1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
183 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
185 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
187 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
189 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
190 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
192 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
194 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
195 we do so if There is no srp login name */
197 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
201 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
208 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
210 ssl_undefined_function,
211 ssl3_get_server_method)
213 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
216 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
217 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
219 int new_state,state,skip=0;
221 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
225 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
227 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
228 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
230 /* init things to blank */
232 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
241 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
242 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
243 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
245 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
247 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
258 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
260 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
264 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
265 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
268 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
270 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
275 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
277 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
279 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
284 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
292 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
299 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
300 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
302 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
304 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
305 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
307 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
309 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
310 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
311 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
313 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
314 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
316 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
317 * client that doesn't support secure
320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
321 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
327 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
328 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
329 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
330 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
334 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
335 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
338 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
339 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
340 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
341 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
344 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
347 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
351 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
352 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
353 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
356 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
357 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
358 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
359 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
360 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
363 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
365 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
366 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
369 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
371 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
372 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
373 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
374 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
376 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
384 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
388 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
389 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
390 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
391 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
392 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
395 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
396 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
398 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
402 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
405 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
409 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
410 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
411 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
412 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
413 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
414 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
415 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
417 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
418 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
419 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
420 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
421 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
423 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
428 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
435 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
440 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
441 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
442 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
444 /* clear this, it may get reset by
445 * send_server_key_exchange */
446 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
447 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
448 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
449 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
451 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
452 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
453 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
454 * be able to handle this) */
455 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
457 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
460 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
461 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
463 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
465 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
466 * message only if the cipher suite is either
467 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
468 * server certificate contains the server's
469 * public key for key exchange.
471 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
472 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
473 * hint if provided */
474 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
475 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
477 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
478 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
479 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
481 || (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
482 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
483 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
484 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
485 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
486 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
492 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
493 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
498 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
502 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
503 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
504 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
505 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
506 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
507 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
508 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
509 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
510 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
511 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
512 * and in RFC 2246): */
513 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
514 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
515 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
516 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
517 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
518 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
519 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
520 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
521 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
523 /* no cert request */
525 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
526 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
527 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
528 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
533 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
534 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
535 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
536 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
537 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
539 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
540 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
546 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
547 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
548 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
549 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
550 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
551 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
555 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
557 /* This code originally checked to see if
558 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
559 * and then flushed. This caused problems
560 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
561 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
562 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
563 * still exist. So instead we just flush
567 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
568 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
573 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
575 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
578 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
579 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
580 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
581 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
585 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
587 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
589 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
590 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
593 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
597 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
598 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
599 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
604 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
605 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
606 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
607 * message is not sent.
608 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
609 * the client uses its key from the certificate
612 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
613 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
615 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
616 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
618 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
622 else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
624 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
626 if (!s->session->peer)
628 /* For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer
629 * at this point and digest cached records.
631 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
633 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
636 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
637 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
645 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
648 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
649 * a client cert, it can be verified
650 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
651 * should be generalized. But it is next step
653 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
654 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
656 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
657 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
661 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
662 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
673 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
674 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
676 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
677 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
678 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
679 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
681 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
682 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
684 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
685 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
687 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
692 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
693 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
694 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
695 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
696 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
698 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
702 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
703 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
704 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
705 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
706 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
707 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
710 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
711 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
712 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
715 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
719 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
720 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
721 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
722 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
723 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
724 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
728 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
729 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
730 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
731 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
732 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
738 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
739 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
741 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
742 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
743 { ret= -1; goto end; }
745 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
746 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
748 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
749 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
752 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
753 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
761 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
762 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
763 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
764 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
765 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
766 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
767 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
768 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
771 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
772 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
774 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
776 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
777 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
780 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
784 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
789 /* clean a few things up */
790 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
792 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
795 /* remove buffering on output */
796 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
800 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
805 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
807 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
809 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
811 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
819 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
825 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
829 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
834 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
838 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
845 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
849 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
853 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
856 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
858 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
859 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
862 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
863 return ssl_do_write(s);
866 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
871 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
872 * so permit appropriate message length */
873 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
879 if (!ok) return((int)n);
880 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
881 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
883 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
885 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
887 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
890 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
891 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
892 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
893 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
895 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
896 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
899 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
900 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
902 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
903 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
906 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
912 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
914 int i,j,ok,al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,ret= -1;
915 unsigned int cookie_len;
920 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
924 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
926 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
929 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
930 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
931 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
932 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
935 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
938 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
941 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
942 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
943 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
944 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
945 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
948 if (!ok) return((int)n);
950 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
952 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
953 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
954 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
957 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version &&
958 s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
959 : (s->client_version < s->version))
961 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
962 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
963 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
965 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
966 s->version = s->client_version;
968 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
972 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
973 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
974 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
976 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
978 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
980 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
981 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
983 if (cookie_length == 0)
987 /* load the client random */
988 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
991 /* get the session-id */
995 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
996 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
997 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
998 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
999 * won't even compile against older library versions).
