1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
183 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
185 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
187 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
189 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
190 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
192 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
194 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
195 we do so if There is no srp login name */
197 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
201 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
208 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
210 ssl_undefined_function,
211 ssl3_get_server_method)
213 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
216 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
217 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
219 int new_state,state,skip=0;
221 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
225 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
227 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
228 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
230 /* init things to blank */
232 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
241 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
242 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
243 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
245 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
247 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
258 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
260 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
264 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
265 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
268 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
270 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
275 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
277 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
279 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
284 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
292 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
299 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
300 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
302 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
304 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
305 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
307 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
309 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
310 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
311 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
313 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
314 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
316 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
317 * client that doesn't support secure
320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
321 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
327 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
328 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
329 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
330 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
334 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
335 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
338 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
339 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
340 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
341 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
344 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
347 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
351 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
352 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
353 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
356 if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP)
358 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
359 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
361 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
364 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
366 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
367 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
370 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
372 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
373 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
374 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
375 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
376 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
377 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
385 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
389 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
390 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
391 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
392 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
393 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
396 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
397 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
399 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
403 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
406 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
407 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A;
409 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
414 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
415 case SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A:
416 case SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B:
417 /* We promised to send an audit proof in the hello. */
418 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client)
420 ret = tls1_send_server_supplemental_data(s);
421 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
426 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
431 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
432 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
433 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
434 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
435 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
436 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
437 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
439 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
440 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
441 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
442 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
443 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
445 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
450 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
457 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
462 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
463 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
464 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
466 /* clear this, it may get reset by
467 * send_server_key_exchange */
468 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
469 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
470 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
471 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
473 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
474 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
475 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
476 * be able to handle this) */
477 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
479 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
482 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
483 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
485 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
487 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
488 * message only if the cipher suite is either
489 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
490 * server certificate contains the server's
491 * public key for key exchange.
493 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
494 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
495 * hint if provided */
496 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
497 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
499 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
500 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
501 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
503 || (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
504 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
505 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
506 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
507 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
508 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
514 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
515 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
520 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
524 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
525 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
526 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
527 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
528 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
529 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
530 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
531 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
532 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
533 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
534 * and in RFC 2246): */
535 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
536 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
537 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
538 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
539 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
540 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
541 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
542 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
543 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
545 /* no cert request */
547 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
548 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
549 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
550 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
555 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
556 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
557 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
558 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
559 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
561 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
562 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
568 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
569 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
570 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
571 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
572 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
573 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
577 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
579 /* This code originally checked to see if
580 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
581 * and then flushed. This caused problems
582 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
583 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
584 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
585 * still exist. So instead we just flush
589 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
590 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
595 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
597 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
600 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
601 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
602 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
603 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
607 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
609 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
611 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
612 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
615 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
619 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
620 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
621 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
626 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
627 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
628 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
629 * message is not sent.
630 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
631 * the client uses its key from the certificate
634 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
635 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
637 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
638 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
640 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
644 else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
646 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
648 if (!s->session->peer)
650 /* For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer
651 * at this point and digest cached records.
653 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
655 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
658 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
659 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
667 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
670 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
671 * a client cert, it can be verified
672 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
673 * should be generalized. But it is next step
675 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
676 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
678 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
679 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
683 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
684 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
695 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
696 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
698 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
699 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
700 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
702 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
703 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
705 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
706 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
708 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
713 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
714 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
715 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
716 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
717 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
719 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
723 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
724 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
725 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
726 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
727 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
730 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
731 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
732 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
735 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
739 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
740 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
741 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
742 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
743 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
744 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
748 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
749 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
750 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
751 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
752 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
758 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
759 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
761 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
762 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
763 { ret= -1; goto end; }
765 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
766 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
768 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
769 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
772 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
773 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
781 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
782 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
783 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
784 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
785 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
786 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
787 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
788 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
791 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
792 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
794 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
795 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
797 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
801 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
806 /* clean a few things up */
807 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
809 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
812 /* remove buffering on output */
813 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
817 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
822 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
824 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
826 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
828 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
836 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
842 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
846 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
851 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
855 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
862 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
866 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
870 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
874 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
876 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
877 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
882 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
883 /* number of bytes to write */
888 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
889 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
892 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
897 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
898 * so permit appropriate message length */
899 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
905 if (!ok) return((int)n);
906 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
907 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
909 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
911 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
913 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
916 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
917 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
918 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
919 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
921 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
922 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
925 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
926 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
928 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
929 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
932 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
938 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
940 int i,j,ok,al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,ret= -1;
941 unsigned int cookie_len;
946 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
950 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
952 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
953 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
954 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
955 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
958 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
961 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
964 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
965 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
966 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
967 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
968 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
971 if (!ok) return((int)n);
973 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
975 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
976 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
977 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
980 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
981 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
983 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
984 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
986 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
987 s->version = s->client_version;
989 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
993 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
994 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
995 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
997 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
999 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
1001 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1002 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
1004 if (cookie_length == 0)
1008 /* load the client random */
1009 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1010 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1012 /* get the session-id */
1016 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
1017 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
1018 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1019 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
1020 * won't even compile against older library versions).
