1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
158 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 #include <openssl/evp.h>
162 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
163 #include <openssl/x509.h>
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
165 #include <openssl/dh.h>
167 #include <openssl/bn.h>
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
169 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
171 #include <openssl/md5.h>
173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
176 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
178 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
179 return(SSLv3_server_method());
184 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
186 ssl_undefined_function,
187 ssl3_get_server_method)
190 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
191 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
193 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
195 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
197 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
198 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
200 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
202 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
203 we do so if There is no srp login name */
205 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
209 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
216 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
219 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
220 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
222 int new_state,state,skip=0;
224 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
228 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
230 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
231 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
233 /* init things to blank */
235 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
243 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
244 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
245 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
246 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
248 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
250 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
261 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
263 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
267 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
268 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
271 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
273 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
279 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0,
282 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
286 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
288 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
290 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
295 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
304 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
311 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
312 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
313 /* Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. */
314 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
316 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
318 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
319 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
321 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
323 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
324 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
325 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
327 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
328 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
330 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
331 * client that doesn't support secure
334 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
335 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
341 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
342 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
343 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
344 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
348 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
349 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
352 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
353 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
354 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
355 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
358 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
361 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
365 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
366 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
367 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
369 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
370 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
371 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
372 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
373 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
376 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
378 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
379 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
382 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
384 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
385 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
386 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
387 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
388 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
389 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
397 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
401 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
402 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
403 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
404 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
408 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
409 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
411 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
415 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
418 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
422 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
423 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
424 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
425 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
426 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5|SSL_aSRP))
427 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
429 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
430 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
431 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
432 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
433 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
435 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
440 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
447 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
452 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
453 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
454 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
456 /* clear this, it may get reset by
457 * send_server_key_exchange */
458 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
459 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
460 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
461 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
463 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
464 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
465 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
466 * be able to handle this) */
467 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
469 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
472 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
473 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
475 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
477 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
478 * message only if the cipher suite is either
479 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
480 * server certificate contains the server's
481 * public key for key exchange.
483 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
484 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
485 * hint if provided */
486 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
487 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
489 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
490 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
491 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
493 || (alg_k & SSL_kDHE)
494 || (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
495 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
496 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
497 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
498 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
504 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
505 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
510 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
514 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
515 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
516 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
517 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
518 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
519 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
520 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
521 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
522 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
523 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
524 * and in RFC 2246): */
525 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
526 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
527 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
528 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
529 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
530 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
531 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
532 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
533 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
534 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
535 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
537 /* no cert request */
539 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
540 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
541 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
542 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
547 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
548 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
549 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
550 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
551 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
553 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
554 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
560 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
561 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
562 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
563 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
564 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
565 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
569 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
571 /* This code originally checked to see if
572 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
573 * and then flushed. This caused problems
574 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
575 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
576 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
577 * still exist. So instead we just flush
581 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
582 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
587 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
589 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
592 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
593 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
594 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
596 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
597 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
600 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
603 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
604 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
605 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
610 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
611 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
612 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
613 * message is not sent.
614 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
615 * the client uses its key from the certificate
618 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
619 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
621 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
622 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
624 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
628 else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
630 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
632 if (!s->session->peer)
634 /* For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer
635 * at this point and digest cached records.
637 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
639 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
642 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
643 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
651 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
654 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
655 * a client cert, it can be verified
656 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
657 * should be generalized. But it is next step
659 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
660 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
662 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
663 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
667 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
668 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
679 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
680 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
682 * This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be
683 * extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need
684 * to set this here because we don't know if we're
685 * expecting a CertificateVerify or not.
687 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
688 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
689 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
690 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
691 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
693 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
694 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
696 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
697 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
699 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
704 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
705 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
706 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
708 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes with NPN.
709 * In a full handshake with NPN, we end up here through
710 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
711 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
712 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
713 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
714 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
715 * the client's Finished message is read.
717 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
718 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
720 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
721 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
723 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
727 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
728 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
730 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes without NPN.
731 * In a full handshake, we end up here through
732 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
733 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
734 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
735 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
736 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
737 * the client's Finished message is read.
