1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
158 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 #include <openssl/evp.h>
162 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
163 #include <openssl/x509.h>
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
165 # include <openssl/dh.h>
167 #include <openssl/bn.h>
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
169 # include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
171 #include <openssl/md5.h>
173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
176 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
178 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
179 return (SSLv3_server_method());
184 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
186 ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method)
188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
189 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
191 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
193 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
195 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
196 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
197 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
199 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
203 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
205 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
212 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
215 unsigned long alg_k, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
216 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
218 int new_state, state, skip = 0;
220 RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
224 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
225 cb = s->info_callback;
226 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
227 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
229 /* init things to blank */
231 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
234 if (s->cert == NULL) {
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
238 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
240 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
241 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
244 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
245 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
254 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
256 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
260 case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
261 case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
265 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
267 if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) {
268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
271 s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
273 if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
274 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
278 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
286 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
292 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
293 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
295 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
297 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
299 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
301 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the
302 * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
304 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
309 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
310 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
311 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
312 } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
314 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
316 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
317 * support secure renegotiation.
319 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
320 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
321 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
326 * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
329 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
330 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
334 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
335 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
338 ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
341 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
342 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
345 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
348 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
349 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
352 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
353 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
354 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
357 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
360 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
361 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
362 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
365 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
367 * callback indicates firther work to be done
369 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
372 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
373 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
375 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
376 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
378 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
380 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
388 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
392 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
393 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
394 ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
397 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
399 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
400 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
402 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
406 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
409 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
413 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
414 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
415 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
416 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
419 new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5 |
421 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
422 ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
425 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
426 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
427 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
429 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
432 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
438 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
443 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
444 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
445 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
448 * clear this, it may get reset by
449 * send_server_key_exchange
451 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0;
454 * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a
455 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
456 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
457 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
458 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
463 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
466 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
467 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
469 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
470 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
471 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
473 || (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
474 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
475 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
476 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
477 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
478 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys
479 [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) *
480 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
485 ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
491 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
495 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
496 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
497 if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
498 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
500 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
501 * during re-negotiation:
503 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
504 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
506 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
507 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
510 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
512 * ... except when the application insists on
513 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
516 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
518 * never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites
520 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
521 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
522 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
524 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
527 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
528 /* no cert request */
530 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
531 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
532 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
533 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
536 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
537 ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
540 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
541 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
543 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
544 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
550 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
551 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
552 ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s);
555 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
556 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
560 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
563 * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending
564 * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as
565 * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely
566 * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of
567 * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush
571 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
572 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
576 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
578 s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
581 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
582 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
583 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
584 ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
589 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
592 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
593 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
594 ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
599 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
600 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
601 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
602 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
604 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
605 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
607 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
608 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
610 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
613 } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
614 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
616 if (!s->session->peer)
619 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer at this point and
620 * digest cached records.
622 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
623 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
626 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
627 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
633 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
637 * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert,
638 * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for
639 * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next
642 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
643 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
645 for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++)
646 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) {
649 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
658 EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
668 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
669 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
671 * This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be
672 * extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need
673 * to set this here because we don't know if we're
674 * expecting a CertificateVerify or not.
676 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
677 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
678 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
679 ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
683 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
684 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
686 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
687 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
689 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
694 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
695 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
696 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
698 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes with NPN.
699 * In a full handshake with NPN, we end up here through
700 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
701 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
702 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
703 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
704 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
705 * the client's Finished message is read.
707 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
708 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
710 ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
714 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
718 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
719 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
721 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes without NPN.
722 * In a full handshake, we end up here through
723 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
724 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
725 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
726 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
727 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
728 * the client's Finished message is read.
