2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
125 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
126 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
129 #include "ssl_locl.h"
130 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
131 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
132 #include <openssl/rand.h>
133 #include <openssl/objects.h>
134 #include <openssl/evp.h>
135 #include <openssl/x509.h>
136 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
137 #include <openssl/dh.h>
139 #include <openssl/bn.h>
140 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
141 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
143 #include <openssl/md5.h>
145 static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
147 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
148 static int nid2curve_id(int nid);
151 static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
153 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
154 return(SSLv3_server_method());
159 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
161 ssl_undefined_function,
162 ssl3_get_server_method)
164 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
167 unsigned long l,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
168 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
171 int new_state,state,skip=0;
173 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
177 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
179 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
180 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
182 /* init things to blank */
184 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
198 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
200 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
204 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
205 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
208 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
210 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
215 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
217 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
219 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
224 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
232 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
240 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
242 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
243 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
245 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
247 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
248 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
249 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
253 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
254 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
255 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
256 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
260 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
261 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
264 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
265 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
266 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
267 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
270 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
273 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
277 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
278 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
279 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
282 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
283 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
285 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
289 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
290 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
291 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
292 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
295 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
297 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
301 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
302 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
303 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH */
304 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
306 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
307 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
311 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
315 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
316 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
317 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
319 /* clear this, it may get reset by
320 * send_server_key_exchange */
321 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
322 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
324 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
326 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
327 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
328 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
329 * be able to handle this) */
330 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
332 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
335 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
336 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
338 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
339 * message only if the cipher suite is either
340 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
341 * server certificate contains the server's
342 * public key for key exchange.
344 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
346 || (l & (SSL_DH|SSL_kFZA))
348 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
349 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
350 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
356 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
357 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
362 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
366 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
367 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
368 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
369 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
370 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
371 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
372 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
373 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
374 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
375 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
376 * and in RFC 2246): */
377 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) &&
378 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
379 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
380 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
381 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
382 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
384 /* no cert request */
386 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
387 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
391 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
392 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
393 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
394 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
395 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
397 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
398 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
404 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
405 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
406 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
407 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
408 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
409 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
413 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
414 /* number of bytes to be flushed */
415 num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,NULL);
418 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
419 num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio);
420 if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; }
421 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
424 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
427 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
428 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
429 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
430 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
434 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
436 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
438 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
439 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
442 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
446 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
447 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
448 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
453 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
454 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
455 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
456 * message is not sent.
458 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
463 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
466 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
467 * a client cert, it can be verified
469 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
470 &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
471 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
472 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
473 &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
474 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
478 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
479 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
481 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
482 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
483 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
485 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
489 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
490 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
491 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
492 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
493 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
497 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
501 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
502 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
504 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
505 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
506 { ret= -1; goto end; }
508 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
509 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
511 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
512 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
515 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
516 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
524 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
525 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
526 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
527 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
528 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
529 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
530 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
531 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
533 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
535 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
540 /* clean a few things up */
541 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
543 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
546 /* remove buffering on output */
547 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
551 if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
553 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
554 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
558 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
560 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
562 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
564 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
572 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
578 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
582 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
587 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
591 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
598 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
602 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
606 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
610 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
612 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
613 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
618 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
619 /* number of bytes to write */
624 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
625 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
628 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
633 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
634 * so permit appropriate message length */
635 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
641 if (!ok) return((int)n);
642 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
643 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
645 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
646 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
647 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
648 * when a handshake is not completed ... */
649 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
650 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
652 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
653 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
661 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
663 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
664 unsigned int cookie_len;
667 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
669 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
672 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
674 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
675 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
676 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
677 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
680 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
683 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
685 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
686 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
687 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
688 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
689 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
692 if (!ok) return((int)n);
693 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
695 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
696 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
697 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
700 if (s->client_version < s->version)
702 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
703 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
705 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
706 s->version = s->client_version;
708 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
712 /* load the client random */
713 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
716 /* get the session-id */
720 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
721 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
722 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
723 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
724 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
725 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
726 * an earlier library version)
728 if (j == 0 || (s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
730 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
735 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s,p,j);
737 { /* previous session */
744 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
751 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION)
756 if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
757 s->d1->send_cookie == 0)
759 /* HelloVerifyMessage has already been sent */
760 if ( cookie_len != s->d1->cookie_len)
762 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
763 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
769 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
770 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
771 * does not cause an overflow.