739 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
740 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
741 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
742 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
743 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
746 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
747 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
748 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
751 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
755 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
756 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
757 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
758 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
759 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
760 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
764 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
765 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
766 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
767 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
768 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
774 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
775 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
777 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
778 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
779 { ret= -1; goto end; }
781 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
782 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
784 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
785 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
788 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
789 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
797 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
798 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
799 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
800 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
801 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
802 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
803 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
804 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
807 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
808 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
810 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
812 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
815 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
819 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
824 /* clean a few things up */
825 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
827 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
830 /* remove buffering on output */
831 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
835 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
840 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
842 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
844 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
846 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
854 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
860 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
864 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
869 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
873 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
880 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
884 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
888 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
891 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
893 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
894 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
897 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
898 return ssl_do_write(s);
901 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
903 int i,j,ok,al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,ret= -1;
904 unsigned int cookie_len;
909 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
913 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
915 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
918 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
919 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
920 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
921 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
924 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
927 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
930 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
931 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
932 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
933 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
934 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
937 if (!ok) return((int)n);
939 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
941 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
942 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
943 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
946 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version &&
947 s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
948 : (s->client_version < s->version))
950 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
951 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
952 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
954 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
955 s->version = s->client_version;
957 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
961 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
962 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
963 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
965 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
967 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
969 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
970 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
972 if (cookie_length == 0)
976 /* load the client random */
977 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
980 /* get the session-id */
984 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
985 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
986 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
987 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
988 * won't even compile against older library versions).
990 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
991 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
992 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
993 * setting will be ignored.
995 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
997 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1002 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1004 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1006 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1007 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1008 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1009 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1010 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1012 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version)
1013 { /* previous session */
1020 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1030 cookie_len = *(p++);
1033 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1034 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1035 * does not cause an overflow.
1037 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1040 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1041 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1045 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1046 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1049 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1051 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1053 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1056 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1057 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1058 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1061 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1063 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1064 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1066 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1067 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1068 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1071 /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
1076 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
1078 /* Select version to use */
1079 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1080 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2))
1082 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1083 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1085 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1087 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1088 s->version = s->client_version;
1089 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1092 else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1093 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1))
1095 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1096 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1100 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1101 s->version = s->client_version;
1102 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1105 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1110 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1112 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1113 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1114 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1119 /* not enough data */
1120 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1121 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1124 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1131 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1132 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1135 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1138 fprintf(stderr,"client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1140 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1142 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1144 fprintf(stderr,"client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1145 i,sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers),
1146 SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1154 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1155 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1158 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1160 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1161 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1162 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1163 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1164 * enabled, though. */
1165 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1166 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1168 s->session->cipher = c;
1175 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1176 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1177 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1178 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1187 /* not enough data */
1188 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1189 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1192 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1197 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1204 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1205 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1209 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1211 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1213 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n))
1215 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1220 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1221 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1222 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1223 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1226 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1227 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1233 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1235 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1237 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1238 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1239 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1242 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1243 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1247 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1248 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1249 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1251 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1256 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1259 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1261 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1262 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1264 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1265 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1270 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1271 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1272 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1273 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1274 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1275 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1276 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1278 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1279 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1280 /* Can't disable compression */
1281 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s))
1283 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1286 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1287 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1289 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1290 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1292 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1296 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1298 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1301 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1302 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1304 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1309 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1310 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1316 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1317 { /* See if we have a match */
1318 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1320 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1321 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1323 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1336 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1341 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1342 * using compression.
1344 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1346 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1351 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1356 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1357 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1359 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1361 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1362 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1363 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1364 if (ciphers == NULL)
1366 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1367 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1371 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s))
1373 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1376 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1378 if (s->cert->cert_cb)
1380 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1383 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1389 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1392 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1394 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1395 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1399 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1400 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1403 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1404 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1405 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1406 s->session->not_resumable=s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1407 ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
1408 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1409 /* do not send a session ticket */
1410 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1414 /* Session-id reuse */
1415 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1416 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1417 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1418 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1420 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1422 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1423 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1425 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1426 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1428 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1432 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1433 else if (ec != NULL)
1434 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1436 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1440 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1443 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1445 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1450 * we now have the following setup.
1452 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1453 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1454 * compression - basically ignored right now
1455 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1456 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1457 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1458 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1461 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1462 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1464 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
1466 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1471 if (ret < 0) ret=-ret;
1475 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1478 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1479 return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
1482 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1485 unsigned char *p,*d;
1490 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1492 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1493 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1494 p=s->s3->server_random;
1495 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1498 /* Do the message type and length last */
1499 d=p= ssl_handshake_start(s);
1501 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1502 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1505 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1506 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1509 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1510 * back in the server hello:
1511 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1512 * we send back the old session ID.
1513 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1514 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1515 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1516 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1518 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1519 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1520 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1521 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1524 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1525 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1527 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1529 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1530 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1532 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1536 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1539 /* put the cipher */
1540 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1543 /* put the compression method */
1544 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1547 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1550 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1552 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1553 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1555 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1558 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &al)) == NULL)
1560 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1561 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1567 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
1568 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1571 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1572 return ssl_do_write(s);
1575 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1578 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1580 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
1581 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1584 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1585 return ssl_do_write(s);
1588 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1590 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1594 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1597 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1600 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1601 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1602 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1605 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1608 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1609 unsigned char *p,*d;
1619 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1620 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1622 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1627 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1629 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1630 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1633 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1635 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1636 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1637 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1640 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1641 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1649 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1650 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1655 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1659 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1660 if (type & SSL_kDHE)
1662 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto)
1664 dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
1667 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1668 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1674 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1675 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1676 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1677 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1680 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1681 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1684 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
1685 DH_security_bits(dhp), 0, dhp))
1687 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1688 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1691 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1693 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1697 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto)
1699 else if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1701 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1706 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1707 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1708 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1710 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1712 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1719 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1720 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1721 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1722 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1724 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1734 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1735 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1737 const EC_GROUP *group;
1739 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1740 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1742 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1743 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1744 if (nid != NID_undef)
1745 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1747 else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
1749 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1750 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1751 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1755 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1756 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1760 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1762 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1766 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1769 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1772 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1774 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1776 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1780 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1781 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1782 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1783 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1785 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1787 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1792 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1793 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1794 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1796 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1800 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1801 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1803 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1807 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1808 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1809 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1812 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1815 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1819 /* Encode the public key.
1820 * First check the size of encoding and
1821 * allocate memory accordingly.
1823 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1824 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1825 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1828 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1829 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1830 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1831 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1833 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1838 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1839 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1840 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1841 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1843 if (encodedlen == 0)
1845 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1849 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1851 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1852 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1853 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1854 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1859 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1860 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1868 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1869 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1870 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1872 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1873 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1876 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1877 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1878 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1880 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1881 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1882 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1883 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1885 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1896 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1897 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1900 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1902 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1903 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1904 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1911 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP))
1912 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1914 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1917 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1920 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1928 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+kn))
1930 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1933 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1935 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1937 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1938 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1950 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1951 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1953 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1954 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1955 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1956 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1957 * the actual encoded point itself
1959 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1967 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1968 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1970 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1971 encodedPoint = NULL;
1976 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1977 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1979 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1980 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1981 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1982 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1989 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1990 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1991 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1992 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1996 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1998 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1999 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
2000 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
2001 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
2002 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2003 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2004 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
2005 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
2006 (unsigned int *)&i);
2010 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
2011 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
2013 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
2023 /* send signature algorithm */
2024 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2026 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
2028 /* Should never happen */
2029 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2030 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2036 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
2039 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
2040 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2041 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2042 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
2043 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
2044 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
2046 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
2051 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2056 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2057 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2058 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2063 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
2066 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2067 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2068 return ssl_do_write(s);
2070 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2072 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2073 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2074 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2076 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2080 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2082 unsigned char *p,*d;
2084 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2088 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2092 d=p=ssl_handshake_start(s);
2094 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2096 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2101 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2103 const unsigned char *psigs;
2104 unsigned char *etmp = p;
2105 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2106 /* Skip over length for now */
2108 nl = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, p, psigs, nl);
2109 /* Now fill in length */
2119 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2123 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2125 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2126 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2127 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+n+j+2))
2129 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2132 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2133 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2136 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2143 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2144 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2150 /* else no CA names */
2151 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2154 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
2156 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2157 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
2159 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4))
2161 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2164 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2166 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2174 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2177 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2178 return ssl_do_write(s);
2183 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2187 unsigned long alg_k;
2189 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2191 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2193 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2195 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2197 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2199 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2201 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2202 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2203 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2204 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2205 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2208 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2209 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2210 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2211 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2215 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2216 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2218 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2220 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2221 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2223 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2225 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2228 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2229 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2231 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2232 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2233 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2234 * be sent already */
2237 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2245 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2246 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2247 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2248 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2250 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2257 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2258 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2263 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2265 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2277 * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
2278 * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
2279 * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
2280 * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
2281 * bound is sufficient to be safe.
2283 if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2285 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2286 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2290 /* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because
2291 * of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see
2292 * RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of
2293 * the TLS RFC and generates a random premaster secret for the
2294 * case that the decrypt fails. See
2295 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */
2297 /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. */
2298 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2299 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2301 decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2304 /* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH.