730 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
731 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
732 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
733 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
737 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
738 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
739 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
740 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
743 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
747 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
748 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
749 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
750 ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
753 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
757 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
758 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
759 ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
762 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
768 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
769 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
771 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
772 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
777 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
779 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
783 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
786 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
787 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
795 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
796 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
797 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
798 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,
799 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
801 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
803 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
806 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
808 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
809 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
811 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
812 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
814 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
817 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
822 /* clean a few things up */
823 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
825 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
828 /* remove buffering on output */
829 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
833 if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a
838 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
840 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
842 s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept;
845 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
853 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
859 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
861 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
865 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
866 new_state = s->state;
868 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
869 s->state = new_state;
875 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
879 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
883 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
886 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) {
887 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
888 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
891 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
892 return ssl_do_write(s);
895 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
897 int i, j, ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1;
898 unsigned int cookie_len;
901 unsigned char *p, *d;
903 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
905 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
907 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
909 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
913 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are
914 * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down
915 * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we
916 * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1.
918 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
919 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
922 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
923 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
924 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
925 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
926 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
931 d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
934 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
935 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
937 s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1];
940 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version &&
941 s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
942 : (s->client_version < s->version)) {
943 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
944 if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
945 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
947 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
950 s->version = s->client_version;
952 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
957 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just
958 * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check
961 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
962 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
964 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
965 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
967 if (cookie_length == 0)
971 /* load the client random */
972 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
973 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
975 /* get the session-id */
980 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
981 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
982 * ignore resumption requests with flag
983 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
984 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this
985 * for security won't even compile against older library versions).
986 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
987 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
988 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
989 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored.
992 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
993 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
996 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
998 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1000 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1001 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1002 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1003 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1004 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1006 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { /* previous
1013 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1020 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1022 cookie_len = *(p++);
1025 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1026 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1027 * does not cause an overflow.
1029 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) {
1031 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1032 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1036 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1037 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) {
1038 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1040 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1041 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1043 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1044 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1045 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1048 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1050 /* default verification */
1051 else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1052 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1053 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1054 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1057 /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
1062 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1063 /* Select version to use */
1064 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1065 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) {
1066 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1067 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1068 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1069 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1070 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1071 s->version = s->client_version;
1072 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1074 } else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1075 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) {
1076 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1077 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1079 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1080 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1081 s->version = s->client_version;
1082 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1085 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1090 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0)) {
1091 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1092 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1096 if ((p + i) >= (d + n)) {
1097 /* not enough data */
1098 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1099 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1102 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers))
1108 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1109 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0)) {
1111 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1114 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1115 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1117 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1118 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1120 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1121 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1129 * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack:
1133 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1134 && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) {
1136 * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used
1137 * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead
1138 * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't
1139 * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the
1140 * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though.
1142 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1143 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) {
1144 s->session->cipher = c;
1151 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1154 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1155 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1156 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1163 if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
1164 /* not enough data */
1165 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1166 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1169 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1172 for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
1180 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1184 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1185 /* TLS extensions */
1186 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1187 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n)) {
1188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1194 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1195 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1196 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1197 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1201 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1202 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1207 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1208 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1210 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1211 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1212 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
1214 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1216 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1217 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1221 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1223 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1228 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1229 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1234 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1237 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1239 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1240 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1242 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1243 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1249 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1250 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1251 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1253 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1254 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1255 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1256 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1257 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1258 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1259 /* Can't disable compression */
1260 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) {
1261 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1262 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1265 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1266 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1267 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1268 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1269 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1273 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1275 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1278 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1279 for (m = 0; m < i; m++) {
1280 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1284 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1285 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1286 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1291 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1292 /* See if we have a match */
1293 int m, nn, o, v, done = 0;
1295 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1296 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1297 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1299 for (o = 0; o < i; o++) {
1309 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1315 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1316 * using compression.
