1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
183 static int SSL_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *ad)
185 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
187 *ad = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
189 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
190 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
192 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
194 /* There isn't any srp login extension !!! */
195 ret = SSL3_AL_WARNING;
196 *ad = SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME;
200 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,ad);
207 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
209 ssl_undefined_function,
210 ssl3_get_server_method)
212 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
215 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
216 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
218 int new_state,state,skip=0;
219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
220 int srp_no_username=0;
221 int extension_error,al;
224 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
228 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
230 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
231 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
233 /* init things to blank */
235 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
249 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
251 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
255 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
256 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
259 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
261 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
263 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
266 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
268 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
270 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
275 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
283 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
291 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
293 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
294 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
296 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
298 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
299 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
300 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
302 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
303 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
305 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
306 * client that doesn't support secure
309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
310 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
316 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
317 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
318 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
319 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
323 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
324 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
327 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
328 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
329 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
330 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
333 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
336 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
340 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
341 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
342 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
343 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
344 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_SRP_USERNAME:
348 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
349 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
350 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
352 if ((al = SSL_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&extension_error)) != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
354 ssl3_send_alert(s,al,extension_error);
355 if (extension_error == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
357 if (srp_no_username) goto end;
360 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_SRP_USERNAME;
361 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
362 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) goto end;
367 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
373 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
377 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
378 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
379 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
380 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
381 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
384 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
385 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
387 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
391 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
394 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
398 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
399 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
400 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
401 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
402 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
403 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
404 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
406 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
407 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
408 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
409 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
410 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
412 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
417 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
424 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
429 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
430 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
431 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
433 /* clear this, it may get reset by
434 * send_server_key_exchange */
435 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
436 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
437 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
438 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
440 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
441 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
442 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
443 * be able to handle this) */
444 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
446 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
449 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
450 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
452 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
454 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
455 * message only if the cipher suite is either
456 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
457 * server certificate contains the server's
458 * public key for key exchange.
460 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
461 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
462 * hint if provided */
463 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
464 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
466 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
467 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
468 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
470 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH))
471 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
472 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
473 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
474 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
475 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
481 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
482 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
487 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
491 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
492 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
493 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
494 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
495 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
496 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
497 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
498 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
499 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
500 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
501 * and in RFC 2246): */
502 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
503 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
504 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
505 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
506 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
507 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
508 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
509 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
510 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
512 /* no cert request */
514 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
515 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
516 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
517 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
522 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
523 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
524 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
525 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
526 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
528 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
529 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
535 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
536 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
537 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
538 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
539 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
540 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
544 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
546 /* This code originally checked to see if
547 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
548 * and then flushed. This caused problems
549 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
550 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
551 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
552 * still exist. So instead we just flush
556 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
557 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
562 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
564 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
567 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
568 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
569 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
570 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
574 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
576 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
578 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
579 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
582 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
586 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
587 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
588 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
593 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
594 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
595 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
596 * message is not sent.
597 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
598 * the client uses its key from the certificate
601 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
604 else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
606 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
608 if (!s->session->peer)
610 /* For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer
611 * at this point and digest cached records.
613 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
615 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
618 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
619 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
627 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
630 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
631 * a client cert, it can be verified
632 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
633 * should be generalized. But it is next step
635 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
636 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
638 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
639 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
643 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
644 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
655 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
656 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
658 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
659 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
660 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
662 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
666 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
667 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
668 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
669 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
670 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
673 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
674 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
675 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
678 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
682 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
683 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
684 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
685 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
686 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
687 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
691 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
692 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
693 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
694 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
695 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
701 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
702 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
704 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
705 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
706 { ret= -1; goto end; }
708 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
709 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
711 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
712 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
715 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
716 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
724 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
725 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
726 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
727 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
728 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
729 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
730 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
731 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
733 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
735 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
740 /* clean a few things up */
741 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
743 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
746 /* remove buffering on output */
747 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
751 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
756 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
758 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
760 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
762 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
770 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
776 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
780 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
785 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
789 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
796 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
800 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
804 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
808 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
810 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
811 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
816 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
817 /* number of bytes to write */
822 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
823 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
826 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
831 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
832 * so permit appropriate message length */
833 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
839 if (!ok) return((int)n);
840 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
841 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
843 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
844 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
845 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
846 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
848 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
849 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
852 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
853 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
855 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
856 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
864 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
866 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
867 unsigned int cookie_len;
870 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
872 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
875 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
877 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
878 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
879 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
880 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
883 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
884 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
885 || (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_SRP_USERNAME)
889 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
892 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
893 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
894 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
895 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
896 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
899 if (!ok) return((int)n);
901 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
903 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
904 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
905 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
908 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
909 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
911 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
912 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
914 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
915 s->version = s->client_version;
917 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
921 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
922 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
923 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
925 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
927 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
929 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
930 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
932 if (cookie_length == 0)
936 /* load the client random */
937 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
940 /* get the session-id */
944 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
945 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
946 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
947 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
948 * won't even compile against older library versions).
