1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
158 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 #include <openssl/evp.h>
162 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
163 #include <openssl/x509.h>
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
165 #include <openssl/dh.h>
167 #include <openssl/bn.h>
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
169 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
171 #include <openssl/md5.h>
173 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
175 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
177 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
178 return(SSLv3_server_method());
183 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
184 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
186 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
188 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
190 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
191 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
193 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
195 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
196 we do so if There is no srp login name */
198 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
202 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
209 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
211 ssl_undefined_function,
212 ssl3_get_server_method)
214 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
217 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
218 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
220 int new_state,state,skip=0;
222 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
226 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
228 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
229 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
231 /* init things to blank */
233 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
237 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
241 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
242 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
243 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
244 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
246 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
248 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
259 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
261 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
265 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
266 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
269 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
271 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
277 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0,
280 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
284 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
286 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
288 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
293 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
301 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
308 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
309 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
311 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
313 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
314 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
316 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
318 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
319 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
320 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
322 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
323 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
325 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
326 * client that doesn't support secure
329 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
330 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
336 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
337 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
338 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
339 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
343 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
344 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
347 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
348 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
349 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
350 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
353 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
356 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
360 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
361 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
362 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
364 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
365 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
366 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
367 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
368 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
371 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
373 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
374 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
377 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
379 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
380 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
381 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
382 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
383 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
384 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
392 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
396 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
397 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
398 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
399 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
400 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
403 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
404 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
406 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
410 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
413 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
417 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
418 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
419 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
420 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
421 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5|SSL_aSRP))
422 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
424 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
425 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
426 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
427 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
428 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
430 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
435 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
442 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
447 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
448 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
449 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
451 /* clear this, it may get reset by
452 * send_server_key_exchange */
453 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
454 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
455 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
456 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
458 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
459 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
460 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
461 * be able to handle this) */
462 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
464 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
467 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
468 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
470 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
472 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
473 * message only if the cipher suite is either
474 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
475 * server certificate contains the server's
476 * public key for key exchange.
478 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
479 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
480 * hint if provided */
481 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
482 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
484 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
485 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
486 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
488 || (alg_k & SSL_kDHE)
489 || (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
490 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
491 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
492 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
493 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
499 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
500 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
505 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
509 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
510 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
511 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
512 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
513 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
514 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
515 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
516 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
517 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
518 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
519 * and in RFC 2246): */
520 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
521 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
522 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
523 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
524 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
525 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
526 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
527 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
528 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
529 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
530 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
532 /* no cert request */
534 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
535 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
536 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
537 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
542 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
543 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
544 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
545 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
546 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
548 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
549 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
555 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
556 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
557 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
558 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
559 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
560 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
564 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
566 /* This code originally checked to see if
567 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
568 * and then flushed. This caused problems
569 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
570 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
571 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
572 * still exist. So instead we just flush
576 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
577 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
582 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
584 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
587 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
588 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
589 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
590 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
594 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
596 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
598 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
599 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
602 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
606 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
607 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
608 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
613 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
614 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
615 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
616 * message is not sent.
617 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
618 * the client uses its key from the certificate
621 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
622 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
624 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
625 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
627 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
631 else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
633 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
635 if (!s->session->peer)
637 /* For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer
638 * at this point and digest cached records.
640 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
642 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
645 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
646 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
654 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
657 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
658 * a client cert, it can be verified
659 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
660 * should be generalized. But it is next step
662 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
663 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
665 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
666 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
670 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
671 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
682 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
683 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
685 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
686 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
687 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
688 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
690 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
691 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
693 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
694 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
696 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
701 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
702 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
703 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
704 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
705 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
707 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
711 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
712 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
713 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
714 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
715 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
716 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
719 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
720 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
721 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
724 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
728 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
729 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
730 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
731 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
732 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
733 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
737 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
738 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
739 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
740 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
741 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
747 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
748 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
750 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
751 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
752 { ret= -1; goto end; }
754 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
755 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
757 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
758 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
761 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
762 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
770 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
771 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
772 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
773 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
774 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
775 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
776 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
777 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
780 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
781 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
783 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
785 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
786 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
789 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
793 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
798 /* clean a few things up */
799 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
801 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
804 /* remove buffering on output */
805 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
809 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
814 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
816 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
818 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
820 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
828 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
834 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
838 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
843 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
847 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
854 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
858 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
862 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
865 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
867 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
868 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
871 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
872 return ssl_do_write(s);
875 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
880 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
881 * so permit appropriate message length */
882 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
888 if (!ok) return((int)n);
889 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
890 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
892 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
894 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
896 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
899 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
900 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
901 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
902 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
904 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
905 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
908 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
909 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
911 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
912 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
915 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
921 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
923 int i,j,ok,al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,ret= -1;
924 unsigned int cookie_len;
929 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
933 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
935 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
938 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
939 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
940 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
941 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
944 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
947 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
950 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
951 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
952 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
953 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
954 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
957 if (!ok) return((int)n);
959 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
961 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
962 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
963 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
966 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version &&
967 s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
968 : (s->client_version < s->version))
970 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
971 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
972 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
974 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
975 s->version = s->client_version;
977 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
981 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
982 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
983 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
985 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
987 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
989 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
990 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
992 if (cookie_length == 0)
996 /* load the client random */
997 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1000 /* get the session-id */
1004 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
1005 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
1006 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1007 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
1008 * won't even compile against older library versions).