2305 * decrypt_good will be 0xff if so and zero otherwise. */
2306 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2308 /* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct
2309 * then version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero.
2310 * The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2311 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2312 * number check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks
2313 * are done in constant time and are treated like any other
2314 * decryption error. */
2315 version_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version>>8));
2316 version_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version&0xff));
2318 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2319 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks
2320 * (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for
2321 * DH ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send the
2322 * negotiated protocol version instead if the server does not
2323 * support the requested protocol version. If
2324 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2325 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)
2327 unsigned char workaround_good;
2328 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version>>8));
2329 workaround_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version&0xff));
2330 version_good |= workaround_good;
2333 /* Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good
2334 * to remain non-zero (0xff). */
2335 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2338 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2339 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2340 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2341 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2343 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++)
2345 p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j],
2346 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2349 s->session->master_key_length=
2350 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2351 s->session->master_key,
2352 p,sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
2353 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
2357 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2358 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2361 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2368 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2370 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2379 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2380 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2381 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2382 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2385 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2386 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2387 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) ||
2388 (skey->pkey.dh == NULL))
2390 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2391 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2394 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2396 else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2398 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2399 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2403 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2407 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2408 EVP_PKEY *clkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2411 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2412 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2414 if (dh_clnt == NULL)
2416 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2417 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2420 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2421 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2424 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2427 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2431 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2435 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2440 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2447 s->session->master_key_length=
2448 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2449 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2450 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2456 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2457 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2459 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2460 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2461 krb5_data authenticator;
2463 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2464 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2465 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2466 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2467 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2468 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2470 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2471 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2473 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2475 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2478 enc_ticket.length = i;
2480 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2482 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2483 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2487 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2488 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2491 authenticator.length = i;
2493 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2495 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2496 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2500 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2501 p+=authenticator.length;
2505 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2508 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2511 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2513 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2514 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2518 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2519 enc_pms.length + 6))
2521 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2522 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2526 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2530 fprintf(stderr,"kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2531 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2533 fprintf(stderr,"kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2534 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2535 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2540 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2541 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2543 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2544 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2547 fprintf(stderr,"kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2548 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2550 fprintf(stderr,"kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2551 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2552 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2557 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2559 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2564 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2565 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2567 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2571 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2573 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2575 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2576 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2579 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2580 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2582 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2583 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2586 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2588 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2589 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2592 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2594 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2595 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2599 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2601 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2602 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2605 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2607 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2608 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2609 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2610 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2611 * the protocol version.
2612 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2613 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2615 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2617 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2618 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2623 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2625 s->session->master_key_length=
2626 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2627 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2629 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2631 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2632 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2634 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2635 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2640 /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2641 * but it caused problems for apache.
2642 * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2643 * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2647 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2649 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2650 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2655 const EC_GROUP *group;
2656 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2658 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2659 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2661 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2662 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2666 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2667 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2669 /* use the certificate */
2670 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2674 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2675 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2677 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2680 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2681 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2683 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2684 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2686 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2691 /* Let's get client's public key */
2692 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2694 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2695 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2701 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2703 if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
2705 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2706 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2709 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2711 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2713 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2714 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2715 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2716 * never executed. When that support is
2717 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2718 * received in the certificate is
2719 * authorized for key agreement.