950 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
951 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
952 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
953 * setting will be ignored.
955 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
957 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
962 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
964 { /* previous session */
971 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
978 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
984 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
985 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
986 * does not cause an overflow.
988 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
991 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
992 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
996 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
997 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1000 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1002 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1004 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1007 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1008 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1009 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1012 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1014 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1015 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1017 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1018 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1019 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1030 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1032 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1033 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1034 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1039 /* not enough data */
1040 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1041 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1044 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1051 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1052 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1055 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1058 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1060 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1062 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1064 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1065 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1073 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1074 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1077 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1079 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1080 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1081 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1082 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1083 * enabled, though. */
1084 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1085 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1087 s->session->cipher = c;
1094 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1095 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1096 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1097 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1106 /* not enough data */
1107 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1108 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1114 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1121 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1122 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1128 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1130 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
1132 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1133 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1137 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1138 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1142 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1143 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1144 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1145 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1149 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1150 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1152 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1154 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1159 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1161 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1163 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1164 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1165 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1168 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1169 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1173 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1174 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1175 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1177 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1178 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1182 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1185 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1187 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1188 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1190 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1191 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1196 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1197 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1198 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1199 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1200 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1201 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1202 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1204 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1205 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1206 /* Can't disable compression */
1207 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1209 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1210 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1213 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1214 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1216 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1217 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1219 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1223 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1225 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1226 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1229 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1230 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1232 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1237 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1244 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1245 { /* See if we have a match */
1246 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1248 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1249 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1251 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1264 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1269 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1270 * using compression.
1272 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1274 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1280 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1285 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1286 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1288 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1290 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1291 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1292 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1293 if (ciphers == NULL)
1295 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1296 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1300 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1301 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1305 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1306 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1309 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1313 /* Session-id reuse */
1314 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1315 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1316 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1317 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1319 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1321 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1322 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1324 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1325 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1327 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1331 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1332 else if (ec != NULL)
1333 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1335 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1339 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1342 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1344 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1348 /* we now have the following setup.
1350 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1351 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1352 * compression - basically ignored right now
1353 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1354 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1355 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1356 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1363 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1366 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1370 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1373 unsigned char *p,*d;
1376 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1380 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1382 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1383 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1384 p=s->s3->server_random;
1385 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
1386 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1388 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1391 /* Do the message type and length last */
1394 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1395 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1398 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1399 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1401 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1402 * back in the server hello:
1403 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1404 * we send back the old session ID.
1405 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1406 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1407 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1408 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1410 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1411 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1412 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1413 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1416 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1418 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1420 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1421 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1423 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1427 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1430 /* put the cipher */
1431 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1434 /* put the compression method */
1435 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1438 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1441 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1443 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1444 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1446 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1449 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1451 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1458 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1461 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1462 /* number of bytes to write */
1467 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1468 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1471 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1475 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1477 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1480 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1485 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1486 /* number of bytes to write */
1491 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1492 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1495 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1497 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1501 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1504 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1507 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1508 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1509 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1512 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1515 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1516 unsigned char *p,*d;
1526 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1527 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1529 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1534 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1536 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1537 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1540 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1542 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1543 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1544 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1547 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1548 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1556 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1557 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1562 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1566 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1567 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1570 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1571 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1572 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1573 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1576 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1577 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1581 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1583 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1587 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1589 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1594 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1595 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1596 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1598 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1600 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1607 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1608 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1609 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1610 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1612 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1622 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1623 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1625 const EC_GROUP *group;
1627 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1628 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1630 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1631 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1632 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1636 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1637 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1641 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1643 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1647 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1650 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1653 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1655 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1659 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1660 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1661 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1662 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1664 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1666 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1671 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1672 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1673 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1675 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1679 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1680 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1682 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1686 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1687 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1688 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1691 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1694 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1698 /* Encode the public key.
1699 * First check the size of encoding and
1700 * allocate memory accordingly.
1702 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1703 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1704 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1707 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1708 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1709 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1710 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1712 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1717 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1718 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1719 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1720 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1722 if (encodedlen == 0)
1724 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1728 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1730 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1731 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1732 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1733 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1738 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1739 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1747 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1748 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1749 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1751 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1752 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1755 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1756 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1757 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1759 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1760 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1761 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1762 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1764 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1775 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1776 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1779 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1781 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1782 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1783 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1790 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1791 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1793 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1796 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1799 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1807 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1809 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1812 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1815 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1817 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1818 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1830 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1831 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1833 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1834 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1835 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1836 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1837 * the actual encoded point itself
1839 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1847 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1848 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1850 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1851 encodedPoint = NULL;
1856 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1857 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1859 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1860 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1861 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1862 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1869 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1870 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1871 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1872 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
1873 && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
1877 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1879 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1880 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1881 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1882 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1883 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1884 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1885 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1886 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1887 (unsigned int *)&i);
1891 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1892 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1894 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1904 /* For TLS1.2 and later send signature
1906 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1908 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
1910 /* Should never happen */
1911 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1912 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1918 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
1921 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
1922 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1923 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1924 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1925 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1926 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1928 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
1933 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1938 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1939 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1940 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1945 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1948 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1954 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1955 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1956 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1958 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1960 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1961 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1962 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1964 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1968 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1970 unsigned char *p,*d;
1972 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
1976 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
1980 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
1982 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1984 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
1989 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1991 nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2);
2001 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2005 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2007 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2008 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2009 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
2011 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2014 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
2015 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2018 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2025 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2026 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2032 /* else no CA names */
2033 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
2036 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
2037 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
2040 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2045 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2046 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2049 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2056 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2059 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2060 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2065 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2069 unsigned long alg_k;
2071 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2073 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2075 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2079 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2081 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2083 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2084 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2085 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2086 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2087 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2090 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2091 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2092 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2093 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2097 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2098 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2100 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2102 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2103 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2105 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2106 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2108 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2109 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2110 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2111 * be sent already */
2114 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2115 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2122 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2123 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2124 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2125 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2127 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2128 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2134 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2135 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2140 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2152 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2156 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2158 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2159 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
2162 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2164 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2165 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2166 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2167 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2168 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2170 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2171 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2172 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2174 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2175 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2177 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2178 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2179 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2180 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
2181 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
2182 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
2183 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
2189 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
2190 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
2191 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2193 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2194 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2195 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2196 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2200 s->session->master_key_length=
2201 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2202 s->session->master_key,
2204 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2209 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2214 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2226 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
2228 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
2234 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2236 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2237 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2241 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2244 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2247 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2251 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2255 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2259 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2264 s->session->master_key_length=
2265 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2266 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2267 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2271 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2272 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2274 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2275 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2276 krb5_data authenticator;
2278 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2279 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2280 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2281 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2282 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2283 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2285 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2286 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2288 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2290 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2293 enc_ticket.length = i;
2295 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2297 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2298 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2302 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2303 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2306 authenticator.length = i;
2308 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2310 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2311 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2315 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2316 p+=authenticator.length;
2320 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2323 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2326 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2328 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2329 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2333 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2334 enc_pms.length + 6))
2336 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2337 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2341 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2345 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2346 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2348 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2349 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2350 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2355 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2356 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2358 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2359 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2362 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2363 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2365 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2366 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2367 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2372 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2374 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2379 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2380 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2382 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2386 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2388 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2390 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2391 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2394 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2395 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2397 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2398 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2401 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2403 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2404 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2407 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2409 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2410 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2414 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2416 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2417 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2420 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2422 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2423 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2424 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2425 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2426 * the protocol version.
2427 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2428 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2430 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2433 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2438 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2440 s->session->master_key_length=
2441 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2442 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2444 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2446 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2447 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2449 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2450 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2455 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2456 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2457 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2458 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2462 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2464 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2465 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2470 const EC_GROUP *group;
2471 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2473 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2474 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2476 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2477 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2481 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2482 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2484 /* use the certificate */
2485 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2489 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2490 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2492 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2495 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2496 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2498 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2499 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2501 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2506 /* Let's get client's public key */
2507 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2509 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2510 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2516 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2518 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2520 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2521 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2524 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2526 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2528 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2529 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2530 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2531 * never executed. When that support is
2532 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2533 * received in the certificate is
2534 * authorized for key agreement.
2535 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2536 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2539 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2540 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2541 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2545 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2546 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2548 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2552 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2556 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2557 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2559 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2561 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2562 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2566 /* Get encoded point length */
2571 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2575 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2576 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2578 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2582 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2583 * currently, so set it to the start
2585 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2588 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2589 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2590 if (field_size <= 0)
2592 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2596 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2599 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2604 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2605 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2606 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2607 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2608 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2609 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2611 /* Compute the master secret */
2612 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2613 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2615 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2620 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2621 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2623 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2624 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2625 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2627 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2629 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2634 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2635 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2638 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2640 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2641 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2644 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2646 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2647 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2651 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2652 * string for the callback */
2653 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2654 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2655 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2656 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2657 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2659 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2661 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2662 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2665 else if (psk_len == 0)
2667 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2668 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2669 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2670 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2674 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2675 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2677 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2679 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2683 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2684 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2685 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2686 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2688 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2689 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2693 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2694 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2695 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2696 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2697 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2699 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2700 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2704 s->session->master_key_length=
2705 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2706 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2709 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2715 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2716 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2724 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2725 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2728 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2730 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2733 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2734 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2735 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2736 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2738 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2739 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2743 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2745 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2752 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2753 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2756 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2757 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2758 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2759 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2760 unsigned long alg_a;
2762 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2763 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2764 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2765 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2766 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2767 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2769 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2770 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2771 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2772 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2773 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2774 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2775 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2776 if (client_pub_pkey)
2778 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2781 /* Decrypt session key */
2782 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)))
2784 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2792 else if (p[1] < 0x80)
2799 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2802 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2805 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2808 /* Generate master secret */
2809 s->session->master_key_length=
2810 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2811 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2812 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2813 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2818 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2819 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2827 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2828 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2829 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2835 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2836 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2839 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2840 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2841 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2842 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2843 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2844 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2849 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2851 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2857 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2859 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2861 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2862 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2863 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2868 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2870 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2872 peer=s->session->peer;
2873 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2874 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2882 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2884 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2885 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2887 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2888 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2897 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2898 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2902 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2904 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2905 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2909 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2911 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2912 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2916 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2917 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2918 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2919 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
2920 * signature without length field */
2921 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
2922 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
2928 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2930 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
2931 /* Should never happen */
2934 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2935 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2938 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
2939 if (sigalg != (int)p[1])
2941 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
2942 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2945 md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
2948 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
2949 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2953 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2962 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2963 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2967 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2968 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
2970 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2971 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2975 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2979 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2982 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2983 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2987 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
2990 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
2991 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
2993 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2994 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2998 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3000 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3001 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3006 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3007 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3009 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3010 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3014 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3015 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3020 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3021 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3027 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3028 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3030 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3031 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3032 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3036 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3037 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3043 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3044 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3046 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3047 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3048 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3052 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3053 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3054 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3060 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3061 { unsigned char signature[64];
3063 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3064 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3066 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3068 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3069 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3071 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3072 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3075 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3076 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3077 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3083 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3084 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3093 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3096 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3098 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3099 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3100 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3102 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3103 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3107 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3109 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3111 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3112 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3114 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3116 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3123 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3125 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3127 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3128 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3130 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3131 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3134 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3135 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3137 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3138 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3141 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3145 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3147 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3148 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3151 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3153 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3155 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3162 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3163 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3166 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3169 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3171 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3172 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3177 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3185 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3186 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3189 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3191 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3198 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3200 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3201 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3203 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3204 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3207 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3208 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3209 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3212 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3215 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3216 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3218 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3224 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3227 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3228 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
3233 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3234 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3235 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3236 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3238 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3239 * when we arrive here. */
3240 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3242 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3243 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3249 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3250 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3251 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3252 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3253 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3261 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3264 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3265 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3269 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3274 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3276 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
3279 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3280 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3281 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3283 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3288 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
3289 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3294 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3295 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3298 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3299 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3300 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3302 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3304 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3305 const unsigned char *const_p;
3306 int len, slen_full, slen;
3311 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3312 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3313 unsigned char key_name[16];
3315 /* get session encoding length */
3316 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3317 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3320 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3322 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3326 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3328 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3330 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3336 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3338 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3339 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3345 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3346 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3348 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3349 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3350 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3351 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3352 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3353 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3355 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3356 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
3357 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3360 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3362 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
3363 /* Skip message length for now */
3365 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3366 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3367 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3368 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3371 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3373 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3382 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3383 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3384 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3385 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3386 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3387 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3390 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3391 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3392 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3393 * as their sessions. */
3394 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3396 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3398 /* Output key name */
3400 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3403 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3404 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3405 /* Encrypt session data */
3406 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3408 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3410 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3412 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3413 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3414 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3417 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3419 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3420 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
3421 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
3423 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
3425 /* number of bytes to write */
3427 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3432 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3433 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3436 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3438 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3441 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3442 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3443 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3446 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3449 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3452 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3453 /* message length */
3454 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3456 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3457 /* length of OCSP response */
3458 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3459 /* actual response */
3460 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3461 /* number of bytes to write */
3462 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3463 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3467 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3468 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));