2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
125 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
126 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
129 #include "ssl_locl.h"
130 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
131 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
132 #include <openssl/rand.h>
133 #include <openssl/objects.h>
134 #include <openssl/evp.h>
135 #include <openssl/x509.h>
136 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
137 #include <openssl/dh.h>
139 #include <openssl/bn.h>
140 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
141 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
143 #include <openssl/md5.h>
145 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
147 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
148 static int nid2curve_id(int nid);
151 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
153 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
154 return(SSLv3_server_method());
159 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
161 ssl_undefined_function,
162 ssl3_get_server_method)
164 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
167 unsigned long l,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
168 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
171 int new_state,state,skip=0;
173 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
177 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
179 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
180 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
182 /* init things to blank */
184 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
198 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
200 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
204 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
205 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
208 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
210 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
215 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
217 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
219 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
224 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
232 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
240 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
242 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
243 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
245 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
247 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
248 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
249 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
253 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
254 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
255 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
256 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
260 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
261 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
264 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
265 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
266 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
267 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
270 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
273 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
277 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
278 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
279 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
282 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
283 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
284 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
287 if (ssl_check_tlsext(s,&al) <= 0)
289 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); /* XXX does this *have* to be fatal? */
290 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLS_EXT);
297 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
301 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
302 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
303 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
304 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
307 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
309 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
313 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
314 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
315 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH */
316 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
318 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
319 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
323 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
327 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
328 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
329 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
331 /* clear this, it may get reset by
332 * send_server_key_exchange */
333 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
334 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
336 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
338 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
339 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
340 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
341 * be able to handle this) */
342 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
344 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
347 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
348 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
350 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
351 * message only if the cipher suite is either
352 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
353 * server certificate contains the server's
354 * public key for key exchange.
356 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
358 || (l & (SSL_DH|SSL_kFZA))
360 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
361 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
362 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
368 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
369 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
374 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
378 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
379 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
380 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
381 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
382 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
383 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
384 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
385 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
386 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
387 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
388 * and in RFC 2246): */
389 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) &&
390 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
391 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
392 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
393 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
394 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
396 /* no cert request */
398 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
399 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
403 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
404 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
405 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
406 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
407 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
409 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
410 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
416 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
417 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
418 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
419 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
420 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
421 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
425 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
426 /* number of bytes to be flushed */
427 num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,NULL);
430 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
431 num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio);
432 if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; }
433 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
436 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
439 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
440 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
441 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
442 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
446 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
448 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
450 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
451 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
454 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
458 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
459 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
460 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
465 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
466 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
467 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
468 * message is not sent.
470 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
475 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
478 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
479 * a client cert, it can be verified
481 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
482 &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
483 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
484 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
485 &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
486 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
490 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
491 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
493 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
494 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
495 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
497 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
501 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
502 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
503 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
504 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
505 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
509 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
513 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
514 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
516 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
517 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
518 { ret= -1; goto end; }
520 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
521 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
523 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
524 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
527 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
528 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
536 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
537 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
538 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
539 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
540 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
541 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
542 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
543 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
545 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
547 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
552 /* clean a few things up */
553 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
555 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
558 /* remove buffering on output */
559 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
563 if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
565 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
566 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
570 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
572 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
574 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
576 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
584 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
590 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
594 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
599 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
603 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
610 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
614 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
618 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
622 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
624 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
625 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
630 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
631 /* number of bytes to write */
636 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
637 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
640 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
645 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
646 * so permit appropriate message length */
647 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
653 if (!ok) return((int)n);
654 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
655 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
657 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
658 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
659 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
660 * when a handshake is not completed ... */
661 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
662 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
664 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
665 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
673 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
675 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
676 unsigned int cookie_len;
679 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
681 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
684 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
686 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
687 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
688 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
689 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
692 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
695 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
697 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
698 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
699 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
700 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
701 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
704 if (!ok) return((int)n);
705 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
707 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
708 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
709 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
712 if (s->client_version < s->version)
714 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
715 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
717 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
718 s->version = s->client_version;
720 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
724 /* load the client random */
725 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
728 /* get the session-id */
732 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
733 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
734 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
735 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
736 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
737 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
738 * an earlier library version)
740 if (j == 0 || (s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
742 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
747 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s,p,j);
749 { /* previous session */
756 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
763 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION)
768 if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
769 s->d1->send_cookie == 0)
771 /* HelloVerifyMessage has already been sent */
772 if ( cookie_len != s->d1->cookie_len)
774 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
775 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
781 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
782 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
783 * does not cause an overflow.
