1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
183 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
185 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
187 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
189 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
190 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
192 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
194 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
195 we do so if There is no srp login name */
197 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
201 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
208 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
210 ssl_undefined_function,
211 ssl3_get_server_method)
213 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
216 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
217 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
219 int new_state,state,skip=0;
221 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
225 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
227 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
228 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
230 /* init things to blank */
232 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
241 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
242 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
243 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
245 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
247 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
258 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
260 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
264 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
265 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
268 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
270 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
275 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
277 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
279 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
284 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
292 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
299 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
300 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
302 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
304 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
305 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
307 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
309 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
310 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
311 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
313 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
314 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
316 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
317 * client that doesn't support secure
320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
321 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
327 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
328 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
329 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
330 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
334 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
335 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
338 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
339 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
340 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
341 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
344 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
347 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
351 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
352 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
353 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
356 if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP)
358 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
359 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
361 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
364 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
366 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
367 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
370 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
372 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
373 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
374 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
375 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
376 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
377 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
385 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
389 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
390 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
391 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
392 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
393 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
396 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
397 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
399 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
403 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
406 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
407 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A;
409 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
414 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
415 case SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A:
416 case SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B:
417 /* We promised to send an audit proof in the hello. */
418 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client)
420 ret = tls1_send_server_supplemental_data(s);
421 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
426 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
431 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
432 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
433 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
434 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
435 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
436 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
437 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
439 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
440 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
441 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
442 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
443 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
445 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
450 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
457 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
462 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
463 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
464 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
466 /* clear this, it may get reset by
467 * send_server_key_exchange */
468 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
469 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
470 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
471 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
473 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
474 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
475 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
476 * be able to handle this) */
477 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
479 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
482 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
483 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
485 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
487 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
488 * message only if the cipher suite is either
489 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
490 * server certificate contains the server's
491 * public key for key exchange.
493 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
494 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
495 * hint if provided */
496 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
497 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
499 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
500 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
501 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
503 || (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
504 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
505 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
506 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
507 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
508 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
514 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
515 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
520 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
524 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
525 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
526 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
527 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
528 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
529 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
530 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
531 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
532 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
533 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
534 * and in RFC 2246): */
535 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
536 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
537 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
538 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
539 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
540 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
541 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
542 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
543 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
545 /* no cert request */
547 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
548 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
549 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
550 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
555 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
556 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
557 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
558 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
559 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
561 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
562 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
568 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
569 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
570 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
571 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
572 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
573 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
577 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
579 /* This code originally checked to see if
580 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
581 * and then flushed. This caused problems
582 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
583 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
584 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
585 * still exist. So instead we just flush
589 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
590 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
595 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
597 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
600 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
601 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
602 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
603 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
607 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
609 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
611 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
612 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
615 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
619 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
620 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
621 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
626 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
627 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
628 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
629 * message is not sent.
630 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
631 * the client uses its key from the certificate
634 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
635 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
637 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
638 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
640 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
644 else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
646 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
648 if (!s->session->peer)
650 /* For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer
651 * at this point and digest cached records.
653 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
655 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
658 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
659 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
667 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
670 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
671 * a client cert, it can be verified
672 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
673 * should be generalized. But it is next step
675 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
676 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
678 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
679 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
683 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
684 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
695 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
696 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
698 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
699 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
700 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
702 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
703 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
705 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
706 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
708 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
713 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
714 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
715 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
716 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
717 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
719 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
723 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
724 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
725 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
726 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
727 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
730 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
731 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
732 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
735 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
739 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
740 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
741 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
742 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
743 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
744 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
748 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
749 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
750 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
751 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
752 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
758 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
759 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
761 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
762 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
763 { ret= -1; goto end; }
765 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
766 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
768 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
769 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
772 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
773 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
781 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
782 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
783 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
784 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
785 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
786 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
787 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
788 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
791 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
792 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
794 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
795 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
797 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
801 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
806 /* clean a few things up */
807 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
809 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
812 /* remove buffering on output */
813 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
817 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
822 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
824 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
826 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
828 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
836 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
842 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
846 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
851 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
855 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
862 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
866 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
870 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
873 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
875 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
876 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
879 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
880 return ssl_do_write(s);
883 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
888 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
889 * so permit appropriate message length */
890 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
896 if (!ok) return((int)n);
897 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
898 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
900 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
902 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
904 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
907 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
908 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
909 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
910 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
912 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
913 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
916 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
917 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
919 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
920 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
923 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
929 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
931 int i,j,ok,al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,ret= -1;
932 unsigned int cookie_len;
937 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
941 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
943 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
944 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
945 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
946 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
949 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
952 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
955 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
956 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
957 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
958 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
959 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
962 if (!ok) return((int)n);
964 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
966 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
967 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
968 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
971 if ((SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->client_version > s->version
972 && s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION) ||
973 (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->client_version < s->version))
975 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
976 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
978 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
979 s->version = s->client_version;
981 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
985 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
986 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
987 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
989 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
991 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
993 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
994 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
996 if (cookie_length == 0)
1000 /* load the client random */
1001 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1002 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1004 /* get the session-id */
1008 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
1009 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
1010 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1011 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
1012 * won't even compile against older library versions).
1014 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
1015 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
1016 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1017 * setting will be ignored.
1019 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
1021 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1026 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1028 { /* previous session */
1035 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1045 cookie_len = *(p++);
1048 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1049 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1050 * does not cause an overflow.
1052 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1055 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1056 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1060 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1061 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1064 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1066 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1068 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1071 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1072 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1073 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1076 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1078 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1079 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1081 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1082 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1083 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1091 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
1093 /* Select version to use */
1094 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1095 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2))
1097 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1098 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1100 else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1101 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1))
1103 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1104 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1108 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1109 s->version = s->client_version;
1110 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1113 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1118 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1120 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1121 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1122 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1127 /* not enough data */
1128 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1129 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1132 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1139 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1140 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1143 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1146 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1148 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1150 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1152 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1153 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1161 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1162 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1165 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1167 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1168 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1169 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1170 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1171 * enabled, though. */
1172 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1173 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1175 s->session->cipher = c;
1182 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1183 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1184 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1185 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1194 /* not enough data */
1195 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1196 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1199 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1204 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1211 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1216 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1218 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1220 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n))
1222 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1227 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1228 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1229 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1230 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1234 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1235 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1237 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1243 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1245 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1247 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1248 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1249 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1252 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1253 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1257 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1258 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1259 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1261 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1262 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1266 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1269 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1271 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1272 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1274 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1275 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1280 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1281 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1282 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1283 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1284 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1285 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1286 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1288 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1289 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1290 /* Can't disable compression */
1291 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1293 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1296 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1297 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1299 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1300 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1302 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1306 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1308 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1311 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1312 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1314 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1319 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1326 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1327 { /* See if we have a match */
1328 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1330 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1331 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1333 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1346 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1351 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1352 * using compression.
1354 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1356 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1361 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1366 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1367 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1369 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1371 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1372 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1373 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1374 if (ciphers == NULL)
1376 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1377 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1381 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1382 if (s->cert->cert_cb
1383 && s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg) <= 0)
1385 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1389 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1390 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1394 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1395 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1398 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1402 /* Session-id reuse */
1403 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1404 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1405 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1406 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1408 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1410 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1411 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1413 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1414 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1416 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1420 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1421 else if (ec != NULL)
1422 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1424 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1428 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1431 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1433 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1437 /* we now have the following setup.
1439 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1440 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1441 * compression - basically ignored right now
1442 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1443 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1444 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1445 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1448 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1449 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1451 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
1453 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1462 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1465 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1469 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1472 unsigned char *p,*d;
1475 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1479 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1481 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1482 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1483 p=s->s3->server_random;
1484 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
1485 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1487 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1490 /* Do the message type and length last */
1491 d=p= ssl_handshake_start(s);
1493 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1494 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1497 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1498 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1500 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1501 * back in the server hello:
1502 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1503 * we send back the old session ID.
