callback */
2272 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2273 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2274 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2275 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2276 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2278 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2280 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2281 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2284 else if (psk_len == 0)
2286 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2287 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2288 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2289 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2293 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2294 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2296 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2298 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2302 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2303 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2304 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2305 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2307 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2308 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2312 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2313 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2314 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2315 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2316 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2318 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2319 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2323 s->session->master_key_length=
2324 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2325 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2328 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2335 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2336 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2337 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2343 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2344 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
2347 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2348 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2349 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2350 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2351 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2352 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2357 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2359 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2366 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2367 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2368 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2373 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2375 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2377 peer=s->session->peer;
2378 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2379 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2387 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2389 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2390 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2392 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2393 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2402 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2403 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2407 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2409 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2410 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2414 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2416 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2417 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2421 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2422 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2427 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2428 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2432 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2433 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
2435 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2436 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2440 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2441 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2443 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2444 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2448 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2449 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2454 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2455 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2461 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2462 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2464 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2465 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2466 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
2470 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2471 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
2477 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2478 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
2480 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2481 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2482 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
2486 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2487 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2488 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2495 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2496 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
2505 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2508 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2512 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2514 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
2516 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
2517 const unsigned char *p,*q;
2519 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
2521 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2528 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2530 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
2532 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2533 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2535 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2536 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2539 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
2540 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
2542 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
2543 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2546 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2550 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
2552 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2553 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2556 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2558 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
2560 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2567 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2568 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2571 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
2574 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
2576 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2577 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2582 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
2585 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2590 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2591 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2594 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
2596 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2603 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
2605 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2606 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2608 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2609 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2612 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2613 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2614 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2616 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2617 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2623 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
2626 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2627 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
2632 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
2633 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2634 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
2635 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2637 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
2638 * when we arrive here. */
2639 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2641 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
2642 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2644 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2648 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
2649 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
2650 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
2651 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
2652 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
2660 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2663 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
2664 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
2668 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
2673 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
2675 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
2677 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
2678 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms
2679 & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
2680 != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))
2682 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2686 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
2687 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
2692 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
2693 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));