1010 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
1011 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
1012 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1013 * setting will be ignored.
1015 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
1017 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1022 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1024 { /* previous session */
1031 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1041 cookie_len = *(p++);
1044 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1045 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1046 * does not cause an overflow.
1048 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1051 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1052 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1056 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1057 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1060 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1062 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1064 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1067 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1068 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1069 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1072 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1074 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1075 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1077 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1078 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1079 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1082 /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
1087 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
1089 /* Select version to use */
1090 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1091 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2))
1093 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1094 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1096 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1098 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1099 s->version = s->client_version;
1100 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1103 else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1104 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1))
1106 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1107 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1111 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1112 s->version = s->client_version;
1113 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1116 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1121 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1123 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1124 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1125 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1130 /* not enough data */
1131 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1132 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1135 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1142 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1143 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1146 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1149 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1151 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1153 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1155 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1156 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1164 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1165 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1168 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1170 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1171 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1172 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1173 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1174 * enabled, though. */
1175 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1176 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1178 s->session->cipher = c;
1185 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1186 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1187 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1197 /* not enough data */
1198 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1199 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1202 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1207 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1214 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1215 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1221 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1223 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n))
1225 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1230 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1231 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1232 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1233 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1236 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1237 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1243 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1245 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1247 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1248 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1249 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1252 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1253 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1257 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1258 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1259 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1261 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1262 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1266 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1269 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1271 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1272 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1274 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1275 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1280 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1281 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1282 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1283 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1284 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1285 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1286 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1288 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1289 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1290 /* Can't disable compression */
1291 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s))
1293 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1296 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1297 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1299 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1300 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1302 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1306 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1308 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1311 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1312 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1314 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1319 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1326 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1327 { /* See if we have a match */
1328 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1330 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1331 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1333 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1346 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1351 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1352 * using compression.
1354 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1356 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1361 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1366 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1367 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1369 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1371 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1372 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1373 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1374 if (ciphers == NULL)
1376 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1377 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1381 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1383 if (s->cert->cert_cb)
1385 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1388 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1389 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1394 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1397 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1399 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1400 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1404 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1405 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1408 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1409 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1410 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1411 s->session->not_resumable=s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1412 ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
1413 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1414 /* do not send a session ticket */
1415 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1419 /* Session-id reuse */
1420 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1421 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1422 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1423 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1425 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1427 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1428 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1430 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1431 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1433 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1437 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1438 else if (ec != NULL)
1439 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1441 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1445 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1448 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1450 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1454 /* we now have the following setup.
1456 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1457 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1458 * compression - basically ignored right now
1459 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1460 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1461 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1462 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1465 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1466 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1468 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
1470 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1475 if (ret < 0) ret=-ret;
1479 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1482 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1483 return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
1486 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1489 unsigned char *p,*d;
1494 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1496 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1497 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1498 p=s->s3->server_random;
1499 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1502 /* Do the message type and length last */
1503 d=p= ssl_handshake_start(s);
1505 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1506 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1509 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1510 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1512 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1513 * back in the server hello:
1514 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1515 * we send back the old session ID.
