1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
183 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
185 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
187 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
189 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
190 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
192 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
194 /* There isn't any srp login extension !!! */
196 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
200 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
207 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
209 ssl_undefined_function,
210 ssl3_get_server_method)
212 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
215 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
216 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
218 int new_state,state,skip=0;
220 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
224 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
226 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
227 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
229 /* init things to blank */
231 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
239 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
240 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
241 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
242 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
244 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
246 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
257 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
259 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
263 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
264 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
267 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
269 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
271 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
274 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
276 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
278 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
283 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
291 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
298 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
300 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
302 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
303 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
305 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
307 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
308 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
309 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
311 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
312 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
314 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
315 * client that doesn't support secure
318 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
319 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
325 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
326 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
327 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
328 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
332 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
333 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
336 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
337 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
338 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
339 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
342 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
345 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
349 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
350 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
351 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
354 if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP)
356 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
357 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
359 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
362 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
364 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
365 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
368 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
370 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
371 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
372 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
373 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
374 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
375 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
382 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
386 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
387 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
388 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
389 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
390 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
393 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
394 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
396 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
400 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
403 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
407 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
408 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
409 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
410 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
411 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
412 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
413 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
415 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
416 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
417 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
418 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
419 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
421 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
426 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
433 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
438 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
439 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
440 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
442 /* clear this, it may get reset by
443 * send_server_key_exchange */
444 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
445 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
446 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
447 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
449 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
450 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
451 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
452 * be able to handle this) */
453 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
455 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
458 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
459 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
461 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
463 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
464 * message only if the cipher suite is either
465 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
466 * server certificate contains the server's
467 * public key for key exchange.
469 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
470 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
471 * hint if provided */
472 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
473 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
475 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
476 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
477 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
479 || (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
480 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
481 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
482 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
483 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
484 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
490 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
491 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
496 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
500 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
501 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
502 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
503 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
504 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
505 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
506 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
507 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
508 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
509 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
510 * and in RFC 2246): */
511 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
512 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
513 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
514 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
515 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
516 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
517 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
518 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
519 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
521 /* no cert request */
523 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
524 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
525 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
526 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
531 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
532 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
533 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
534 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
535 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
537 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
538 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
544 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
545 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
546 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
547 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
548 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
549 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
553 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
555 /* This code originally checked to see if
556 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
557 * and then flushed. This caused problems
558 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
559 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
560 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
561 * still exist. So instead we just flush
565 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
566 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
571 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
573 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
576 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
577 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
578 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
579 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
583 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
585 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
587 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
588 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
591 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
595 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
596 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
597 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
602 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
603 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
604 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
605 * message is not sent.
606 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
607 * the client uses its key from the certificate
610 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
611 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
613 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
614 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
616 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
620 else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
622 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
624 if (!s->session->peer)
626 /* For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer
627 * at this point and digest cached records.
629 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
631 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
634 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
635 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
643 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
646 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
647 * a client cert, it can be verified
648 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
649 * should be generalized. But it is next step
651 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
652 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
654 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
655 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
659 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
660 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
671 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
672 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
674 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
675 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
676 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
678 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
679 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
681 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
682 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
684 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
689 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
690 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
691 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
692 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
693 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
695 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
699 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
700 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
701 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
702 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
703 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
706 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
707 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
708 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
711 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
715 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
716 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
717 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
718 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
719 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
720 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
724 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
725 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
726 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
727 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
728 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
734 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
735 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
737 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
738 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
739 { ret= -1; goto end; }
741 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
742 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
744 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
745 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
748 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
749 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
757 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
758 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
759 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
760 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
761 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
762 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
763 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
764 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
767 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
768 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
770 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
771 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
773 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
777 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
782 /* clean a few things up */
783 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
785 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
788 /* remove buffering on output */
789 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
793 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
798 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
800 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
802 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
804 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
812 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
818 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
822 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
827 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
831 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
838 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
842 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
846 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
850 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
852 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
853 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
858 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
859 /* number of bytes to write */
864 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
865 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
868 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
873 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
874 * so permit appropriate message length */
875 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
881 if (!ok) return((int)n);
882 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
883 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
885 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
887 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
889 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
892 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
893 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
894 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
895 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
897 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
898 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
901 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
902 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
904 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
905 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
908 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
914 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
916 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
917 unsigned int cookie_len;
920 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
922 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
925 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
927 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
928 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
929 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
930 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
933 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
936 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
939 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
940 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
941 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
942 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
943 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
946 if (!ok) return((int)n);
948 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
950 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
951 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
952 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
955 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
956 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
958 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
959 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
961 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
962 s->version = s->client_version;
964 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
968 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
969 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
970 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
972 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
974 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
976 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
977 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
979 if (cookie_length == 0)
983 /* load the client random */
984 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
987 /* get the session-id */
991 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
992 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
993 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
994 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
995 * won't even compile against older library versions).
997 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
998 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
999 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1000 * setting will be ignored.
1002 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
1004 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1009 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1011 { /* previous session */
1018 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1025 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1028 cookie_len = *(p++);
1031 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1032 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1033 * does not cause an overflow.
1035 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1038 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1039 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1043 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1044 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1047 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1049 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1051 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1054 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1055 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1056 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1059 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1061 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1062 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1064 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1065 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1066 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1077 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1079 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1080 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1081 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1086 /* not enough data */
1087 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1088 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1091 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1098 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1099 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1102 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1105 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1107 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1109 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1111 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1112 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1120 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1121 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1124 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1126 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1127 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1128 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1129 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1130 * enabled, though. */
1131 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1132 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1134 s->session->cipher = c;
1141 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1142 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1143 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1144 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1153 /* not enough data */
1154 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1155 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1161 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1168 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1175 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1177 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
1179 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1184 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1185 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1189 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1190 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1191 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1192 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1196 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1197 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1199 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1201 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1206 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1208 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1210 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1211 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1212 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1215 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1216 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1220 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1221 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1222 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1224 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1225 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1229 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1232 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1234 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1235 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1237 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1238 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1243 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1244 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1245 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1246 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1247 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1248 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1249 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1251 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1252 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1253 /* Can't disable compression */
1254 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1256 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1260 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1261 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1263 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1264 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1266 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1270 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1272 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1276 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1277 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1279 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1284 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1285 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1291 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1292 { /* See if we have a match */
1293 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1295 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1296 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1298 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1311 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1316 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1317 * using compression.
1319 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1321 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1322 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1327 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1332 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1333 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1335 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1337 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1338 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1339 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1340 if (ciphers == NULL)
1342 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1343 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1347 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1348 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1352 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1353 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1356 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1360 /* Session-id reuse */
1361 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1362 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1363 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1364 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1366 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1368 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1369 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1371 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1372 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1374 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1378 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1379 else if (ec != NULL)
1380 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1382 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1386 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1389 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1391 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1395 /* we now have the following setup.
1397 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1398 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1399 * compression - basically ignored right now
1400 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1401 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1402 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1403 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1410 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1413 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1417 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1420 unsigned char *p,*d;
1423 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1427 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1429 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1430 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1431 p=s->s3->server_random;
1432 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
1433 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1435 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1438 /* Do the message type and length last */
1441 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1442 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1445 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1446 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1448 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1449 * back in the server hello:
1450 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1451 * we send back the old session ID.
1452 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1453 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1454 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1455 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1457 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1458 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1459 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1460 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1463 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1465 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1467 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1468 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1470 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1474 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1477 /* put the cipher */
1478 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1481 /* put the compression method */
1482 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1485 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1488 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1490 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1491 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1493 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1496 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1498 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1505 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1508 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1509 /* number of bytes to write */
1514 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1515 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1518 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1522 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1524 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1527 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1532 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1533 /* number of bytes to write */
1538 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1539 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1542 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1544 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1548 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1551 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1554 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1555 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1556 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1559 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1562 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1563 unsigned char *p,*d;
1573 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1574 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1576 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1581 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1583 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1584 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1587 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1589 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1590 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1591 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1594 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1595 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1603 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1604 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1609 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1613 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1614 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1617 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1618 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1619 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1620 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1623 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1624 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1628 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1630 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1634 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1636 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1641 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1642 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1643 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1645 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1647 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1654 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1655 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1656 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1657 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1659 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1669 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1670 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1672 const EC_GROUP *group;
1674 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1675 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1677 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1678 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1679 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1683 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1684 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1688 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1690 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1694 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1697 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1700 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1702 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1706 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1707 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1708 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1709 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1711 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1713 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1718 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1719 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1720 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1722 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1726 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1727 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1729 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1733 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1734 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1735 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1738 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1741 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1745 /* Encode the public key.
1746 * First check the size of encoding and
1747 * allocate memory accordingly.
1749 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1750 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1751 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1754 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1755 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1756 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1757 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1759 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1764 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1765 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1766 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1767 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1769 if (encodedlen == 0)
1771 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1775 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1777 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1778 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1779 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1780 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1785 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1786 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1794 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1795 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1796 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1798 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1799 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1802 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1803 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1804 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1806 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1807 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1808 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1809 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1811 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1822 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1823 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1826 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1828 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1829 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1830 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1837 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1838 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1840 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1843 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1846 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1854 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1856 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1859 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1862 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1864 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1865 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1877 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1878 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1880 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1881 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1882 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1883 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1884 * the actual encoded point itself
1886 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1894 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1895 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1897 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1898 encodedPoint = NULL;
1903 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1904 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1906 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1907 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1908 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1909 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1916 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1917 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1918 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1919 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
1920 && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
1924 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1926 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1927 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1928 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1929 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1930 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1931 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1932 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1933 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1934 (unsigned int *)&i);
1938 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1939 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1941 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1951 /* For TLS1.2 and later send signature
1953 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1955 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
1957 /* Should never happen */
1958 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1959 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1965 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
1968 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
1969 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1970 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1971 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1972 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1973 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1975 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
1980 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1985 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1986 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1987 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1992 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1995 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2001 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2002 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2003 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2005 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2007 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2008 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2009 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2011 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2015 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2017 unsigned char *p,*d;
2019 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2023 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2027 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
2029 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2031 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2036 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2038 nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2);
2048 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2052 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2054 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2055 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2056 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
2058 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2061 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
2062 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2065 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2072 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2073 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2079 /* else no CA names */
2080 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
2083 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
2084 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
2087 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2092 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2093 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2096 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2103 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2106 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2107 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2112 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2116 unsigned long alg_k;
2118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2120 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2128 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2130 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2131 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2132 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2133 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2134 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2137 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2138 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2139 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2140 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2144 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2145 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2147 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2149 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2150 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2152 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2153 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2155 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2156 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2157 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2158 * be sent already */
2161 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2162 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2169 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2170 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2171 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2172 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2174 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2175 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2181 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2182 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2187 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2189 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2199 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2203 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2205 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2206 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
2209 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2211 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2212 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2213 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2214 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2215 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2217 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2218 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2219 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2221 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2222 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2224 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2225 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2226 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2227 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
2228 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
2229 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
2230 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
2236 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
2237 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
2238 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2240 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2241 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2242 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2243 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2247 s->session->master_key_length=
2248 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2249 s->session->master_key,
2251 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2255 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2256 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2261 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2263 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2273 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
2275 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2276 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
2282 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2283 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2284 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2285 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2288 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2289 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2290 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) ||
2291 (skey->pkey.dh == NULL))
2293 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2294 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2297 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2299 else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2301 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2306 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2309 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2312 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2316 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2325 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2330 s->session->master_key_length=
2331 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2332 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2333 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2337 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2338 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2340 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2341 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2342 krb5_data authenticator;
2344 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2345 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2346 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2347 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2348 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2349 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2351 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2352 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2354 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2356 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2359 enc_ticket.length = i;
2361 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2363 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2364 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2368 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2369 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2372 authenticator.length = i;
2374 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2376 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2377 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2381 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2382 p+=authenticator.length;
2386 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2389 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2392 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2394 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2395 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2399 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2400 enc_pms.length + 6))
2402 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2403 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2407 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2411 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2412 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2414 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2415 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2416 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2421 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2422 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2424 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2425 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2428 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2429 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2431 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2432 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2433 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2438 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2440 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2445 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2446 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2448 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2452 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2454 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2456 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2457 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2460 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2461 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2463 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2464 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2467 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2469 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2470 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2473 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2475 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2476 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2480 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2482 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2483 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2486 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2488 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2489 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2490 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2491 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2492 * the protocol version.
2493 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2494 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2496 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2498 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2499 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2504 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2506 s->session->master_key_length=
2507 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2508 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2510 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2512 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2513 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2515 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2516 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2521 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2522 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2523 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2524 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2528 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2530 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2531 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2536 const EC_GROUP *group;
2537 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2539 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2540 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2542 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2543 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2547 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2548 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2550 /* use the certificate */
2551 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2555 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2556 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2558 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2561 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2562 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2564 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2565 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2567 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2572 /* Let's get client's public key */
2573 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2575 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2576 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2582 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2584 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2586 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2587 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2590 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2592 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2594 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2595 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2596 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2597 * never executed. When that support is
2598 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2599 * received in the certificate is
2600 * authorized for key agreement.
2601 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2602 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2605 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2606 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2607 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2611 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2612 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2614 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2618 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2622 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2623 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2625 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2627 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2628 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2632 /* Get encoded point length */
2637 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2641 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2642 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2644 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2648 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2649 * currently, so set it to the start
2651 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2654 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2655 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2656 if (field_size <= 0)
2658 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2662 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2665 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2670 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2671 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2672 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2673 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2674 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2675 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2677 /* Compute the master secret */
2678 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2679 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2681 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2686 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2687 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2689 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2690 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2691 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2693 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2695 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2700 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2701 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2704 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2706 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2707 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2710 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2712 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2713 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2717 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2718 * string for the callback */
2719 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2720 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2721 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2722 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2723 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2725 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2727 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2728 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2731 else if (psk_len == 0)
2733 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2734 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2735 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2736 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2740 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2741 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2743 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2745 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2749 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2750 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2751 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2752 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2754 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2755 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2759 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2760 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2761 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2762 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2763 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2765 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2766 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2770 s->session->master_key_length=
2771 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2772 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2775 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2781 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2782 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2790 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2791 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2794 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2796 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2799 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2800 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2801 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2802 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2804 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2805 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2809 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2811 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2818 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2819 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2822 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2823 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2824 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2825 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2826 unsigned long alg_a;
2828 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2829 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2830 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2831 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2832 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2833 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2835 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2836 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2837 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2838 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2839 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2840 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2841 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2842 if (client_pub_pkey)
2844 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2847 /* Decrypt session key */
2848 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)))
2850 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2858 else if (p[1] < 0x80)
2865 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2868 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2871 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2874 /* Generate master secret */
2875 s->session->master_key_length=
2876 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2877 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2878 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2879 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2884 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2885 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2893 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2894 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2895 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2901 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2902 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2905 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2906 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2907 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2908 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2909 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2910 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2915 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2917 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2923 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2925 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2927 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2928 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2929 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2931 516, /* Enough for 4096 bit RSA key with TLS v1.2 */
2934 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2936 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2938 peer=s->session->peer;
2939 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2940 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2948 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2950 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2951 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2953 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2954 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2963 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2964 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2968 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2970 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2971 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2975 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2977 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2978 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2982 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2983 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2984 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2985 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
2986 * signature without length field */
2987 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
2988 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
2994 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2996 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
2997 /* Should never happen */
3000 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3001 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3004 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
3005 if (sigalg != (int)p[1])
3007 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
3008 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3011 md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
3014 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
3015 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3019 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3028 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3029 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3033 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3034 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
3036 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3037 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3041 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3045 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3048 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3049 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3053 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3056 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3057 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3059 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3060 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3064 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3066 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3067 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3072 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3073 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3075 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3076 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3080 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3081 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3086 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3087 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3093 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3094 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3096 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3097 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3098 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3102 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3103 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3109 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3110 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3112 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3113 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3114 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3118 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3119 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3120 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3126 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3127 { unsigned char signature[64];
3129 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3130 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3132 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3134 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3135 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3137 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3138 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3141 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3143 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3149 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3150 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3159 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3162 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3164 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3165 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3166 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3168 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3169 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3173 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3175 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3177 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3178 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3180 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3182 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3189 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3191 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3193 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3194 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3196 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3197 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3200 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3201 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3203 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3204 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3207 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3211 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3213 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3217 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3219 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3221 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3228 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3232 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3235 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3237 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3243 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3246 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3251 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3255 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3264 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3266 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3267 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3269 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3270 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3273 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3274 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3275 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3278 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3281 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3282 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3284 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3290 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3293 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3294 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
3299 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3300 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3301 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3302 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3304 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3305 * when we arrive here. */
3306 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3308 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3309 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3311 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3315 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3316 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3317 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3318 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3319 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3327 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3330 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3331 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3335 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3340 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3342 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
3345 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3346 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3347 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3349 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3354 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
3355 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3360 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3361 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3364 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3365 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3366 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3368 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3370 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3371 const unsigned char *const_p;
3372 int len, slen_full, slen;
3377 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3378 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3379 unsigned char key_name[16];
3381 /* get session encoding length */
3382 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3383 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3386 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3388 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3392 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3394 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3396 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3402 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3404 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3405 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3411 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3412 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3414 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3415 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3416 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3417 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3418 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3419 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3421 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3422 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
3423 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3426 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3428 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
3429 /* Skip message length for now */
3431 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3432 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3433 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3434 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3437 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3439 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3448 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3449 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3450 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3451 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3452 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3453 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3456 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3457 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3458 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3459 * as their sessions. */
3460 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3462 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3464 /* Output key name */
3466 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3469 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3470 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3471 /* Encrypt session data */
3472 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3474 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3476 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3478 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3479 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3480 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3483 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3485 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3486 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
3487 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
3489 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
3491 /* number of bytes to write */
3493 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3498 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3499 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3502 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3504 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3507 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3508 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3509 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3512 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3515 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3518 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3519 /* message length */
3520 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3522 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3523 /* length of OCSP response */
3524 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3525 /* actual response */
3526 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3527 /* number of bytes to write */
3528 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3529 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3533 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3534 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3537 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3538 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3539 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3540 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3543 int proto_len, padding_len;
3545 const unsigned char *p;
3547 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3548 * extension in their ClientHello */
3549 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3551 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3555 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3556 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3557 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3559 514, /* See the payload format below */
3565 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3566 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3567 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3568 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3570 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3575 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3577 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3579 /* The payload looks like:
3581 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3582 * uint8 padding_len;
3583 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3586 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3588 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3589 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3592 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3593 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3595 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3598 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3599 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;