1318 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1319 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1325 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1329 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1330 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1332 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1334 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1335 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1336 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1337 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1338 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1339 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1343 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1344 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1347 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1349 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1350 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1352 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1353 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1357 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1360 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1362 c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1365 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1366 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1369 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1371 /* Session-id reuse */
1372 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1373 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1374 SSL_CIPHER *nc = NULL;
1375 SSL_CIPHER *ec = NULL;
1377 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) {
1378 sk = s->session->ciphers;
1379 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
1380 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
1381 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1383 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1387 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = nc;
1388 else if (ec != NULL)
1389 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = ec;
1391 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1394 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1397 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1398 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1403 * we now have the following setup.
1405 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1406 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1407 * compression - basically ignored right now
1408 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1409 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1410 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1411 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1414 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1415 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1416 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
1417 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1426 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1429 if (ciphers != NULL)
1430 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1431 return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
1434 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1437 unsigned char *p, *d;
1442 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
1443 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1444 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1445 p = s->s3->server_random;
1446 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1449 /* Do the message type and length last */
1450 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1452 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
1453 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
1456 memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1457 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1460 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1461 * back in the server hello:
1462 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1463 * we send back the old session ID.
1464 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1465 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1466 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1467 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1469 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1470 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1471 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1472 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1475 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1477 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1479 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1480 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1481 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1485 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
1488 /* put the cipher */
1489 i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
1492 /* put the compression method */
1493 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1496 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1499 *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1501 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1502 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1503 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1507 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
1509 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1510 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1516 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
1517 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1520 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1521 return ssl_do_write(s);
1524 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1527 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
1528 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
1529 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1532 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1533 return ssl_do_write(s);
1536 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1538 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1542 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1545 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1546 DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
1548 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1549 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp;
1550 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1553 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1556 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1557 unsigned char *p, *d;
1567 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1568 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
1569 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1574 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1576 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1577 if (type & SSL_kRSA) {
1578 rsa = cert->rsa_tmp;
1579 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1580 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1581 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1583 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1586 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1587 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1588 SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1592 cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
1595 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1596 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1597 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1602 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1;
1605 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1606 if (type & SSL_kEDH) {
1608 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1609 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1610 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1612 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1615 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1616 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1617 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1621 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
1622 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1623 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1627 if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
1628 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1633 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1634 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1635 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) {
1636 if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
1637 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1641 dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1642 dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1643 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) {
1644 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1653 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1654 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
1655 const EC_GROUP *group;
1657 ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp;
1658 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
1659 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1660 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1661 if (nid != NID_undef)
1662 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1663 } else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) {
1664 ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1665 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1667 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->
1668 s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1670 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1671 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1672 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1673 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1677 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
1678 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1679 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1683 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1684 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1685 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1688 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1690 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) {
1691 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1695 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh;
1696 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1697 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1698 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
1699 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
1700 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1706 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1707 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1708 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) {
1709 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1713 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1714 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
1715 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1716 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1721 * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named
1722 * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is
1726 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1728 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1729 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1734 * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
1735 * allocate memory accordingly.
1737 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1738 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1739 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1742 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1743 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char));
1744 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1745 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
1746 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1747 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1751 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1752 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1753 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1754 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1756 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1757 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1761 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1765 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in
1766 * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four
1767 * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1773 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1774 * can set these to NULLs
1781 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1782 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1783 if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
1785 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
1787 n += 2 + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1789 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1790 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1791 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
1792 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1793 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1794 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
1795 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1796 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1799 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
1800 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
1801 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
1802 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
1806 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1807 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1808 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1811 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1812 nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1813 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1814 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1821 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
1822 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
1823 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
1825 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1828 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1834 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) {
1835 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
1838 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1840 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1841 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1842 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
1852 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1853 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
1855 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
1856 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
1857 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
1858 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
1860 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1868 memcpy((unsigned char *)p,
1869 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen);
1870 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1871 encodedPoint = NULL;
1876 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1877 if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
1878 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1879 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1880 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
1881 strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1882 p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1889 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1890 * points to the space at the end.
