1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
158 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 #include <openssl/evp.h>
162 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
163 #include <openssl/x509.h>
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
165 # include <openssl/dh.h>
167 #include <openssl/bn.h>
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
169 # include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
171 #include <openssl/md5.h>
173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
176 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
178 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
179 return (SSLv3_server_method());
184 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
186 ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method)
188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
189 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
191 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
193 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
195 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
196 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
197 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
199 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
203 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
205 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
212 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
215 unsigned long alg_k, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
216 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
218 int new_state, state, skip = 0;
220 RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
224 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
225 cb = s->info_callback;
226 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
227 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
229 /* init things to blank */
231 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
234 if (s->cert == NULL) {
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
238 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
240 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
241 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
244 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
245 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
254 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
256 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
260 case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
261 case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
265 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
267 if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) {
268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
272 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) {
273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
277 s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
279 if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
280 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
284 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
292 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
298 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
299 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
301 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
303 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
305 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
307 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the
308 * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
310 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
315 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
316 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
317 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
318 } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
320 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
322 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
323 * support secure renegotiation.
325 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
326 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
327 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
332 * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
335 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
336 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
340 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
341 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
344 ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
347 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
348 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
351 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
354 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
355 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
358 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
359 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
360 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
362 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
365 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
366 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
367 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
370 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
372 * callback indicates firther work to be done
374 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
377 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
378 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
380 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
381 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
383 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
385 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
393 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
397 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
398 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
399 ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
402 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
404 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
405 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
407 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
411 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
414 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
418 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
419 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
420 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
421 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
424 new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5 |
426 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
427 ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
430 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
431 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
432 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
434 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
437 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
443 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
448 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
449 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
450 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
453 * clear this, it may get reset by
454 * send_server_key_exchange
456 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0;
459 * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a
460 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
461 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
462 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
463 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
468 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
471 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
472 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
474 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
475 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
476 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
478 || (alg_k & SSL_kDHE)
479 || (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
480 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
481 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
482 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
483 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys
484 [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) *
485 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
490 ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
496 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
500 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
501 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
502 if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
503 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
505 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
506 * during re-negotiation:
508 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
509 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
511 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
512 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
515 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
517 * ... except when the application insists on
518 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
521 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
523 * never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites
525 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
526 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
527 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
529 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
532 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
533 /* no cert request */
535 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
536 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
537 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
538 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
541 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
542 ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
545 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
546 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
548 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
549 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
555 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
556 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
557 ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s);
560 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
561 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
565 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
568 * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending
569 * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as
570 * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely
571 * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of
572 * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush
576 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
577 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
581 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
583 s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
586 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
587 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
588 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
589 ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
594 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
597 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
598 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
599 ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
604 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
605 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
606 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
607 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
609 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
610 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
612 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
613 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
615 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
618 } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
619 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
621 if (!s->session->peer)
623 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
624 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
628 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
629 * extms we've done this already.
631 if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
632 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
633 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
640 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
644 * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert,
645 * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for
646 * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next
649 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
650 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
652 for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++)
653 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) {
656 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
665 EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
675 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
676 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
678 * This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be
679 * extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need
680 * to set this here because we don't know if we're
681 * expecting a CertificateVerify or not.
683 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
684 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
685 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
686 ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
690 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
691 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
693 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
694 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
696 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
701 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
702 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
703 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
705 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes with NPN.
706 * In a full handshake with NPN, we end up here through
707 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
708 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
709 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
710 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
711 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
712 * the client's Finished message is read.
714 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
715 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
717 ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
721 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
725 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
726 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
728 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes without NPN.
729 * In a full handshake, we end up here through
730 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
731 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
732 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
733 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
734 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
735 * the client's Finished message is read.