773 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
776 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
777 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
781 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
782 if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
785 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
787 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
789 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
792 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
793 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
794 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
797 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
799 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
800 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
802 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
803 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
804 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
813 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
815 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
816 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
817 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
822 /* not enough data */
823 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
824 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
827 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
834 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
835 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
838 id=s->session->cipher->id;
841 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
843 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
845 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
847 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
848 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
858 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
860 /* Very bad for multi-threading.... */
861 s->session->cipher=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
865 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
866 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
867 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
868 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
878 /* not enough data */
879 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
880 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
886 if (p[j] == 0) break;
893 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
894 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
898 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
899 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
900 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
901 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
902 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
903 if (s->ctx->comp_methods != NULL)
904 { /* See if we have a match */
907 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
910 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
923 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
929 /* TLS does not mind if there is extra stuff */
930 #if 0 /* SSL 3.0 does not mind either, so we should disable this test
931 * (was enabled in 0.9.6d through 0.9.6j and 0.9.7 through 0.9.7b,
932 * in earlier SSLeay/OpenSSL releases this test existed but was buggy) */
933 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
937 /* wrong number of bytes,
938 * there could be more to follow */
939 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
940 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
946 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
951 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
952 s->session->compress_meth=0;
954 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
956 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
957 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
958 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
961 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
962 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
966 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
971 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
972 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
975 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
979 /* Session-id reuse */
980 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
981 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
985 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
987 sk=s->session->ciphers;
988 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
990 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
991 if (c->algorithms & SSL_eNULL)
993 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
997 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
999 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1001 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1005 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1008 /* we now have the following setup.
1010 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1011 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1012 * compression - basically ignored right now
1013 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1014 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1015 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1016 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1023 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1026 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1030 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1033 unsigned char *p,*d;
1035 unsigned long l,Time;
1037 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1039 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1040 p=s->s3->server_random;
1041 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1043 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1045 /* Do the message type and length last */
1048 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1049 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1052 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1053 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1055 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1056 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1057 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1058 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1059 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1060 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1061 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1063 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER))
1064 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1066 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1067 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1069 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1073 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1076 /* put the cipher */
1077 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1080 /* put the compression method */
1081 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1084 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1087 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1093 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1096 s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
1097 /* number of bytes to write */
1102 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
1103 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1106 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1110 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1112 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1115 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1120 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1121 /* number of bytes to write */
1126 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
1127 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1130 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1132 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1136 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1139 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1142 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1143 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1144 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1147 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1150 unsigned char *p,*d;
1160 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1161 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1163 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_MKEY_MASK;
1168 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1170 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1171 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1174 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1176 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1177 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1178 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1181 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1182 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1190 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1191 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1196 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1200 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1201 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1204 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1205 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1206 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1207 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1210 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1215 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1218 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1222 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1224 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1229 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1230 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1231 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1233 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1242 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1243 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1244 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1245 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1247 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1257 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1258 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1260 const EC_GROUP *group;
1262 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1263 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1265 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1266 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1267 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1271 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1276 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1278 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
1279 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1283 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1286 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1289 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp))
1291 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1296 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1297 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1298 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1299 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1301 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1303 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1308 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1309 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1310 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1312 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1316 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1317 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1319 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1323 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1324 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1325 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1328 nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1331 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1335 /* Encode the public key.
1336 * First check the size of encoding and
1337 * allocate memory accordingly.
1339 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1340 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1341 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1344 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1345 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1346 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1347 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1349 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1354 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1355 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1356 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1357 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1359 if (encodedlen == 0)
1361 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1365 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1367 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1368 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1369 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1370 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1375 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1376 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1384 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1386 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1387 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1390 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1392 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1396 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
1398 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
1401 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1404 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1412 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1414 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1417 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1420 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1427 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1428 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1430 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1431 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1432 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1433 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1434 * the actual encoded point itself
1436 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1444 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1445 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1447 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1455 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1456 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1457 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1458 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1462 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1464 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1465 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1466 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1467 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1468 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1469 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1470 (unsigned int *)&i);
1474 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1475 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1477 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1485 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1486 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1489 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
1490 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1491 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1492 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1493 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1494 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1496 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
1504 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1505 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1507 /* let's do ECDSA */
1508 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
1509 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1510 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1511 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1512 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1513 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1515 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
1524 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1525 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1526 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1531 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1534 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1540 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1541 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1542 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1544 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1546 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1547 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1548 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1550 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1554 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1556 unsigned char *p,*d;
1558 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
1562 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
1566 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
1568 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1570 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
1579 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1583 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
1585 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
1586 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
1587 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
1589 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1592 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
1593 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
1596 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1603 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1604 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
1610 /* else no CA names */
1611 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
1614 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
1615 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1618 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1623 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1624 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
1627 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1634 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
1637 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1638 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1643 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1649 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1651 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1653 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1657 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1659 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1661 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1662 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
1663 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
1664 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
1665 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1668 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1669 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1670 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
1671 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1675 if (!ok) return((int)n);
1676 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1678 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
1680 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1683 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
1684 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
1686 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
1687 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
1688 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
1689 * be sent already */
1692 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1693 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
1700 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
1701 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
1702 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
1703 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
1705 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1706 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
1713 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
1718 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
1720 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1730 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
1734 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
1736 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1737 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
1740 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
1742 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
1743 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
1744 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
1745 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
1746 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
1748 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
1749 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
1750 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
1752 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1753 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
1755 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
1756 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
1757 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
1758 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
1759 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
1760 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
1761 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
1767 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
1768 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
1769 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
1771 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
1772 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
1773 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
1774 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
1778 s->session->master_key_length=
1779 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1780 s->session->master_key,
1782 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1786 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1787 if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
1792 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
1794 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1804 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
1806 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1807 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
1812 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
1814 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1815 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1819 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
1822 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
1825 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
1829 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
1833 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1837 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
1842 s->session->master_key_length=
1843 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1844 s->session->master_key,p,i);
1845 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1849 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1852 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
1853 krb5_data enc_ticket;
1854 krb5_data authenticator;
1856 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
1857 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
1858 EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
1859 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
1860 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
1861 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
1863 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
1864 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
1866 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
1868 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
1871 enc_ticket.length = i;
1873 if (n < (int)enc_ticket.length + 6)
1875 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1876 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1880 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
1881 p+=enc_ticket.length;
1884 authenticator.length = i;
1886 if (n < (int)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length) + 6)
1888 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1889 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1893 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
1894 p+=authenticator.length;
1898 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
1901 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
1904 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
1906 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1907 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1911 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
1912 enc_pms.length + 6))
1914 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1915 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1919 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
1923 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
1924 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
1926 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
1927 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1928 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1933 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
1934 ** but will return authtime == 0.