1892 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1893 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1896 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
1897 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1898 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1899 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
1900 ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1901 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1903 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1905 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
1906 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, (unsigned int *)&i);
1910 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1911 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
1912 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA);
1920 /* send signature algorithm */
1921 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1922 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
1923 /* Should never happen */
1924 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1925 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1926 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1932 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1934 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
1935 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1937 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1939 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
1940 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]),
1941 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) {
1942 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
1947 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1950 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1951 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1952 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1953 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1958 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
1961 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1962 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1963 return ssl_do_write(s);
1965 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1967 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1968 if (encodedPoint != NULL)
1969 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1970 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1972 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1976 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1978 unsigned char *p, *d;
1979 int i, j, nl, off, n;
1980 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
1984 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
1987 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1989 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1991 n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
1996 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1997 const unsigned char *psigs;
1998 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2000 memcpy(p, psigs, nl);
2009 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2012 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
2013 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
2014 j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
2015 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
2016 (buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) {
2017 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2021 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2022 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) {
2024 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2029 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2038 /* else no CA names */
2039 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2042 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
2044 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2045 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2046 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4)) {
2047 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2050 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2052 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2060 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2063 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2064 return ssl_do_write(s);
2069 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2073 unsigned long alg_k;
2075 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2077 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2079 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2081 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2083 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2085 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2087 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2088 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2089 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2090 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2091 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2094 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2095 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2096 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2097 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok);
2101 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2103 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2105 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2106 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
2107 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2109 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2112 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2113 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) {
2114 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2115 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2117 * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already
2120 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2121 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2122 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2127 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2128 if ((pkey == NULL) ||
2129 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
2130 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2131 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2132 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2135 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
2138 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2139 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2142 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) {
2143 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2144 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2145 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2154 * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
2155 * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
2156 * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
2157 * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
2158 * bound is sufficient to be safe.
2160 if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2161 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2162 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2163 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2168 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2169 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2170 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2171 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2172 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2176 * should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure.
2178 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2179 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2182 RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2186 * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
2187 * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
2190 constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2193 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2194 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2195 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2196 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2197 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2198 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2201 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2203 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2206 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2207 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2208 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2209 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2210 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2211 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2214 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2215 unsigned char workaround_good;
2217 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2219 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2220 version_good |= workaround_good;
2224 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2225 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2227 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2230 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2231 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2232 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2233 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2235 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2236 p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j],
2237 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2240 s->session->master_key_length =
2241 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2243 session->master_key,
2246 (rand_premaster_secret));
2247 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
2250 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2251 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
2253 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2258 if (n && n != i + 2) {
2259 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) {
2260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2261 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2268 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2269 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2270 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2271 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2273 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2274 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2275 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) || (skey->pkey.dh == NULL)) {
2276 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2278 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2281 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2282 } else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) {
2283 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2284 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2285 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2288 dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh;
2291 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2292 EVP_PKEY *clkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2294 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2295 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2297 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
2298 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2299 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2300 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2303 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2304 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2306 pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL);
2308 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2312 i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr);
2315 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2320 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2321 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
2327 s->session->master_key_length =
2328 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2330 session->master_key,
2332 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2337 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2338 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
2339 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2340 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2341 krb5_data authenticator;
2343 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2344 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2345 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2346 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2347 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2349 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2350 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2352 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2355 kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2358 enc_ticket.length = i;
2360 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) {
2361 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2362 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2366 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2367 p += enc_ticket.length;
2370 authenticator.length = i;
2372 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) {
2373 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2374 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2378 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2379 p += authenticator.length;
2383 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2384 p += enc_pms.length;
2387 * Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption
2389 if (enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) {
2390 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2391 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2395 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2396 enc_pms.length + 6)) {
2397 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2398 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2402 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2405 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2406 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2408 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2409 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2410 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2415 * Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will
2416 * return authtime == 0.
