2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
125 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
126 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
129 #include "ssl_locl.h"
130 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
131 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
132 #include <openssl/rand.h>
133 #include <openssl/objects.h>
134 #include <openssl/evp.h>
135 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
136 #include <openssl/x509.h>
137 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
138 #include <openssl/dh.h>
140 #include <openssl/bn.h>
141 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
142 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
144 #include <openssl/md5.h>
146 static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
147 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
148 static int nid2curve_id(int nid);
151 static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
153 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
154 return(SSLv3_server_method());
159 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
161 ssl_undefined_function,
162 ssl3_get_server_method)
164 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
167 unsigned long l,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
168 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
171 int new_state,state,skip=0;
173 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
177 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
179 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
180 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
182 /* init things to blank */
184 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
198 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
200 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
204 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
205 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
208 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
210 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
215 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
217 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
219 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
224 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
232 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
240 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
242 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
243 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
245 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
247 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
248 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
249 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
253 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
254 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
255 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
256 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
260 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
261 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
264 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
265 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
266 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
267 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
270 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
273 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
277 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
278 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
279 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
282 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
283 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
285 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
289 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
290 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
291 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
292 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
295 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
297 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
301 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
302 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
303 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH or KRB5 */
304 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL)
305 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
307 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
308 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
309 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
310 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
311 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
313 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
318 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
325 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
330 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
331 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
332 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
334 /* clear this, it may get reset by
335 * send_server_key_exchange */
336 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
337 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
339 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
341 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
342 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
343 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
344 * be able to handle this) */
345 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
347 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
350 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
351 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
353 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
354 * message only if the cipher suite is either
355 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
356 * server certificate contains the server's
357 * public key for key exchange.
359 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
361 || (l & (SSL_DH|SSL_kFZA))
363 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
364 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
365 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
371 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
372 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
377 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
381 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
382 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
383 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
384 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
385 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
386 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
387 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
388 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
389 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
390 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
391 * and in RFC 2246): */
392 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) &&
393 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
394 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
395 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
396 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
397 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
399 /* no cert request */
401 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
402 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
406 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
407 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
408 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
409 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
410 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
412 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
413 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
419 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
420 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
421 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
422 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
423 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
424 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
428 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
429 /* number of bytes to be flushed */
430 num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,NULL);
433 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
434 num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio);
435 if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; }
436 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
439 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
442 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
443 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
444 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
445 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
449 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
451 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
453 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
454 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
457 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
461 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
462 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
463 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
468 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
469 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
470 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
471 * message is not sent.
473 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
478 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
481 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
482 * a client cert, it can be verified
484 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
485 &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
486 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
487 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
488 &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
489 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
493 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
494 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
496 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
497 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
498 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
500 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
504 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
505 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
506 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
507 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
508 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
511 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
512 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
513 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
516 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
520 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
521 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
522 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
523 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
524 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
525 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
529 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
530 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
531 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
532 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
533 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
539 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
540 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
542 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
543 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
544 { ret= -1; goto end; }
546 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
547 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
549 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
550 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
553 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
554 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
562 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
563 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
564 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
565 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
566 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
567 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
568 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
569 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
571 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
573 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
578 /* clean a few things up */
579 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
581 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
584 /* remove buffering on output */
585 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
589 if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
591 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
592 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
596 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
598 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
600 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
602 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
610 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
616 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
620 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
625 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
629 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
636 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
640 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
644 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
648 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
650 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
651 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
656 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
657 /* number of bytes to write */
662 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
663 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
666 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
671 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
672 * so permit appropriate message length */
673 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
679 if (!ok) return((int)n);
680 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
681 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
683 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
684 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
685 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
686 * when a handshake is not completed ... */
687 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
688 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
690 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
691 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
699 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
701 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
702 unsigned int cookie_len;
705 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
707 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
710 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
712 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
713 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
714 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
715 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
718 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
720 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
723 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
724 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
725 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
726 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
727 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
730 if (!ok) return((int)n);
732 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
734 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
735 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
736 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
739 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
740 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
742 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
743 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
745 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
746 s->version = s->client_version;
748 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
752 /* load the client random */
753 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
756 /* get the session-id */
760 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
761 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
762 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
763 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
764 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
765 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
766 * an earlier library version)
768 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
770 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
775 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
777 { /* previous session */
784 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
791 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION)
796 if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
797 s->d1->send_cookie == 0)
799 /* HelloVerifyMessage has already been sent */
800 if ( cookie_len != s->d1->cookie_len)
802 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
803 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
809 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
810 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
811 * does not cause an overflow.