1516 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1517 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1518 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1519 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1521 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1522 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1523 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1524 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1527 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1528 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1530 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1532 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1533 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1535 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1539 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1542 /* put the cipher */
1543 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1546 /* put the compression method */
1547 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1550 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1553 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1555 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1556 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1558 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1561 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &al)) == NULL)
1563 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1564 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1570 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
1571 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1574 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1575 return ssl_do_write(s);
1578 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1581 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1583 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
1584 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1587 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1588 return ssl_do_write(s);
1591 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1593 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1597 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1600 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1603 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1604 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1605 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1608 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1611 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1612 unsigned char *p,*d;
1622 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1623 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1625 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1630 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1632 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1633 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1636 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1638 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1639 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1640 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1643 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1644 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1652 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1653 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1658 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1662 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1663 if (type & SSL_kDHE)
1665 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto)
1667 dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
1670 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1671 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1677 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1678 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1679 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1680 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1683 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1684 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1687 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
1688 DH_security_bits(dhp), 0, dhp))
1690 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1691 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1694 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1696 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1700 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto)
1702 else if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1704 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1709 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1710 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1711 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1713 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1715 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1722 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1723 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1724 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1725 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1727 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1737 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1738 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1740 const EC_GROUP *group;
1742 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1743 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1745 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1746 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1747 if (nid != NID_undef)
1748 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1750 else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
1752 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1753 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1754 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1758 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1759 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1763 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1765 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1769 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1772 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1775 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1777 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1779 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1783 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1784 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1785 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1786 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1788 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1790 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1795 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1796 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1797 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1799 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1803 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1804 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1806 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1810 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1811 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1812 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1815 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1818 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1822 /* Encode the public key.
1823 * First check the size of encoding and
1824 * allocate memory accordingly.
1826 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1827 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1828 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1831 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1832 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1833 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1834 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1836 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1841 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1842 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1843 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1844 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1846 if (encodedlen == 0)
1848 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1852 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1854 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1855 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1856 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1857 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1862 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1863 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1871 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1872 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1873 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1875 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1876 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1879 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1880 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1881 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1883 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1884 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1885 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1886 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1888 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1899 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1900 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1903 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1905 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1906 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1907 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1914 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP))
1915 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1917 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1920 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1923 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1931 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+kn))
1933 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1936 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1938 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1940 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1941 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1953 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1954 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1956 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1957 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1958 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1959 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1960 * the actual encoded point itself
1962 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1970 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1971 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1973 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1974 encodedPoint = NULL;
1979 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1980 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1982 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1983 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1984 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1985 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1992 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1993 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1994 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1995 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1999 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
2001 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
2002 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
2003 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
2004 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
2005 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2006 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2007 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
2008 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
2009 (unsigned int *)&i);
2013 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
2014 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
2016 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
2026 /* send signature algorithm */
2027 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2029 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
2031 /* Should never happen */
2032 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2033 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2039 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
2042 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
2043 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2044 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2045 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
2046 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
2047 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
2049 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
2054 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2059 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2060 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2061 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2066 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
2069 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2070 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2071 return ssl_do_write(s);
2073 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2075 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2076 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2077 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2079 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2083 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2085 unsigned char *p,*d;
2087 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2091 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2095 d=p=ssl_handshake_start(s);
2097 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2099 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2104 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2106 const unsigned char *psigs;
2107 unsigned char *etmp = p;
2108 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2109 /* Skip over length for now */
2111 nl = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, p, psigs, nl);
2112 /* Now fill in length */
2122 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2126 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2128 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2129 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2130 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+n+j+2))
2132 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2135 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2136 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2139 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2146 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2147 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2153 /* else no CA names */
2154 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2157 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
2159 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2160 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
2162 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4))
2164 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2167 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2169 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2177 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2180 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2181 return ssl_do_write(s);
2186 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2190 unsigned long alg_k;
2192 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2194 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2196 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2198 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2200 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2202 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2205 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2206 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2207 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2208 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2211 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2212 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2213 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2214 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2218 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2219 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2221 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2224 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2226 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2228 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2230 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2231 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2233 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2234 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2235 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2236 * be sent already */
2239 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2247 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2248 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2249 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2250 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2252 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2253 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2259 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2260 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2265 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2267 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2277 /* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because
2278 * of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see
2279 * RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of
2280 * the TLS RFC and generates a random premaster secret for the
2281 * case that the decrypt fails. See
2282 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */
2284 /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. */
2285 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2286 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2288 decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2291 /* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH.
2292 * decrypt_good will be 0xff if so and zero otherwise. */
2293 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2295 /* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct
2296 * then version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero.
