1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
153 #include "ssl_locl.h"
154 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
155 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
156 #include <openssl/rand.h>
157 #include <openssl/objects.h>
158 #include <openssl/evp.h>
159 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
160 #include <openssl/x509.h>
161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
162 # include <openssl/dh.h>
164 #include <openssl/bn.h>
165 #include <openssl/md5.h>
167 static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
168 PACKET *cipher_suites,
169 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
170 int sslv2format, int *al);
173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
174 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
176 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
178 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
180 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
181 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
182 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
184 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
188 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
190 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
197 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
200 unsigned long alg_k, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
201 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
203 int new_state, state, skip = 0;
205 RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
209 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
210 cb = s->info_callback;
211 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
212 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
214 /* init things to blank */
216 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) {
221 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
223 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
224 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
227 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
228 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
237 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
239 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
243 case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
244 case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
248 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
250 if ((s->version >> 8 != 3) && s->version != TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
252 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
256 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) {
257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
261 s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
263 if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
264 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
266 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
269 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
272 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
278 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
280 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
285 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
287 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
289 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
291 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
293 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the
294 * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
296 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
298 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
302 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
303 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
304 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
305 } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
307 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
309 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
310 * support secure renegotiation.
312 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
313 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
314 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
316 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
320 * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
323 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
324 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
328 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
329 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
332 ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
335 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
336 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
339 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
342 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
343 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
346 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
347 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
348 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
350 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
353 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
354 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
355 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
358 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
360 * callback indicates firther work to be done
362 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
365 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
366 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
368 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
369 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
371 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
373 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
375 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
382 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
386 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
387 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
388 ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
393 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
394 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
396 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
398 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
403 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
404 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
405 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
406 /* normal PSK or SRP */
407 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
408 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
409 ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
413 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
414 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
416 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
419 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
424 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
425 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
426 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
429 * clear this, it may get reset by
430 * send_server_key_exchange
432 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0;
435 * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a
436 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
437 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
438 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
439 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
444 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
447 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
448 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
449 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
450 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
451 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
453 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
454 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
455 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
457 || (alg_k & SSL_kDHE)
458 || (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
459 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
460 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
461 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
462 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys
463 [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) *
464 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
469 ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
475 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
479 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
480 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
481 if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
482 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
484 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
485 * during re-negotiation:
487 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
488 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
490 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
491 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
494 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
496 * ... except when the application insists on
497 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
500 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
501 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
502 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
504 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
507 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
508 /* no cert request */
510 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
511 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
512 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
513 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
517 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
518 ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
521 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
526 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
527 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
528 ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s);
531 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
532 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
536 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
539 * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending
540 * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as
541 * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely
542 * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of
543 * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush
547 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
548 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
552 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
554 s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
557 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
558 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
559 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
560 ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
565 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
568 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
569 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
570 ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
575 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
576 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
577 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
578 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
580 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A;
582 } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
583 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
585 if (!s->session->peer)
587 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
588 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
589 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
593 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
594 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
596 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
597 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
604 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
608 * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert,
609 * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for
610 * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next
613 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
614 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
617 for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++)
618 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) {
621 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
630 EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
632 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
641 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
642 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
643 ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
647 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A;
651 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
652 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
653 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
654 ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
658 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
663 case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A:
664 case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_B:
665 ret = ssl3_get_change_cipher_spec(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A,
666 SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_B);
670 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
671 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
673 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
674 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
676 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
681 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
682 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
683 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
684 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
688 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
689 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
690 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
692 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
696 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
697 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
698 ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
701 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
705 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
706 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
707 ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
710 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
714 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
715 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
717 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
718 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
720 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
724 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
726 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
730 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
733 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
734 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
737 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
743 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
744 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
745 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
746 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,
747 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
749 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
751 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
754 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
756 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A;
758 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
763 /* clean a few things up */
764 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
766 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
769 /* remove buffering on output */
770 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
774 if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a
779 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
781 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
783 s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept;
786 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
795 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
801 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
803 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
807 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
808 new_state = s->state;
810 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
811 s->state = new_state;
817 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
821 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
825 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
828 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) {
829 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0)) {
830 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_HELLO_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
833 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
836 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
837 return ssl_do_write(s);
840 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
842 int i, ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1;
843 unsigned int j, complen = 0;
847 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
848 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
850 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
852 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
853 PACKET pkt, session_id, cipher_suites, compression, extensions, cookie;
856 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
860 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are
861 * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down
862 * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we
863 * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1.
865 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
866 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
869 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
870 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
871 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
872 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
873 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
878 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, n)) {
879 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
880 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
884 is_v2_record = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
886 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
887 /* First lets get s->client_version set correctly */
889 unsigned int version;
892 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
893 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
894 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
895 * the rest right through. Its format is:
897 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
898 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
900 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
901 * 7-8 session_id_length
902 * 9-10 challenge_length
906 if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &mt)
907 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
909 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
910 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
913 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
917 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &version)) {
918 /* No protocol version supplied! */
919 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
922 if (version == 0x0002) {
923 /* This is real SSLv2. We don't support it. */
924 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
926 } else if ((version & 0xff00) == (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
928 s->client_version = version;
930 /* No idea what protocol this is */
931 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
936 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
937 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
939 if(!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->client_version)) {
940 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
941 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
946 /* Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable */
947 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
948 if (s->version != TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
949 if (s->client_version >= s->version) {
952 } else if (s->client_version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
953 switch(s->client_version) {
956 if(!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2)) {
957 s->version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
958 s->method = TLSv1_2_server_method();
962 /* Deliberately fall through */
964 if(!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1)) {
965 s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
966 s->method = TLSv1_1_server_method();
970 /* Deliberately fall through */
972 if(!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1)) {
973 s->version = TLS1_VERSION;
974 s->method = TLSv1_server_method();
978 /* Deliberately fall through */
980 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
981 if(!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)) {
982 s->version = SSL3_VERSION;
983 s->method = SSLv3_server_method();
992 } else if (s->client_version <= s->version
993 || s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
995 * For DTLS we just check versions are potentially compatible. Version
996 * negotiation comes later.
1002 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1003 if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) {
1005 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
1008 s->version = s->client_version;
1010 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1014 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1017 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1018 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1019 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected above.
1021 unsigned int cipher_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1024 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &cipher_len)
1025 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &session_id_len)
1026 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1027 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1028 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1032 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&pkt, &cipher_suites, cipher_len)
1033 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&pkt, &session_id, session_id_len)
1034 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1035 /* No extensions. */
1036 || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 0) {
1037 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1038 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1042 /* Load the client random */
1043 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE :
1045 memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1046 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1047 s->s3->client_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1048 challenge_len, challenge_len)) {
1049 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1050 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1054 PACKET_null_init(&compression);
1055 PACKET_null_init(&extensions);
1057 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1058 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1059 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &session_id)) {
1060 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1061 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1065 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1066 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &cookie)) {
1067 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1068 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1072 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1073 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1074 * So check cookie length...
1076 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1077 if (PACKET_remaining(&cookie) == 0)
1082 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &cipher_suites)
1083 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &compression)) {
1084 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1085 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1088 /* Could be empty. */
1095 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1096 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1098 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1099 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1100 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1101 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1102 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1103 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1104 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1105 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1106 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1107 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1112 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1113 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1116 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &extensions, &session_id);
1118 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1120 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1121 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1122 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1123 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1124 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1126 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) {
1127 /* previous session */
1129 } else if (i == -1) {
1133 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1138 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1139 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1140 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1141 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1142 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&cookie),
1143 PACKET_remaining(&cookie)) == 0) {
1144 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1145 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1146 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1148 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1150 /* default verification */
1151 } else if (!PACKET_equal(&cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1152 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1153 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1154 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1157 /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
1160 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1161 /* Select version to use */
1162 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1163 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) {
1164 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1165 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1166 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1167 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1168 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1169 s->version = s->client_version;
1170 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1172 } else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1173 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) {
1174 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1175 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1177 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1178 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1179 s->version = s->client_version;
1180 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1183 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1187 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &cipher_suites, &(ciphers),
1188 is_v2_record, &al) == NULL) {
1192 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1195 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1198 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1199 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1201 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1202 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1204 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1205 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1214 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1217 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1218 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1219 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1224 complen = PACKET_remaining(&compression);
1225 for (j = 0; j < complen; j++) {
1226 if (PACKET_data(&compression)[j] == 0)
1232 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1233 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1237 /* TLS extensions */
1238 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1239 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &extensions)) {
1240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1246 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1247 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1248 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1249 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1253 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1254 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1259 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1260 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1262 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1263 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1264 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
1266 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1268 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1269 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1273 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1275 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1280 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1281 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1282 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1286 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1287 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1288 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1289 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1290 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1295 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1296 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1297 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1299 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1300 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1301 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1302 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1303 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1305 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1306 /* Can't disable compression */
1307 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1308 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1309 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1312 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1313 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1314 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1315 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1316 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1320 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1321 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1322 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1325 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1326 for (k = 0; k < complen; k++) {
1327 if (PACKET_data(&compression)[k] == comp_id)
1331 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1332 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1333 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1338 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1339 /* See if we have a match */
1340 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1343 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1344 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1345 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1347 for (o = 0; o < complen; o++) {
1348 if (v == PACKET_data(&compression)[o]) {
1357 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1363 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1364 * using compression.
1366 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1367 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1373 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1377 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1378 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1380 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1382 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1383 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1384 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1385 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1390 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1391 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1394 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1396 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1397 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1399 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1400 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1404 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1407 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1409 c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1412 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1413 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1416 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1417 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1418 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1419 s->session->not_resumable = s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1420 ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE))
1422 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1423 /* do not send a session ticket */
1424 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1426 /* Session-id reuse */
1427 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1430 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1431 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
1436 * we now have the following setup.
1438 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1439 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1440 * compression - basically ignored right now
1441 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1442 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1443 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1444 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1447 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1448 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1449 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
1450 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1459 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1461 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1464 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1465 return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
1468 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1471 unsigned char *p, *d;
1476 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
1477 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1479 /* Do the message type and length last */
1480 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1482 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
1483 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
1486 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
1487 * ssl3_get_client_hello()
1489 memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1490 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1493 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1494 * back in the server hello:
1495 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1496 * we send back the old session ID.
1497 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1498 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1499 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1500 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1502 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1503 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1504 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1505 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1508 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1509 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1511 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1513 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1514 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1515 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1516 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1520 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
1523 /* put the cipher */
1524 i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
1527 /* put the compression method */
1528 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1531 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1534 *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1537 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1538 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1539 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1543 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
1545 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1546 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1547 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1553 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l)) {
1554 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1557 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1560 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1561 return ssl_do_write(s);
1564 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1567 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
1568 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0)) {
1569 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1572 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1575 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1576 return ssl_do_write(s);
1579 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1581 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1585 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1588 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1589 DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
1591 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1592 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp;
1593 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1596 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1599 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1600 unsigned char *p, *d;
1610 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1611 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
1612 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1617 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1619 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1620 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
1622 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
1625 if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
1626 n += strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
1628 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
1629 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
1631 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1632 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1633 if (type & SSL_kRSA) {
1634 rsa = cert->rsa_tmp;
1635 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1636 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1637 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1639 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1642 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1643 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1644 SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1648 cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
1651 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1652 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1653 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1658 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1;
1661 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1662 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
1663 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
1664 dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
1666 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1667 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1668 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1673 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1674 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1675 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1677 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1680 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1681 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1682 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1685 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
1686 DH_security_bits(dhp), 0, dhp)) {
1687 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1688 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1689 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1692 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
1693 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1694 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1698 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto)
1700 else if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
1701 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1706 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1707 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1708 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) {
1709 if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
1710 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1714 dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1715 dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1716 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) {
1717 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1726 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1727 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1728 const EC_GROUP *group;
1730 ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp;
1731 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
1732 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1733 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1734 if (nid != NID_undef)
1735 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1736 } else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) {
1737 ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1738 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1740 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->
1741 s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1743 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1744 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1745 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1746 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1750 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
1751 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1752 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1756 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1757 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1758 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1761 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1763 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) {
1764 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1768 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh;
1769 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1770 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1771 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
1772 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
1773 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1779 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1780 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1781 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) {
1782 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1786 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1787 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
1788 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1789 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1794 * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named
1795 * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is
1799 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1801 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1802 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1807 * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
1808 * allocate memory accordingly.
1810 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1811 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1812 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1815 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1816 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char));
1817 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1818 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
1819 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1820 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1824 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1825 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1826 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1827 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1829 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1830 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1834 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1838 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in
1839 * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four
1840 * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1843 n += 4 + encodedlen;
1846 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1847 * can set these to NULLs
1854 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1855 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1856 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
1857 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1858 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1859 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
1860 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1861 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1864 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
1865 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
1866 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
1867 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
1871 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1872 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1873 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1876 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1877 nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1878 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1879 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1886 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP))
1887 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
1888 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
1890 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1893 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1899 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) {
1900 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
1903 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1905 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1906 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
1907 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1908 if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint) {
1909 s2n(strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint), p);
1910 strncpy((char *)p, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
1911 strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint));
1912 p += strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
1919 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1920 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1921 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
1931 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1932 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1934 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
1935 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
1936 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
1937 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
1939 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1947 memcpy(p, encodedPoint, encodedlen);
1948 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1949 encodedPoint = NULL;
1957 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1958 * points to the space at the end.