2418 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2419 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) {
2421 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2422 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2424 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2425 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2426 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2430 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) {
2431 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2435 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2436 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2438 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2442 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2444 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv)) {
2445 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2446 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2449 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms, &outl,
2450 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2452 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2453 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2456 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2457 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2458 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2461 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) {
2462 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2463 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2467 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2468 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2469 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2472 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8))
2473 && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) {
2475 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2476 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely,
2477 * the protocol does not offer such protection for DH
2478 * ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random
2479 * bytes instead of the protocol version. If
2480 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2481 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos
2484 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) {
2485 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2486 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2491 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2493 s->session->master_key_length =
2494 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2496 session->master_key,
2499 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) {
2500 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2501 if (len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH) {
2502 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2503 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ, kssl_ctx->client_princ,
2508 /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2509 * but it caused problems for apache.
2510 * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2511 * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2514 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2516 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2517 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2521 const EC_GROUP *group;
2522 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2524 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2525 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
2526 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2530 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2531 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2532 /* use the certificate */
2533 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2536 * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
2537 * ServerKeyExchange msg.
2539 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2542 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2543 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2545 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2546 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) {
2547 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2551 /* Let's get client's public key */
2552 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
2553 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2558 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2560 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) {
2561 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2562 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2563 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2566 if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2567 == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
2569 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
2570 * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the
2571 * code is never executed. When that support is added, we
2572 * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is
2573 * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly
2574 * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group.
2576 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2577 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2578 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2582 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2583 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->
2585 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2588 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2591 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2592 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2594 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
2595 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2596 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2600 /* Get encoded point length */
2604 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2607 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
2608 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2612 * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it
2615 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2618 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2619 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2620 if (field_size <= 0) {
2621 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2624 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh,
2627 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2631 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2632 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2633 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2634 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2635 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2636 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2638 /* Compute the master secret */
2639 s->session->master_key_length =
2640 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2642 session->master_key,
2645 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2649 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2650 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2651 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2652 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4];
2653 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2655 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2657 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2661 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2664 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2665 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2666 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2669 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2670 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2671 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2676 * Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback
2678 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2679 memset(tmp_id + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
2680 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2682 sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2683 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1);
2685 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2686 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2688 } else if (psk_len == 0) {
2690 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2692 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2693 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2694 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2698 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2699 pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
2701 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2703 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2707 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2708 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2709 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2710 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
2711 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2715 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2716 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2717 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2718 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2719 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
2720 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2724 s->session->master_key_length =
2725 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2727 session->master_key,
2732 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2737 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2738 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2743 if (param_len > n) {
2744 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2745 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2746 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2749 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
2750 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2753 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2754 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2755 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2756 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2757 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2760 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2761 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2762 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2763 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2764 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2768 if ((s->session->master_key_length =
2769 SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,
2770 s->session->master_key)) < 0) {
2771 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2777 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2778 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2780 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2781 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2782 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2783 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2784 unsigned long alg_a;
2788 /* Get our certificate private key */
2789 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2790 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2791 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2792 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2793 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2795 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2796 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2798 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2799 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2800 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2801 * client certificate for authorization only.