813 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
816 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
817 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
821 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
822 if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
825 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
827 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
829 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
832 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
833 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
834 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
837 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
839 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
840 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
842 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
843 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
844 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
853 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
855 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
856 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
857 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
862 /* not enough data */
863 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
864 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
867 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
874 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
875 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
878 id=s->session->cipher->id;
881 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
883 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
885 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
887 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
888 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
898 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
900 /* Very bad for multi-threading.... */
901 s->session->cipher=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
905 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
906 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
907 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
908 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
918 /* not enough data */
919 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
920 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
926 if (p[j] == 0) break;
933 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
934 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
938 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
940 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
942 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
944 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
945 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
949 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
950 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
954 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
955 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
956 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
957 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
958 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
959 if (s->ctx->comp_methods != NULL)
960 { /* See if we have a match */
963 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
966 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
979 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
985 /* TLS does not mind if there is extra stuff */
986 #if 0 /* SSL 3.0 does not mind either, so we should disable this test
987 * (was enabled in 0.9.6d through 0.9.6j and 0.9.7 through 0.9.7b,
988 * in earlier SSLeay/OpenSSL releases this test existed but was buggy) */
989 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
993 /* wrong number of bytes,
994 * there could be more to follow */
995 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
996 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1002 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1007 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1008 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1010 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1012 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1013 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1014 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1015 if (ciphers == NULL)
1017 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1018 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1022 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1023 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1027 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1028 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1031 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1035 /* Session-id reuse */
1036 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1037 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1038 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1039 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1041 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1043 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1044 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1046 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1047 if (c->algorithms & SSL_eNULL)
1049 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1053 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1054 else if (ec != NULL)
1055 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1057 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1061 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1064 /* we now have the following setup.
1066 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1067 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1068 * compression - basically ignored right now
1069 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1070 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1071 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1072 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1079 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1082 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1086 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1089 unsigned char *p,*d;
1091 unsigned long l,Time;
1093 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1095 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1096 p=s->s3->server_random;
1097 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1099 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1101 /* Do the message type and length last */
1104 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1105 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1108 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1109 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1111 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1112 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1113 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1114 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1115 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1116 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1117 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1119 * We also have an additional case where stateless session
1120 * resumption is successful: we always send back the old
1121 * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can
1122 * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful
1123 * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality
1126 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1128 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1130 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1131 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1133 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1137 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1140 /* put the cipher */
1141 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1144 /* put the compression method */
1145 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1148 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1151 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1153 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1154 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1156 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1163 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1166 s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
1167 /* number of bytes to write */
1172 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
1173 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1176 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1180 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1182 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1185 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1190 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1191 /* number of bytes to write */
1196 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
1197 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1200 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1202 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1206 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1209 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1212 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1213 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1214 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1217 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1220 unsigned char *p,*d;
1230 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1231 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1233 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_MKEY_MASK;
1238 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1241 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1244 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1246 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1247 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1248 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1251 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1260 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1261 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1266 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1270 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1271 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1274 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1275 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1276 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1277 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1280 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1281 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1285 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1288 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1292 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1294 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1299 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1300 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1301 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1303 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1305 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1312 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1313 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1314 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1315 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1317 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1327 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1328 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1330 const EC_GROUP *group;
1332 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1333 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1335 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1336 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1337 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1341 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1342 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1346 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1348 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
1349 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1353 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1356 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1359 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp))
1361 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1366 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1367 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1368 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1369 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1371 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1373 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1378 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1379 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1380 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1382 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1386 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1387 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1389 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1393 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1394 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1395 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1398 nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1401 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1405 /* Encode the public key.
1406 * First check the size of encoding and
1407 * allocate memory accordingly.
1409 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1410 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1411 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1414 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1415 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1416 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1417 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1419 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1424 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1425 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1426 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1427 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1429 if (encodedlen == 0)
1431 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1435 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1437 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1438 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1439 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1440 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1445 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1446 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1454 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1456 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1457 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1460 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1462 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1466 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
1468 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
1471 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1474 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1482 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1484 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1487 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1490 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1497 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1498 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1500 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1501 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1502 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1503 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1504 * the actual encoded point itself
1506 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1514 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1515 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1517 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1525 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1526 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1527 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1528 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1532 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1534 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1535 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1536 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1537 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1538 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1539 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1540 (unsigned int *)&i);
1544 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1545 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1547 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1555 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1556 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1559 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
1560 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1561 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1562 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1563 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1564 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1566 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
1574 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1575 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1577 /* let's do ECDSA */
1578 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
1579 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1580 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1581 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1582 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1583 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1585 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
1594 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1595 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1596 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1601 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1604 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1610 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1611 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1612 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1614 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1616 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1617 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1618 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1620 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1624 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1626 unsigned char *p,*d;
1628 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
1632 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
1636 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
1638 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1640 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
1649 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1653 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
1655 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
1656 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
1657 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
1659 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1662 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
1663 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
1666 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1673 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1674 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
1680 /* else no CA names */
1681 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
1684 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
1685 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1688 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1693 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1694 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
1697 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1704 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
1707 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1708 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1713 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1719 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1721 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1723 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1727 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1729 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1731 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1732 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
1733 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
1734 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
1735 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1738 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1739 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1740 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
1741 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1745 if (!ok) return((int)n);
1746 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1748 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
1750 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1753 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
1754 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
1756 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
1757 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
1758 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
1759 * be sent already */
1762 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1763 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
1770 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
1771 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
1772 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
1773 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
1775 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1776 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
1782 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS, including pre-0.9.8f */
1783 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION &&
1784 s->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1789 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
1791 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1801 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
1805 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
1807 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1808 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
1811 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
1813 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
1814 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
1815 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
1816 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
1817 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
1819 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
1820 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
1821 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
1823 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1824 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
1826 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
1827 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
1828 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
1829 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
1830 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
1831 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
1832 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
1838 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
1839 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
1840 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
1842 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
1843 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
1844 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
1845 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
1849 s->session->master_key_length=
1850 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1851 s->session->master_key,
1853 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1857 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1858 if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
1863 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
1865 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1875 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
1877 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1878 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
1883 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
1885 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1886 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1890 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
1893 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
1896 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
1900 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
1904 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1908 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
1913 s->session->master_key_length=
1914 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1915 s->session->master_key,p,i);
1916 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1920 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1923 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
1924 krb5_data enc_ticket;
1925 krb5_data authenticator;
1927 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
1928 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
1929 EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
1930 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
1931 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
1932 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
1934 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
1935 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
1937 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
1939 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
1942 enc_ticket.length = i;
1944 if (n < (int)enc_ticket.length + 6)
1946 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1947 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1951 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
1952 p+=enc_ticket.length;
1955 authenticator.length = i;
1957 if (n < (int)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length) + 6)
1959 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1960 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1964 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
1965 p+=authenticator.length;
1969 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
1972 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
1975 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
1977 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1978 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1982 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
1983 enc_pms.length + 6))
1985 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1986 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1990 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
1994 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
1995 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
1997 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
1998 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1999 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2004 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2005 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2007 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2008 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2011 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2012 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2014 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2015 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2016 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2021 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2023 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2028 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2029 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2031 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2035 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2037 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2039 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2040 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2043 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2044 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2046 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2047 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2050 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2052 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2053 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2056 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2058 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2059 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2063 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2065 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2066 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2069 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2071 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2072 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2073 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2074 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2075 * the protocol version.