785 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
788 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
789 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
793 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
794 if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
797 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
799 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
801 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
804 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
805 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
806 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
809 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
811 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
812 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
814 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
815 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
816 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
825 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
827 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
828 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
829 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
834 /* not enough data */
835 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
836 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
839 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
846 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
847 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
850 id=s->session->cipher->id;
853 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
855 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
857 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
859 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
860 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
870 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
872 /* Very bad for multi-threading.... */
873 s->session->cipher=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
877 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
878 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
879 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
880 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
890 /* not enough data */
891 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
892 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
898 if (p[j] == 0) break;
905 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
906 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
910 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
911 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
912 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
913 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
914 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
915 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
916 { /* See if we have a match */
919 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
922 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
935 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
941 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
943 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
945 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
947 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
948 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLS_EXT);
954 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
959 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
960 s->session->compress_meth=0;
962 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
964 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
965 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
966 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
969 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
970 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
974 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
979 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
980 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
983 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
987 /* Session-id reuse */
988 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
989 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
993 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
995 sk=s->session->ciphers;
996 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
998 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
999 if (c->algorithms & SSL_eNULL)
1001 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1005 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1006 else if (ec != NULL)
1007 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1009 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1013 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1016 /* we now have the following setup.
1018 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1019 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1020 * compression - basically ignored right now
1021 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1022 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1023 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1024 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1031 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1034 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1038 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1041 unsigned char *p,*d;
1043 unsigned long l,Time;
1045 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1047 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1048 p=s->s3->server_random;
1049 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1051 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1053 /* Do the message type and length last */
1056 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1057 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1060 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1061 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1063 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1064 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1065 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1066 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1067 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1068 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1069 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1071 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER))
1072 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1074 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1075 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1077 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1081 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1084 /* put the cipher */
1085 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1088 /* put the compression method */
1089 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1092 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1095 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1097 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1098 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1100 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1108 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1111 s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
1112 /* number of bytes to write */
1117 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
1118 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1121 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1125 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1127 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1130 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1135 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1136 /* number of bytes to write */
1141 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
1142 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1145 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1147 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1151 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1154 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1157 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1158 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1159 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1162 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1165 unsigned char *p,*d;
1175 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1176 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1178 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_MKEY_MASK;
1183 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1185 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1186 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1189 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1191 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1192 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1193 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1196 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1197 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1205 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1206 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1211 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1215 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1216 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1219 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1220 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1221 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1222 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1225 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1226 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1230 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1233 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1237 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1244 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1245 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1246 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1248 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1257 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1258 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1259 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1260 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1262 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1272 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1273 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1275 const EC_GROUP *group;
1277 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1278 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1280 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1281 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1282 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1286 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1287 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1291 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1293 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
1294 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1298 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1301 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1304 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp))
1306 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1311 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1312 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1313 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1314 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1316 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1318 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1323 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1324 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1325 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1327 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1331 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1332 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1334 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1338 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1339 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1340 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1343 nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1346 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1350 /* Encode the public key.
1351 * First check the size of encoding and
1352 * allocate memory accordingly.
1354 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1355 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1356 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1359 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1360 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1361 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1362 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1364 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1369 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1370 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1371 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1372 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1374 if (encodedlen == 0)
1376 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1380 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1382 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1383 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1384 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1385 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1390 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1391 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1399 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1401 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1402 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1405 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1407 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1411 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
1413 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
1416 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1419 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1427 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1429 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1432 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1435 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1442 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1443 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1445 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1446 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1447 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1448 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1449 * the actual encoded point itself
1451 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1459 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1460 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1462 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1470 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1471 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1472 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1473 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1477 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1479 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1480 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1481 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1482 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1483 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1484 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1485 (unsigned int *)&i);
1489 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1490 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1492 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1500 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1501 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1504 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
1505 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1506 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1507 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1508 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1509 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1511 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
1519 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1520 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1522 /* let's do ECDSA */
1523 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
1524 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1525 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1526 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1527 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1528 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1530 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
1539 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1540 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1541 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1546 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1549 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1555 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1556 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1557 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1559 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1561 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1562 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1563 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1565 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1569 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1571 unsigned char *p,*d;
1573 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
1577 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
1581 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
1583 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1585 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
1594 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1598 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
1600 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
1601 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
1602 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
1604 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1607 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
1608 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
1611 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1618 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1619 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
1625 /* else no CA names */
1626 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
1629 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
1630 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1633 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1638 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1639 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
1642 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1649 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
1652 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1653 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1658 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1664 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1666 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1668 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1672 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1674 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1676 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1677 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
1678 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
1679 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
1680 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1683 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1684 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1685 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
1686 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1690 if (!ok) return((int)n);
1691 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1693 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
1695 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1698 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
1699 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
1701 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
1702 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
1703 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
1704 * be sent already */
1707 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1708 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
1715 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
1716 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
1717 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
1718 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
1720 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1721 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
1728 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
1733 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
1735 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1745 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
1749 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
1751 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1752 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
1755 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
1757 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
1758 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
1759 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
1760 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
1761 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
1763 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
1764 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
1765 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
1767 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1768 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
1770 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
1771 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
1772 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
1773 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
1774 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
1775 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
1776 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
1782 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
1783 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
1784 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
1786 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
1787 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
1788 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
1789 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
1793 s->session->master_key_length=
1794 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1795 s->session->master_key,
1797 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1801 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1802 if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
1807 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
1809 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1819 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
1821 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1822 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
1827 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
1829 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1830 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1834 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
1837 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
1840 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
1844 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
1848 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1852 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
1857 s->session->master_key_length=
1858 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1859 s->session->master_key,p,i);
1860 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1864 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1867 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
1868 krb5_data enc_ticket;
1869 krb5_data authenticator;
1871 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
1872 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
1873 EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
1874 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
1875 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
1876 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
1878 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
1879 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
1881 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
1883 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
1886 enc_ticket.length = i;
1888 if (n < enc_ticket.length + 6)
1890 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1891 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1895 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
1896 p+=enc_ticket.length;
1899 authenticator.length = i;
1901 if (n < enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)
1903 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1904 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1908 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
1909 p+=authenticator.length;
1913 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
1916 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
1919 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
1921 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1922 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1926 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
1927 enc_pms.length + 6))
1929 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1930 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1934 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
1938 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
1939 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
1941 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
1942 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1943 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1948 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
1949 ** but will return authtime == 0.