1960 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1961 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1964 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
1965 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1966 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1967 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
1968 ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1969 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1971 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1973 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
1974 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, (unsigned int *)&i);
1978 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1979 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
1980 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA);
1988 /* send signature algorithm */
1989 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1990 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
1991 /* Should never happen */
1992 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1993 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1994 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2000 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2002 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
2003 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2005 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2007 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
2008 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]),
2009 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) {
2010 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
2015 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2018 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2019 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2020 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2021 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2026 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) {
2027 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2028 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2033 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2034 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2035 return ssl_do_write(s);
2037 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2039 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2040 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2041 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2043 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2044 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2048 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2050 unsigned char *p, *d;
2051 int i, j, nl, off, n;
2052 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
2056 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
2059 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2061 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2063 n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
2068 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2069 const unsigned char *psigs;
2070 unsigned char *etmp = p;
2071 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2072 /* Skip over length for now */
2074 nl = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, p, psigs, nl);
2075 /* Now fill in length */
2085 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2088 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
2089 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
2090 j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
2091 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
2092 (buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) {
2093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2097 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2099 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2104 /* else no CA names */
2105 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2108 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n)) {
2109 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2113 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2116 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2117 return ssl_do_write(s);
2119 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2123 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2128 unsigned long alg_k;
2129 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2131 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2133 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2135 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2137 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2138 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2139 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2140 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2141 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2143 PACKET pkt, enc_premaster;
2144 unsigned char *data, *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2146 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2147 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2148 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2149 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok);
2153 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, n)) {
2154 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2155 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2159 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2162 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
2163 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2164 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2166 PACKET psk_identity;
2168 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2169 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2170 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2173 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2174 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2175 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2176 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2179 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2180 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2182 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2186 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2188 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2192 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2195 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2196 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2197 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2199 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2201 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2203 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2204 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2205 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2209 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2210 s->s3->tmp.psk = BUF_memdup(psk, psklen);
2211 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2213 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2214 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2215 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2219 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2221 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2222 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
2223 if (PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 0) {
2224 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2225 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2228 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
2229 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
2230 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2231 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2236 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2237 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2238 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2240 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2243 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2244 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) {
2245 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2246 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2248 * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already
2251 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2253 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2258 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2259 if ((pkey == NULL) ||
2260 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
2261 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2262 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2263 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2266 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
2269 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2270 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2271 enc_premaster = pkt;
2274 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &enc_premaster)
2275 || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 0) {
2276 /* Try SSLv3 behaviour for TLS. */
2277 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG) {
2278 enc_premaster = orig;
2280 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2281 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2288 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2289 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2290 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2291 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2293 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2294 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2295 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2296 RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
2300 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
2301 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2302 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2303 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2308 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2309 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2310 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2311 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2312 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2315 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2316 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) {
2320 decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt(PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
2321 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2322 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2326 * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
2327 * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
2330 constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2333 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2334 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2335 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2336 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2337 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2338 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2341 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[0],
2342 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2344 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[1],
2345 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2348 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2349 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2350 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2351 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2352 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2353 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2356 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2357 unsigned char workaround_good;
2359 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2361 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[1],
2362 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2363 version_good |= workaround_good;
2367 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2368 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2370 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2373 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2374 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2375 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2376 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2378 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2380 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, rsa_decrypt[j],
2381 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2384 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt,
2385 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
2386 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2387 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2390 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2394 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2395 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2397 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2398 PACKET bookmark = pkt;
2399 unsigned char shared[(OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS + 7) / 8];
2401 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &i)) {
2402 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2403 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2404 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2405 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2410 if (PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != i) {
2411 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) {
2412 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2413 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2417 i = PACKET_remaining(&pkt);
2420 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2421 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2422 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2423 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2425 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2426 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2427 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) || (skey->pkey.dh == NULL)) {
2428 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2429 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2430 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2433 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2434 } else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) {
2435 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2436 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2437 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2440 dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh;
2443 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2444 EVP_PKEY *clkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2446 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2447 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2449 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
2450 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2451 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2452 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2455 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2456 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2458 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &data, i)) {
2459 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2460 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2461 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2462 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2465 pub = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
2468 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2472 i = DH_compute_key(shared, pub, dh_srvr);
2475 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2480 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2481 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
2487 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, shared, i, 0)) {
2488 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2489 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2497 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2498 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2502 const EC_GROUP *group;
2503 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2504 unsigned char *shared;
2506 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2507 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
2508 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2512 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2513 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2514 /* use the certificate */
2515 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2518 * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
2519 * ServerKeyExchange msg.