1936 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
1937 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
1940 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
1941 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
1943 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
1944 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1945 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1950 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
1952 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
1957 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
1958 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1960 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
1964 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
1966 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
1968 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1969 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
1972 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
1973 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
1975 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1976 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
1979 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
1981 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1982 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1985 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
1987 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1988 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
1992 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
1994 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1995 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1998 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2000 s->session->master_key_length=
2001 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2002 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2004 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2006 int len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2007 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2009 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2010 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2015 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2016 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2017 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2018 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2022 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2024 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2025 if ((l & SSL_kECDH) || (l & SSL_kECDHE))
2030 const EC_GROUP *group;
2031 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2033 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2034 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2036 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2037 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2041 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2044 /* use the certificate */
2045 tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
2049 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2050 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2052 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2055 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2056 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2058 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2059 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2061 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2066 /* Let's get client's public key */
2067 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2069 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2070 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2076 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2080 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2081 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2084 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2086 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2088 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2089 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2090 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2091 * never executed. When that support is
2092 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2093 * received in the certificate is
2094 * authorized for key agreement.
2095 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2096 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2099 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2100 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2101 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2105 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2106 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2108 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2112 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2116 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2117 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2119 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2121 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2122 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2126 /* Get encoded point length */
2129 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2130 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2132 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2136 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2137 * currently, so set it to the start
2139 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2142 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2143 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2144 if (field_size <= 0)
2146 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2150 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2153 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2158 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2159 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2160 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2161 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2162 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2164 /* Compute the master secret */
2165 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2166 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2168 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2174 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2175 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2176 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2182 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2183 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
2186 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2187 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2188 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2189 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2190 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2191 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2196 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2198 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2205 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2206 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2207 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2212 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2214 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2216 peer=s->session->peer;
2217 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2218 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2226 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2228 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2229 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2231 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2232 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2241 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2242 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2246 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2248 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2249 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2253 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2255 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2256 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2260 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2261 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2267 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2271 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2272 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
2274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2275 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2279 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2280 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2282 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2283 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2287 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2288 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2293 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2294 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2300 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2301 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2303 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2304 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2305 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
2309 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2310 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
2316 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2317 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
2319 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2320 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2321 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
2325 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2327 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2334 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2335 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
2344 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2347 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2351 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2353 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
2355 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
2356 const unsigned char *p,*q;
2358 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
2360 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2367 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2369 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
2371 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2372 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2374 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2375 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2378 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
2379 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
2381 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
2382 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2385 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2389 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
2391 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2392 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2395 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2397 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
2399 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2406 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2407 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2410 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
2413 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
2415 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2416 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2421 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
2424 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2429 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2430 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2433 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
2435 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2442 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
2444 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2445 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2447 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2448 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2451 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2452 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2453 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2455 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2456 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2462 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
2465 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2466 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
2471 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
2472 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2473 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
2474 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2476 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
2477 * when we arrive here. */
2478 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2480 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
2481 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2483 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2487 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
2488 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
2489 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
2490 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
2491 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
2499 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2502 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
2503 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
2507 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
2512 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
2514 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
2516 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
2517 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms
2518 & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
2519 != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))
2521 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2525 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
2526 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
2531 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
2532 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2536 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2537 /* This is the complement of curve_id2nid in s3_clnt.c. */
2538 static int nid2curve_id(int nid)
2540 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001)
2541 * (no changes in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt [June 2003]) */
2543 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
2545 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
2547 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
2549 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
2551 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
2553 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
2555 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
2557 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
2559 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
2561 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
2563 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
2565 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
2567 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
2569 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
2571 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
2573 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
2575 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
2577 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
2579 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
2581 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
2583 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
2585 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
2587 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
2589 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
2591 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */