1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
183 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
185 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
187 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
189 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
190 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
192 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
194 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
195 we do so if There is no srp login name */
197 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
201 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
208 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
210 ssl_undefined_function,
211 ssl3_get_server_method)
213 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
216 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
217 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
219 int new_state,state,skip=0;
221 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
225 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
227 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
228 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
230 /* init things to blank */
232 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
241 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
242 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
243 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
245 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
247 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
258 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
260 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
264 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
265 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
268 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
270 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
275 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
277 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
279 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
284 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
292 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
299 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
300 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
302 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
304 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
305 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
307 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
309 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
310 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
311 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
313 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
314 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
316 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
317 * client that doesn't support secure
320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
321 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
327 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
328 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
329 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
330 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
334 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
335 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
338 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
339 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
340 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
341 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
344 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
347 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
351 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
352 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
353 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
356 if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP)
358 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
359 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
361 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
364 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
366 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
367 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
370 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
372 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
373 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
374 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
375 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
376 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
377 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
385 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
389 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
390 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
391 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
392 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
393 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
396 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
397 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
399 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
403 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
406 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
407 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A;
409 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
414 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
415 case SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A:
416 case SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B:
417 /* We promised to send an audit proof in the hello. */
418 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client)
420 ret = tls1_send_server_supplemental_data(s);
421 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
426 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
431 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
432 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
433 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
434 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
435 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
436 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
437 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
439 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
440 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
441 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
442 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
443 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
445 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
450 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
457 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
462 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
463 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
464 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
466 /* clear this, it may get reset by
467 * send_server_key_exchange */
468 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
469 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
470 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
471 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
473 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
474 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
475 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
476 * be able to handle this) */
477 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
479 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
482 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
483 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
485 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
487 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
488 * message only if the cipher suite is either
489 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
490 * server certificate contains the server's
491 * public key for key exchange.
493 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
494 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
495 * hint if provided */
496 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
497 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
499 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
500 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
501 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
503 || (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
504 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
505 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
506 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
507 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
508 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
514 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
515 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
520 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
524 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
525 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
526 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
527 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
528 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
529 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
530 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
531 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
532 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
533 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
534 * and in RFC 2246): */
535 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
536 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
537 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
538 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
539 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
540 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
541 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
542 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
543 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
545 /* no cert request */
547 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
548 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
549 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
550 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
555 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
556 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
557 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
558 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
559 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
561 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
562 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
568 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
569 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
570 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
571 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
572 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
573 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
577 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
579 /* This code originally checked to see if
580 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
581 * and then flushed. This caused problems
582 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
583 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
584 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
585 * still exist. So instead we just flush
589 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
590 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
595 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
597 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
600 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
601 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
602 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
603 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
607 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
609 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
611 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
612 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
615 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
619 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
620 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
621 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
626 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
627 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
628 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
629 * message is not sent.
630 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
631 * the client uses its key from the certificate
634 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
635 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
637 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
638 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
640 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
644 else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
646 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
648 if (!s->session->peer)
650 /* For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer
651 * at this point and digest cached records.
653 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
655 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
658 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
659 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
667 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
670 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
671 * a client cert, it can be verified
672 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
673 * should be generalized. But it is next step
675 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
676 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
678 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
679 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
683 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
684 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
695 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
696 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
698 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
699 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
700 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
702 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
703 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
705 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
706 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
708 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
713 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
714 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
715 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
716 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
717 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
719 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
723 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
724 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
725 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
726 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
727 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
730 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
731 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
732 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
735 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
739 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
740 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
741 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
742 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
743 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
744 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
748 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
749 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
750 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
751 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
752 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
758 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
759 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
761 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
762 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
763 { ret= -1; goto end; }
765 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
766 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
768 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
769 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
772 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
773 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
781 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
782 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
783 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
784 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
785 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
786 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
787 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
788 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
791 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
792 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
794 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
795 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
797 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
801 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
806 /* clean a few things up */
807 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
809 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
812 /* remove buffering on output */
813 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
817 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
822 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
824 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
826 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
828 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
836 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
842 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
846 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
851 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
855 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
862 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
866 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
870 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
873 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
875 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
876 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
879 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
880 return ssl_do_write(s);
883 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
888 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
889 * so permit appropriate message length */
890 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
896 if (!ok) return((int)n);
897 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
898 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
900 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
902 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
904 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
907 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
908 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
909 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
910 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
912 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
913 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
916 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
917 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
919 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
920 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
923 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
929 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
931 int i,j,ok,al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,ret= -1;
932 unsigned int cookie_len;
937 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
941 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
943 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
944 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
945 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
946 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
949 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
952 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
955 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
956 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
957 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
958 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
959 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
962 if (!ok) return((int)n);
964 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
966 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
967 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
968 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
971 if ((SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->client_version > s->version
972 && s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION) ||
973 (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->client_version < s->version))
975 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
976 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
978 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
979 s->version = s->client_version;
981 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
985 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
986 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
987 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
989 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
991 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
993 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
994 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
996 if (cookie_length == 0)
1000 /* load the client random */
1001 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1002 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1004 /* get the session-id */
1008 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
1009 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
1010 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1011 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
1012 * won't even compile against older library versions).
