1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
183 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
185 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
187 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
189 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
190 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
192 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
194 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
195 we do so if There is no srp login name */
197 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
201 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
208 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
210 ssl_undefined_function,
211 ssl3_get_server_method)
213 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
216 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
217 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
219 int new_state,state,skip=0;
221 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
225 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
227 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
228 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
230 /* init things to blank */
232 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
241 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
242 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
243 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
245 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
247 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
258 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
260 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
264 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
265 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
268 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
270 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
275 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
277 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
279 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
284 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
292 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
299 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
300 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
302 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
304 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
305 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
307 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
309 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
310 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
311 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
313 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
314 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
316 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
317 * client that doesn't support secure
320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
321 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
327 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
328 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
329 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
330 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
334 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
335 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
338 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
339 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
340 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
341 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
344 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
347 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
351 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
352 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
353 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
356 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
357 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
358 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
359 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
360 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
363 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
365 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
366 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
369 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
371 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
372 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
373 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
374 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
376 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
384 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
388 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
389 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
390 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
391 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
392 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
395 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
396 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
398 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
402 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
406 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A;
408 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
413 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
414 case SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A:
415 case SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B:
416 ret = tls1_send_server_supplemental_data(s, &skip);
417 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
419 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
424 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
425 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
426 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
427 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
428 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
429 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
430 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
432 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
433 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
434 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
435 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
436 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
438 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
443 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
450 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
455 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
456 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
457 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
459 /* clear this, it may get reset by
460 * send_server_key_exchange */
461 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
462 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
463 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
464 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
466 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
467 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
468 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
469 * be able to handle this) */
470 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
472 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
475 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
476 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
478 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
480 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
481 * message only if the cipher suite is either
482 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
483 * server certificate contains the server's
484 * public key for key exchange.
486 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
487 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
488 * hint if provided */
489 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
490 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
492 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
493 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
494 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
496 || (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
497 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
498 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
499 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
500 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
501 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
507 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
508 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
513 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
517 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
518 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
519 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
520 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
521 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
522 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
523 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
524 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
525 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
526 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
527 * and in RFC 2246): */
528 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
529 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
530 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
531 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
532 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
533 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
534 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
535 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
536 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
538 /* no cert request */
540 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
541 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
542 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
543 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
548 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
549 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
550 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
551 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
552 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
554 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
555 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
561 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
562 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
563 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
564 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
565 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
566 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
570 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
572 /* This code originally checked to see if
573 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
574 * and then flushed. This caused problems
575 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
576 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
577 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
578 * still exist. So instead we just flush
582 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
583 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
588 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
590 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
592 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
593 case SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A:
594 case SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B:
595 ret=tls1_get_client_supplemental_data(s);
596 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
597 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
598 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
602 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
603 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
604 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
605 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
609 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
610 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
612 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A;
615 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
617 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
618 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
621 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
625 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
626 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
627 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
632 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
633 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
634 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
635 * message is not sent.
636 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
637 * the client uses its key from the certificate
640 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
641 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
643 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
644 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
646 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
650 else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
652 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
654 if (!s->session->peer)
656 /* For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer
657 * at this point and digest cached records.
659 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
661 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
664 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
665 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
673 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
676 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
677 * a client cert, it can be verified
678 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
679 * should be generalized. But it is next step
681 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
682 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
684 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
685 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
689 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
690 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
701 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
702 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
704 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
705 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
706 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
708 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
709 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
711 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
712 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
714 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
719 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
720 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
721 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
722 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
723 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
725 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
729 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
730 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
731 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
732 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
733 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
736 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
737 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
738 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
741 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
745 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
746 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
747 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
748 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
749 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
750 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
754 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
755 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
756 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
757 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
758 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
764 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
765 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
767 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
768 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
769 { ret= -1; goto end; }
771 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
772 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
774 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
775 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
778 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
779 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
787 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
788 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
789 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
790 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
791 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
792 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
793 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
794 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
797 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
798 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
800 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
801 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
803 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
807 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
812 /* clean a few things up */
813 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
815 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
818 /* remove buffering on output */
819 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
823 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
828 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
830 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
832 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
834 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
842 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
848 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
852 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
857 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
861 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
868 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
872 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
876 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
879 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
881 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
882 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
885 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
886 return ssl_do_write(s);
889 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
894 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
895 * so permit appropriate message length */
896 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
902 if (!ok) return((int)n);
903 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
904 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
905 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA)
908 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
910 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
912 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
914 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
917 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
918 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
919 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
920 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
922 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
923 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
926 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
927 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
929 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
930 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
933 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
939 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
941 int i,j,ok,al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,ret= -1;
942 unsigned int cookie_len;
947 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
951 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
953 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C)
956 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
957 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
958 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
959 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
962 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
965 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
968 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
969 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
970 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
971 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
972 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
975 if (!ok) return((int)n);
977 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
979 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
980 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
981 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
984 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version &&
985 s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
986 : (s->client_version < s->version))
988 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
989 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
990 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
992 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
993 s->version = s->client_version;
995 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
999 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
1000 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
1001 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
1003 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
1005 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
1007 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1008 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
1010 if (cookie_length == 0)
1014 /* load the client random */
1015 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1016 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1018 /* get the session-id */
1022 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
1023 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
1024 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1025 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
1026 * won't even compile against older library versions).
1028 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
1029 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
1030 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1031 * setting will be ignored.
1033 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
1035 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1040 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1042 { /* previous session */
1049 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1059 cookie_len = *(p++);
1062 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1063 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1064 * does not cause an overflow.
1066 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1069 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1070 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1074 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1075 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1078 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1080 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1082 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1085 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1086 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1087 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1090 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1092 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1093 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1095 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1096 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1097 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1100 /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
1105 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
1107 /* Select version to use */
1108 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1109 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2))
1111 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1112 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1114 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1116 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1117 s->version = s->client_version;
1118 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1121 else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1122 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1))
1124 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1125 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1129 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1130 s->version = s->client_version;
1131 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1134 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1139 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1141 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1142 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1143 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1148 /* not enough data */
1149 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1150 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1153 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1160 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1161 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1164 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1167 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1169 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1171 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1173 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1174 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1182 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1183 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1186 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1188 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1189 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1190 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1191 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1192 * enabled, though. */
1193 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1194 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1196 s->session->cipher = c;
1203 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1204 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1205 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1206 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1215 /* not enough data */
1216 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1217 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1220 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1225 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1232 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1233 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1237 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1239 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1241 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n))
1243 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1248 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1249 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1250 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1251 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1254 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1255 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1261 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1263 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1265 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1266 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1267 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1270 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1271 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1275 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1276 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1277 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1279 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1280 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1284 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1287 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1289 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1290 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1292 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1293 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1298 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1299 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1300 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1301 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1302 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1303 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1304 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1306 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1307 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1308 /* Can't disable compression */
1309 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1311 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1314 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1315 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1317 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1318 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1320 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1324 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1329 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1330 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1332 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1337 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1338 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1344 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1345 { /* See if we have a match */
1346 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1348 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1349 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1351 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1364 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1369 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1370 * using compression.
1372 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1374 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1379 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1384 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1385 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1387 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1389 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1390 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1391 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1392 if (ciphers == NULL)
1394 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1395 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1399 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1401 if (s->cert->cert_cb)
1403 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1406 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1407 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1412 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1415 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1417 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1418 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1422 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1423 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1426 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1430 /* Session-id reuse */
1431 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1432 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1433 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1434 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1436 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1438 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1439 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1441 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1442 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1444 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1448 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1449 else if (ec != NULL)
1450 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1452 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1456 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1459 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1461 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1465 /* we now have the following setup.
1467 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1468 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1469 * compression - basically ignored right now
1470 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1471 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1472 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1473 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1476 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1477 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1479 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
1481 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1486 if (ret < 0) ret=-ret;
1490 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1493 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1494 return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
1497 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1500 unsigned char *p,*d;
1505 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1507 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1508 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1509 p=s->s3->server_random;
1510 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1513 /* Do the message type and length last */
1514 d=p= ssl_handshake_start(s);
1516 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1517 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1520 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1521 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1523 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1524 * back in the server hello:
1525 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1526 * we send back the old session ID.
1527 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1528 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1529 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1530 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1532 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1533 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1534 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1535 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1538 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1540 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1542 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1543 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1549 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1552 /* put the cipher */
1553 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1556 /* put the compression method */
1557 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1560 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1563 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1565 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1566 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1568 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1571 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &al)) == NULL)
1573 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1574 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1580 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
1581 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1584 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1585 return ssl_do_write(s);
1588 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1591 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1593 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
1594 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1597 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1598 return ssl_do_write(s);
1601 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1603 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1607 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1610 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1613 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1614 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1615 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1618 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1621 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1622 unsigned char *p,*d;
1632 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1633 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1635 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1640 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1642 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1643 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1646 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1648 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1649 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1650 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1653 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1654 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1662 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1663 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1668 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1672 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1673 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1676 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1677 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1678 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1679 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1682 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1683 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1687 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1689 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1693 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1700 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1701 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1702 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1704 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1706 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1713 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1714 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1715 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1716 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1718 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1728 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1729 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1731 const EC_GROUP *group;
1733 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1734 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1736 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1737 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1738 if (nid != NID_undef)
1739 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1741 else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
1743 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1744 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1745 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1749 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1750 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1754 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1756 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1760 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1763 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1766 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1768 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1770 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1774 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1775 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1776 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1777 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1779 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1781 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1786 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1787 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1788 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1790 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1794 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1795 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1797 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1801 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1802 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1803 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1806 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1809 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1813 /* Encode the public key.
1814 * First check the size of encoding and
1815 * allocate memory accordingly.
1817 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1818 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1819 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1822 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1823 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1824 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1825 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1827 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1832 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1833 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1834 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1835 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1837 if (encodedlen == 0)
1839 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1843 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1845 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1846 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1847 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1848 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1853 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1854 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1862 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1863 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1864 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1866 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1867 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1870 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1871 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1872 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1874 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1875 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1876 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1877 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1879 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1890 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1891 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1894 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1896 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1897 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1898 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1905 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1906 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1908 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1911 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1914 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1922 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+kn))
1924 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1927 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1929 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1931 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1932 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1944 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1945 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1947 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1948 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1949 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1950 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1951 * the actual encoded point itself
1953 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1961 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1962 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1964 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1965 encodedPoint = NULL;
1970 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1971 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1973 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1974 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1975 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1976 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1983 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1984 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1985 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1986 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1990 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1992 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1993 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1994 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1995 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1996 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1997 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1998 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
1999 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
2000 (unsigned int *)&i);
2004 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
2005 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
2007 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
2017 /* send signature algorithm */
2018 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2020 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
2022 /* Should never happen */
2023 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2024 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2030 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
2033 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
2034 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2035 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2036 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
2037 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
2038 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
2040 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
2045 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2050 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2051 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2052 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2057 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
2060 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2061 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2062 return ssl_do_write(s);
2064 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2066 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2067 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2068 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2070 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2074 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2076 unsigned char *p,*d;
2078 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2082 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2086 d=p=ssl_handshake_start(s);
2088 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2090 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2095 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2097 const unsigned char *psigs;
2098 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2100 memcpy(p, psigs, nl);
2109 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2113 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2115 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2116 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2117 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+n+j+2))
2119 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2122 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2123 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2126 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2133 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2134 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2140 /* else no CA names */
2141 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2144 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
2146 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2147 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
2149 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2151 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2159 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2162 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2163 return ssl_do_write(s);
2168 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2172 unsigned long alg_k;
2174 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2176 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2178 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2180 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2184 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2186 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2187 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2188 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2189 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2190 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2193 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2194 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2195 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2196 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2200 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2201 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2203 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2205 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2206 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2208 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2209 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2211 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2212 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2213 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2214 * be sent already */
2217 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2218 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2225 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2226 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2227 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2228 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2230 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2231 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2237 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2238 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2243 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2255 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2259 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2261 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2262 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
2265 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2267 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2268 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2269 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2270 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2271 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2273 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2274 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2275 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2277 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2278 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2280 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2281 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2282 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2283 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
2284 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
2285 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
2286 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
2292 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
2293 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
2294 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2296 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2297 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2298 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2299 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2303 s->session->master_key_length=
2304 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2305 s->session->master_key,
2307 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2311 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2312 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2315 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2322 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2324 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2333 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2334 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2335 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2336 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2339 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2340 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2341 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) ||
2342 (skey->pkey.dh == NULL))
2344 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2345 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2348 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2350 else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2352 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2353 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2357 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2361 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2362 EVP_PKEY *clkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2365 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2366 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2368 if (dh_clnt == NULL)
2370 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2371 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2374 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2375 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2378 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2381 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2385 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2389 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2394 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2401 s->session->master_key_length=
2402 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2403 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2404 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2410 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2411 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2413 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2414 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2415 krb5_data authenticator;
2417 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2418 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2419 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2420 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2421 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2422 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2424 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2425 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2427 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2429 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2432 enc_ticket.length = i;
2434 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2436 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2437 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2441 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2442 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2445 authenticator.length = i;
2447 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2449 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2450 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2454 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2455 p+=authenticator.length;
2459 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2462 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2465 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2467 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2468 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2472 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2473 enc_pms.length + 6))
2475 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2476 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2480 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2484 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2485 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2487 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2488 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2489 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2494 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2495 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2497 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2498 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2501 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2502 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2504 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2505 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2506 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2511 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2513 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2518 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2519 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2521 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2525 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2527 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2529 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2530 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2533 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2534 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2536 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2537 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2540 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2542 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2543 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2546 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2548 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2549 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2553 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2555 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2556 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2559 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2561 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2562 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2563 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2564 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2565 * the protocol version.
2566 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2567 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2569 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2571 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2572 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2577 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2579 s->session->master_key_length=
2580 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2581 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2583 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2585 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2586 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2588 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2589 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2594 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2595 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2596 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2597 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2601 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2603 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2604 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2609 const EC_GROUP *group;
2610 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2612 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2613 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2615 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2616 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2620 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2621 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2623 /* use the certificate */
2624 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2628 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2629 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2631 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2634 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2635 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2637 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2638 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2640 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2645 /* Let's get client's public key */
2646 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2648 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2649 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2655 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2657 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2659 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2660 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2663 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2665 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2667 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2668 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2669 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2670 * never executed. When that support is
2671 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2672 * received in the certificate is
2673 * authorized for key agreement.
2674 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2675 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2678 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2679 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2680 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2684 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2685 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2687 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2691 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2695 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2696 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2698 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2700 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2701 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2705 /* Get encoded point length */
2710 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2714 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2715 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2717 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2721 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2722 * currently, so set it to the start
2724 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2727 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2728 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2729 if (field_size <= 0)
2731 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2735 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2738 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2743 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2744 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2745 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2746 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2747 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2748 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2750 /* Compute the master secret */
2751 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2752 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2754 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2759 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2760 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2762 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2763 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2764 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2766 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2768 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2773 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2774 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2777 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2779 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2780 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2783 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2785 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2786 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2790 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2791 * string for the callback */
2792 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2793 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2794 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2795 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2796 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2798 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2800 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2801 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2804 else if (psk_len == 0)
2806 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2807 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2808 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2809 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2813 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2814 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2816 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2818 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2822 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2823 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2824 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2825 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2827 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2828 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2832 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2833 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2834 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2835 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2836 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2838 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2839 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2843 s->session->master_key_length=
2844 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2845 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2848 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2854 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2855 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2863 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2864 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2867 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2869 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2872 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2873 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2874 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2875 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2877 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2878 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2882 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2884 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2891 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2892 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2895 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2896 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2897 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2898 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2899 unsigned long alg_a;
2901 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2902 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2903 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2904 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2905 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2906 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2908 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2909 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2910 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2911 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2912 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2913 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2914 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2915 if (client_pub_pkey)
2917 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2920 /* Decrypt session key */
2921 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)))
2923 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2931 else if (p[1] < 0x80)
2938 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2941 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2944 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2947 /* Generate master secret */
2948 s->session->master_key_length=
2949 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2950 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2951 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2952 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2957 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2958 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2966 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2967 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2968 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2974 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2975 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2978 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2979 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2980 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2981 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2982 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2983 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2988 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2990 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2996 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2998 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
3000 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3001 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
3002 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
3004 516, /* Enough for 4096 bit RSA key with TLS v1.2 */
3007 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3009 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
3011 peer=s->session->peer;
3012 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
3013 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
3021 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
3023 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3024 if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3026 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3027 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
3036 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
3037 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3041 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3043 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
3044 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3048 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3050 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
3051 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3055 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3056 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3057 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3058 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
3059 * signature without length field */
3060 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3061 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
3067 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3069 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
3072 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3077 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3081 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3090 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3091 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3095 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3096 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
3098 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3099 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3103 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3107 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3111 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3115 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3118 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3119 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3121 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3122 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3126 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3128 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3129 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3134 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3135 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3137 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3138 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3142 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3143 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3148 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3149 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3155 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3156 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3158 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3159 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3160 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3164 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3165 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3171 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3172 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3174 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3175 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3176 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3180 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3182 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3188 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3189 { unsigned char signature[64];
3191 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3192 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3194 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3196 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3197 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3199 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3200 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3203 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3204 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3205 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3212 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3221 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3224 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3226 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3227 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3228 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3230 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3231 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3235 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3237 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3239 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3240 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3242 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3244 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3251 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3253 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3255 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3256 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3259 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3262 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3263 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3266 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3269 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3273 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3275 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3276 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3279 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3281 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3283 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3290 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3291 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3294 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3297 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3299 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3300 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3305 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3308 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3313 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3317 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3319 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3326 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3328 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3329 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3331 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3332 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3335 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3336 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3337 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3339 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3340 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3343 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3344 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3346 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3352 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3355 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3356 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3361 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3362 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3363 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3364 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3366 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3367 * when we arrive here. */
3368 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3370 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3371 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3373 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3377 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3378 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3379 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3380 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3381 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3389 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3392 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3393 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3397 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3401 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3403 cpk=ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3406 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3407 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3408 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3410 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3415 ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,cpk);
3416 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3419 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3420 return ssl_do_write(s);
3423 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3424 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3425 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3427 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3429 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3430 const unsigned char *const_p;
3431 int len, slen_full, slen;
3436 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3437 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3438 unsigned char key_name[16];
3440 /* get session encoding length */
3441 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3442 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3445 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3447 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3451 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3453 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3455 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3461 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3463 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3464 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3470 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3471 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3473 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3474 * follows handshake_header_length +
3475 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3476 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3477 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3478 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3480 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3481 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3482 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3484 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3485 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3486 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3487 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3488 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3491 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3493 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3502 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3503 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3504 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3505 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3506 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3507 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3510 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3511 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3512 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3513 * as their sessions. */
3514 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3516 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3518 /* Output key name */
3520 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3523 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3524 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3525 /* Encrypt session data */
3526 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3528 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3530 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3532 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3533 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3534 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3537 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3539 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3540 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
3541 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3542 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3544 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3548 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3549 return ssl_do_write(s);
3552 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3554 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3557 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3558 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3559 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3562 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3565 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3568 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3569 /* message length */
3570 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3572 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3573 /* length of OCSP response */
3574 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3575 /* actual response */
3576 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3577 /* number of bytes to write */
3578 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3579 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3583 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3584 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3587 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3588 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3589 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3590 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3593 int proto_len, padding_len;
3595 const unsigned char *p;
3597 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3598 * extension in their ClientHello */
3599 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3601 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3605 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3606 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3607 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3609 514, /* See the payload format below */
3615 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3616 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3617 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3618 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3620 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3625 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3627 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3629 /* The payload looks like:
3631 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3632 * uint8 padding_len;
3633 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3636 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3638 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3639 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3642 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3643 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3645 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3648 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3649 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
3655 int tls1_send_server_supplemental_data(SSL *s, int *skip)
3658 if (s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records_count)
3660 unsigned char *p = NULL;
3661 unsigned char *size_loc = NULL;
3662 srv_supp_data_record *record = NULL;
3666 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records_count; i++)
3668 const unsigned char *out = NULL;
3669 unsigned short outlen = 0;
3671 record = &s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records[i];
3673 /* NULL callback or -1 omits supp data entry */
3676 cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->supp_data_type,
3677 &out, &outlen, &al, record->arg);
3678 if (cb_retval == -1)
3679 continue; /* skip this supp data entry */
3682 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
3685 if (outlen == 0 || TLSEXT_MAXLEN_supplemental_data < outlen + 4 + length)
3687 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
3690 /* write supp data entry...
3691 * if first entry, write handshake message type
3692 * jump back to write length at end */
3695 /* 1 byte message type + 3 bytes for
3697 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, 4))
3699 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
3702 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3703 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA;
3704 /* hold on to length field to update later */
3706 /* skip over handshake length field (3
3707 * bytes) and supp_data length field
3712 /* 2 byte supp data type + 2 byte length + outlen */
3713 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, outlen + 4))
3715 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
3718 s2n(record->supp_data_type, p);
3720 memcpy(p, out, outlen);
3721 /* update length to supp data type (2 bytes) +
3722 * supp data length (2 bytes) + supp data */
3723 length += (outlen + 4);
3728 /* write handshake length */
3729 l2n3(length - 4, size_loc);
3730 /* supp_data length */
3731 l2n3(length - 7, size_loc);
3732 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B;
3733 s->init_num = length;
3736 return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
3740 /* no supp data message sent */
3746 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3750 int tls1_get_client_supplemental_data(SSL *s)
3756 const unsigned char *p, *d;
3757 unsigned short supp_data_entry_type = 0;
3758 unsigned short supp_data_entry_len = 0;
3759 unsigned long supp_data_len = 0;
3762 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3763 SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A,
3764 SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B,
3765 SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,
3766 /* use default limit */
3767 TLSEXT_MAXLEN_supplemental_data,
3770 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3772 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3775 /* The message cannot be empty */
3778 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3779 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CLIENT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3782 n2l3(p, supp_data_len);
3783 while (p<d+supp_data_len)
3785 n2s(p, supp_data_entry_type);
3786 n2s(p, supp_data_entry_len);
3787 /* if there is a callback for this supp data type, send it */
3788 for (i=0; i < s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records_count; i++)
3790 if (s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records[i].supp_data_type == supp_data_entry_type && s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records[i].fn2)
3792 cb_retval = s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records[i].fn2(s, supp_data_entry_type, p, supp_data_entry_len, &al, s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records[i].arg);
3795 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CLIENT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
3800 p+=supp_data_entry_len;
3804 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);