1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
153 #include "ssl_locl.h"
154 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
155 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
156 #include <openssl/rand.h>
157 #include <openssl/objects.h>
158 #include <openssl/evp.h>
159 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
160 #include <openssl/x509.h>
161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
162 # include <openssl/dh.h>
164 #include <openssl/bn.h>
165 #include <openssl/md5.h>
167 static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, unsigned char *p,
168 int num, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp, int sslv2format);
171 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
172 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
174 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
176 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
178 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
179 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
180 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
182 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
186 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
188 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
195 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
198 unsigned long alg_k, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
199 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
201 int new_state, state, skip = 0;
203 RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
207 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
208 cb = s->info_callback;
209 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
210 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
212 /* init things to blank */
214 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) {
219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
221 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
222 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
225 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
226 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
235 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
237 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
241 case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
242 case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
246 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
248 if ((s->version >> 8 != 3) && s->version != TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
250 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
254 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) {
255 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
259 s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
261 if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
262 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
264 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
267 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
270 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
276 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
278 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
283 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
284 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
286 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
288 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
290 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
292 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the
293 * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
295 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
297 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
301 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
302 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
303 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
304 } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
306 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
308 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
309 * support secure renegotiation.
311 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
312 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
313 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
315 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
319 * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
322 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
323 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
327 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
328 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
331 ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
334 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
335 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
338 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
341 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
342 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
345 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
346 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
347 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
349 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
352 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
353 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
354 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
357 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
359 * callback indicates firther work to be done
361 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
364 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
365 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
367 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
368 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
370 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
371 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
372 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
374 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
381 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
385 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
386 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
387 ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
392 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
393 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
395 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
397 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
402 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
403 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
404 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
405 /* normal PSK or SRP */
408 new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
409 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
410 ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
414 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
415 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
417 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
420 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
425 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
426 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
427 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
430 * clear this, it may get reset by
431 * send_server_key_exchange
433 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0;
436 * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a
437 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
438 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
439 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
440 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
445 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
448 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
449 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
451 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
452 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
453 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
455 || (alg_k & SSL_kDHE)
456 || (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
457 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
458 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
459 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
460 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys
461 [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) *
462 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
467 ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
473 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
477 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
478 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
479 if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
480 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
482 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
483 * during re-negotiation:
485 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
486 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
488 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
489 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
492 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
494 * ... except when the application insists on
495 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
498 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
499 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
500 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
502 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
505 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
506 /* no cert request */
508 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
509 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
510 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
511 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
515 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
516 ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
519 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
524 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
525 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
526 ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s);
529 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
530 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
534 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
537 * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending
538 * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as
539 * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely
540 * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of
541 * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush
545 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
546 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
550 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
552 s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
555 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
556 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
557 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
558 ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
563 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
566 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
567 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
568 ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
573 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
574 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
575 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
576 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
578 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
579 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
581 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
582 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
584 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
587 } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
588 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
590 if (!s->session->peer)
592 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
593 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
594 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
598 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
599 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
601 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
602 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
609 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
613 * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert,
614 * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for
615 * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next
618 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
619 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
622 for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++)
623 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) {
626 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
635 EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
637 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
646 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
647 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
648 ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
652 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
653 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
655 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
656 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
658 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
663 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
664 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
665 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
667 * Enable CCS for NPN. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
668 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. This *should* be the
669 * first time we have received one - but we check anyway to be
671 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
672 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
673 * the client's Finished message is read.
675 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
676 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
678 ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
682 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
686 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
687 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
689 * Enable CCS for handshakes without NPN. In NPN the CCS flag has
690 * already been set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
691 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
692 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
693 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
694 * the client's Finished message is read.
696 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
697 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
698 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
699 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
703 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
704 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
705 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
707 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
711 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
712 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
713 ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
716 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
720 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
721 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
722 ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
725 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
729 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
730 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
732 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
733 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
735 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
739 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
741 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
745 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
748 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
749 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
752 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
758 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
759 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
760 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
761 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,
762 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
764 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
766 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
769 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
771 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
772 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
774 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
775 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
777 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
780 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
785 /* clean a few things up */
786 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
788 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
791 /* remove buffering on output */
792 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
796 if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a
801 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
803 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
805 s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept;
808 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
817 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
823 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
825 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
829 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
830 new_state = s->state;
832 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
833 s->state = new_state;
839 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
843 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
847 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
850 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) {
851 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0)) {
852 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_HELLO_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
855 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
858 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
859 return ssl_do_write(s);
862 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
864 int i, complen, j, ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1;
865 unsigned int cookie_len;
868 unsigned char *p, *d;
870 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
871 unsigned char *q = NULL;
872 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
874 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
877 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
881 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are
882 * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down
883 * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we
884 * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1.
886 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
887 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
890 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
891 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
892 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
893 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
894 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
899 d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
901 /* First lets get s->client_version set correctly */
902 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
904 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
905 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
906 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
907 * the rest right through. Its format is:
909 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
910 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
912 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
913 * 7-8 session_id_length
914 * 9-10 challenge_length
918 if (p[0] != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
920 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
921 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
924 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
928 if ((p[1] == 0x00) && (p[2] == 0x02)) {
929 /* This is real SSLv2. We don't support it. */
930 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
932 } else if (p[1] == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
934 s->client_version = (((int)p[1]) << 8) | (int)p[2];
936 /* No idea what protocol this is */
937 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
942 * 2 bytes for client version, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes for random, 1 byte
943 * for session id length
945 if (n < 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1) {
946 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
947 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
952 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
953 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
955 s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1];
958 /* Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable */
959 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
960 if (s->version != TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
961 if (s->client_version >= s->version) {
964 } else if (s->client_version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
965 switch(s->client_version) {
968 if(!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2)) {
969 s->version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
970 s->method = TLSv1_2_server_method();
974 /* Deliberately fall through */
976 if(!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1)) {
977 s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
978 s->method = TLSv1_1_server_method();
982 /* Deliberately fall through */
984 if(!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1)) {
985 s->version = TLS1_VERSION;
986 s->method = TLSv1_server_method();
990 /* Deliberately fall through */
992 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
993 if(!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)) {
994 s->version = SSL3_VERSION;
995 s->method = SSLv3_server_method();
1004 } else if (s->client_version <= s->version
1005 || s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1007 * For DTLS we just check versions are potentially compatible. Version
1008 * negotiation comes later.
1014 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1015 if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) {
1017 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
1020 s->version = s->client_version;
1022 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1026 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
1028 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1029 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1030 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected above.
1032 unsigned int csl, sil, cl;
1039 if (csl + sil + cl + MIN_SSL2_RECORD_LEN != (unsigned int) n) {
1040 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1041 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1046 /* we need at least one cipher */
1047 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1048 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1052 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, csl, &(ciphers), 1) == NULL) {
1057 * Ignore any session id. We don't allow resumption in a backwards
1058 * compatible ClientHello
1062 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1065 /* Load the client random */
1066 i = (cl > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : cl;
1067 memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1068 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, &(p[csl + sil]), i);
1070 /* Set p to end of packet to ensure we don't look for extensions */
1073 /* No compression, so set complen to 0 */
1076 /* If we get here we've got SSLv3+ in an SSLv3+ record */
1081 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just
1082 * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check
1085 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1086 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
1088 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1090 if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) {
1091 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1092 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1095 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
1097 if (cookie_length == 0)
1101 /* load the client random */
1102 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1103 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1105 /* get the session-id */
1108 if (p + j > d + n) {
1109 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1116 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1117 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1118 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1119 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1120 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1121 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1122 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1123 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1124 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1125 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1129 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1130 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1133 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1135 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1137 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1138 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1139 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1140 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1141 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1143 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) {
1144 /* previous session */
1150 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1157 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1159 if (p + 1 > d + n) {
1160 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1161 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1164 cookie_len = *(p++);
1166 if (p + cookie_len > d + n) {
1167 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1168 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1173 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1174 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1175 * does not cause an overflow.
1177 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) {
1179 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1184 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1185 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
1186 && cookie_len > 0) {
1187 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1189 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1190 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1192 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1193 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1194 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1197 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1199 /* default verification */
1200 else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1201 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1202 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1203 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1206 /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
1211 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1212 /* Select version to use */
1213 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1214 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) {
1215 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1216 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1217 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1218 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1219 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1220 s->version = s->client_version;
1221 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1223 } else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1224 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) {
1225 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1226 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1228 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1229 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1230 s->version = s->client_version;
1231 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1234 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1238 if (p + 2 > d + n) {
1239 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1246 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1247 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1251 /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
1252 if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) {
1253 /* not enough data */
1254 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1255 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1258 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers), 0) == NULL) {
1263 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1266 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1269 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1270 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1272 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1273 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1275 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1276 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1284 * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1289 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1290 && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) {
1292 * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used
1293 * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead
1294 * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't
1295 * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the
1296 * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though.
1298 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1299 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) {
1300 s->session->cipher = c;
1307 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1310 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1311 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1312 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1319 if ((p + complen) > (d + n)) {
1320 /* not enough data */
1321 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1322 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1325 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1328 for (j = 0; j < complen; j++) {
1336 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1337 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1342 /* TLS extensions */
1343 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1344 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n)) {
1345 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1351 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1352 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1353 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1354 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1358 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1359 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1364 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1365 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1367 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1368 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1369 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
1371 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1373 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1374 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1378 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1380 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1385 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1386 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1387 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1391 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1392 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1393 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1394 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1395 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1400 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1401 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1402 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1404 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1406 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1407 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1408 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1409 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1410 /* Can't disable compression */
1411 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1412 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1413 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1416 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1417 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1418 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1419 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1420 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1424 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1425 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1426 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1429 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1430 for (m = 0; m < complen; m++) {
1431 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1435 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1436 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1437 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1442 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1443 /* See if we have a match */
1444 int m, nn, o, v, done = 0;
1446 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1447 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1448 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1450 for (o = 0; o < complen; o++) {
1460 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1466 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1467 * using compression.
1469 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1470 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1476 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1480 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1481 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1483 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1485 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1486 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1487 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1488 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1489 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1493 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1494 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1497 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1499 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1500 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1502 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1503 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1507 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1510 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1512 c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1515 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1516 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1519 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1520 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1521 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1522 s->session->not_resumable = s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1523 ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE))
1525 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1526 /* do not send a session ticket */
1527 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1529 /* Session-id reuse */
1530 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1533 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1534 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
1539 * we now have the following setup.
1541 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1542 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1543 * compression - basically ignored right now
1544 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1545 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1546 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1547 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1550 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1551 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1552 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
1553 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1562 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1564 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1567 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1568 return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
1571 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1574 unsigned char *p, *d;
1579 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
1580 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1582 p = s->s3->server_random;
1583 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1584 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1588 /* Do the message type and length last */
1589 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1591 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
1592 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
1595 memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1596 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1599 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1600 * back in the server hello:
1601 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1602 * we send back the old session ID.
1603 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1604 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1605 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1606 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1608 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1609 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1610 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1611 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1614 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1615 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1617 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1619 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1620 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1621 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1622 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1626 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
1629 /* put the cipher */
1630 i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
1633 /* put the compression method */
1634 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1637 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1640 *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1643 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1644 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1645 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1649 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
1651 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1652 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1653 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1659 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l)) {
1660 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1663 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1666 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1667 return ssl_do_write(s);
1670 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1673 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
1674 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0)) {
1675 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1678 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1681 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1682 return ssl_do_write(s);
1685 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1687 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1691 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1694 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1695 DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
1697 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1698 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp;
1699 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1702 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1705 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1706 unsigned char *p, *d;
1716 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1717 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
1718 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1723 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1725 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1726 if (type & SSL_kRSA) {
1727 rsa = cert->rsa_tmp;
1728 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1729 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1730 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1732 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1735 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1736 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1737 SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1741 cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
1744 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1745 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1746 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1751 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1;
1754 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1755 if (type & SSL_kDHE) {
1756 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
1757 dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
1759 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1760 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1761 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1766 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1767 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1768 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1770 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1773 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1774 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1775 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1778 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
1779 DH_security_bits(dhp), 0, dhp)) {
1780 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1781 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1782 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1785 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
1786 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1787 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1791 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto)
1793 else if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
1794 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1799 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1800 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1801 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) {
1802 if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
1803 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1807 dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1808 dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1809 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) {
1810 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1819 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1820 if (type & SSL_kECDHE) {
1821 const EC_GROUP *group;
1823 ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp;
1824 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
1825 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1826 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1827 if (nid != NID_undef)
1828 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1829 } else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) {
1830 ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1831 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1833 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->
1834 s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1836 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1837 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1838 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1839 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1843 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
1844 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1845 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1849 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1850 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1851 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1854 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1856 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) {
1857 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1861 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh;
1862 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1863 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1864 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
1865 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
1866 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1872 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1873 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1874 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) {
1875 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1879 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1880 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
1881 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1882 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1887 * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named
1888 * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is
1892 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1894 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1895 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1900 * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
1901 * allocate memory accordingly.
1903 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1904 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1905 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1908 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1909 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char));
1910 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1911 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
1912 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1913 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1917 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1918 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1919 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1920 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1922 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1923 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1927 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1931 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in
1932 * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four
1933 * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1939 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1940 * can set these to NULLs
1947 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1948 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1949 if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
1951 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
1953 n += 2 + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1955 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1956 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1957 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
1958 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1959 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1960 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
1961 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1962 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1965 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
1966 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
1967 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
1968 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
1972 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1973 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1974 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1977 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1978 nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1979 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1980 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1987 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
1988 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
1989 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
1991 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1994 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2000 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) {
2001 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
2004 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2006 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
2007 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2008 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2018 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2019 if (type & SSL_kECDHE) {
2021 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
2022 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
2023 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
2024 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
2026 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
2034 memcpy(p, encodedPoint, encodedlen);
2035 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2036 encodedPoint = NULL;
2041 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2042 if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
2043 /* copy PSK identity hint */
2044 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
2045 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
2046 strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
2047 p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2054 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
2055 * points to the space at the end.
2057 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2058 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2061 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
2062 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
2063 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
2064 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
2065 ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
2066 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2068 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2070 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
2071 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, (unsigned int *)&i);
2075 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
2076 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
2077 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA);
2085 /* send signature algorithm */
2086 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2087 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
2088 /* Should never happen */
2089 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2090 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2091 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2097 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2099 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
2100 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2102 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2104 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
2105 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]),
2106 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) {
2107 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
2112 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2115 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2116 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2117 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2118 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2123 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) {
2124 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2125 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2130 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2131 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2132 return ssl_do_write(s);
2134 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2136 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2137 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2138 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2140 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2141 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2145 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2147 unsigned char *p, *d;
2148 int i, j, nl, off, n;
2149 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
2153 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
2156 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2158 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2160 n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
2165 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2166 const unsigned char *psigs;
2167 unsigned char *etmp = p;
2168 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2169 /* Skip over length for now */
2171 nl = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, p, psigs, nl);
2172 /* Now fill in length */
2182 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2185 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
2186 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
2187 j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
2188 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
2189 (buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) {
2190 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2194 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2196 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2201 /* else no CA names */
2202 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2205 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n)) {
2206 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2210 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2213 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2214 return ssl_do_write(s);
2216 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2220 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2224 unsigned long alg_k;
2226 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2228 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2230 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2232 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2234 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2235 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2236 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2237 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2238 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2241 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2242 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2243 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2244 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok);
2248 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2250 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2252 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2253 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
2254 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2256 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2259 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2260 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) {
2261 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2262 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2264 * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already
2267 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2269 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2274 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2275 if ((pkey == NULL) ||
2276 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
2277 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2278 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2279 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2282 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
2285 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2286 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2289 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) {
2290 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2291 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2292 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2301 * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
2302 * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
2303 * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
2304 * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
2305 * bound is sufficient to be safe.
2307 if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2308 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2310 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2315 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2316 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2317 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2318 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2319 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2322 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2323 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2326 RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2330 * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
2331 * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
2334 constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2337 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2338 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2339 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2340 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2341 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2342 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2345 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2347 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2350 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2351 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2352 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2353 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2354 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2355 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2358 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2359 unsigned char workaround_good;
2361 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2363 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2364 version_good |= workaround_good;
2368 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2369 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2371 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2374 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2375 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2376 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2377 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2379 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2380 p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j],
2381 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2384 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, p, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
2385 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2391 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2392 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
2394 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2398 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
2399 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2400 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2401 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2406 if (n && n != i + 2) {
2407 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) {
2408 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2409 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2416 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2417 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2418 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2419 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2421 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2422 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2423 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) || (skey->pkey.dh == NULL)) {
2424 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2425 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2426 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2429 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2430 } else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) {
2431 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2433 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2436 dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh;
2439 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2440 EVP_PKEY *clkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2442 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2443 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2445 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
2446 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2447 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2448 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2451 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2452 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2454 pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL);
2456 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2460 i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr);
2463 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2468 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2469 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
2475 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, p, i, 0)) {
2476 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2477 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2485 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2486 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2490 const EC_GROUP *group;
2491 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2493 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2494 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
2495 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2499 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2500 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2501 /* use the certificate */
2502 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2505 * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
2506 * ServerKeyExchange msg.
2508 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2511 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2512 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2514 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2515 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) {
2516 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2520 /* Let's get client's public key */
2521 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
2522 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2527 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2529 if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
2530 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2531 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2532 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2535 if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2536 == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
2538 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
2539 * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the
2540 * code is never executed. When that support is added, we
2541 * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is
2542 * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly
2543 * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group.
2545 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2546 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2547 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2551 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2552 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->
2554 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2557 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2560 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2561 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2563 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
2564 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2565 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2569 /* Get encoded point length */
2573 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2576 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
2577 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2581 * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it
2584 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2587 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2588 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2589 if (field_size <= 0) {
2590 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2593 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh,
2596 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2600 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2601 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2602 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2603 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2604 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2605 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2607 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, p, i, 0)) {
2608 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2609 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2615 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2616 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2617 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2618 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4];
2619 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2621 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2623 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2627 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2630 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2631 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2632 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2635 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2636 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2637 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2642 * Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback
2644 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2645 memset(tmp_id + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
2646 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2648 sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2649 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, sizeof(tmp_id));
2651 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2652 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2654 } else if (psk_len == 0) {
2656 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2658 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2659 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2660 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2664 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2665 pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
2667 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2669 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2673 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2674 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2675 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
2676 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2680 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2681 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2682 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2683 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
2684 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2688 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len, 0)) {
2689 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2690 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2696 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2701 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2702 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2707 if (param_len > n) {
2708 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2709 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2710 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2713 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
2714 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2717 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2718 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2719 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2720 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2721 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2724 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2725 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2726 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2727 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2731 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
2732 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2738 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2739 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2741 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2742 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2743 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2744 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2745 unsigned long alg_a;
2749 /* Get our certificate private key */
2750 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2751 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2752 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2753 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2754 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2756 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2757 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2759 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2760 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2761 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2762 * client certificate for authorization only.
2764 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2765 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2766 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2769 /* Decrypt session key */
2771 ((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass,
2772 n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
2773 || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2774 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2775 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2780 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2781 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2782 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2783 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2786 /* Generate master secret */
2787 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
2788 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
2789 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2790 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2793 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2794 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2795 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2800 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2801 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2806 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2807 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2813 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2814 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2817 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2818 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2819 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2820 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2821 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2823 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2827 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2829 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2831 int al, ok, ret = 0;
2835 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2837 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2840 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have received
2841 * a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| will be non
2842 * NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is not required even
2843 * if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in the case of static
2844 * DH). In that case the ClientKeyExchange processing will skip the
2845 * CertificateVerify state so we should not arrive here.
2847 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2852 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2853 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2854 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2855 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,
2856 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
2861 peer = s->session->peer;
2862 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2863 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
2865 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2866 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2867 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2868 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2872 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2873 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2874 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2876 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
2879 if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
2880 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)) {
2883 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2884 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
2886 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2888 } else if (rv == 0) {
2889 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2893 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2901 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2902 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2906 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2907 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
2908 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2909 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2913 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2916 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2917 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
2918 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2919 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2923 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
2926 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
2927 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
2928 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2929 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2933 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) {
2934 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2935 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2939 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2940 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
2941 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2942 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2945 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2946 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2950 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2951 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2956 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2957 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
2958 j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2959 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2960 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa);
2963 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2964 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
2969 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2970 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
2971 j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2972 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2973 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec);
2976 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2977 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2982 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
2983 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
2984 unsigned char signature[64];
2986 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2987 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
2989 fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", i);
2991 for (idx = 0; idx < 64; idx++) {
2992 signature[63 - idx] = p[idx];
2994 j = EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, signature, 64, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2996 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2998 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2999 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3003 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3004 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3011 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3012 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3015 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3016 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3017 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3018 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3022 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3024 int i, ok, al, ret = -1;
3026 unsigned long l, nc, llen, n;
3027 const unsigned char *p, *q;