1022 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
1023 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
1024 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1025 * setting will be ignored.
1027 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
1029 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1034 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1036 { /* previous session */
1043 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1050 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1053 cookie_len = *(p++);
1056 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1057 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1058 * does not cause an overflow.
1060 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1063 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1064 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1068 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1069 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1072 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1074 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1076 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1079 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1080 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1081 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1084 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1086 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1087 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1089 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1090 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1091 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1102 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1104 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1105 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1106 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1111 /* not enough data */
1112 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1113 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1116 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1123 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1124 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1127 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1130 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1132 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1134 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1136 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1137 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1145 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1146 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1149 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1151 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1152 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1153 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1154 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1155 * enabled, though. */
1156 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1157 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1159 s->session->cipher = c;
1166 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1167 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1168 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1178 /* not enough data */
1179 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1183 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1188 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1195 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1196 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1200 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1202 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1204 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n))
1206 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1211 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1212 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1213 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1214 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1218 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1219 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1221 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1227 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1229 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1231 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1232 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1233 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1236 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1237 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1241 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1242 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1243 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1245 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1246 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1250 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1253 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1255 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1256 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1258 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1259 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1264 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1265 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1266 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1267 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1268 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1269 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1270 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1272 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1273 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1274 /* Can't disable compression */
1275 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1280 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1281 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1283 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1284 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1286 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1290 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1292 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1295 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1296 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1298 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1303 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1304 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1310 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1311 { /* See if we have a match */
1312 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1314 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1315 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1317 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1330 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1335 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1336 * using compression.
1338 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1340 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1345 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1350 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1351 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1353 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1355 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1356 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1357 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1358 if (ciphers == NULL)
1360 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1361 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1365 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1366 if (s->cert->cert_cb
1367 && s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg) <= 0)
1369 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1370 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1373 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1374 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1378 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1382 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1386 /* Session-id reuse */
1387 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1388 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1389 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1390 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1392 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1394 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1395 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1397 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1398 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1400 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1404 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1405 else if (ec != NULL)
1406 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1408 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1412 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1415 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1417 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1421 /* we now have the following setup.
1423 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1424 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1425 * compression - basically ignored right now
1426 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1427 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1428 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1429 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1432 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1433 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1435 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
1437 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1446 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1449 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1453 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1456 unsigned char *p,*d;
1459 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1463 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1465 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1466 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1467 p=s->s3->server_random;
1468 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
1469 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1471 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1474 /* Do the message type and length last */
1477 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1478 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1481 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1482 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1484 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1485 * back in the server hello:
1486 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1487 * we send back the old session ID.
1488 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1489 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1490 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1491 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1493 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1494 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1495 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1496 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1499 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1501 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1503 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1504 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1506 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1510 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1513 /* put the cipher */
1514 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1517 /* put the compression method */
1518 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1521 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1524 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1526 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1527 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1529 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1532 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1534 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1541 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1544 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1545 /* number of bytes to write */
1550 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1551 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1554 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1558 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1560 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1563 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1568 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1569 /* number of bytes to write */
1574 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1575 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1578 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1580 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1584 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1587 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1590 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1591 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1592 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1595 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1598 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1599 unsigned char *p,*d;
1609 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1610 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1612 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1617 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1619 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1620 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1623 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1625 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1626 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1627 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1630 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1631 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1639 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1640 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1645 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1649 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1650 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1653 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1654 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1655 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1656 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1659 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1660 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1664 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1666 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1670 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1672 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1677 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1678 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1679 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1681 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1683 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1690 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1691 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1692 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1693 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1705 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1706 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1708 const EC_GROUP *group;
1710 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1711 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1713 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1714 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1715 if (nid != NID_undef)
1716 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1718 else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
1720 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1721 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1722 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1726 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1727 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1731 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1733 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1737 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1740 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1743 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1745 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1747 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1751 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1752 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1753 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1754 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1756 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1758 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1763 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1764 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1765 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1767 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1771 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1772 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1774 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1778 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1779 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1780 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1783 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1786 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1790 /* Encode the public key.
1791 * First check the size of encoding and
1792 * allocate memory accordingly.
1794 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1795 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1796 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1799 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1800 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1801 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1802 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1804 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1809 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1810 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1811 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1812 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1814 if (encodedlen == 0)
1816 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1820 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1822 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1823 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1824 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1825 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1830 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1831 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1839 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1840 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1841 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1843 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1844 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1847 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1848 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1849 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1851 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1852 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1853 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1854 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1856 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1867 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1868 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1871 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1873 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1874 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1875 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1882 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1883 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1885 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1888 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1891 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1899 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1901 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1904 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1907 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1909 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1910 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1922 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1923 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1925 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1926 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1927 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1928 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1929 * the actual encoded point itself
1931 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1939 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1940 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1942 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1943 encodedPoint = NULL;
1948 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1949 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1951 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1952 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1953 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1954 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1961 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1962 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1963 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1964 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
1965 && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
1969 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1971 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1972 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1973 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1974 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1975 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1976 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1977 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1978 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1979 (unsigned int *)&i);
1983 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1984 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1986 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1996 /* For TLS1.2 and later send signature
1998 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2000 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
2002 /* Should never happen */
2003 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2004 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2010 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
2013 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
2014 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2015 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2016 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
2017 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
2018 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
2020 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
2025 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2030 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2031 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2032 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2037 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
2040 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2046 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2047 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2048 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2050 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2052 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2053 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2054 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2056 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2060 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2062 unsigned char *p,*d;
2064 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2068 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2072 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
2074 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2076 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2081 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2083 const unsigned char *psigs;
2084 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2086 memcpy(p, psigs, nl);
2095 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2099 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2101 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2102 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2103 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
2105 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2108 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
2109 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2112 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2119 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2120 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2126 /* else no CA names */
2127 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
2130 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
2131 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
2134 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2139 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2140 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2143 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2150 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2153 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2154 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2159 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2163 unsigned long alg_k;
2165 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2167 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2169 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2171 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2175 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2177 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2178 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2179 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2180 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2181 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2184 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2185 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2186 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2187 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2191 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2192 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2194 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2196 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2197 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2199 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2200 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2202 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2203 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2204 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2205 * be sent already */
2208 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2209 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2216 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2217 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2218 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2219 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2221 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2222 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2228 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2229 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2234 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2246 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2250 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2252 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2253 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
2256 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2258 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2259 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2260 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2261 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2262 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2264 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2265 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2266 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2268 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2269 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2271 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2272 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2273 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2274 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
2275 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
2276 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
2277 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
2283 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
2284 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
2285 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2287 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2288 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2289 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2290 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2294 s->session->master_key_length=
2295 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2296 s->session->master_key,
2298 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2302 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2303 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2306 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2313 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2315 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2324 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2325 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2326 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2327 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2330 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2331 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2332 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) ||
2333 (skey->pkey.dh == NULL))
2335 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2336 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2339 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2341 else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2343 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2344 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2348 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2352 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2353 EVP_PKEY *clkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2356 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2357 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2359 if (dh_clnt == NULL)
2361 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2362 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2365 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2366 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2369 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2376 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2380 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2385 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2392 s->session->master_key_length=
2393 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2394 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2395 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2401 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2402 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2404 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2405 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2406 krb5_data authenticator;
2408 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2409 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2410 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2411 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2412 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2413 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2415 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2416 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2418 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2420 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2423 enc_ticket.length = i;
2425 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2427 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2428 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2432 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2433 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2436 authenticator.length = i;
2438 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2440 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2441 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2445 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2446 p+=authenticator.length;
2450 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2453 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2456 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2458 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2459 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2463 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2464 enc_pms.length + 6))
2466 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2467 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2471 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2475 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2476 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2478 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2479 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2480 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2485 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2486 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2488 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2489 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2492 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2493 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2495 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2496 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2497 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2502 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2504 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2509 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2510 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2512 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2516 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2518 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2520 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2521 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2524 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2525 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2527 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2528 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2531 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2533 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2534 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2537 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2539 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2540 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2544 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2546 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2547 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2550 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2552 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2553 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2554 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2555 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2556 * the protocol version.
2557 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2558 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2560 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2562 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2563 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2568 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2570 s->session->master_key_length=
2571 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2572 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2574 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2576 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2577 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2579 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2580 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2585 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2586 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2587 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2588 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2592 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2594 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2595 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2600 const EC_GROUP *group;
2601 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2603 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2604 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2606 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2607 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2611 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2612 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2614 /* use the certificate */
2615 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2619 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2620 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2622 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2625 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2626 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2628 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2629 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2631 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2636 /* Let's get client's public key */
2637 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2639 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2640 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2646 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2648 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2650 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2651 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2654 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2656 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2658 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2659 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2660 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2661 * never executed. When that support is
2662 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2663 * received in the certificate is
2664 * authorized for key agreement.
2665 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2666 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2669 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2670 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2671 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2675 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2676 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2678 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2682 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2686 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2687 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2689 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2691 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2692 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2696 /* Get encoded point length */
2701 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2705 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2706 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2708 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2712 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2713 * currently, so set it to the start
2715 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2718 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2719 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2720 if (field_size <= 0)
2722 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2726 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2729 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2734 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2735 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2736 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2737 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2738 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2739 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2741 /* Compute the master secret */
2742 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2743 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2745 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2750 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2751 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2753 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2754 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2755 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2757 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2759 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2764 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2765 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2768 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2770 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2771 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2774 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2776 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2777 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2781 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2782 * string for the callback */
2783 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2784 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2785 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2786 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2787 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2789 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2791 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2792 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2795 else if (psk_len == 0)
2797 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2798 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2799 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2800 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2804 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2805 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2807 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2809 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2813 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2814 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2815 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2816 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2818 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2819 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2823 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2824 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2825 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2826 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2827 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2829 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2830 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2834 s->session->master_key_length=
2835 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2836 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2839 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2845 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2846 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2854 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2855 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2858 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2860 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2863 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2864 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2865 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2866 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2868 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2869 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2873 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2875 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2882 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2883 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2886 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2887 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2888 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2889 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2890 unsigned long alg_a;
2892 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2893 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2894 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2895 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2896 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2897 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2899 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2900 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2901 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2902 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2903 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2904 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2905 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2906 if (client_pub_pkey)
2908 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2911 /* Decrypt session key */
2912 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)))
2914 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2922 else if (p[1] < 0x80)
2929 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2932 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2935 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2938 /* Generate master secret */
2939 s->session->master_key_length=
2940 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2941 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2942 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2943 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2948 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2949 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2957 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2958 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2959 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2965 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2966 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2969 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2970 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2971 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2972 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2973 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2974 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2979 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2981 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2987 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2989 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2991 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2992 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2993 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2995 516, /* Enough for 4096 bit RSA key with TLS v1.2 */
2998 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3000 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
3002 peer=s->session->peer;
3003 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
3004 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
3012 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
3014 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3015 if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3017 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3018 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
3027 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
3028 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3032 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3034 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
3035 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3039 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3041 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
3042 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3046 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3047 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3048 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3049 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
3050 * signature without length field */
3051 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3052 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
3058 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3060 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
3063 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3068 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3072 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3081 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3082 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3086 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3087 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
3089 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3090 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3094 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3098 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3101 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3102 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3106 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3109 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3110 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3112 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3113 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3117 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3119 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3120 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3125 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3126 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3128 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3129 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3133 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3134 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3139 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3140 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3146 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3147 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3149 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3150 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3151 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3155 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3156 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3162 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3163 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3165 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3166 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3167 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3171 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3172 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3173 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3179 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3180 { unsigned char signature[64];