737 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
738 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
739 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
740 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
744 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
745 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
746 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
747 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
750 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
754 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
755 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
756 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
757 ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
760 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
764 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
765 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
766 ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
769 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
775 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
776 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
778 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
779 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
784 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
786 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
790 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
793 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
794 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
802 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
803 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
804 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
805 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,
806 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
808 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
810 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
813 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
815 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
816 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
818 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
819 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
821 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
824 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
829 /* clean a few things up */
830 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
832 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
835 /* remove buffering on output */
836 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
840 if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a
845 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
847 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
849 s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept;
852 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
860 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
866 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
868 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
872 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
873 new_state = s->state;
875 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
876 s->state = new_state;
882 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
886 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
890 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
893 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) {
894 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
895 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
898 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
899 return ssl_do_write(s);
902 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
904 int i, j, ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1;
905 unsigned int cookie_len;
908 unsigned char *p, *d;
910 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
912 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
914 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
916 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
920 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are
921 * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down
922 * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we
923 * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1.
925 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
926 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
929 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
930 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
931 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
932 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
933 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
938 d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
941 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
942 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
944 s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1];
947 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version &&
948 s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
949 : (s->client_version < s->version)) {
950 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
951 if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
952 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
954 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
957 s->version = s->client_version;
959 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
964 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just
965 * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check
968 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
969 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
971 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
972 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
974 if (cookie_length == 0)
978 /* load the client random */
979 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
980 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
982 /* get the session-id */
987 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
988 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
989 * ignore resumption requests with flag
990 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
991 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this
992 * for security won't even compile against older library versions).
993 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
994 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
995 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
996 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored.
999 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1000 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1003 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1005 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1007 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1008 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1009 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1010 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1011 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1013 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { /* previous
1020 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1027 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1029 cookie_len = *(p++);
1032 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1033 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1034 * does not cause an overflow.
1036 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) {
1038 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1039 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1043 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1044 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) {
1045 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1047 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1048 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1050 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1051 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1052 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1055 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1057 /* default verification */
1058 else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1059 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1060 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1061 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1064 /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
1069 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1070 /* Select version to use */
1071 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1072 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) {
1073 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1074 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1075 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1076 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1077 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1078 s->version = s->client_version;
1079 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1081 } else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1082 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) {
1083 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1084 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1086 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1087 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1088 s->version = s->client_version;
1089 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1092 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1097 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0)) {
1098 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1099 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1100 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1103 if ((p + i) >= (d + n)) {
1104 /* not enough data */
1105 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1106 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1109 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers))
1115 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1116 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0)) {
1118 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1121 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1122 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1124 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1125 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1127 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1128 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1136 * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack:
1140 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1141 && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) {
1143 * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used
1144 * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead
1145 * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't
1146 * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the
1147 * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though.
1149 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1150 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) {
1151 s->session->cipher = c;
1158 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1161 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1162 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1163 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1170 if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
1171 /* not enough data */
1172 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1173 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1176 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1179 for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
1187 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1191 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1192 /* TLS extensions */
1193 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1194 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n)) {
1195 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1201 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1202 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1203 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1204 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1208 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1209 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1214 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1215 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1217 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1218 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1219 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
1221 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1223 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1224 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1228 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1230 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1235 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1236 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1237 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1241 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1244 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1246 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1247 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1249 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1250 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1256 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1257 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1258 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1260 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1261 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1262 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1263 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1264 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1265 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1266 /* Can't disable compression */
1267 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1269 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1272 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1273 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1274 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1275 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1276 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1280 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1281 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1282 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1285 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1286 for (m = 0; m < i; m++) {
1287 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1291 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1292 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1293 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1298 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1299 /* See if we have a match */
1300 int m, nn, o, v, done = 0;
1302 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1303 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1304 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1306 for (o = 0; o < i; o++) {
1316 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1322 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1323 * using compression.
1325 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1332 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1336 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1337 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1339 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1341 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1342 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1343 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1344 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1345 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1346 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1350 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1351 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1354 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1356 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1357 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1359 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1360 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1364 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1367 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1369 c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1372 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1373 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1376 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1377 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1378 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1379 s->session->not_resumable = s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1380 ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE))
1382 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1383 /* do not send a session ticket */
1384 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1386 /* Session-id reuse */
1387 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1388 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1389 SSL_CIPHER *nc = NULL;
1390 SSL_CIPHER *ec = NULL;
1392 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) {
1393 sk = s->session->ciphers;
1394 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
1395 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
1396 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1398 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1402 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = nc;
1403 else if (ec != NULL)
1404 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = ec;
1406 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1409 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1412 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1413 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1418 * we now have the following setup.
1420 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1421 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1422 * compression - basically ignored right now
1423 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1424 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1425 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1426 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1429 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1430 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1431 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
1432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1441 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1444 if (ciphers != NULL)
1445 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1446 return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
1449 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1452 unsigned char *p, *d;
1457 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
1458 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1459 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1460 p = s->s3->server_random;
1461 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1464 /* Do the message type and length last */
1465 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1467 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
1468 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
1471 memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1472 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1475 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1476 * back in the server hello:
1477 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1478 * we send back the old session ID.
1479 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1480 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1481 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1482 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1484 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1485 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1486 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1487 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1490 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1491 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1493 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1495 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1496 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1497 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1501 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
1504 /* put the cipher */
1505 i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
1508 /* put the compression method */
1509 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1512 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1515 *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1517 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1518 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1519 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1523 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
1525 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1526 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1532 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
1533 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1536 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1537 return ssl_do_write(s);
1540 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1543 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
1544 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
1545 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1548 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1549 return ssl_do_write(s);
1552 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1554 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1558 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1561 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1562 DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
1564 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1565 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp;
1566 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1569 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1572 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1573 unsigned char *p, *d;
1583 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1584 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
1585 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1590 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1592 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1593 if (type & SSL_kRSA) {
1594 rsa = cert->rsa_tmp;
1595 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1596 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1597 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1599 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1602 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1603 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1604 SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1608 cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
1611 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1612 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1613 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1618 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1;
1621 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1622 if (type & SSL_kDHE) {
1623 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
1624 dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
1626 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1627 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1628 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1633 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1634 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1635 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1637 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1640 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1641 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1642 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1645 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
1646 DH_security_bits(dhp), 0, dhp)) {
1647 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1648 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1649 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1652 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
1653 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1654 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1658 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto)
1660 else if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
1661 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1666 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1667 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1668 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) {
1669 if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
1670 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1674 dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1675 dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1676 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) {
1677 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1686 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1687 if (type & SSL_kECDHE) {
1688 const EC_GROUP *group;
1690 ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp;
1691 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
1692 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1693 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1694 if (nid != NID_undef)
1695 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1696 } else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) {
1697 ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1698 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1700 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->
1701 s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1703 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1704 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1705 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1706 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1710 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
1711 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1712 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1716 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1717 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1718 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1721 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1723 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) {
1724 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1728 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh;
1729 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1730 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1731 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
1732 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
1733 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1739 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1740 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1741 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) {
1742 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1746 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1747 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
1748 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1749 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1754 * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named
1755 * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is
1759 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1761 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1762 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1767 * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
1768 * allocate memory accordingly.
1770 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1771 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1772 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1775 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1776 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char));
1777 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1778 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
1779 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1780 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1784 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1785 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1786 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1787 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1789 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1790 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1794 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1798 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in
1799 * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four
1800 * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1806 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1807 * can set these to NULLs
1814 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1815 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1816 if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
1818 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
1820 n += 2 + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1822 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1823 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1824 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
1825 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1826 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1827 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
1828 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1829 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1832 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
1833 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
1834 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
1835 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
1839 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1840 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1841 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1844 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1845 nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1846 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1847 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1854 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
1855 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
1856 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
1858 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1861 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1867 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) {
1868 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
1871 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1873 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1874 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1875 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
1885 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1886 if (type & SSL_kECDHE) {
1888 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
1889 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
1890 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
1891 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
1893 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1901 memcpy((unsigned char *)p,
1902 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen);
1903 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1904 encodedPoint = NULL;
1909 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1910 if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
1911 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1912 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1913 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
1914 strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1915 p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1922 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1923 * points to the space at the end.
1925 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1926 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1929 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
1930 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1931 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1932 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
1933 ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1934 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1936 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1938 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
1939 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, (unsigned int *)&i);
1943 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1944 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
1945 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA);
1953 /* send signature algorithm */
1954 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1955 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
1956 /* Should never happen */
1957 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1958 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1959 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1965 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1967 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
1968 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1970 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1972 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
1973 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]),
1974 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) {
1975 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
1980 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1983 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1984 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1985 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1986 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1991 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
1994 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1995 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1996 return ssl_do_write(s);
1998 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2000 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2001 if (encodedPoint != NULL)
2002 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2003 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2005 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2009 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2011 unsigned char *p, *d;
2012 int i, j, nl, off, n;
2013 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
2017 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
2020 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2022 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2024 n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
2029 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2030 const unsigned char *psigs;
2031 unsigned char *etmp = p;
2032 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2033 /* Skip over length for now */
2035 nl = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, p, psigs, nl);
2036 /* Now fill in length */
2046 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2049 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
2050 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
2051 j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
2052 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
2053 (buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) {
2054 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2058 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2060 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2065 /* else no CA names */
2066 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2069 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
2071 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2072 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2073 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4)) {
2074 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2077 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2079 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2087 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2090 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2091 return ssl_do_write(s);
2096 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2100 unsigned long alg_k;
2102 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2104 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2106 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2108 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2110 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2112 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2114 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2115 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2116 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2117 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2118 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2121 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2122 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2123 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2124 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok);
2128 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2130 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2132 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2133 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
2134 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2136 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2139 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2140 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) {
2141 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2142 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2144 * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already
2147 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2148 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2149 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2154 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2155 if ((pkey == NULL) ||
2156 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
2157 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2158 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2159 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2162 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
2165 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2166 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2169 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) {
2170 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2171 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2172 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2181 * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
2182 * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
2183 * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
2184 * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
2185 * bound is sufficient to be safe.
2187 if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2188 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2189 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2190 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2195 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2196 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2197 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2198 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2199 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2203 * should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure.
2205 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2206 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2209 RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2213 * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
2214 * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
2217 constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2220 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2221 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2222 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2223 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2224 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2225 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2228 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2230 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2233 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2234 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2235 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2236 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2237 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2238 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2241 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2242 unsigned char workaround_good;
2244 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2246 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2247 version_good |= workaround_good;
2251 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2252 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2254 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2257 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2258 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2259 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2260 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2262 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2263 p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j],
2264 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2267 s->session->master_key_length =
2268 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2270 session->master_key,
2273 (rand_premaster_secret));
2274 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
2277 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2278 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
2280 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2285 if (n && n != i + 2) {
2286 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) {
2287 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2288 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2295 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2296 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2297 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2298 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2300 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2301 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2302 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) || (skey->pkey.dh == NULL)) {
2303 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2304 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2305 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2308 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2309 } else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) {
2310 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2311 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2312 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2315 dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh;
2318 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2319 EVP_PKEY *clkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2321 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2322 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2324 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
2325 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2327 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2330 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2331 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2333 pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL);
2335 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2339 i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr);
2342 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2347 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2348 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
2354 s->session->master_key_length =
2355 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2357 session->master_key,
2359 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2364 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2365 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
2366 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2367 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2368 krb5_data authenticator;
2370 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2371 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2372 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2373 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2374 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2376 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2377 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2379 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2382 kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2385 enc_ticket.length = i;
2387 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) {
2388 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2389 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2393 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2394 p += enc_ticket.length;
2397 authenticator.length = i;
2399 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) {
2400 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2401 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2405 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2406 p += authenticator.length;
2410 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2411 p += enc_pms.length;
2414 * Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption
2416 if (enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) {
2417 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2418 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2422 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2423 enc_pms.length + 6)) {
2424 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2425 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2429 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2432 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2433 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2435 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2436 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2437 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2442 * Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will
2443 * return authtime == 0.
2445 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2446 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) {
2448 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2449 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2451 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2452 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2453 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2457 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) {
2458 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2462 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2463 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2465 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2469 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2471 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv)) {
2472 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2473 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2476 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms, &outl,
2477 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2479 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2480 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2483 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2484 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2485 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2488 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) {
2489 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2490 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2494 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2495 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2496 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2499 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8))
2500 && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) {
2502 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2503 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely,
2504 * the protocol does not offer such protection for DH
2505 * ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random
2506 * bytes instead of the protocol version. If
2507 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2508 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos
2511 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) {
2512 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2513 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2518 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2520 s->session->master_key_length =
2521 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2523 session->master_key,
2526 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) {
2527 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2528 if (len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH) {
2529 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2530 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ, kssl_ctx->client_princ,
2535 /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2536 * but it caused problems for apache.
2537 * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2538 * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2541 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2543 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2544 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2548 const EC_GROUP *group;
2549 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2551 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2552 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
2553 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2557 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2558 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2559 /* use the certificate */
2560 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2563 * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
2564 * ServerKeyExchange msg.
2566 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2569 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2570 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2572 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2573 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) {
2574 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2578 /* Let's get client's public key */
2579 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
2580 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2585 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2587 if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
2588 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2589 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2590 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2593 if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2594 == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
2596 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
2597 * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the
2598 * code is never executed. When that support is added, we
2599 * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is
2600 * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly
2601 * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group.
2603 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2604 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2605 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2609 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2610 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->
2612 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2615 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2618 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2619 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2621 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
2622 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2623 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2627 /* Get encoded point length */
2631 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2634 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
2635 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2639 * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it
2642 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2645 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2646 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2647 if (field_size <= 0) {
2648 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2651 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh,
2654 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2658 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2659 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2660 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2661 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2662 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2663 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2665 /* Compute the master secret */
2666 s->session->master_key_length =
2667 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2669 session->master_key,
2672 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2676 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2677 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2678 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2679 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4];
2680 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2682 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2684 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2688 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2691 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2692 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2693 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2696 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2697 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2698 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2703 * Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback
2705 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2706 memset(tmp_id + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
2707 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2709 sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2710 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1);
2712 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2713 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2715 } else if (psk_len == 0) {
2717 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2719 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2720 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2721 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2725 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2726 pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
2728 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2730 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2734 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2735 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2736 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2737 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
2738 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2742 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2743 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2744 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2745 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2746 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
2747 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2751 s->session->master_key_length =
2752 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2754 session->master_key,
2759 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2764 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2765 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2770 if (param_len > n) {
2771 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2772 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2773 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2776 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
2777 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2780 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2781 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2782 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2783 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2784 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2787 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2788 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2789 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2790 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2791 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2795 if ((s->session->master_key_length =
2796 SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,
2797 s->session->master_key)) < 0) {
2798 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2804 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2805 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2807 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2808 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2809 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2810 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2811 unsigned long alg_a;
2815 /* Get our certificate private key */
2816 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2817 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2818 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2819 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2820 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2822 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2823 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2825 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2826 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2827 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2828 * client certificate for authorization only.
2830 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2831 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2832 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2835 /* Decrypt session key */
2837 ((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass,
2838 n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
2839 || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2840 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2841 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2846 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2847 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2848 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2849 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2852 /* Generate master secret */
2853 s->session->master_key_length =
2854 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2856 session->master_key,
2857 premaster_secret, 32);
2858 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2859 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2860 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2865 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2866 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2872 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2873 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2879 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2880 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2883 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2884 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2885 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2886 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2887 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2888 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2893 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2895 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2897 int al, ok, ret = 0;
2901 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2903 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2905 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2906 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2907 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2908 -1, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
2913 if (s->session->peer != NULL) {
2914 peer = s->session->peer;
2915 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2916 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
2922 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
2923 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
2925 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2926 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2934 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2935 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2939 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2940 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2941 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2942 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2946 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
2947 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2948 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2952 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2953 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2954 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2956 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
2959 if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
2960 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)) {
2963 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2964 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
2966 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2968 } else if (rv == 0) {
2969 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2973 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2981 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2982 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2986 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2987 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
2988 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2989 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2993 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2996 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2997 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
2998 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2999 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3003 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3006 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3007 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
3008 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3009 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3013 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) {
3014 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3015 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3019 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3020 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
3021 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3022 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3025 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3026 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3030 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3031 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3036 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3037 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
3038 j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3039 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3040 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa);
3043 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3044 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3049 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3050 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3051 j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3052 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3053 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec);
3056 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3057 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3062 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
3063 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
3064 unsigned char signature[64];
3066 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
3067 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3069 fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", i);
3071 for (idx = 0; idx < 64; idx++) {
3072 signature[63 - idx] = p[idx];
3074 j = EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, signature, 64, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3076 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3078 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3079 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3083 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3084 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3091 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3094 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
3095 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3096 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3097 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3099 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3100 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3104 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3106 int i, ok, al, ret = -1;
3108 unsigned long l, nc, llen, n;
3109 const unsigned char *p, *q;
3111 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3113 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3116 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
3121 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
3122 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3123 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3124 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3125 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3126 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3130 * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list
3132 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
3133 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3134 SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3135 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3138 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
3142 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
3143 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3144 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3147 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3149 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3150 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3155 if (llen + 3 != n) {
3156 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3157 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3160 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
3162 if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
3163 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3164 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3165 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3170 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, l);
3172 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3176 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3177 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3178 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3181 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3182 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3189 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3190 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3191 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3192 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3193 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3194 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3197 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3198 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3199 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3200 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3201 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3202 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3205 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3206 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
3207 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3212 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3214 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3215 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3216 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3220 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3221 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3224 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3226 al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3227 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3228 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3231 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3234 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3235 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3236 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3237 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3240 * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we
3243 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
3244 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3245 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
3246 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3250 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3251 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3252 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk;
3254 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3255 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
3263 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3269 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3273 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3277 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
3278 cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3280 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3281 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3282 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) {
3283 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
3284 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3289 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) {
3290 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3293 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3296 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3297 return ssl_do_write(s);
3300 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3301 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3302 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3304 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
3305 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3306 const unsigned char *const_p;
3307 int len, slen_full, slen;
3312 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3313 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3314 unsigned char key_name[16];
3316 /* get session encoding length */
3317 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3319 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3322 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3324 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3328 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3331 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3334 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3339 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3341 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3342 if (slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3347 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3348 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3351 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3352 * follows handshake_header_length +
3353 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3354 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3355 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3356 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3358 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3359 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3360 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3362 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3363 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3364 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3366 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3367 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3369 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3370 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3376 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3377 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3378 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3379 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3380 EVP_sha256(), NULL);
3381 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3385 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3386 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3387 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3389 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3391 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3393 /* Output key name */
3395 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3398 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3399 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3400 /* Encrypt session data */
3401 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3403 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3405 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3407 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3408 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3409 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3412 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3414 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3415 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
3416 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3417 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3419 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3423 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3424 return ssl_do_write(s);
3427 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3429 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) {
3432 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3433 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3434 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3437 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3440 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3443 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3444 /* message length */
3445 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3447 *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
3448 /* length of OCSP response */
3449 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3450 /* actual response */
3451 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3452 /* number of bytes to write */
3453 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3454 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3458 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3459 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3462 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3464 * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3465 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3467 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3470 int proto_len, padding_len;
3472 const unsigned char *p;
3475 * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3476 * extension in their ClientHello
3478 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
3479 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,
3480 SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3484 /* See the payload format below */
3485 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3486 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3487 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3488 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok);
3494 * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in
3495 * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by
3496 * ssl3_get_finished).
3498 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
3499 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3504 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3506 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3509 * The payload looks like:
3511 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3512 * uint8 padding_len;
3513 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3516 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3518 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3519 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3522 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3523 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
3524 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3527 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3528 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;