3029 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3031 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3034 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
3039 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
3040 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3041 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3042 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3043 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3044 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3048 * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list
3050 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
3051 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3052 SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3053 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3056 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
3060 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
3061 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3062 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3065 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3067 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3068 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3073 if (llen + 3 != n) {
3074 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3075 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3078 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
3080 if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
3081 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3082 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3083 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3088 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, l);
3090 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3094 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3095 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3096 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3099 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3100 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3107 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3108 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3109 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3110 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3111 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3112 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3115 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3116 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3117 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3118 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3119 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3120 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3123 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3124 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3125 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3130 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3132 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3133 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3134 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3138 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3139 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3142 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3144 al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3145 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3146 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3149 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3152 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3153 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3154 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3156 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3157 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3159 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3160 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
3167 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3169 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3171 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3175 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3179 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
3180 cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3182 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3183 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3187 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) {
3188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3189 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3192 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3195 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3196 return ssl_do_write(s);
3199 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3200 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3202 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3206 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
3207 unsigned char *p, *macstart;
3208 const unsigned char *const_p;
3209 int len, slen_full, slen;
3212 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3213 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3214 unsigned char key_name[16];
3216 /* get session encoding length */
3217 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3219 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3222 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3223 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3226 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3228 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3232 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3233 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3236 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3240 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3243 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3246 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3248 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3249 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3250 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3254 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3255 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3258 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3261 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3262 * follows handshake_header_length +
3263 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3264 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3265 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3266 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3268 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3269 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3270 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3273 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3275 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3276 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3278 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3279 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3283 if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0)
3285 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3286 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
3288 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3289 EVP_sha256(), NULL))
3291 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3295 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3296 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3297 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3299 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3301 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3303 /* Output key name */
3305 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3308 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3309 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3310 /* Encrypt session data */
3311 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
3314 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len))
3318 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
3320 if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen))
3323 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3324 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3327 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3329 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3330 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3331 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3333 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len))
3335 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3339 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3340 return ssl_do_write(s);
3343 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3344 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3345 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3349 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3351 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) {
3354 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3355 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3356 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3359 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
3360 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3364 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3367 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3368 /* message length */
3369 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3371 *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
3372 /* length of OCSP response */
3373 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3374 /* actual response */
3375 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3376 /* number of bytes to write */
3377 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3378 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3382 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3383 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3386 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3388 * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3389 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3391 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3394 int proto_len, padding_len;
3396 const unsigned char *p;
3399 * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3400 * extension in their ClientHello
3402 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
3403 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,
3404 SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3405 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3409 /* See the payload format below */
3410 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3411 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3412 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3413 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok);
3419 * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in
3420 * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by
3421 * ssl3_get_finished).
3423 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
3424 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3425 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3430 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3431 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3434 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3437 * The payload looks like:
3439 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3440 * uint8 padding_len;
3441 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3444 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) {
3445 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3448 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3449 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) {
3450 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3454 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3455 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
3456 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3457 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3460 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3461 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
3467 #define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3
3469 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, unsigned char *p,
3471 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
3474 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3475 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
3479 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
3482 n = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN;
3484 n = ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s, NULL, NULL);
3486 if (n == 0 || (num % n) != 0) {
3487 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3488 SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
3491 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) {
3492 sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
3494 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3499 sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk);
3502 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw);
3503 s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw = BUF_memdup(p, num);
3504 if (s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw == NULL) {
3505 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3508 s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen = (size_t)num;
3510 for (i = 0; i < num; i += n) {
3511 /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
3512 if (s->s3 && (n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
3513 (p[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3514 (p[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3515 /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
3516 if (s->renegotiate) {
3517 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3518 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
3519 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
3522 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
3524 #ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
3525 fprintf(stderr, "SCSV received by server\n");
3530 /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
3531 if ((n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
3532 (p[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3533 (p[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3535 * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
3536 * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
3539 if (!SSL_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION, 0, NULL)) {
3540 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3541 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
3543 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
3544 SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
3553 * We only support SSLv2 format ciphers in SSLv3+ using a
3554 * SSLv2 backward compatible ClientHello. In this case the first
3555 * byte is always 0 for SSLv3 compatible ciphers. Anything else
3556 * is an SSLv2 cipher and we ignore it
3559 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, &p[1]);
3563 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p);
3567 if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
3568 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3578 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
3579 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);