1001 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
1002 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
1003 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1004 * setting will be ignored.
1006 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
1008 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1013 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1015 { /* previous session */
1022 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1032 cookie_len = *(p++);
1035 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1036 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1037 * does not cause an overflow.
1039 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1042 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1043 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1047 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1048 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1051 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1053 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1055 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1058 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1059 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1060 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1063 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1065 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1066 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1068 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1069 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1070 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1073 /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
1078 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
1080 /* Select version to use */
1081 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1082 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2))
1084 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1085 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1087 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1089 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1090 s->version = s->client_version;
1091 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1094 else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1095 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1))
1097 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1098 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1102 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1103 s->version = s->client_version;
1104 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1107 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1112 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1114 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1115 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1116 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1121 /* not enough data */
1122 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1123 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1126 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1133 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1134 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1137 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1140 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1142 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1144 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1146 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1147 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1155 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1156 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1159 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1161 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1162 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1163 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1164 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1165 * enabled, though. */
1166 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1167 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1169 s->session->cipher = c;
1176 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1177 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1178 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1179 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1188 /* not enough data */
1189 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1190 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1193 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1198 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1205 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1206 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1210 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1212 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1214 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n))
1216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1221 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1222 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1223 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1224 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1227 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1228 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1234 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1236 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1238 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1239 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1240 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1243 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1244 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1248 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1249 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1250 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1252 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1253 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1257 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1260 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1262 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1263 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1265 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1266 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1271 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1272 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1273 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1274 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1275 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1276 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1277 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1279 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1280 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1281 /* Can't disable compression */
1282 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1284 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1287 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1288 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1290 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1291 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1293 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1297 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1299 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1302 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1303 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1305 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1310 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1311 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1317 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1318 { /* See if we have a match */
1319 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1321 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1322 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1324 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1337 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1342 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1343 * using compression.
1345 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1347 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1352 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1357 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1358 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1360 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1362 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1363 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1364 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1365 if (ciphers == NULL)
1367 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1368 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1372 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1374 if (s->cert->cert_cb)
1376 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1379 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1380 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1385 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1388 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1390 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1391 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1395 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1396 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1399 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1403 /* Session-id reuse */
1404 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1405 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1406 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1407 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1409 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1411 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1412 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1414 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1415 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1417 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1421 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1422 else if (ec != NULL)
1423 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1425 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1429 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1432 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1434 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1438 /* we now have the following setup.
1440 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1441 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1442 * compression - basically ignored right now
1443 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1444 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1445 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1446 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1449 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1450 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1452 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
1454 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1459 if (ret < 0) ret=-ret;
1463 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1466 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1467 return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
1470 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1473 unsigned char *p,*d;
1478 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1480 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1481 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1482 p=s->s3->server_random;
1483 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1486 /* Do the message type and length last */
1487 d=p= ssl_handshake_start(s);
1489 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1490 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1493 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1494 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1496 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1497 * back in the server hello:
1498 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1499 * we send back the old session ID.
1500 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1501 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1502 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1503 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1505 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1506 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1507 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1508 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1511 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1513 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1515 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1516 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1518 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1522 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1525 /* put the cipher */
1526 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1529 /* put the compression method */
1530 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1533 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1536 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1538 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1539 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1541 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1544 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &al)) == NULL)
1546 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1547 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1553 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
1554 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1557 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1558 return ssl_do_write(s);
1561 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1564 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1566 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
1567 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1570 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1571 return ssl_do_write(s);
1574 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1576 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1580 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1583 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1586 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1587 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1588 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1591 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1594 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1595 unsigned char *p,*d;
1605 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1606 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1608 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1613 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1615 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1616 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1619 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1621 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1622 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1623 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1626 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1627 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1635 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1636 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1641 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1645 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1646 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1649 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1650 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1651 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1652 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1655 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1656 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1660 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1662 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1666 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1668 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1673 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1674 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1675 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1677 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1679 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1686 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1687 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1688 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1689 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1691 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1701 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1702 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1704 const EC_GROUP *group;
1706 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1707 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1709 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1710 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1711 if (nid != NID_undef)
1712 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1714 else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
1716 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1717 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1718 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1722 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1723 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1727 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1729 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1733 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1736 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1739 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1741 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1743 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1747 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1748 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1749 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1750 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1752 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1754 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1759 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1760 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1761 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1763 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1767 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1768 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1770 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1774 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1775 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1776 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1779 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1782 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1786 /* Encode the public key.
1787 * First check the size of encoding and
1788 * allocate memory accordingly.
1790 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1791 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1792 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1795 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1796 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1797 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1798 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1800 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1805 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1806 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1807 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1808 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1810 if (encodedlen == 0)
1812 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1816 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1818 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1819 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1820 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1821 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1826 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1827 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1835 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1836 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1837 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1839 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1840 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1843 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1844 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1845 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1847 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1848 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1849 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1850 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1852 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1863 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1864 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1867 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1869 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1870 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1871 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1878 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1879 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1881 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1884 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1887 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1895 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+kn))
1897 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1900 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1902 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1904 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1905 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1917 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1918 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1920 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1921 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1922 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1923 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1924 * the actual encoded point itself
1926 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1934 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1935 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1937 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1938 encodedPoint = NULL;
1943 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1944 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1946 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1947 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1948 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1949 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1956 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1957 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1958 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1959 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1963 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1965 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1966 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1967 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1968 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1969 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1970 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1971 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
1972 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1973 (unsigned int *)&i);
1977 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1978 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1980 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1990 /* send signature algorithm */
1991 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1993 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
1995 /* Should never happen */
1996 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1997 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2003 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
2006 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
2007 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2008 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2009 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
2010 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
2011 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
2013 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
2018 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2023 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2024 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2025 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2030 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
2033 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2034 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2035 return ssl_do_write(s);
2037 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2039 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2040 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2041 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2043 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2047 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2049 unsigned char *p,*d;
2051 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2055 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2059 d=p=ssl_handshake_start(s);
2061 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2063 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2068 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2070 const unsigned char *psigs;
2071 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2073 memcpy(p, psigs, nl);
2082 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2086 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2088 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2089 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2090 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+n+j+2))
2092 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2095 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2096 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2099 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2106 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2107 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2113 /* else no CA names */
2114 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2117 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
2119 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2120 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
2122 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4))
2124 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2127 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2129 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2137 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2140 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2141 return ssl_do_write(s);
2146 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2150 unsigned long alg_k;
2152 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2154 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2156 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2158 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2160 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2162 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2165 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2166 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2167 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2168 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2171 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2172 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2173 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2174 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2178 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2179 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2181 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2183 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2184 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2186 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2187 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2189 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2190 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2191 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2192 * be sent already */
2195 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2196 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2203 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2204 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2205 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2206 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2208 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2209 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2215 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2216 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2221 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2223 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2233 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2237 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2239 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2240 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
2243 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2245 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2246 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2247 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2248 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2249 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2251 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2252 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2253 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2255 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2256 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2258 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2259 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2260 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2261 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
2262 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
2263 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
2264 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
2270 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
2271 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
2272 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2274 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2275 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2276 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2277 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2281 s->session->master_key_length=
2282 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2283 s->session->master_key,
2285 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2289 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2290 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2293 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2300 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2311 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2312 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2313 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2314 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2317 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2318 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2319 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) ||
2320 (skey->pkey.dh == NULL))
2322 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2323 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2326 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2328 else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2330 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2331 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2335 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2339 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2340 EVP_PKEY *clkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2343 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2344 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2346 if (dh_clnt == NULL)
2348 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2349 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2352 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2353 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2356 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2363 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2367 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2372 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2379 s->session->master_key_length=
2380 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2381 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2382 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2388 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2389 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2391 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2392 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2393 krb5_data authenticator;
2395 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2396 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2397 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2398 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2399 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2400 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2402 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2403 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2405 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2407 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2410 enc_ticket.length = i;
2412 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2414 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2415 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2419 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2420 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2423 authenticator.length = i;
2425 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2427 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2428 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2432 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2433 p+=authenticator.length;
2437 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2440 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2443 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2445 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2446 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2450 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2451 enc_pms.length + 6))
2453 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2454 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2458 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2462 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2463 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2465 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2466 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2467 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2472 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2473 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2475 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2476 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2479 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2480 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2482 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2483 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2484 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2489 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2491 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2496 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2497 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2499 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2503 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2505 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2507 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2508 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2511 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2512 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2514 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2515 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2518 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2520 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2521 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2524 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2526 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2527 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2531 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2533 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2534 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2537 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2539 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2540 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2541 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2542 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2543 * the protocol version.
2544 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2545 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2547 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2549 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2550 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2555 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2557 s->session->master_key_length=
2558 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2559 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2561 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2563 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2564 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2566 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2567 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2572 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2573 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2574 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2575 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2579 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2581 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2582 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2587 const EC_GROUP *group;
2588 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2590 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2591 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2593 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2594 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2598 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2599 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2601 /* use the certificate */
2602 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2606 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2607 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2609 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2612 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2613 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2615 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2616 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2618 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2623 /* Let's get client's public key */
2624 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2626 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2627 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2633 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2635 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2637 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2641 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2643 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2645 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2646 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2647 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2648 * never executed. When that support is
2649 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2650 * received in the certificate is
2651 * authorized for key agreement.
2652 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2653 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2656 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2657 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2658 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2662 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2663 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2665 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2669 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2673 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2674 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2676 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2678 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2679 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2683 /* Get encoded point length */
2688 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2692 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2693 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2699 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2700 * currently, so set it to the start
2702 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2705 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2706 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2707 if (field_size <= 0)
2709 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2713 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2716 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2721 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2722 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2723 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2724 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2725 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2726 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2728 /* Compute the master secret */
2729 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2730 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2732 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2737 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2738 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2740 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2741 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2742 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2744 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2746 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2751 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2752 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2755 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2757 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2758 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2761 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2763 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2764 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2768 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2769 * string for the callback */
2770 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2771 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2772 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2773 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2774 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2776 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2778 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2779 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2782 else if (psk_len == 0)
2784 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2785 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2786 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2787 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2791 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2792 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2794 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2796 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2800 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2801 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2802 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2803 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2805 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2806 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2810 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2811 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2812 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2813 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2814 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2816 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2817 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2821 s->session->master_key_length=
2822 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2823 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2826 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2832 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2833 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2841 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2842 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2845 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2847 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2850 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2851 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2852 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2853 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2855 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2856 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2860 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2862 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2869 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2870 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2873 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2874 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2875 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2876 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2877 unsigned long alg_a;
2881 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2882 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2883 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2884 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2885 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2886 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2888 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2889 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2890 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2891 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2892 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2893 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2894 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2895 if (client_pub_pkey)
2897 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2900 /* Decrypt session key */
2901 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass, n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED ||
2902 Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE ||
2903 Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL)
2905 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2910 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2913 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2916 /* Generate master secret */
2917 s->session->master_key_length=
2918 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2919 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2920 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2921 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2926 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2927 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2935 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2936 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2937 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2943 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2944 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2947 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2948 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2949 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2950 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2951 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2952 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2957 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2959 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2965 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2967 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2969 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2970 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2971 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2973 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
2976 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2978 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2980 peer=s->session->peer;
2981 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2982 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2990 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2992 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2993 if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2995 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2996 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
3005 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
3006 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3010 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3012 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
3013 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3017 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3019 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
3020 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3024 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3025 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3026 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3027 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
3028 * signature without length field */
3029 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3030 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
3036 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3038 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
3041 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3046 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3050 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3059 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3060 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3064 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3065 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
3067 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3068 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3072 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3076 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3079 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3080 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3084 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3087 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3088 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3090 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3091 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3095 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3097 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3098 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3103 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3104 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3106 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3107 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3111 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3112 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3117 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3118 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3124 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3125 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3127 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3128 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3129 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3133 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3134 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3140 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3141 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3143 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3144 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3145 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3149 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3150 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3151 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3157 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3158 { unsigned char signature[64];
3160 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3161 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3163 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3165 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3166 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3168 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3169 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3172 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3173 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3174 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3181 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3190 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3193 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3195 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3196 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3197 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3199 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3200 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3204 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3206 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3208 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3209 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3211 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3213 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3220 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3222 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3224 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3225 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3227 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3228 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3231 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3232 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3235 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3238 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3242 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3244 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3248 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3250 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3259 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3263 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3266 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3268 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3269 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3274 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3282 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3283 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3286 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3288 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3295 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3297 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3298 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3300 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3301 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3304 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3305 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3306 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3308 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3309 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3312 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3313 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3315 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3321 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3324 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3325 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3330 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3331 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3332 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3333 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3335 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3336 * when we arrive here. */
3337 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3339 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3340 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3342 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3346 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3347 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3348 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3349 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3350 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3358 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3361 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3362 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3366 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3370 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3372 cpk=ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3375 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3376 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3377 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3384 ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,cpk);
3385 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3388 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3389 return ssl_do_write(s);
3392 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3393 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3394 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3396 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3398 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3399 const unsigned char *const_p;
3400 int len, slen_full, slen;
3405 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3406 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3407 unsigned char key_name[16];
3409 /* get session encoding length */
3410 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3411 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3414 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3416 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3420 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3422 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3424 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3430 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3432 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3433 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3439 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3440 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3442 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3443 * follows handshake_header_length +
3444 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3445 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3446 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3447 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3449 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3450 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3451 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3453 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3454 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3455 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3456 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3457 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3460 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3462 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3471 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3472 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3473 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3474 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3475 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3476 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3479 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3480 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3481 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3482 * as their sessions. */
3483 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3485 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3487 /* Output key name */
3489 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3492 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3493 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3494 /* Encrypt session data */
3495 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3497 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3499 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3501 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3502 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3503 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3506 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3508 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3509 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
3510 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3511 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3513 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3517 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3518 return ssl_do_write(s);
3521 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3523 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3526 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3527 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3528 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3531 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3534 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3537 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3538 /* message length */
3539 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3541 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3542 /* length of OCSP response */
3543 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3544 /* actual response */
3545 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3546 /* number of bytes to write */
3547 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3548 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3552 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3553 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3556 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3557 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3558 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3559 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3562 int proto_len, padding_len;
3564 const unsigned char *p;
3566 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3567 * extension in their ClientHello */
3568 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3570 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3574 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3575 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3576 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3578 514, /* See the payload format below */
3584 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3585 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3586 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3587 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3589 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3594 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3596 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3598 /* The payload looks like:
3600 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3601 * uint8 padding_len;
3602 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3605 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3607 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3608 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3611 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3612 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3614 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3617 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3618 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;