1014 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
1015 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
1016 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1017 * setting will be ignored.
1019 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
1021 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1026 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1028 { /* previous session */
1035 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1045 cookie_len = *(p++);
1048 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1049 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1050 * does not cause an overflow.
1052 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1055 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1056 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1060 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1061 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1064 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1066 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1068 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1071 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1072 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1073 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1076 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1078 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1079 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1081 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1082 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1083 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1086 /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
1091 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
1093 /* Select version to use */
1094 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1095 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2))
1097 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1098 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1100 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1102 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1103 s->version = s->client_version;
1104 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1107 else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1108 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1))
1110 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1111 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1115 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1116 s->version = s->client_version;
1117 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1120 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1125 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1127 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1128 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1129 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1134 /* not enough data */
1135 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1136 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1139 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1146 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1147 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1150 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1153 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1155 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1157 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1159 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1160 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1168 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1169 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1172 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1174 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1175 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1176 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1177 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1178 * enabled, though. */
1179 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1180 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1182 s->session->cipher = c;
1189 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1190 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1191 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1192 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1201 /* not enough data */
1202 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1203 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1206 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1211 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1218 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1219 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1225 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1227 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n))
1229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1234 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1235 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1236 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1237 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1240 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1241 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1247 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1249 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1251 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1252 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1253 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1256 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1257 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1261 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1262 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1263 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1265 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1270 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1273 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1275 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1276 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1278 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1279 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1284 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1285 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1286 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1287 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1288 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1289 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1290 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1292 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1293 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1294 /* Can't disable compression */
1295 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1297 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1300 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1301 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1303 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1304 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1306 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1310 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1312 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1315 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1316 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1318 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1323 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1324 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1330 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1331 { /* See if we have a match */
1332 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1334 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1335 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1337 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1350 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1355 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1356 * using compression.
1358 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1360 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1365 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1370 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1371 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1373 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1375 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1376 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1377 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1378 if (ciphers == NULL)
1380 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1381 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1385 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1386 if (s->cert->cert_cb
1387 && s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg) <= 0)
1389 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1390 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1393 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1394 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1398 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1399 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1402 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1406 /* Session-id reuse */
1407 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1408 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1409 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1410 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1412 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1414 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1415 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1417 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1418 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1420 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1424 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1425 else if (ec != NULL)
1426 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1428 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1432 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1435 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1437 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1441 /* we now have the following setup.
1443 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1444 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1445 * compression - basically ignored right now
1446 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1447 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1448 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1449 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1452 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1453 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1455 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
1457 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1462 if (ret < 0) ret=-ret;
1466 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1469 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1470 return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
1473 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1476 unsigned char *p,*d;
1480 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1482 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1483 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1484 p=s->s3->server_random;
1485 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1488 /* Do the message type and length last */
1489 d=p= ssl_handshake_start(s);
1491 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1492 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1495 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1496 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1498 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1499 * back in the server hello:
1500 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1501 * we send back the old session ID.
1502 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1503 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1504 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1505 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1507 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1508 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1509 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1510 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1513 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1515 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1517 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1518 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1520 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1524 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1527 /* put the cipher */
1528 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1531 /* put the compression method */
1532 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1535 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1538 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1540 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1541 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1543 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1546 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1548 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1554 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
1555 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1558 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1559 return ssl_do_write(s);
1562 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1565 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1567 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
1568 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1571 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1572 return ssl_do_write(s);
1575 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1577 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1581 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1584 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1587 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1588 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1589 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1592 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1595 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1596 unsigned char *p,*d;
1606 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1607 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1609 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1614 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1616 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1617 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1620 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1622 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1623 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1624 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1627 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1628 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1636 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1637 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1642 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1646 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1647 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1650 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1651 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1652 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1653 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1656 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1657 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1661 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1663 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1667 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1669 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1674 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1675 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1676 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1678 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1680 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1687 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1688 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1689 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1690 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1692 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1702 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1703 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1705 const EC_GROUP *group;
1707 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1708 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1710 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1711 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1712 if (nid != NID_undef)
1713 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1715 else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
1717 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1718 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1719 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1723 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1724 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1728 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1730 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1734 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1737 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1740 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1742 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1744 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1748 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1749 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1750 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1751 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1753 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1755 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1760 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1761 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1762 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1764 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1768 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1769 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1771 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1775 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1776 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1777 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1780 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1783 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1787 /* Encode the public key.
1788 * First check the size of encoding and
1789 * allocate memory accordingly.
1791 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1792 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1793 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1796 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1797 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1798 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1799 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1801 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1806 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1807 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1808 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1809 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1811 if (encodedlen == 0)
1813 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1817 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1819 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1820 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1821 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1822 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1827 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1828 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1836 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1837 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1838 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1840 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1841 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1844 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1845 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1846 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1848 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1849 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1850 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1851 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1853 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1864 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1865 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1868 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1870 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1871 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1872 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1879 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1880 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1882 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1885 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1888 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1896 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+kn))
1898 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1901 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1903 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1905 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1906 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1918 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1919 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1921 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1922 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1923 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1924 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1925 * the actual encoded point itself
1927 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1935 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1936 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1938 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1939 encodedPoint = NULL;
1944 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1945 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1947 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1948 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1949 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1950 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1957 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1958 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1959 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1960 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1964 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1966 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1967 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1968 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1969 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1970 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1971 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1972 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
1973 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1974 (unsigned int *)&i);
1978 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1979 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1981 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1991 /* send signature algorithm */
1992 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1994 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
1996 /* Should never happen */
1997 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1998 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2004 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
2007 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
2008 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2009 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2010 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
2011 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
2012 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
2014 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
2019 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2024 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2025 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2026 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2031 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
2034 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2035 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2036 return ssl_do_write(s);
2038 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2040 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2041 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2042 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2044 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2048 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2050 unsigned char *p,*d;
2052 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2056 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2060 d=p=ssl_handshake_start(s);
2062 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2064 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2069 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2071 const unsigned char *psigs;
2072 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2074 memcpy(p, psigs, nl);
2083 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2087 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2089 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2090 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2091 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
2093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2096 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
2097 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2100 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2107 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2108 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2114 /* else no CA names */
2115 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2118 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
2120 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2121 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
2123 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2125 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2133 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2136 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2137 return ssl_do_write(s);
2142 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2146 unsigned long alg_k;
2148 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2150 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2152 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2154 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2156 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2158 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2160 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2161 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2162 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2163 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2164 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2167 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2168 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2169 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2170 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2174 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2175 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2177 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2179 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2180 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2182 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2183 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2185 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2186 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2187 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2188 * be sent already */
2191 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2192 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2199 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2200 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2201 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2202 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2204 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2205 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2211 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2212 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2217 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2219 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2229 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2233 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2235 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2236 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
2239 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2241 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2242 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2243 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2244 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2245 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2247 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2248 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2249 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2251 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2252 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2254 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2255 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2256 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2257 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
2258 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
2259 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
2260 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
2266 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
2267 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
2268 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2270 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2271 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2272 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2273 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2277 s->session->master_key_length=
2278 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2279 s->session->master_key,
2281 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2285 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2286 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2289 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2296 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2298 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2307 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2308 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2309 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2310 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2313 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2314 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2315 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) ||
2316 (skey->pkey.dh == NULL))
2318 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2319 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2322 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2324 else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2326 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2327 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2331 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2335 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2336 EVP_PKEY *clkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2339 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2340 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2342 if (dh_clnt == NULL)
2344 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2345 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2348 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2349 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2352 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2359 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2363 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2368 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2375 s->session->master_key_length=
2376 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2377 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2378 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2384 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2385 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2387 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2388 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2389 krb5_data authenticator;
2391 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2392 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2393 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2394 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2395 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2396 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2398 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2399 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2401 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2403 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2406 enc_ticket.length = i;
2408 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2410 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2411 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2415 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2416 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2419 authenticator.length = i;
2421 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2423 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2424 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2428 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2429 p+=authenticator.length;
2433 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2436 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2439 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2441 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2442 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2446 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2447 enc_pms.length + 6))
2449 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2450 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2454 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2458 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2459 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2461 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2462 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2463 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2468 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2469 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2471 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2472 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2475 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2476 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2478 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2479 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2480 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2485 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2487 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2492 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2493 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2495 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2499 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2501 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2503 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2504 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2507 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2508 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2510 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2511 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2514 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2516 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2517 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2520 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2522 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2523 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2527 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2529 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2530 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2533 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2535 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2536 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2537 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2538 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2539 * the protocol version.