1504 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1505 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1506 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1507 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1509 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1510 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1511 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1512 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1515 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1517 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1519 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1520 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1522 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1526 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1529 /* put the cipher */
1530 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1533 /* put the compression method */
1534 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1537 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1540 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1542 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1543 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1548 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1550 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1556 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
1557 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1560 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1561 return ssl_do_write(s);
1564 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1567 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1569 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
1570 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1573 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1574 return ssl_do_write(s);
1577 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1579 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1583 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1586 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1589 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1590 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1591 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1594 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1597 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1598 unsigned char *p,*d;
1608 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1609 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1611 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1616 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1618 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1619 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1622 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1624 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1625 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1626 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1629 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1630 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1638 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1639 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1644 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1648 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1649 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1652 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1653 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1654 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1655 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1658 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1659 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1663 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1665 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1669 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1671 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1676 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1677 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1678 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1680 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1682 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1689 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1690 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1691 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1692 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1694 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1704 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1705 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1707 const EC_GROUP *group;
1709 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1710 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1712 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1713 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1714 if (nid != NID_undef)
1715 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1717 else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
1719 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1720 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1721 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1725 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1726 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1730 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1732 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1736 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1739 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1742 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1744 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1746 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1750 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1751 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1752 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1753 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1755 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1757 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1762 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1763 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1764 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1766 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1770 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1771 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1773 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1777 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1778 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1779 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1782 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1785 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1789 /* Encode the public key.
1790 * First check the size of encoding and
1791 * allocate memory accordingly.
1793 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1794 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1795 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1798 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1799 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1800 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1801 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1803 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1808 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1809 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1810 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1811 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1813 if (encodedlen == 0)
1815 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1819 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1821 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1822 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1823 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1824 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1829 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1830 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1838 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1839 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1840 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1842 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1843 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1846 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1847 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1848 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1850 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1851 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1852 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1853 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1855 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1866 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1867 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1870 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1872 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1873 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1874 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1881 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1882 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1884 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1887 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1890 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1898 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+kn))
1900 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1903 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1905 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1907 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1908 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1920 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1921 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1923 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1924 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1925 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1926 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1927 * the actual encoded point itself
1929 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1937 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1938 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1940 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1941 encodedPoint = NULL;
1946 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1947 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1949 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1950 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1951 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1952 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1959 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1960 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1961 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1962 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1966 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1968 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1969 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1970 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1971 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1972 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1973 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1974 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
1975 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1976 (unsigned int *)&i);
1980 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1981 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1983 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1993 /* send signature algorithm */
1994 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1996 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
1998 /* Should never happen */
1999 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2000 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2006 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
2009 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
2010 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2011 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2012 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
2013 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
2014 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
2016 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
2021 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2026 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2027 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2028 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2033 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
2036 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2037 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2038 return ssl_do_write(s);
2040 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2042 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2043 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2044 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2046 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2050 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2052 unsigned char *p,*d;
2054 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2058 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2062 d=p=ssl_handshake_start(s);
2064 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2066 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2071 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2073 const unsigned char *psigs;
2074 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2076 memcpy(p, psigs, nl);
2085 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2089 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2091 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2092 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2093 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
2095 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2098 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
2099 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2102 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2109 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2110 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2116 /* else no CA names */
2117 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2120 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
2122 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2123 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
2125 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2127 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2135 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2138 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2139 return ssl_do_write(s);
2144 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2148 unsigned long alg_k;
2150 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2152 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2154 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2156 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2158 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2160 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2162 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2163 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2164 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2165 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2166 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2169 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2170 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2171 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2172 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2176 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2177 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2179 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2181 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2182 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2184 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2185 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2187 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2188 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2189 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2190 * be sent already */
2193 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2201 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2202 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2203 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2204 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2206 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2207 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2213 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2214 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2219 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2221 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2231 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2235 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2237 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2238 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
2241 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2243 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2244 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2245 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2246 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2247 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2249 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2250 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2251 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2253 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2254 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2256 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2257 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2258 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2259 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
2260 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
2261 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
2262 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
2268 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
2269 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
2270 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2272 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2273 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2274 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2275 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2279 s->session->master_key_length=
2280 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2281 s->session->master_key,
2283 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2287 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2288 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2291 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2298 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2300 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2309 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2310 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2311 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2312 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2315 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2316 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2317 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) ||
2318 (skey->pkey.dh == NULL))
2320 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2321 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2324 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2326 else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2328 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2329 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2333 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2337 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2338 EVP_PKEY *clkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2341 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2342 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2344 if (dh_clnt == NULL)
2346 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2347 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2350 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2351 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2354 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2357 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2361 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2365 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2370 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2377 s->session->master_key_length=
2378 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2379 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2380 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2386 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2387 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2389 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2390 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2391 krb5_data authenticator;
2393 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2394 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2395 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2396 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2397 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2398 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2400 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2401 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2403 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2405 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2408 enc_ticket.length = i;
2410 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2412 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2413 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2417 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2418 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2421 authenticator.length = i;
2423 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2425 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2426 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2430 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2431 p+=authenticator.length;
2435 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2438 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2441 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2443 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2444 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2448 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2449 enc_pms.length + 6))
2451 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2452 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2456 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2460 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2461 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2463 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2464 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2465 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2470 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2471 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2473 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2474 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2477 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2478 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2480 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2481 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2482 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2487 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2489 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2494 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2495 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2497 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2501 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2503 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2505 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2506 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2509 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2510 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2512 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2513 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2516 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2518 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2519 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2522 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2524 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2525 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2529 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2531 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2532 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2535 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2537 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2538 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2539 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2540 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2541 * the protocol version.
2542 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2543 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2545 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2547 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2548 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2553 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2555 s->session->master_key_length=
2556 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2557 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2559 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2561 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2562 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2564 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2565 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2570 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2571 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2572 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2573 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2577 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2579 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2580 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2585 const EC_GROUP *group;
2586 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2588 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2589 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2591 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2592 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2596 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2597 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2599 /* use the certificate */
2600 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2604 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2605 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2607 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2610 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2611 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2613 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2614 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2616 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2621 /* Let's get client's public key */
2622 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2624 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2625 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2631 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2633 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2635 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2636 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2639 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2641 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2643 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2644 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2645 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2646 * never executed. When that support is
2647 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2648 * received in the certificate is
2649 * authorized for key agreement.
2650 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2651 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2654 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2655 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2656 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2660 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2661 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2663 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2667 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2671 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2672 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2674 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2676 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2677 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2681 /* Get encoded point length */
2686 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2690 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2691 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2693 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2697 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2698 * currently, so set it to the start
2700 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2703 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2704 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2705 if (field_size <= 0)
2707 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2711 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2714 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2719 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2720 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2721 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2722 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2723 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2724 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2726 /* Compute the master secret */
2727 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2728 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2730 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2735 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2736 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2738 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2739 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2740 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2742 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2744 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2749 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2750 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2753 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2755 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2756 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2759 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2761 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2762 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2766 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2767 * string for the callback */
2768 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2769 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2770 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2771 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2772 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2774 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2776 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2777 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2780 else if (psk_len == 0)
2782 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2783 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2784 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2785 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2789 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2790 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2792 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2794 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2798 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2799 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2800 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2801 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2803 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2804 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2808 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2809 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2810 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2811 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2812 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2814 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2815 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2819 s->session->master_key_length=
2820 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2821 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2824 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2830 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2831 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2839 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2840 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2843 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2845 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2848 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2849 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2850 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2851 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2853 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2854 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2858 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2860 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2867 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2868 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2871 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2872 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2873 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2874 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2875 unsigned long alg_a;
2877 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2878 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2879 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2880 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2881 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2882 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2884 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2885 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2886 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2887 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2888 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2889 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2890 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2891 if (client_pub_pkey)
2893 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2896 /* Decrypt session key */
2897 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)))
2899 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2907 else if (p[1] < 0x80)
2914 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2917 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2920 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2923 /* Generate master secret */
2924 s->session->master_key_length=
2925 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2926 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2927 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2928 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2933 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2934 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2942 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2943 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2944 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2950 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2951 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2954 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2955 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2956 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2957 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2958 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2959 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2964 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2966 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2972 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2974 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2976 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2977 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2978 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2980 516, /* Enough for 4096 bit RSA key with TLS v1.2 */
2983 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2985 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2987 peer=s->session->peer;
2988 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2989 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2997 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2999 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3000 if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3002 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3003 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
3012 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
3013 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3017 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3019 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
3020 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3024 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3026 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
3027 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3031 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3032 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3033 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3034 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
3035 * signature without length field */
3036 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3037 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
3043 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3045 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
3048 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3053 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3057 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3066 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3067 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3071 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3072 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
3074 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3075 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3079 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3083 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3086 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3087 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3091 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3094 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3095 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3097 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3098 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3102 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3104 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3105 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3110 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3111 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3113 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3114 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3118 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3119 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3124 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3125 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3132 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3134 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3135 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3136 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3140 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3141 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3147 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3148 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3150 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3151 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3152 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3156 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3157 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3158 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3164 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3165 { unsigned char signature[64];
3167 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3168 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3170 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3172 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3173 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3175 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3176 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3179 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3181 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3188 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3197 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3200 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3202 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3203 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3204 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3206 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3207 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3211 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3213 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3215 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3216 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3218 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3220 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3227 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3229 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3231 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3232 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3235 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3238 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3239 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3241 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3242 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3245 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3249 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3251 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3255 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3257 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3259 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3266 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3267 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3270 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3273 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3275 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3276 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3281 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3284 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3289 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3290 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3293 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3295 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3302 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3304 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3305 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3307 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3308 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3311 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3312 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3313 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3315 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3316 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3319 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3320 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3322 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3328 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3331 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3332 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3337 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3338 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3339 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3340 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3342 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3343 * when we arrive here. */
3344 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3346 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3347 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3349 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3353 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3354 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3355 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3356 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3357 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3365 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3368 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3369 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3373 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3377 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3379 cpk=ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3382 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3383 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3384 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3391 ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,cpk);
3392 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3395 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3396 return ssl_do_write(s);
3399 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3400 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3401 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3403 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3405 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3406 const unsigned char *const_p;
3407 int len, slen_full, slen;
3412 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3413 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3414 unsigned char key_name[16];
3416 /* get session encoding length */
3417 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3418 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3421 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3423 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3427 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3429 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3431 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3437 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3439 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3440 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3446 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3447 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3449 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3450 * follows handshake_header_length +
3451 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3452 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3453 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3454 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3456 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3457 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3458 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3460 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3461 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3462 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3463 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3464 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3467 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3469 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3478 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3479 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3480 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3481 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3482 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3483 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3486 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3487 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3488 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3489 * as their sessions. */
3490 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3492 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3494 /* Output key name */
3496 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3499 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3500 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3501 /* Encrypt session data */
3502 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3504 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3506 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3508 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3509 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3510 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3513 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3515 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3516 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
3517 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3518 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3520 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3524 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3525 return ssl_do_write(s);
3528 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3530 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3533 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3534 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3535 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3538 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3541 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3544 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3545 /* message length */
3546 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3548 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3549 /* length of OCSP response */
3550 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3551 /* actual response */
3552 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3553 /* number of bytes to write */
3554 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3555 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3559 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3560 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3563 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3564 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3565 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3566 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3569 int proto_len, padding_len;
3571 const unsigned char *p;
3573 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3574 * extension in their ClientHello */
3575 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3577 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3581 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3582 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3583 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3585 514, /* See the payload format below */
3591 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3592 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3593 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3594 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3596 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3601 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3603 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3605 /* The payload looks like:
3607 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3608 * uint8 padding_len;
3609 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3612 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3614 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3615 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3618 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3619 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3621 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3624 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3625 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
3631 int tls1_send_server_supplemental_data(SSL *s)
3634 const unsigned char *authz, *orig_authz;
3636 size_t authz_length, i;
3638 if (s->state != SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A)
3639 return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
3641 orig_authz = authz = ssl_get_authz_data(s, &authz_length);
3644 /* This should never occur. */
3648 /* First we walk over the authz data to see how long the handshake
3649 * message will be. */
3650 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
3657 /* n2s increments authz by 2*/
3660 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
3662 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
3663 length += 1 /* authz type */ + 2 /* length */ + len;
3669 length += 1 /* handshake type */ +
3670 3 /* handshake length */ +
3671 3 /* supplemental data length */ +
3672 2 /* supplemental entry type */ +
3673 2 /* supplemental entry length */;
3675 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, length))
3677 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
3681 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3682 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA;
3683 /* Handshake length */
3684 l2n3(length - 4, p);
3685 /* Length of supplemental data */
3686 l2n3(length - 7, p);
3687 /* Supplemental data type */
3688 s2n(TLSEXT_SUPPLEMENTALDATATYPE_authz_data, p);
3690 s2n(length - 11, p);
3694 /* Walk over the authz again and append the selected elements. */
3695 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
3702 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
3705 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
3707 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
3711 memcpy(p, authz, len);
3719 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B;
3720 s->init_num = length;
3723 return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);