2297 * The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2298 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2299 * number check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks
2300 * are done in constant time and are treated like any other
2301 * decryption error. */
2302 version_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version>>8));
2303 version_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version&0xff));
2305 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2306 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks
2307 * (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for
2308 * DH ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send the
2309 * negotiated protocol version instead if the server does not
2310 * support the requested protocol version. If
2311 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2312 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)
2314 unsigned char workaround_good;
2315 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version>>8));
2316 workaround_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version&0xff));
2317 version_good |= workaround_good;
2320 /* Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good
2321 * to remain non-zero (0xff). */
2322 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2324 /* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over p using
2325 * decrypt_good_mask. */
2326 for (i = 0; i < (int) sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); i++)
2328 p[i] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[i],
2329 rand_premaster_secret[i]);
2332 s->session->master_key_length=
2333 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2334 s->session->master_key,
2336 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2340 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2341 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2344 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2351 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2353 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2362 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2363 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2364 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2365 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2368 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2369 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2370 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) ||
2371 (skey->pkey.dh == NULL))
2373 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2374 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2377 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2379 else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2381 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2382 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2386 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2390 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2391 EVP_PKEY *clkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2394 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2395 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2397 if (dh_clnt == NULL)
2399 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2400 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2403 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2404 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2407 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2410 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2414 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2418 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2423 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2430 s->session->master_key_length=
2431 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2432 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2433 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2439 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2440 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2442 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2443 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2444 krb5_data authenticator;
2446 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2447 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2448 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2449 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2450 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2451 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2453 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2454 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2456 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2458 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2461 enc_ticket.length = i;
2463 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2465 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2466 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2470 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2471 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2474 authenticator.length = i;
2476 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2478 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2479 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2483 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2484 p+=authenticator.length;
2488 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2491 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2494 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2496 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2497 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2501 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2502 enc_pms.length + 6))
2504 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2505 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2509 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2513 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2514 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2516 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2517 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2518 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2523 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2524 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2526 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2527 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2530 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2531 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2533 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2534 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2535 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2540 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2542 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2547 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2548 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2550 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2554 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2556 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2558 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2559 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2562 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2563 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2565 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2566 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2569 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2571 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2572 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2575 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2577 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2578 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2582 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2584 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2585 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2588 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2590 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2591 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2592 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2593 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2594 * the protocol version.
2595 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2596 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2598 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2600 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2601 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2606 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2608 s->session->master_key_length=
2609 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2610 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2612 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2614 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2615 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2617 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2618 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2623 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2624 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2625 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2626 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2630 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2632 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2633 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2638 const EC_GROUP *group;
2639 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2641 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2642 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2644 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2645 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2649 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2650 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2652 /* use the certificate */
2653 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2657 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2658 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2660 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2663 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2664 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2666 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2667 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2669 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2674 /* Let's get client's public key */
2675 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2677 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2678 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2684 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2686 if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
2688 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2689 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2692 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2694 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2696 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2697 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2698 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2699 * never executed. When that support is
2700 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2701 * received in the certificate is
2702 * authorized for key agreement.
2703 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2704 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2707 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2708 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2709 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2713 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2714 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2716 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2720 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2724 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2725 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2727 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2729 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2730 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2734 /* Get encoded point length */
2739 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2743 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2744 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2746 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2750 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2751 * currently, so set it to the start
2753 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2756 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2757 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2758 if (field_size <= 0)
2760 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2764 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2767 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2772 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2773 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2774 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2775 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2776 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2777 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2779 /* Compute the master secret */
2780 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2781 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2783 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2788 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2789 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2791 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2792 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2793 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2795 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2797 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2802 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2803 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2806 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2808 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2809 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2812 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2814 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2815 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2819 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2820 * string for the callback */
2821 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2822 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2823 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2824 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2825 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2827 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2829 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2830 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2833 else if (psk_len == 0)
2835 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2836 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2837 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2838 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2842 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2843 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2845 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2847 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2851 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2852 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2853 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2854 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2856 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2857 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2861 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2862 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2863 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2864 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2865 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2867 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2868 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2872 s->session->master_key_length=
2873 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2874 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2877 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2883 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2884 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2892 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2893 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2896 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2898 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2901 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2902 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A))
2904 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2905 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2908 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2909 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2910 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2911 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2913 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2914 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2918 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2920 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2927 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2928 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2931 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2932 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2933 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2934 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2935 unsigned long alg_a;
2939 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2940 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2941 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2942 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2943 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2944 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2946 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2947 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2948 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2949 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2950 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2951 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2952 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2953 if (client_pub_pkey)
2955 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2958 /* Decrypt session key */
2959 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass, n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED ||
2960 Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE ||
2961 Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL)
2963 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2968 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2971 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2974 /* Generate master secret */
2975 s->session->master_key_length=
2976 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2977 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2978 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2979 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2984 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2985 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2993 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2994 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2995 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3001 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3002 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
3005 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
3006 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
3007 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
3008 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
3009 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
3010 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
3015 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
3017 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
3023 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
3025 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
3027 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3028 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
3029 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
3031 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
3034 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3036 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
3038 peer=s->session->peer;
3039 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
3040 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
3048 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
3050 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3051 if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3053 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3054 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
3063 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
3064 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3068 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3070 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
3071 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3075 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3077 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
3078 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3082 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3083 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3084 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3085 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
3086 * signature without length field */
3087 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3088 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
3094 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3096 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
3099 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3104 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3108 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3117 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3118 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3122 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3123 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
3125 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3126 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3130 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3134 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3137 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3138 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3142 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3145 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3146 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3148 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3149 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3153 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3155 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3156 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3162 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3164 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3165 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3169 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3170 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3175 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3176 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3183 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3185 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3186 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3187 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3191 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3192 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3198 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3199 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3201 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3202 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3203 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3207 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3208 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3209 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3215 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3216 { unsigned char signature[64];
3218 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3219 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3221 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3223 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3224 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3226 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3227 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3230 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3231 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3232 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3239 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3248 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3251 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3253 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3254 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3255 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3257 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3258 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3262 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3264 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3266 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3267 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3269 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3271 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3278 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3280 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3282 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3283 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3285 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3286 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3289 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3290 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3292 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3293 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3296 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3300 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3302 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3303 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3306 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3308 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3310 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3317 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3318 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3321 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3324 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3326 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3327 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3332 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3335 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3340 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3341 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3344 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3346 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3353 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3355 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3356 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3358 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3362 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3363 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3364 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3366 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3367 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3370 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3371 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3373 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3380 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3383 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3389 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3390 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3393 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3396 al=SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3397 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3398 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3401 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3404 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3405 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3406 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3407 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3409 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3410 * when we arrive here. */
3411 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3413 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3414 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3416 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3420 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3421 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3422 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3423 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3424 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3432 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3435 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3436 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3440 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3444 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3446 cpk=ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3449 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3450 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3451 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3453 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3458 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,cpk))
3460 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3463 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3466 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3467 return ssl_do_write(s);
3470 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3471 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3472 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3474 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3476 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3477 const unsigned char *const_p;
3478 int len, slen_full, slen;
3483 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3484 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3485 unsigned char key_name[16];
3487 /* get session encoding length */
3488 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3489 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3492 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3494 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3498 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3500 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3502 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3508 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3510 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3511 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3517 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3518 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3520 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3521 * follows handshake_header_length +
3522 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3523 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3524 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3525 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3527 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3528 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3529 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3531 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3532 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3533 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3534 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3535 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3538 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3540 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3549 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3550 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3551 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3552 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3553 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3554 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3557 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3558 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3559 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3560 * as their sessions. */
3561 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3563 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3565 /* Output key name */
3567 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3570 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3571 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3572 /* Encrypt session data */
3573 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3575 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3577 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3579 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3580 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3581 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3584 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3586 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3587 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
3588 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3589 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3591 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3595 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3596 return ssl_do_write(s);
3599 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3601 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3604 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3605 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3606 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3609 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3612 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3615 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3616 /* message length */
3617 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3619 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3620 /* length of OCSP response */
3621 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3622 /* actual response */
3623 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3624 /* number of bytes to write */
3625 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3626 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3630 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3631 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3634 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3635 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3636 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3637 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3640 int proto_len, padding_len;
3642 const unsigned char *p;
3644 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3645 * extension in their ClientHello */
3646 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3648 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3652 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3653 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3654 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3656 514, /* See the payload format below */
3662 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3663 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3664 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3665 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3667 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3672 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3674 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3676 /* The payload looks like:
3678 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3679 * uint8 padding_len;
3680 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3683 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3685 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3686 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3689 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3690 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3692 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3695 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3696 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;