2521 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2524 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2525 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2527 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2528 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) {
2529 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2533 /* Let's get client's public key */
2534 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
2535 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2540 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2542 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2543 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2544 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2545 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2548 if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2549 == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
2551 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
2552 * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the
2553 * code is never executed. When that support is added, we
2554 * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is
2555 * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly
2556 * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group.
2558 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2559 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2560 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2564 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2565 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->
2567 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2570 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2573 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2574 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2576 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
2577 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2578 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2582 /* Get encoded point length */
2583 if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &i)) {
2584 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2585 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2586 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2589 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &data, i)
2590 || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 0) {
2591 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2594 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, data, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
2595 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2600 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2601 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2602 if (field_size <= 0) {
2603 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2606 shared = OPENSSL_malloc((field_size + 7) / 8);
2607 if (shared == NULL) {
2608 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2611 i = ECDH_compute_key(shared, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint,
2614 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2615 OPENSSL_free(shared);
2619 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2620 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2621 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2622 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2623 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2624 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2626 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, shared, i, 1)) {
2627 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2628 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2634 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2635 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2636 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &i)
2637 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &data, i)) {
2638 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2639 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2642 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
2643 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2646 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2647 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2648 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2649 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2650 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2653 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2654 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2655 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2656 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2660 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
2661 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2665 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2666 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2668 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2669 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2670 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2671 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2672 unsigned long alg_a;
2676 /* Get our certificate private key */
2677 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2678 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2679 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2681 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2682 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2684 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2685 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2686 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2687 * client certificate for authorization only.
2689 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2690 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2691 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2694 /* Decrypt session key */
2695 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &data, n)) {
2696 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2697 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2701 ((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass,
2702 n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
2703 || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2704 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2705 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2710 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2711 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2712 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2713 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2716 /* Generate master secret */
2717 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
2718 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
2719 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2720 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2723 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2724 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2725 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2730 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2731 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2736 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2737 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2743 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2744 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2747 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2748 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2749 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2750 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2751 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2752 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2754 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2755 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
2756 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
2758 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2762 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2764 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2765 unsigned char *sig, *data;
2766 int al, ok, ret = 0;
2771 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2774 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2777 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have received
2778 * a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| will be non
2779 * NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is not required even
2780 * if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in the case of static
2781 * DH). In that case the ClientKeyExchange processing will skip the
2782 * CertificateVerify state so we should not arrive here.
2784 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2789 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2790 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2791 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2792 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,
2793 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
2798 peer = s->session->peer;
2799 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2800 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
2802 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2803 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2804 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2805 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2809 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2810 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, n)) {
2811 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2812 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2815 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2817 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
2820 if (n == 64 && pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
2823 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2826 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &sig, 2)) {
2827 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2830 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sig, pkey);
2832 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2834 } else if (rv == 0) {
2835 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2839 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2842 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &len)) {
2843 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2844 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2848 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2849 if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(&pkt) > j) || (n <= 0)) {
2850 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2851 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2854 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &data, len)) {
2855 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2856 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2860 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2863 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2864 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
2865 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2866 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2870 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
2873 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
2874 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
2875 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2876 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2880 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, data, len, pkey) <= 0) {
2881 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2882 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2886 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2887 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
2888 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2889 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, data, len,
2892 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2893 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2897 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2898 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2903 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2904 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
2905 j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2906 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2907 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, data, len, pkey->pkey.dsa);
2910 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2911 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
2916 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2917 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
2918 j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2919 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2920 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, data, len, pkey->pkey.ec);
2923 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2924 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2929 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
2930 unsigned char signature[64];
2932 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2933 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
2935 fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", len);
2937 for (idx = 0; idx < 64; idx++) {
2938 signature[63 - idx] = data[idx];
2940 j = EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, signature, 64, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2942 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2944 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2945 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2949 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2950 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
2957 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2958 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2961 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
2962 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
2963 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
2964 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2968 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2970 int i, ok, al, ret = -1;
2972 unsigned long l, llen, n;
2973 const unsigned char *certstart;
2974 unsigned char *certbytes;
2975 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
2978 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2981 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
2986 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
2987 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2988 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
2989 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2990 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2991 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2995 * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list
2997 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
2998 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2999 SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3000 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3003 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
3007 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