2803 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2804 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2805 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2808 /* Decrypt session key */
2810 ((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass,
2811 n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
2812 || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2813 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2814 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2819 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2820 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2821 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2822 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2825 /* Generate master secret */
2826 s->session->master_key_length =
2827 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2829 session->master_key,
2830 premaster_secret, 32);
2831 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2832 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2833 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2838 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2839 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2845 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2846 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2852 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2853 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2856 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2857 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2858 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2859 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2860 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2861 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2866 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2868 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2870 int al, ok, ret = 0;
2874 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2876 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2878 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2879 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2880 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2881 -1, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
2886 if (s->session->peer != NULL) {
2887 peer = s->session->peer;
2888 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2889 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
2895 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
2896 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
2898 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2899 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2907 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2908 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2912 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2913 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2914 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2915 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2919 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
2920 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2921 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2925 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2926 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2927 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2929 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
2932 if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
2933 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)) {
2936 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2937 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
2939 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2941 } else if (rv == 0) {
2942 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2946 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2954 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2955 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2959 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2960 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
2961 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2962 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2966 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2969 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2970 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
2971 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2972 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2976 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
2979 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
2980 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
2981 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2982 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2986 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) {
2987 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2988 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2992 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2993 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
2994 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2995 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2998 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2999 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3003 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3004 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3009 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3010 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
3011 j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3012 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3013 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa);
3016 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3017 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3022 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3023 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3024 j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3025 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3026 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec);
3029 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3030 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3035 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
3036 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
3037 unsigned char signature[64];
3039 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
3040 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3042 fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", i);
3044 for (idx = 0; idx < 64; idx++) {
3045 signature[63 - idx] = p[idx];
3047 j = EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, signature, 64, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3049 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3051 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3052 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3056 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3057 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3064 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3067 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
3068 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3069 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3070 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3072 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3073 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3077 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3079 int i, ok, al, ret = -1;
3081 unsigned long l, nc, llen, n;
3082 const unsigned char *p, *q;
3084 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3086 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3089 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
3094 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
3095 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3096 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3097 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3098 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3099 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3103 * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list
3105 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
3106 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3107 SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3108 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3111 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
3115 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
3116 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3117 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3120 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3122 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3123 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3128 if (llen + 3 != n) {
3129 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3130 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3133 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
3135 if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
3136 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3137 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3138 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3143 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, l);
3145 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3149 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3150 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3151 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3154 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3155 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3162 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3163 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3164 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3165 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3166 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3167 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3170 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3171 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3172 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3173 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3174 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3175 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3178 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3179 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
3180 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3184 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3186 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3188 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3193 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3194 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3195 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3196 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3199 * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we
3202 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
3203 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3204 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
3205 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3209 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3210 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3211 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk;
3213 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3214 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
3222 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3228 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3232 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3236 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
3237 cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3239 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3240 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3241 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) {
3242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
3243 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3248 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) {
3249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3252 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3255 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3256 return ssl_do_write(s);
3259 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3260 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3261 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3263 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3267 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
3268 unsigned char *p, *macstart;
3269 const unsigned char *const_p;
3270 int len, slen_full, slen;
3273 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3274 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3275 unsigned char key_name[16];
3277 /* get session encoding length */
3278 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3280 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3283 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00)
3285 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3289 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3290 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3293 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3297 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3300 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3303 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3305 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3306 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3307 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3311 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3312 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3315 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3318 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3319 * follows handshake_header_length +
3320 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3321 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3322 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3323 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3325 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3326 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3327 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3330 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3332 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3333 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3335 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3336 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3340 if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0)
3342 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3343 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
3345 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3346 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL))
3348 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3352 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3353 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3354 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3356 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3358 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3360 /* Output key name */
3362 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3365 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3366 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3367 /* Encrypt session data */
3368 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
3371 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len))
3375 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
3377 if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen))
3380 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3381 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3384 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3386 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3387 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
3388 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3389 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3391 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3395 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3396 return ssl_do_write(s);
3400 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3401 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3405 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3407 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) {
3410 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3411 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3412 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3415 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3418 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3421 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3422 /* message length */
3423 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3425 *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
3426 /* length of OCSP response */
3427 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3428 /* actual response */
3429 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3430 /* number of bytes to write */
3431 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3432 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3436 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3437 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3440 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3442 * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3443 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3445 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3448 int proto_len, padding_len;
3450 const unsigned char *p;
3453 * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3454 * extension in their ClientHello
3456 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
3457 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,
3458 SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3462 /* See the payload format below */
3463 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3464 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3465 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3466 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok);
3472 * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in
3473 * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by
3474 * ssl3_get_finished).
3476 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
3477 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3482 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3484 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3487 * The payload looks like:
3489 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3490 * uint8 padding_len;
3491 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3494 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3496 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3497 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3500 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3501 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
3502 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3505 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3506 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;