2076 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2077 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2079 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2081 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2082 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2087 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2089 s->session->master_key_length=
2090 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2091 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2093 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2095 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2096 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2098 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2099 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2104 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2105 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2106 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2107 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2111 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2113 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2114 if ((l & SSL_kECDH) || (l & SSL_kECDHE))
2119 const EC_GROUP *group;
2120 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2122 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2123 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2125 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2126 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2130 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2133 /* use the certificate */
2134 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2138 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2139 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2141 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2144 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2145 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2147 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2148 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2150 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2155 /* Let's get client's public key */
2156 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2158 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2159 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2165 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2169 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2170 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2173 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2175 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2177 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2178 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2179 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2180 * never executed. When that support is
2181 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2182 * received in the certificate is
2183 * authorized for key agreement.
2184 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2185 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2188 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2189 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2190 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2194 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2195 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2197 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2201 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2205 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2206 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2208 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2210 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2211 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2215 /* Get encoded point length */
2218 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2219 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2221 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2225 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2226 * currently, so set it to the start
2228 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2231 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2232 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2233 if (field_size <= 0)
2235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2239 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2247 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2248 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2249 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2250 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2251 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2253 /* Compute the master secret */
2254 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2255 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2257 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2263 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2264 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2265 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2271 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2272 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
2275 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2276 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2277 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2278 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2279 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2280 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2285 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2287 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2294 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2295 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2296 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2301 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2303 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2305 peer=s->session->peer;
2306 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2307 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2315 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2317 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2318 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2320 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2321 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2330 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2331 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2335 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2337 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2338 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2342 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2344 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2345 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2349 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2350 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2356 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2360 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2361 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
2363 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2364 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2368 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2369 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2371 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2372 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2376 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2377 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2382 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2383 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2389 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2390 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2392 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2393 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2394 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
2398 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2399 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
2405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2406 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
2408 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2409 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2410 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
2414 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2415 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2416 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2423 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2424 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
2433 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2436 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2440 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2442 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
2444 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
2445 const unsigned char *p,*q;
2447 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
2449 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2456 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2458 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
2460 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2461 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2463 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2464 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2467 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
2468 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
2470 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
2471 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2474 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2478 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
2480 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2481 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2484 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2486 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
2488 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2495 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2496 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2499 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
2502 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
2504 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2505 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2510 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
2513 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2518 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2519 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2522 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
2524 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2531 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
2533 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2534 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2536 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2537 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2540 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2541 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2542 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2544 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2545 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2551 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
2554 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2555 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
2560 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
2561 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2562 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
2563 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2565 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
2566 * when we arrive here. */
2567 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2569 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
2570 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2572 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2576 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
2577 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
2578 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
2579 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
2580 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
2588 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2591 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
2592 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
2596 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
2601 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
2603 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
2605 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
2606 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms
2607 & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
2608 != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))
2610 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2614 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
2615 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
2620 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
2621 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2625 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2626 /* This is the complement of curve_id2nid in s3_clnt.c. */
2627 static int nid2curve_id(int nid)
2629 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001)
2630 * (no changes in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt [June 2003]) */
2632 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
2634 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
2636 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
2638 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
2640 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
2642 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
2644 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
2646 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
2648 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
2650 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
2652 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
2654 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
2656 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
2658 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
2660 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
2662 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
2664 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
2666 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
2668 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
2670 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
2672 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
2674 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
2676 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
2678 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
2680 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
2687 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
2688 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
2690 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
2692 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
2698 /* get session encoding length */
2699 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
2700 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
2705 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
2706 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
2707 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
2708 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
2709 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
2710 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
2712 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
2713 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
2714 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
2716 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
2720 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
2722 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2724 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
2725 /* Skip message length for now */
2727 l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
2728 /* Skip ticket length for now */
2730 /* Output key name */
2732 memcpy(p, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
2734 /* Generate and output IV */
2735 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
2736 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
2737 /* Encrypt session data */
2738 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
2739 s->ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, p);
2741 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
2743 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
2745 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2747 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
2748 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
2749 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
2750 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
2751 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
2752 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
2755 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
2757 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2758 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
2759 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
2761 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
2763 /* number of bytes to write */
2765 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
2770 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
2771 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2774 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
2776 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
2779 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
2780 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
2781 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
2784 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
2787 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2790 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
2791 /* message length */
2792 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
2794 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
2795 /* length of OCSP response */
2796 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
2797 /* actual response */
2798 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
2799 /* number of bytes to write */
2800 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
2801 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
2805 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
2806 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));