3008 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3009 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3013 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, n)) {
3014 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3015 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3019 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3020 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3024 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&pkt, &llen)
3025 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&pkt, &spkt, llen)
3026 || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 0) {
3027 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3028 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3032 while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0) {
3033 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3034 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3035 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3036 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3037 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3041 certstart = certbytes;
3042 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
3044 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3047 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3048 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3049 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3050 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3053 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3054 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3060 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3061 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3062 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3063 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3064 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3065 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3068 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3069 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3070 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3071 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3072 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3073 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3076 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3077 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3078 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3083 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3085 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3086 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3087 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3091 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3092 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3095 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3097 al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3098 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3099 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3102 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3105 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3106 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3107 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3109 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3110 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3112 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3113 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
3120 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3122 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3124 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3128 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3132 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
3133 cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3135 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3136 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3140 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) {
3141 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3142 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3145 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3148 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3149 return ssl_do_write(s);
3152 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3153 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3155 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3159 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
3160 unsigned char *p, *macstart;
3161 const unsigned char *const_p;
3162 int len, slen_full, slen;
3165 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3166 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3167 unsigned char key_name[16];
3169 /* get session encoding length */
3170 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3172 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3175 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3176 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3179 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3181 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3185 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3186 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3189 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3193 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3196 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3199 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3201 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3202 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3203 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3207 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3208 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3211 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3214 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3215 * follows handshake_header_length +
3216 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3217 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3218 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3219 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3221 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3222 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3223 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3226 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3228 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3229 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3231 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3232 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3236 if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0)
3238 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3239 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
3241 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3242 EVP_sha256(), NULL))
3244 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3248 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3249 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3250 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3252 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3254 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3256 /* Output key name */
3258 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3261 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3262 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3263 /* Encrypt session data */
3264 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
3267 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len))
3271 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
3273 if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen))
3276 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3277 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3280 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3282 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3283 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3284 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3286 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len))
3288 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3292 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3293 return ssl_do_write(s);
3296 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3297 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3298 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3302 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3304 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) {
3307 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3308 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3309 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3312 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
3313 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3317 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3320 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3321 /* message length */
3322 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3324 *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
3325 /* length of OCSP response */
3326 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3327 /* actual response */
3328 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3329 /* number of bytes to write */
3330 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3331 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3335 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3336 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3339 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3341 * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3342 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3344 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3348 PACKET pkt, next_proto, padding;
3349 size_t next_proto_len;
3352 * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3353 * extension in their ClientHello
3355 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
3356 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,
3357 SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3358 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3362 /* See the payload format below */
3363 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3364 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3365 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3366 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok);
3372 * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in
3373 * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by
3374 * ssl3_get_finished).
3376 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
3377 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3378 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3383 goto err; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3386 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, n)) {
3387 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3392 * The payload looks like:
3394 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3395 * uint8 padding_len;
3396 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3398 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &next_proto)
3399 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &padding)
3400 || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) > 0) {
3401 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3405 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->next_proto_negotiated,
3407 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0;
3411 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
3415 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3420 #define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3
3422 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
3423 PACKET *cipher_suites,
3424 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
3425 int sslv2format, int *al
3428 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3429 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
3431 /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */
3432 unsigned char cipher[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN];
3434 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
3436 n = sslv2format ? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN : TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
3438 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) {
3439 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
3440 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3444 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % n != 0) {
3445 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3446 SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
3447 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3451 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) {
3452 sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
3454 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3455 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3460 sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk);
3463 if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw,
3464 &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) {
3465 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3469 while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites, cipher, n)) {
3471 * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the
3472 * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero
3473 * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them.
3475 if (sslv2format && cipher[0] != '\0')
3478 /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
3479 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3480 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3481 /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
3482 if (s->renegotiate) {
3483 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3484 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
3485 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3488 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
3489 #ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
3490 fprintf(stderr, "SCSV received by server\n");
3495 /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
3496 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3497 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3499 * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
3500 * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
3503 if (!SSL_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION, 0, NULL)) {
3504 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3505 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
3506 *al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
3512 /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */
3513 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, sslv2format ? &cipher[1] : cipher);
3515 if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
3516 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3517 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3522 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) > 0) {
3523 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3524 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3532 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
3533 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);