3182 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3183 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3185 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3187 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3188 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3190 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3191 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3194 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3195 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3196 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3203 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3212 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3215 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3217 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3218 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3219 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3221 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3222 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3226 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3228 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3230 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3231 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3233 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3235 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3242 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3244 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3246 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3247 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3250 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3253 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3254 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3257 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3260 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3264 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3266 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3267 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3270 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3272 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3281 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3282 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3285 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3288 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3290 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3291 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3296 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3299 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3304 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3305 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3308 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3310 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3317 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3319 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3320 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3322 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3323 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3326 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3327 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3328 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3330 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3331 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3334 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3335 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3337 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3343 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3346 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3347 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3352 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3353 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3354 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3355 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3357 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3358 * when we arrive here. */
3359 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3361 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3362 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3364 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3368 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3369 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3370 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3371 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3372 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3380 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3383 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3384 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3388 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3393 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3395 cpk=ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3398 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3399 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3400 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3402 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3407 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,cpk);
3408 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3413 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3414 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3417 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3418 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3419 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3421 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3423 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3424 const unsigned char *const_p;
3425 int len, slen_full, slen;
3430 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3431 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3432 unsigned char key_name[16];
3434 /* get session encoding length */
3435 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3436 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3439 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3441 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3445 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3447 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3449 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3455 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3457 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3458 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3464 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3465 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3467 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3468 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3469 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3470 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3471 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3472 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3474 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3475 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
3476 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3479 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3481 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
3482 /* Skip message length for now */
3484 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3485 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3486 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3487 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3490 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3492 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3501 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3502 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3503 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3504 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3505 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3506 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3509 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3510 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3511 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3512 * as their sessions. */
3513 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3515 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3517 /* Output key name */
3519 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3522 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3523 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3524 /* Encrypt session data */
3525 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3527 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3529 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3531 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3532 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3533 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3536 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3538 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3539 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
3540 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
3542 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
3544 /* number of bytes to write */
3546 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3551 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3552 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3555 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3557 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3560 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3561 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3562 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3565 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3568 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3571 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3572 /* message length */
3573 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3575 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3576 /* length of OCSP response */
3577 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3578 /* actual response */
3579 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3580 /* number of bytes to write */
3581 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3582 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3586 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3587 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3590 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3591 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3592 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3593 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3596 int proto_len, padding_len;
3598 const unsigned char *p;
3600 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3601 * extension in their ClientHello */
3602 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3604 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3608 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3609 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3610 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3612 514, /* See the payload format below */
3618 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3619 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3620 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3621 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3623 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3628 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3630 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3632 /* The payload looks like:
3634 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3635 * uint8 padding_len;
3636 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3639 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3641 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3642 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3645 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3646 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3648 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3651 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3652 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
3658 int tls1_send_server_supplemental_data(SSL *s)
3661 const unsigned char *authz, *orig_authz;
3663 size_t authz_length, i;
3665 if (s->state != SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A)
3666 return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
3668 orig_authz = authz = ssl_get_authz_data(s, &authz_length);
3671 /* This should never occur. */
3675 /* First we walk over the authz data to see how long the handshake
3676 * message will be. */
3677 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
3684 /* n2s increments authz by 2*/
3687 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
3689 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
3690 length += 1 /* authz type */ + 2 /* length */ + len;
3696 length += 1 /* handshake type */ +
3697 3 /* handshake length */ +
3698 3 /* supplemental data length */ +
3699 2 /* supplemental entry type */ +
3700 2 /* supplemental entry length */;
3702 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, length))
3704 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
3708 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3709 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA;
3710 /* Handshake length */
3711 l2n3(length - 4, p);
3712 /* Length of supplemental data */
3713 l2n3(length - 7, p);
3714 /* Supplemental data type */
3715 s2n(TLSEXT_SUPPLEMENTALDATATYPE_authz_data, p);
3717 s2n(length - 11, p);
3721 /* Walk over the authz again and append the selected elements. */
3722 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
3729 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
3732 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
3734 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
3738 memcpy(p, authz, len);
3746 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B;
3747 s->init_num = length;
3750 return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);