2720 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2721 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2724 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2725 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2726 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2730 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2731 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2733 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2737 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2741 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2742 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2744 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2746 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2747 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2751 /* Get encoded point length */
2756 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2760 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2761 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2763 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2767 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2768 * currently, so set it to the start
2770 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2773 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2774 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2775 if (field_size <= 0)
2777 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2781 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2784 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2789 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2790 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2791 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2792 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2793 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2794 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2796 /* Compute the master secret */
2797 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2798 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2800 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2805 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2806 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2808 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2809 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2810 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2812 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2814 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2819 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2820 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2823 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2825 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2826 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2829 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2831 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2832 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2836 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2837 * string for the callback */
2838 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2839 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2840 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2841 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2842 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2844 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2846 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2847 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2850 else if (psk_len == 0)
2852 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2853 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2854 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2855 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2859 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2860 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2862 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2864 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2868 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2869 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2870 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2871 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2873 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2874 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2878 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2879 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2880 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2881 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2882 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2884 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2885 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2889 s->session->master_key_length=
2890 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2891 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2894 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2900 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2901 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2909 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2910 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2913 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2915 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2918 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2919 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A))
2921 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2922 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2925 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2926 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2927 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2928 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2930 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2931 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2935 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2937 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2944 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2945 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2948 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2949 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2950 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2951 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2952 unsigned long alg_a;
2956 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2957 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2958 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2959 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2960 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2961 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2963 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2964 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2965 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2966 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2967 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2968 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2969 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2970 if (client_pub_pkey)
2972 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2975 /* Decrypt session key */
2976 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass, n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED ||
2977 Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE ||
2978 Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL)
2980 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2985 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2988 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2991 /* Generate master secret */
2992 s->session->master_key_length=
2993 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2994 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2995 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2996 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
3001 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
3002 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3010 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3011 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3012 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3018 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3019 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
3022 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
3023 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
3024 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
3025 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
3026 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
3027 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
3032 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
3034 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
3040 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
3042 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
3044 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3045 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
3046 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
3048 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
3051 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3053 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
3055 peer=s->session->peer;
3056 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
3057 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
3065 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
3067 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3068 if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3070 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3071 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
3080 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
3081 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3085 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3087 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
3088 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3092 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3094 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
3095 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3099 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3100 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3101 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3102 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
3103 * signature without length field */
3104 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3105 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
3111 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3113 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
3116 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3121 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3125 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3134 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3135 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3139 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3140 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
3142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3143 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3147 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3151 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3154 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3155 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3159 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3162 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3163 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3165 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3166 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3170 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3172 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3173 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3178 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3179 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3181 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3182 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3186 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3192 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3193 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3199 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3200 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3202 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3203 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3204 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3208 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3209 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3215 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3216 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3218 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3219 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3220 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3224 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3225 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3226 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3232 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3233 { unsigned char signature[64];
3235 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3236 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3238 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3240 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3241 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3243 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3244 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3247 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3248 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3249 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3255 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3256 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3265 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3268 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3270 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3271 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3272 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3274 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3275 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3279 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3281 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3283 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3284 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3286 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3288 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3295 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3297 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3299 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3300 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3303 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3306 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3307 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3310 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3313 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3317 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3319 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3323 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3325 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3327 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3334 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3335 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3338 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3341 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3343 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3344 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3349 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3352 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3357 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3358 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3361 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3363 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3370 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3372 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3373 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3375 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3376 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3379 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3380 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3381 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3383 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3384 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3387 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3388 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3390 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3397 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3400 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3401 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3406 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3407 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3410 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3413 al=SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3414 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3415 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3418 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3421 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3422 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3423 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3424 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3426 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3427 * when we arrive here. */
3428 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3430 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3431 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3433 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3437 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3438 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3439 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3440 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3441 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3449 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3452 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3453 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3457 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3461 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3463 cpk=ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3466 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3467 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3468 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3470 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3475 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,cpk))
3477 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3480 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3483 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3484 return ssl_do_write(s);
3487 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3488 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3489 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3491 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3493 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3494 const unsigned char *const_p;
3495 int len, slen_full, slen;
3500 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3501 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3502 unsigned char key_name[16];
3504 /* get session encoding length */
3505 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3506 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3509 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3511 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3515 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3517 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3519 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3525 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3527 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3528 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3534 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3535 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3538 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3539 * follows handshake_header_length +
3540 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3541 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3542 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3543 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3545 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3546 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3547 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3549 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3550 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3551 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3552 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3553 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3556 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3558 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3567 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3568 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3569 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3570 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3571 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3572 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3575 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3576 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3577 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3578 * as their sessions. */
3579 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3581 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3583 /* Output key name */
3585 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3588 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3589 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3590 /* Encrypt session data */
3591 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3593 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3595 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3597 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3598 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3599 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3602 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3604 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3605 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
3606 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3607 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3609 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3613 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3614 return ssl_do_write(s);
3617 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3619 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3623 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3624 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3625 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3628 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3631 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3634 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3635 /* message length */
3636 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3638 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3639 /* length of OCSP response */
3640 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3641 /* actual response */
3642 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3643 /* number of bytes to write */
3644 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3645 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3649 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3650 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3653 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3654 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3655 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3656 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3659 int proto_len, padding_len;
3661 const unsigned char *p;
3663 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3664 * extension in their ClientHello */
3665 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3667 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3671 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3672 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3673 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3675 514, /* See the payload format below */
3681 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3682 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3683 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3684 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3686 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3691 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3693 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3696 * The payload looks like:
3698 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3699 * uint8 padding_len;
3700 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3703 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3705 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3706 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3709 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3710 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3712 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3715 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3716 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;