2540 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2541 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2543 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2546 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2551 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2553 s->session->master_key_length=
2554 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2555 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2557 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2559 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2560 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2562 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2563 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2568 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2569 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2570 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2571 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2575 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2577 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2578 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2583 const EC_GROUP *group;
2584 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2586 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2587 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2589 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2590 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2594 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2595 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2597 /* use the certificate */
2598 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2602 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2603 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2605 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2608 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2609 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2611 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2612 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2614 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2619 /* Let's get client's public key */
2620 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2622 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2623 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2629 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2631 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2633 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2634 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2637 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2639 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2641 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2642 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2643 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2644 * never executed. When that support is
2645 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2646 * received in the certificate is
2647 * authorized for key agreement.
2648 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2649 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2652 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2653 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2654 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2658 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2659 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2661 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2665 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2669 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2670 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2672 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2674 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2675 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2679 /* Get encoded point length */
2684 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2688 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2689 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2691 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2695 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2696 * currently, so set it to the start
2698 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2701 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2702 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2703 if (field_size <= 0)
2705 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2709 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2712 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2717 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2718 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2719 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2720 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2721 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2722 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2724 /* Compute the master secret */
2725 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2726 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2728 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2733 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2734 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2736 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2737 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2738 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2740 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2742 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2747 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2748 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2751 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2753 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2754 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2757 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2759 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2760 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2764 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2765 * string for the callback */
2766 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2767 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2768 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2769 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2770 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2772 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2774 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2775 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2778 else if (psk_len == 0)
2780 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2781 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2782 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2783 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2787 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2788 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2790 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2792 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2796 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2797 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2798 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2799 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2801 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2802 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2806 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2807 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2808 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2809 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2810 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2812 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2813 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2817 s->session->master_key_length=
2818 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2819 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2822 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2828 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2829 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2837 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2838 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2841 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2843 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2846 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2847 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2848 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2849 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2851 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2852 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2856 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2858 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2865 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2866 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2869 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2870 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2871 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2872 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2873 unsigned long alg_a;
2875 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2876 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2877 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2878 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2879 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2880 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2882 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2883 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2884 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2885 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2886 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2887 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2888 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2889 if (client_pub_pkey)
2891 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2894 /* Decrypt session key */
2895 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)))
2897 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2905 else if (p[1] < 0x80)
2912 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2915 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2918 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2921 /* Generate master secret */
2922 s->session->master_key_length=
2923 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2924 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2925 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2926 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2931 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2932 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2940 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2941 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2942 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2948 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2949 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2952 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2953 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2954 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2955 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2956 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2957 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2962 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2964 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2970 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2972 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2974 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2975 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2976 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2978 516, /* Enough for 4096 bit RSA key with TLS v1.2 */
2981 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2983 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2985 peer=s->session->peer;
2986 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2987 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2995 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2997 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2998 if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3000 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3001 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
3010 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
3011 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3015 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3017 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
3018 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3022 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3024 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
3025 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3029 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3030 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3031 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3032 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
3033 * signature without length field */
3034 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3035 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
3041 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3043 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
3046 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3051 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3055 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3064 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3065 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3069 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3070 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
3072 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3073 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3077 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3081 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3084 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3085 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3089 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3092 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3093 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3095 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3096 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3100 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3102 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3103 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3108 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3109 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3111 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3112 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3116 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3117 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3122 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3123 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3129 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3130 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3132 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3133 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3134 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3138 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3139 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3145 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3146 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3148 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3149 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3150 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3154 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3155 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3156 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3162 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3163 { unsigned char signature[64];
3165 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3166 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3168 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3170 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3171 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3173 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3174 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3177 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3178 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3179 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3185 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3186 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3195 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3198 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3200 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3201 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3202 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3204 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3205 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3209 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3211 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3213 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3214 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3216 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3218 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3225 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3227 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3229 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3230 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3232 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3233 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3236 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3237 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3240 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3243 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3247 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3249 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3253 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3255 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3264 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3268 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3271 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3273 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3279 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3282 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3287 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3288 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3291 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3293 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3300 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3302 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3303 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3305 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3306 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3309 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3310 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3311 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3313 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3314 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3317 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3318 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3320 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3326 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3329 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3330 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3335 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3336 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3337 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3338 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3340 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3341 * when we arrive here. */
3342 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3344 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3345 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3347 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3351 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3352 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3353 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3354 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3355 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3363 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3366 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3367 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3371 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3375 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3377 cpk=ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3380 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3381 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3382 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3389 ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,cpk);
3390 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3393 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3394 return ssl_do_write(s);
3397 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3398 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3399 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3401 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3403 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3404 const unsigned char *const_p;
3405 int len, slen_full, slen;
3410 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3411 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3412 unsigned char key_name[16];
3414 /* get session encoding length */
3415 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3416 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3419 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3421 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3425 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3427 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3429 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3435 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3437 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3438 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3444 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3445 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3447 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3448 * follows handshake_header_length +
3449 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3450 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3451 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3452 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3454 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3455 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3456 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3458 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3459 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3460 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3461 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3462 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3465 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3467 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3476 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3477 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3478 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3479 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3480 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3481 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3484 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3485 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3486 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3487 * as their sessions. */
3488 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3490 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3492 /* Output key name */
3494 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3497 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3498 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3499 /* Encrypt session data */
3500 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3502 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3504 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3506 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3507 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3508 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3511 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3513 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3514 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
3515 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3516 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3518 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3522 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3523 return ssl_do_write(s);
3526 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3528 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3531 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3532 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3533 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3536 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3539 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3542 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3543 /* message length */
3544 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3546 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3547 /* length of OCSP response */
3548 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3549 /* actual response */
3550 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3551 /* number of bytes to write */
3552 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3553 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3557 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3558 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3561 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3562 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3563 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3564 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3567 int proto_len, padding_len;
3569 const unsigned char *p;
3571 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3572 * extension in their ClientHello */
3573 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3575 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3579 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3580 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3581 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3583 514, /* See the payload format below */
3589 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3590 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3591 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3592 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3594 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3599 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3601 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3603 /* The payload looks like:
3605 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3606 * uint8 padding_len;
3607 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3610 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3612 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3613 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3616 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3617 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3619 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3622 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3623 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
3629 int tls1_send_server_supplemental_data(SSL *s)
3632 const unsigned char *authz, *orig_authz;
3634 size_t authz_length, i;
3636 if (s->state != SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A)
3637 return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
3639 orig_authz = authz = ssl_get_authz_data(s, &authz_length);
3642 /* This should never occur. */
3646 /* First we walk over the authz data to see how long the handshake
3647 * message will be. */
3648 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
3655 /* n2s increments authz by 2*/
3658 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
3660 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
3661 length += 1 /* authz type */ + 2 /* length */ + len;
3667 length += 1 /* handshake type */ +
3668 3 /* handshake length */ +
3669 3 /* supplemental data length */ +
3670 2 /* supplemental entry type */ +
3671 2 /* supplemental entry length */;
3673 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, length))
3675 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
3679 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3680 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA;
3681 /* Handshake length */
3682 l2n3(length - 4, p);
3683 /* Length of supplemental data */
3684 l2n3(length - 7, p);
3685 /* Supplemental data type */
3686 s2n(TLSEXT_SUPPLEMENTALDATATYPE_authz_data, p);
3688 s2n(length - 11, p);
3692 /* Walk over the authz again and append the selected elements. */
3693 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
3700 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
3703 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
3705 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
3709 memcpy(p, authz, len);
3717 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B;
3718 s->init_num = length;
3721 return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);