1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
182 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
184 ssl_undefined_function,
185 ssl3_get_server_method)
187 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
190 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
191 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
194 int new_state,state,skip=0;
196 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
200 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
202 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
203 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
205 /* init things to blank */
207 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
221 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
223 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
227 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
228 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
231 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
233 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
238 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
240 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
242 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
247 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
255 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
263 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
265 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
266 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
268 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
270 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
271 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
272 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
276 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
277 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
278 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
279 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
283 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
284 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
287 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
288 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
289 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
290 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
293 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
296 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
300 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
301 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
302 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
305 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
306 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
309 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
313 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
314 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
315 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
316 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
319 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
321 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
325 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
326 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
327 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
328 /* normal PSK or KRB5 */
329 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
330 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
331 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
333 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
334 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
335 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
336 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
337 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
339 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
344 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
350 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
355 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
356 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
357 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
359 /* clear this, it may get reset by
360 * send_server_key_exchange */
361 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
362 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
363 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
364 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
366 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
367 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
368 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
369 * be able to handle this) */
370 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
372 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
375 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
376 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
378 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
380 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
381 * message only if the cipher suite is either
382 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
383 * server certificate contains the server's
384 * public key for key exchange.
386 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
387 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
388 * hint if provided */
389 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
390 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
392 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH))
393 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
394 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
395 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
396 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
397 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
403 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
404 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
409 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
413 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
414 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
415 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
416 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
417 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
418 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
419 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
420 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
421 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
422 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
423 * and in RFC 2246): */
424 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
425 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
426 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
427 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
428 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
429 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
430 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
431 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
432 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
434 /* no cert request */
436 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
437 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
441 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
442 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
443 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
444 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
445 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
447 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
448 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
454 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
455 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
456 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
457 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
458 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
459 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
463 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
464 /* number of bytes to be flushed */
465 num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,NULL);
468 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
469 num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio);
470 if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; }
471 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
474 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
477 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
478 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
479 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
480 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
484 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
486 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
488 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
489 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
492 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
496 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
497 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
498 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
503 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
504 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
505 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
506 * message is not sent.
508 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
513 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
516 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
517 * a client cert, it can be verified
518 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
519 * should be generalized. But it is next step
522 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
524 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
525 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
527 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
531 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
532 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
534 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
535 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
536 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
538 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
542 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
543 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
544 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
545 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
546 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
549 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
550 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
551 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
554 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
558 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
559 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
560 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
561 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
562 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
563 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
567 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
568 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
569 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
570 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
571 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
577 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
578 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
580 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
581 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
582 { ret= -1; goto end; }
584 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
585 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
587 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
588 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
591 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
592 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
600 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
601 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
602 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
603 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
604 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
605 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
606 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
607 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
609 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
611 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
616 /* clean a few things up */
617 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
619 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
622 /* remove buffering on output */
623 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
627 if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
629 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
630 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
634 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
636 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
638 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
640 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
648 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
654 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
658 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
663 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
667 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
674 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
678 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
682 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
686 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
688 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
689 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
694 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
695 /* number of bytes to write */
700 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
701 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
704 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
709 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
710 * so permit appropriate message length */
711 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
717 if (!ok) return((int)n);
718 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
719 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
721 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
722 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
723 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
724 * when a handshake is not completed ... */
725 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
726 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
728 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
729 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
737 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
739 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
740 unsigned int cookie_len;
743 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
745 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
748 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
750 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
751 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
752 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
753 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
756 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
758 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
761 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
762 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
763 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
764 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
765 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
768 if (!ok) return((int)n);
770 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
772 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
773 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
774 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
777 if (s->client_version < s->version)
779 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
780 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
782 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
783 s->version = s->client_version;
785 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
789 /* load the client random */
790 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
793 /* get the session-id */
797 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
798 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
799 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
800 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
801 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
802 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
803 * an earlier library version)
805 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
807 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
812 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
814 { /* previous session */
821 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
828 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION)
833 if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
834 s->d1->send_cookie == 0)
836 /* HelloVerifyMessage has already been sent */
837 if ( cookie_len != s->d1->cookie_len)
839 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
840 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
846 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
847 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
848 * does not cause an overflow.
850 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
853 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
854 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
858 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
859 if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
862 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
864 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
866 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
869 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
870 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
871 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
874 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
876 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
877 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
879 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
880 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
881 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
890 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
892 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
893 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
894 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
899 /* not enough data */
900 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
901 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
904 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
911 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
912 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
915 id=s->session->cipher->id;
918 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
920 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
922 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
924 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
925 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
935 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
937 /* Very bad for multi-threading.... */
938 s->session->cipher=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
942 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
943 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
944 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
945 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
955 /* not enough data */
956 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
957 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
963 if (p[j] == 0) break;
970 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
971 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
975 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
977 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
979 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
981 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
982 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
986 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
987 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
992 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
993 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
994 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
995 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
996 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
997 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
998 { /* See if we have a match */
1001 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1002 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1004 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1017 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1023 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1028 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1029 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1031 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1033 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1034 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1035 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1036 if (ciphers == NULL)
1038 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1039 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1043 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1044 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1048 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1049 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1052 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1053 ssl3_digest_cached_records(s);
1057 /* Session-id reuse */
1058 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1059 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1060 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1061 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1063 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1065 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1066 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1068 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1069 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1071 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1075 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1076 else if (ec != NULL)
1077 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1079 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1083 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1084 /* Clear cached handshake records */
1085 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
1086 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
1089 /* we now have the following setup.
1091 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1092 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1093 * compression - basically ignored right now
1094 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1095 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1096 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1097 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1104 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1107 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1111 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1114 unsigned char *p,*d;
1116 unsigned long l,Time;
1118 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1120 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1121 p=s->s3->server_random;
1122 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1124 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1126 /* Do the message type and length last */
1129 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1130 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1133 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1134 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1136 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1137 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1138 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1139 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1140 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1141 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1142 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1144 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER))
1145 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1147 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1148 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1150 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1154 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1157 /* put the cipher */
1158 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1161 /* put the compression method */
1162 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1165 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1168 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1170 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1171 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1173 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1176 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1178 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1186 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1189 s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
1190 /* number of bytes to write */
1195 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
1196 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1199 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1203 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1205 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1208 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1213 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1214 /* number of bytes to write */
1219 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
1220 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1223 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1225 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1229 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1232 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1235 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1236 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1237 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1240 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1243 unsigned char *p,*d;
1253 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1254 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1256 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1261 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1263 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1264 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1267 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1269 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1270 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1271 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1274 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1283 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1284 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1289 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1293 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1294 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1297 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1298 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1299 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1300 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1303 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1304 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1308 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1311 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1315 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1317 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1322 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1323 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1324 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1326 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1328 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1335 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1336 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1337 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1338 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1340 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1350 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1351 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1353 const EC_GROUP *group;
1355 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1356 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1358 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1359 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1360 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1364 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1365 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1369 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1371 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
1372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1376 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1382 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp))
1384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1389 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1390 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1391 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1392 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1394 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1396 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1401 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1402 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1403 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1405 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1409 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1410 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1412 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1416 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1417 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1418 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1421 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1424 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1428 /* Encode the public key.
1429 * First check the size of encoding and
1430 * allocate memory accordingly.
1432 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1433 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1434 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1437 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1438 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1439 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1440 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1447 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1448 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1449 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1450 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1452 if (encodedlen == 0)
1454 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1458 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1460 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1461 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1462 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1463 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1468 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1469 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1477 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1478 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1479 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1481 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1482 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1485 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1487 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1488 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1491 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1493 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1497 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1498 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1500 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
1503 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1506 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1514 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1516 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1519 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1522 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1529 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1530 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1532 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1533 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1534 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1535 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1536 * the actual encoded point itself
1538 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1546 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1547 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1549 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1554 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1555 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1557 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1558 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1559 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1560 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1567 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1568 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1569 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1570 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1574 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1576 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1577 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1578 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1579 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1580 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1581 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1582 (unsigned int *)&i);
1586 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1587 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1589 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1597 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1598 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1601 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
1602 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1603 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1604 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1605 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1606 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1608 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
1616 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1617 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1619 /* let's do ECDSA */
1620 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
1621 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1622 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1623 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1624 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1625 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1627 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
1636 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1637 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1643 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1646 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1652 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1653 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1654 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1656 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1658 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1659 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1660 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1662 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1666 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1668 unsigned char *p,*d;
1670 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
1674 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
1678 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
1680 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1682 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
1691 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1695 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
1697 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
1698 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
1699 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
1701 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1704 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
1705 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
1708 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1715 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1716 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
1722 /* else no CA names */
1723 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
1726 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
1727 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1730 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1735 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1736 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
1739 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1746 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
1749 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1750 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1755 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1759 unsigned long alg_k;
1761 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1763 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1765 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1769 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1771 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1773 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1774 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
1775 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
1776 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
1777 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1780 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1781 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1782 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
1783 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1787 if (!ok) return((int)n);
1788 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1790 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1792 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1793 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
1795 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
1796 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
1798 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
1799 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
1800 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
1801 * be sent already */
1804 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1805 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
1812 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
1813 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
1814 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
1815 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
1817 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1818 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
1825 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
1830 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
1832 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1842 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
1846 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
1848 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1849 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
1852 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
1854 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
1855 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
1856 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
1857 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
1858 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
1860 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
1861 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
1862 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
1864 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1865 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
1867 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
1868 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
1869 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
1870 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
1871 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
1872 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
1873 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
1879 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
1880 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
1881 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
1883 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
1884 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
1885 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
1886 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
1890 s->session->master_key_length=
1891 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1892 s->session->master_key,
1894 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1898 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1899 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
1904 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
1906 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1916 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
1918 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1919 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
1924 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
1926 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1927 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1931 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
1934 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
1937 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
1941 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
1945 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1949 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
1954 s->session->master_key_length=
1955 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1956 s->session->master_key,p,i);
1957 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1961 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1962 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
1964 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
1965 krb5_data enc_ticket;
1966 krb5_data authenticator;
1968 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
1969 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
1970 EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
1971 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
1972 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
1973 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
1975 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
1976 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
1978 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
1980 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
1983 enc_ticket.length = i;
1985 if (n < enc_ticket.length + 6)
1987 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1988 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1992 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
1993 p+=enc_ticket.length;
1996 authenticator.length = i;
1998 if (n < enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)
2000 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2001 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2005 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2006 p+=authenticator.length;
2010 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2013 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2016 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2018 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2019 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2023 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2024 enc_pms.length + 6))
2026 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2027 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2031 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2035 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2036 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2038 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2039 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2040 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2045 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2046 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2048 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2049 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2052 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2053 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2055 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2056 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2057 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2062 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2064 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2069 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2070 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2072 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2076 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2078 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2080 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2081 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2084 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2085 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2087 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2088 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2091 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2094 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2097 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2099 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2100 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2104 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2106 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2107 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2110 if (!((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2112 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2113 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2114 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2115 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2116 * the protocol version.
2117 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2118 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2120 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2121 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2123 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2124 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2129 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2131 s->session->master_key_length=
2132 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2133 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2135 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2137 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2138 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2140 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2141 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2146 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2147 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2148 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2149 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2153 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2155 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2156 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2161 const EC_GROUP *group;
2162 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2164 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2165 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2167 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2168 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2172 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2173 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2175 /* use the certificate */
2176 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2180 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2181 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2183 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2186 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2187 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2189 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2190 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2192 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2197 /* Let's get client's public key */
2198 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2200 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2201 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2207 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2209 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2211 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2215 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2217 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2219 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2220 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2221 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2222 * never executed. When that support is
2223 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2224 * received in the certificate is
2225 * authorized for key agreement.
2226 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2227 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2230 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2231 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2232 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2236 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2237 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2243 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2247 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2248 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2250 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2253 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2257 /* Get encoded point length */
2260 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2261 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2263 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2267 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2268 * currently, so set it to the start
2270 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2273 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2274 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2275 if (field_size <= 0)
2277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2281 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2284 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2289 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2290 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2291 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2292 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2293 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2295 /* Compute the master secret */
2296 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2297 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2299 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2304 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2305 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2307 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2308 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2309 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2311 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2313 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2318 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2319 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2322 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2324 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2325 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2328 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2330 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2331 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2335 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2336 * string for the callback */
2337 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2338 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2339 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2340 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2341 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2343 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2345 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2346 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2349 else if (psk_len == 0)
2351 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2352 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2353 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2354 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2358 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2359 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2361 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2363 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2367 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2368 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2369 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2370 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2373 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2377 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2378 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2379 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2380 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2381 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2383 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2384 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2388 s->session->master_key_length=
2389 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2390 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2393 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2400 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2401 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2402 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2408 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2409 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
2412 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2413 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2414 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2415 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2416 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2417 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2422 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2424 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2431 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2432 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2433 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2438 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2440 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2442 peer=s->session->peer;
2443 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2444 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2452 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2454 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2455 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2457 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2458 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2467 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2468 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2472 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2474 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2475 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2479 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2481 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2482 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2486 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2487 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2492 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2493 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2497 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2498 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
2500 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2501 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2505 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2506 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2508 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2509 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2513 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2514 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2519 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2520 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2526 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2527 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2529 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2530 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2531 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
2535 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2536 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
2542 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2543 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
2545 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2546 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2547 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
2551 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2552 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2553 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2560 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2561 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
2570 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2573 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2577 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2579 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
2581 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
2582 const unsigned char *p,*q;
2584 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
2586 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2593 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2595 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
2597 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2598 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2600 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2601 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2604 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
2605 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
2607 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
2608 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2611 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2615 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
2617 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2618 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2621 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2623 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
2625 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2632 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2633 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2636 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
2639 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
2641 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2642 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2647 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
2650 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2655 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2656 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2659 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
2661 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2668 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
2670 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2671 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2673 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2674 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2677 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2678 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2679 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2681 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2682 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2688 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
2691 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2692 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
2697 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
2698 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2699 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
2700 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2702 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
2703 * when we arrive here. */
2704 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2706 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
2707 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2709 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2713 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
2714 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
2715 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
2716 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
2717 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
2725 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2728 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
2729 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
2733 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
2738 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
2740 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
2743 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
2744 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
2745 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
2747 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2752 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
2753 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
2758 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
2759 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2761 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
2762 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
2764 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
2766 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
2772 /* get session encoding length */
2773 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
2774 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
2779 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
2780 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
2781 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
2782 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
2783 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
2784 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
2786 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
2787 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
2788 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
2790 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
2794 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
2796 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2798 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
2799 /* Skip message length for now */
2801 l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
2802 /* Skip ticket length for now */
2804 /* Output key name */
2806 memcpy(p, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
2808 /* Generate and output IV */
2809 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
2810 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
2811 /* Encrypt session data */
2812 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
2813 s->ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, p);
2815 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
2817 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
2819 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2821 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
2822 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
2823 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
2824 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
2825 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
2826 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
2829 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
2831 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2832 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
2833 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
2835 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
2837 /* number of bytes to write */
2839 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
2844 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
2845 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2848 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
2850 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
2853 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
2854 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
2855 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
2858 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
2861 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2864 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
2865 /* message length */
2866 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
2868 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
2869 /* length of OCSP response */
2870 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
2871 /* actual response */
2872 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
2873 /* number of bytes to write */
2874 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
2875 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
2879 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
2880 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));