1951 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
1952 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
1955 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
1956 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
1958 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
1959 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1960 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1965 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
1967 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
1972 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
1973 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1975 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
1979 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
1981 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
1983 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1984 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
1987 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
1988 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
1990 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1991 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
1994 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
1996 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1997 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2000 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2002 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2003 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2007 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2009 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2010 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2013 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2015 s->session->master_key_length=
2016 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2017 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2019 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2021 int len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2022 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2024 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2025 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2030 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2031 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2032 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2033 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2037 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2039 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2040 if ((l & SSL_kECDH) || (l & SSL_kECDHE))
2045 const EC_GROUP *group;
2046 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2048 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2049 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2051 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2052 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2056 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2059 /* use the certificate */
2060 tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
2064 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2065 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2067 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2070 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2071 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2073 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2074 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2076 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2081 /* Let's get client's public key */
2082 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2084 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2085 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2091 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2095 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2096 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2099 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2101 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2103 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2104 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2105 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2106 * never executed. When that support is
2107 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2108 * received in the certificate is
2109 * authorized for key agreement.
2110 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2111 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2114 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2115 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2116 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2120 EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2121 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec));
2122 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2126 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2127 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2129 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2131 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2132 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2136 /* Get encoded point length */
2139 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2140 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2146 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2147 * currently, so set it to the start
2149 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2152 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2153 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2154 if (field_size <= 0)
2156 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2160 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2163 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2168 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2169 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2170 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2171 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2172 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2174 /* Compute the master secret */
2175 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2176 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2178 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2184 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2185 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2186 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2192 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2193 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
2196 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2197 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2198 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2199 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2200 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2201 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2206 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2208 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2215 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2216 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2217 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2222 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2224 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2226 peer=s->session->peer;
2227 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2228 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2236 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2238 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2239 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2241 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2252 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2256 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2259 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2263 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2266 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2270 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2271 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2276 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2277 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2281 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2282 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
2284 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2285 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2289 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2290 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2292 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2293 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2297 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2298 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2303 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2304 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2310 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2311 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2313 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2314 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2315 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
2319 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
2326 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2327 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
2329 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2330 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2331 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
2335 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2336 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2337 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2344 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2345 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
2354 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2357 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2361 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2363 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
2365 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
2366 const unsigned char *p,*q;
2368 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
2370 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2377 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2379 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
2381 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2382 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2385 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2388 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
2389 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
2391 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
2392 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2395 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2399 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
2401 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2402 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2405 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2407 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
2409 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2416 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2417 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2420 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
2423 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
2425 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2426 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2431 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
2434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2439 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2440 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2443 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
2445 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2452 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
2454 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2455 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2457 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2458 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2461 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2462 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2463 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2465 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2466 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2472 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
2475 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2476 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
2481 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
2482 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2483 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
2484 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2486 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
2487 * when we arrive here. */
2488 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2490 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
2491 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2493 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2497 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
2498 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
2499 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
2500 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
2501 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
2509 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2512 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
2513 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
2517 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
2522 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
2524 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
2526 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
2527 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms
2528 & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
2529 != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))
2531 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2535 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
2536 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
2541 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
2542 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2546 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2547 /* This is the complement of curve_id2nid in s3_clnt.c. */
2548 static int nid2curve_id(int nid)
2550 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001)
2551 * (no changes in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt [June 2003]) */
2553 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
2555 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
2557 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
2559 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
2561 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
2563 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
2565 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
2567 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
2569 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
2571 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
2573 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
2575 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
2577 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
2579 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
2581 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
2583 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
2585 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
2587 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
2589 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
2591 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
2593 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
2595 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
2597 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
2599 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
2601 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */