2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
125 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
126 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
129 #include "ssl_locl.h"
130 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
131 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
132 #include <openssl/rand.h>
133 #include <openssl/objects.h>
134 #include <openssl/evp.h>
135 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
136 #include <openssl/x509.h>
137 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
138 #include <openssl/dh.h>
140 #include <openssl/bn.h>
141 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
142 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
144 #include <openssl/md5.h>
146 static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
147 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
148 static int nid2curve_id(int nid);
151 static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
153 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
154 return(SSLv3_server_method());
159 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
161 ssl_undefined_function,
162 ssl3_get_server_method)
164 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
167 unsigned long l,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
168 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
171 int new_state,state,skip=0;
173 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
177 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
179 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
180 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
182 /* init things to blank */
184 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
198 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
200 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
204 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
205 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
208 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
210 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
215 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
217 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
219 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
224 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
232 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
240 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
242 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
243 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
245 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
247 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
248 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
249 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
253 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
254 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
255 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
256 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
260 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
261 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
264 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
265 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
266 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
267 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
270 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
273 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
277 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
278 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
279 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
282 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
283 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
285 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
289 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
290 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
291 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
292 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
293 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
296 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
297 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
299 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
303 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
306 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
310 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
311 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
312 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH or KRB5 */
313 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL)
314 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
316 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
317 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
318 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
319 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
320 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
322 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
327 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
334 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
339 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
340 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
341 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
343 /* clear this, it may get reset by
344 * send_server_key_exchange */
345 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
346 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
348 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
350 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
351 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
352 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
353 * be able to handle this) */
354 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
356 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
359 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
360 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
362 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
363 * message only if the cipher suite is either
364 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
365 * server certificate contains the server's
366 * public key for key exchange.
368 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
370 || (l & (SSL_DH|SSL_kFZA))
372 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
373 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
374 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
380 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
381 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
386 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
390 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
391 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
392 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
393 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
394 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
395 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
396 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
397 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
398 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
399 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
400 * and in RFC 2246): */
401 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) &&
402 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
403 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
404 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
405 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
406 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
408 /* no cert request */
410 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
411 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
415 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
416 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
417 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
418 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
419 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
421 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
422 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
428 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
429 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
430 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
431 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
432 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
433 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
437 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
438 /* number of bytes to be flushed */
439 num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,NULL);
442 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
443 num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio);
444 if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; }
445 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
448 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
451 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
452 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
453 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
454 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
458 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
460 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
462 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
463 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
466 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
470 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
471 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
472 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
477 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
478 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
479 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
480 * message is not sent.
482 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
487 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
490 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
491 * a client cert, it can be verified
493 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
494 &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
495 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
496 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
497 &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
498 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
502 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
503 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
505 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
506 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
507 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
509 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
513 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
514 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
515 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
516 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
517 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
520 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
521 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
522 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
525 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
529 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
530 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
531 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
532 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
533 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
534 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
538 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
539 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
540 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
541 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
542 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
548 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
549 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
551 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
552 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
553 { ret= -1; goto end; }
555 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
556 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
558 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
559 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
562 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
563 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
571 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
572 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
573 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
574 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
575 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
576 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
577 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
578 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
580 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
582 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
587 /* clean a few things up */
588 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
590 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
593 /* remove buffering on output */
594 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
598 if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
600 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
601 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
605 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
607 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
609 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
611 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
619 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
625 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
629 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
634 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
638 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
645 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
649 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
653 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
657 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
659 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
660 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
665 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
666 /* number of bytes to write */
671 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
672 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
675 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
680 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
681 * so permit appropriate message length */
682 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
688 if (!ok) return((int)n);
689 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
690 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
692 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
693 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
694 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
695 * when a handshake is not completed ... */
696 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
697 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
699 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
700 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
708 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
710 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
711 unsigned int cookie_len;
714 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
716 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
719 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
721 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
722 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
723 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
724 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
727 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
729 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
732 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
733 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
734 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
735 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
736 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
739 if (!ok) return((int)n);
741 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
743 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
744 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
745 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
748 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
749 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
751 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
752 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
754 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
755 s->version = s->client_version;
757 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
761 /* load the client random */
762 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
765 /* get the session-id */
769 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
770 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
771 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
772 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
773 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
774 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
775 * an earlier library version)
777 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
779 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
784 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
786 { /* previous session */
793 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
800 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION)
805 if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
806 s->d1->send_cookie == 0)
808 /* HelloVerifyMessage has already been sent */
809 if ( cookie_len != s->d1->cookie_len)
811 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
812 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
818 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
819 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
820 * does not cause an overflow.
822 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
825 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
826 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
830 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
831 if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
834 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
836 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
838 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
841 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
842 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
843 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
846 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
848 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
849 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
851 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
852 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
853 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
862 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
864 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
865 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
866 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
871 /* not enough data */
872 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
873 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
876 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
883 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
884 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
887 id=s->session->cipher->id;
890 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
892 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
894 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
896 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
897 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
905 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
907 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
908 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
909 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
910 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
911 * enabled, though. */
912 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
913 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
915 s->session->cipher = c;
921 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
922 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
923 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
924 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
933 /* not enough data */
934 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
935 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
941 if (p[j] == 0) break;
948 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
949 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
953 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
955 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
957 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
959 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
960 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
964 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
965 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
969 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
970 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
971 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
972 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
973 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
974 if (s->ctx->comp_methods != NULL)
975 { /* See if we have a match */
978 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
981 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
994 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1000 /* TLS does not mind if there is extra stuff */
1001 #if 0 /* SSL 3.0 does not mind either, so we should disable this test
1002 * (was enabled in 0.9.6d through 0.9.6j and 0.9.7 through 0.9.7b,
1003 * in earlier SSLeay/OpenSSL releases this test existed but was buggy) */
1004 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1008 /* wrong number of bytes,
1009 * there could be more to follow */
1010 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1011 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1017 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1022 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1023 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1025 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1027 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1028 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1029 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1030 if (ciphers == NULL)
1032 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1033 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1037 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1038 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1042 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1043 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1046 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1050 /* Session-id reuse */
1051 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1052 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1053 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1054 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1056 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1058 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1059 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1061 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1062 if (c->algorithms & SSL_eNULL)
1064 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1068 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1069 else if (ec != NULL)
1070 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1072 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1076 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1079 /* we now have the following setup.
1081 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1082 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1083 * compression - basically ignored right now
1084 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1085 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1086 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1087 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1094 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1097 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1101 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1104 unsigned char *p,*d;
1106 unsigned long l,Time;
1108 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1110 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1111 p=s->s3->server_random;
1112 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1114 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1116 /* Do the message type and length last */
1119 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1120 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1123 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1124 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1126 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1127 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1128 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1129 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1130 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1131 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1132 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1134 * We also have an additional case where stateless session
1135 * resumption is successful: we always send back the old
1136 * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can
1137 * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful
1138 * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality
1141 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1143 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1145 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1146 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1148 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1152 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1155 /* put the cipher */
1156 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1159 /* put the compression method */
1160 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1163 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1166 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1169 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1171 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1178 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1181 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1182 /* number of bytes to write */
1187 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1188 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1191 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1195 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1197 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1200 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1205 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1206 /* number of bytes to write */
1211 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1212 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1215 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1217 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1221 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1224 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1227 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1228 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1229 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1232 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1235 unsigned char *p,*d;
1245 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1246 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1248 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_MKEY_MASK;
1253 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1255 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1256 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1259 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1261 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1262 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1263 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1266 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1267 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1275 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1276 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1281 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1285 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1286 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1289 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1290 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1291 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1292 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1295 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1296 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1300 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1303 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1307 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1314 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1315 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1316 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1318 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1327 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1328 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1329 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1330 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1332 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1342 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1343 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1345 const EC_GROUP *group;
1347 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1348 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1350 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1351 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1352 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1356 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1357 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1361 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1363 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
1364 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1368 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1371 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1374 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp))
1376 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1381 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1382 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1383 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1384 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1386 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1388 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1393 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1394 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1395 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1397 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1401 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1402 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1404 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1408 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1409 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1410 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1413 nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1416 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1420 /* Encode the public key.
1421 * First check the size of encoding and
1422 * allocate memory accordingly.
1424 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1425 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1426 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1429 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1430 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1431 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1432 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1439 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1440 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1441 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1442 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1444 if (encodedlen == 0)
1446 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1450 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1452 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1453 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1454 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1455 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1460 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1461 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1469 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1471 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1472 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1475 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1477 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1481 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
1483 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
1486 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1489 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1497 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1499 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1502 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1505 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1512 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1513 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1515 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1516 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1517 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1518 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1519 * the actual encoded point itself
1521 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1529 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1530 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1532 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1540 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1541 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1542 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1543 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1547 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1549 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1550 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1551 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1552 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1553 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1554 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1555 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1556 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1557 (unsigned int *)&i);
1561 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1562 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1564 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1572 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1573 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1576 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
1577 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1578 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1579 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1580 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1581 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1583 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
1591 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1592 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1594 /* let's do ECDSA */
1595 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
1596 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1597 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1598 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1599 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1600 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1602 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
1611 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1612 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1613 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1618 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1621 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1627 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1628 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1629 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1631 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1633 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1634 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1635 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1637 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1641 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1643 unsigned char *p,*d;
1645 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
1649 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
1653 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
1655 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1657 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
1666 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1670 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
1672 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
1673 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
1674 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
1676 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1679 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
1680 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
1683 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1690 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1691 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
1697 /* else no CA names */
1698 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
1701 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
1702 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1705 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1710 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1711 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
1714 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1721 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
1724 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1725 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1730 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1736 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1738 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1740 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1744 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1746 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1748 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1749 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
1750 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
1751 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
1752 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1755 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1756 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1757 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
1758 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1762 if (!ok) return((int)n);
1763 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1765 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
1767 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1770 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
1771 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
1773 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
1774 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
1775 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
1776 * be sent already */
1779 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1780 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
1787 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
1788 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
1789 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
1790 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
1792 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1793 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
1799 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS, including pre-0.9.8f */
1800 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION &&
1801 s->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1806 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
1808 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1818 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
1822 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
1824 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1825 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
1828 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
1830 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
1831 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
1832 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
1833 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
1834 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
1836 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
1837 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
1838 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
1840 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1841 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
1843 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
1844 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
1845 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
1846 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
1847 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
1848 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
1849 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
1855 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
1856 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
1857 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
1859 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
1860 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
1861 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
1862 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
1866 s->session->master_key_length=
1867 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1868 s->session->master_key,
1870 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1874 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1875 if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
1880 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
1882 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1892 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
1894 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1895 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
1900 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
1902 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1903 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1907 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
1910 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
1913 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
1917 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
1921 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1925 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
1930 s->session->master_key_length=
1931 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1932 s->session->master_key,p,i);
1933 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1937 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1940 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
1941 krb5_data enc_ticket;
1942 krb5_data authenticator;
1944 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
1945 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
1946 EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
1947 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
1948 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
1949 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
1951 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
1952 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
1954 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
1956 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
1959 enc_ticket.length = i;
1961 if (n < (int)enc_ticket.length + 6)
1963 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1964 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1968 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
1969 p+=enc_ticket.length;
1972 authenticator.length = i;
1974 if (n < (int)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length) + 6)
1976 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1977 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1981 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
1982 p+=authenticator.length;
1986 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
1989 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
1992 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
1994 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1995 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1999 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2000 enc_pms.length + 6))
2002 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2003 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2007 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2011 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2012 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2014 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2015 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2016 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2021 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2022 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2024 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2025 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2028 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2029 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2031 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2032 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2033 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2038 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2040 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2045 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2046 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2048 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2052 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2054 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2056 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2057 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2060 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2061 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2063 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2064 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2067 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2069 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2070 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2073 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2075 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2076 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2080 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2082 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2083 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2086 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2088 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2089 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2090 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2091 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2092 * the protocol version.
2093 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2094 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2096 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2098 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2099 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2104 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2106 s->session->master_key_length=
2107 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2108 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2110 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2112 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2113 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2115 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2116 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2121 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2122 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2123 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2124 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2128 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2130 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2131 if ((l & SSL_kECDH) || (l & SSL_kECDHE))
2136 const EC_GROUP *group;
2137 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2139 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2140 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2143 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2147 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2150 /* use the certificate */
2151 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2155 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2156 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2158 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2161 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2162 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2164 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2165 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2167 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2172 /* Let's get client's public key */
2173 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2175 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2176 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2182 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2186 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2190 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2192 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2194 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2195 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2196 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2197 * never executed. When that support is
2198 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2199 * received in the certificate is
2200 * authorized for key agreement.
2201 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2202 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2205 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2206 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2207 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2211 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2212 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2218 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2222 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2223 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2225 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2227 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2228 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2232 /* Get encoded point length */
2235 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2236 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2242 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2243 * currently, so set it to the start
2245 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2248 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2249 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2250 if (field_size <= 0)
2252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2256 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2259 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2264 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2265 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2266 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2267 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2268 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2270 /* Compute the master secret */
2271 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2272 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2274 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2280 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2281 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2282 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2288 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2289 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
2292 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2293 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2294 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2295 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2296 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2297 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2302 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2304 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2311 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2312 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2313 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2318 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2320 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2322 peer=s->session->peer;
2323 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2324 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2332 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2334 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2335 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2337 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2338 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2347 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2348 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2352 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2354 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2355 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2359 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2361 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2362 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2366 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2367 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2373 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2377 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2378 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
2380 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2381 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2385 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2386 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2388 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2389 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2393 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2394 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2399 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2400 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2406 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2407 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2409 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2410 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2411 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
2415 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2416 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
2422 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2423 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
2425 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2426 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2427 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
2431 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2433 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2440 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2441 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
2450 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2453 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2457 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2459 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
2461 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
2462 const unsigned char *p,*q;
2464 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
2466 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2473 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2475 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
2477 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2478 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2480 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2481 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2484 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
2485 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
2487 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
2488 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2491 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2495 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
2497 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2498 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2501 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2503 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
2505 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2512 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2513 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2516 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
2519 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
2521 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2522 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2527 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
2530 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2535 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2536 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2539 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
2541 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2548 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
2550 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2551 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2553 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2554 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2557 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2558 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2559 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2561 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2562 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2568 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
2571 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2572 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
2577 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
2578 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2579 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
2580 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2582 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
2583 * when we arrive here. */
2584 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2586 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
2587 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2589 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2593 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
2594 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
2595 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
2596 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
2597 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
2605 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2608 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
2609 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
2613 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
2618 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
2620 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
2622 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
2623 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms
2624 & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
2625 != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))
2627 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2631 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
2632 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
2637 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
2638 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2642 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2643 /* This is the complement of curve_id2nid in s3_clnt.c. */
2644 static int nid2curve_id(int nid)
2646 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001)
2647 * (no changes in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt [June 2003]) */
2649 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
2651 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
2653 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
2655 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
2657 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
2659 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
2661 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
2663 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
2665 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
2667 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
2669 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
2671 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
2673 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
2675 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
2677 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
2679 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
2681 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
2683 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
2685 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
2687 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
2689 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
2691 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
2693 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
2695 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
2697 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
2704 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
2705 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
2707 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
2709 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
2714 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2715 unsigned char key_name[16];
2717 /* get session encoding length */
2718 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
2719 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
2724 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
2725 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
2726 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
2727 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
2728 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
2729 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
2731 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
2732 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
2733 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
2735 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
2739 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
2741 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2743 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
2744 /* Skip message length for now */
2746 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
2747 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
2748 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
2749 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
2752 if (s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
2754 if (s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
2763 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
2764 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
2765 s->ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
2766 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
2767 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
2768 memcpy(key_name, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
2770 l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
2771 /* Skip ticket length for now */
2773 /* Output key name */
2775 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
2778 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
2779 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2780 /* Encrypt session data */
2781 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
2783 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
2785 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2787 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
2788 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
2789 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
2792 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
2794 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2795 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
2796 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
2798 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
2800 /* number of bytes to write */
2802 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
2807 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
2808 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2811 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
2813 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
2816 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
2817 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
2818 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
2821 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
2824 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2827 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
2828 /* message length */
2829 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
2831 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
2832 /* length of OCSP response */
2833 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
2834 /* actual response */
2835 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
2836 /* number of bytes to write */
2837 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
2838 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
2842 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
2843 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));