1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
183 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
185 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
187 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
189 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
190 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
192 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
194 /* There isn't any srp login extension !!! */
196 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
200 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
207 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
209 ssl_undefined_function,
210 ssl3_get_server_method)
212 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
215 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
216 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
218 int new_state,state,skip=0;
220 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
224 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
226 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
227 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
229 /* init things to blank */
231 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
239 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
240 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
241 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
242 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
244 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
246 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
257 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
259 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
263 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
264 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
267 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
269 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
271 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
274 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
276 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
278 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
283 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
291 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
298 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
299 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
301 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
303 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
304 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
306 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
308 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
309 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
310 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
312 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
313 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
315 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
316 * client that doesn't support secure
319 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
320 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
326 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
327 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
328 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
329 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
333 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
334 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
337 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
338 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
339 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
340 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
343 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
346 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
350 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
351 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
352 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
355 if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP)
357 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
358 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
360 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
363 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
365 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
366 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
369 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
371 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
372 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
373 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
374 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
376 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
383 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
387 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
388 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
389 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
390 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
391 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
394 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
395 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
397 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
401 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
404 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
408 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
409 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
410 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
411 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
412 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
413 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
414 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
416 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
417 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
418 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
419 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
420 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
422 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
427 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
434 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
439 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
440 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
441 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
443 /* clear this, it may get reset by
444 * send_server_key_exchange */
445 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
446 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
447 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
448 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
450 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
451 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
452 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
453 * be able to handle this) */
454 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
456 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
459 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
460 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
462 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
464 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
465 * message only if the cipher suite is either
466 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
467 * server certificate contains the server's
468 * public key for key exchange.
470 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
471 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
472 * hint if provided */
473 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
474 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
476 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
477 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
478 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
480 || (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
481 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
482 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
483 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
484 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
485 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
491 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
492 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
497 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
501 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
502 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
503 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
504 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
505 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
506 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
507 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
508 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
509 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
510 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
511 * and in RFC 2246): */
512 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
513 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
514 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
515 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
516 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
517 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
518 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
519 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
520 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
522 /* no cert request */
524 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
525 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
526 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
527 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
532 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
533 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
534 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
535 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
536 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
538 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
539 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
545 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
546 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
547 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
548 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
549 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
550 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
554 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
556 /* This code originally checked to see if
557 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
558 * and then flushed. This caused problems
559 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
560 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
561 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
562 * still exist. So instead we just flush
566 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
567 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
572 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
574 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
577 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
578 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
579 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
580 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
584 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
586 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
588 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
589 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
592 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
596 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
597 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
598 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
603 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
604 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
605 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
606 * message is not sent.
607 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
608 * the client uses its key from the certificate
611 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
612 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
614 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
615 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
617 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
621 else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
623 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
625 if (!s->session->peer)
627 /* For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer
628 * at this point and digest cached records.
630 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
632 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
635 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
636 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
644 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
647 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
648 * a client cert, it can be verified
649 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
650 * should be generalized. But it is next step
652 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
653 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
655 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
656 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
660 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
661 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
672 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
673 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
675 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
676 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
677 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
679 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
680 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
682 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
683 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
685 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
690 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
691 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
692 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
693 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
694 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
696 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
700 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
701 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
702 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
703 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
704 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
707 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
708 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
709 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
712 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
716 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
717 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
718 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
719 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
720 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
721 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
725 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
726 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
727 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
728 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
729 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
735 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
736 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
738 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
739 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
740 { ret= -1; goto end; }
742 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
743 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
745 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
746 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
749 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
750 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
758 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
759 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
760 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
761 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
762 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
763 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
764 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
765 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
768 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
769 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
771 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
772 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
774 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
778 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
783 /* clean a few things up */
784 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
786 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
789 /* remove buffering on output */
790 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
794 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
799 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
801 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
803 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
805 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
813 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
819 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
823 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
828 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
832 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
839 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
843 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
847 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
851 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
853 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
854 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
859 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
860 /* number of bytes to write */
865 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
866 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
869 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
874 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
875 * so permit appropriate message length */
876 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
882 if (!ok) return((int)n);
883 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
884 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
886 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
888 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
890 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
893 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
894 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
895 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
896 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
898 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
899 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
902 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
903 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
905 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
906 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
909 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
915 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
917 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
918 unsigned int cookie_len;
921 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
923 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
926 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
928 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
929 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
930 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
931 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
934 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
937 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
940 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
941 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
942 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
943 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
944 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
947 if (!ok) return((int)n);
949 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
951 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
952 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
953 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
956 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
957 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
959 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
960 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
962 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
963 s->version = s->client_version;
965 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
969 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
970 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
971 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
973 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
975 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
977 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
978 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
980 if (cookie_length == 0)
984 /* load the client random */
985 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
988 /* get the session-id */
992 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
993 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
994 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
995 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
996 * won't even compile against older library versions).
998 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
999 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
1000 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1001 * setting will be ignored.
1003 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
1005 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1010 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1012 { /* previous session */
1019 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1026 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1029 cookie_len = *(p++);
1032 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1033 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1034 * does not cause an overflow.
1036 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1039 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1040 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1044 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1045 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1048 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1050 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1052 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1055 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1056 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1057 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1060 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1062 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1063 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1065 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1066 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1067 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1078 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1080 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1081 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1082 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1087 /* not enough data */
1088 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1089 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1092 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1099 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1100 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1103 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1106 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1108 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1110 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1112 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1113 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1121 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1122 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1125 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1127 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1128 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1129 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1130 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1131 * enabled, though. */
1132 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1133 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1135 s->session->cipher = c;
1142 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1143 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1144 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1145 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1154 /* not enough data */
1155 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1156 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1162 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1169 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1170 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1174 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1176 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1178 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n))
1180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1185 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1186 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1187 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1188 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1192 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1193 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1195 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1197 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1202 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1204 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1206 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1207 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1208 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1211 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1212 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1216 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1217 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1218 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1220 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1221 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1225 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1228 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1230 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1231 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1233 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1234 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1239 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1240 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1241 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1242 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1243 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1244 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1245 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1247 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1248 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1249 /* Can't disable compression */
1250 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1252 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1253 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1256 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1257 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1259 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1260 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1262 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1266 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1268 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1269 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1272 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1273 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1275 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1280 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1281 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1287 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1288 { /* See if we have a match */
1289 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1291 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1292 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1294 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1307 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1312 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1313 * using compression.
1315 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1317 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1318 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1323 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1328 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1329 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1331 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1333 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1334 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1335 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1336 if (ciphers == NULL)
1338 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1339 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1343 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1344 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1348 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1349 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1352 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1356 /* Session-id reuse */
1357 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1358 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1359 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1360 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1362 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1364 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1365 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1367 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1368 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1370 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1374 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1375 else if (ec != NULL)
1376 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1378 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1382 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1385 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1387 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1391 /* we now have the following setup.
1393 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1394 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1395 * compression - basically ignored right now
1396 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1397 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1398 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1399 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1406 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1409 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1413 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1416 unsigned char *p,*d;
1419 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1423 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1425 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1426 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1427 p=s->s3->server_random;
1428 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
1429 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1431 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1434 /* Do the message type and length last */
1437 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1438 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1441 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1442 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1444 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1445 * back in the server hello:
1446 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1447 * we send back the old session ID.
1448 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1449 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1450 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1451 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1453 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1454 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1455 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1456 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1459 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1461 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1463 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1464 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1466 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1470 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1473 /* put the cipher */
1474 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1477 /* put the compression method */
1478 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1481 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1484 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1486 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1487 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1489 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1492 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1494 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1501 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1504 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1505 /* number of bytes to write */
1510 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1511 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1514 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1518 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1520 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1523 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1528 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1529 /* number of bytes to write */
1534 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1535 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1538 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1540 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1544 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1547 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1550 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1551 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1552 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1555 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1558 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1559 unsigned char *p,*d;
1569 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1570 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1572 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1577 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1579 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1580 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1583 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1585 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1586 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1587 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1590 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1591 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1599 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1600 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1605 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1609 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1610 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1613 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1614 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1615 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1616 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1619 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1620 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1624 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1626 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1630 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1632 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1637 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1638 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1639 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1641 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1643 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1650 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1651 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1652 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1653 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1655 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1665 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1666 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1668 const EC_GROUP *group;
1670 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1671 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1673 /* Get NID of first shared curve */
1674 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, 0);
1675 if (nid != NID_undef)
1676 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1678 else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
1680 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1681 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1682 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1686 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1687 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1691 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1693 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1697 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1700 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1703 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1705 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1707 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1711 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1712 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1713 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1714 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1716 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1718 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1723 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1724 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1725 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1727 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1731 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1732 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1734 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1738 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1739 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1740 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1743 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1746 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1750 /* Encode the public key.
1751 * First check the size of encoding and
1752 * allocate memory accordingly.
1754 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1755 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1756 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1759 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1760 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1761 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1762 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1764 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1769 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1770 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1771 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1772 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1774 if (encodedlen == 0)
1776 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1780 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1782 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1783 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1784 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1785 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1790 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1791 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1799 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1800 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1801 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1803 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1804 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1807 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1808 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1809 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1811 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1812 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1813 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1814 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1816 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1827 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1828 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1831 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1833 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1834 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1835 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1842 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1843 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1845 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1848 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1851 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1859 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1861 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1864 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1867 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1869 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1870 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1882 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1883 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1885 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1886 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1887 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1888 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1889 * the actual encoded point itself
1891 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1899 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1900 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1902 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1903 encodedPoint = NULL;
1908 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1909 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1911 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1912 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1913 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1914 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1921 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1922 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1923 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1924 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
1925 && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
1929 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1931 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1932 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1933 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1934 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1935 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1936 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1937 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1938 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1939 (unsigned int *)&i);
1943 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1944 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1946 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1956 /* For TLS1.2 and later send signature
1958 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1960 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
1962 /* Should never happen */
1963 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1964 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1970 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
1973 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
1974 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1975 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1976 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1977 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1978 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1980 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
1985 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1990 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1991 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1992 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1997 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
2000 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2006 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2007 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2008 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2010 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2012 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2013 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2014 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2016 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2020 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2022 unsigned char *p,*d;
2024 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2028 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2032 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
2034 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2036 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2041 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2043 nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2);
2053 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2057 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2059 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2060 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2061 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
2063 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2066 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
2067 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2070 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2077 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2078 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2084 /* else no CA names */
2085 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
2088 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
2089 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
2092 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2097 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2098 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2101 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2108 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2111 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2112 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2117 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2121 unsigned long alg_k;
2123 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2125 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2127 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2129 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2133 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2135 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2136 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2137 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2138 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2139 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2142 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2143 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2144 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2145 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2149 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2150 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2152 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2154 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2155 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2157 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2158 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2160 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2161 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2162 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2163 * be sent already */
2166 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2167 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2174 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2175 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2176 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2177 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2179 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2186 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2187 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2192 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2204 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2208 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2210 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2211 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
2214 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2216 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2217 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2218 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2219 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2220 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2222 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2223 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2224 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2226 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2227 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2229 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2230 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2231 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2232 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
2233 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
2234 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
2235 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
2241 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
2242 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
2243 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2245 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2246 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2247 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2248 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2252 s->session->master_key_length=
2253 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2254 s->session->master_key,
2256 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2260 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2261 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2264 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2271 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2282 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2283 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2284 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2285 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2288 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2289 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2290 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) ||
2291 (skey->pkey.dh == NULL))
2293 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2294 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2297 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2299 else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2301 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2306 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2310 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2311 EVP_PKEY *clkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2314 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2315 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2317 if (dh_clnt == NULL)
2319 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2323 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2324 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2327 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2330 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2334 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2338 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2343 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2350 s->session->master_key_length=
2351 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2352 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2353 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2359 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2360 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2362 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2363 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2364 krb5_data authenticator;
2366 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2367 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2368 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2369 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2370 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2371 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2373 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2374 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2376 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2378 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2381 enc_ticket.length = i;
2383 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2386 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2390 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2391 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2394 authenticator.length = i;
2396 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2398 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2399 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2403 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2404 p+=authenticator.length;
2408 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2411 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2414 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2416 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2417 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2421 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2422 enc_pms.length + 6))
2424 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2425 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2429 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2433 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2434 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2436 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2437 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2438 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2443 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2444 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2446 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2447 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2450 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2451 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2453 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2454 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2455 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2460 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2462 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2467 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2468 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2470 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2474 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2476 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2478 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2479 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2482 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2483 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2485 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2486 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2489 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2491 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2492 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2495 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2497 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2498 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2502 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2504 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2505 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2508 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2510 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2511 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2512 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2513 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2514 * the protocol version.
2515 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2516 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2518 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2520 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2521 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2526 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2528 s->session->master_key_length=
2529 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2530 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2532 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2534 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2535 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2537 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2538 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2543 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2544 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2545 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2546 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2550 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2552 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2553 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2558 const EC_GROUP *group;
2559 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2561 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2562 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2564 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2565 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2569 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2570 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2572 /* use the certificate */
2573 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2577 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2578 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2580 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2583 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2584 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2586 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2587 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2589 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2594 /* Let's get client's public key */
2595 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2597 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2598 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2604 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2606 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2608 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2609 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2612 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2614 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2616 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2617 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2618 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2619 * never executed. When that support is
2620 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2621 * received in the certificate is
2622 * authorized for key agreement.
2623 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2624 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2627 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2628 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2629 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2633 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2634 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2636 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2640 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2644 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2645 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2647 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2649 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2650 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2654 /* Get encoded point length */
2659 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2663 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2664 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2666 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2670 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2671 * currently, so set it to the start
2673 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2676 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2677 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2678 if (field_size <= 0)
2680 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2684 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2687 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2692 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2693 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2694 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2695 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2696 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2697 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2699 /* Compute the master secret */
2700 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2701 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2703 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2708 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2709 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2711 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2712 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2713 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2715 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2717 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2722 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2723 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2726 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2728 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2729 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2732 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2734 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2735 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2739 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2740 * string for the callback */
2741 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2742 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2743 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2744 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2745 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2747 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2749 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2750 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2753 else if (psk_len == 0)
2755 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2756 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2757 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2758 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2762 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2763 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2765 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2767 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2771 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2772 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2773 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2774 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2776 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2777 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2781 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2782 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2783 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2784 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2785 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2787 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2788 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2792 s->session->master_key_length=
2793 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2794 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2797 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2803 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2804 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2812 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2813 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2816 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2818 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2821 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2822 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2823 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2824 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2826 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2827 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2831 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2833 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2840 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2841 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2844 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2845 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2846 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2847 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2848 unsigned long alg_a;
2850 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2851 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2852 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2853 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2854 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2855 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2857 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2858 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2859 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2860 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2861 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2862 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2863 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2864 if (client_pub_pkey)
2866 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2869 /* Decrypt session key */
2870 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)))
2872 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2880 else if (p[1] < 0x80)
2887 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2890 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2893 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2896 /* Generate master secret */
2897 s->session->master_key_length=
2898 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2899 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2900 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2901 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2906 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2907 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2915 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2916 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2917 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2923 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2924 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2927 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2928 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2929 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2930 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2931 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2932 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2937 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2939 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2945 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2947 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2949 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2950 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2951 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2953 516, /* Enough for 4096 bit RSA key with TLS v1.2 */
2956 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2958 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2960 peer=s->session->peer;
2961 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2962 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2970 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2972 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2973 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2975 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2976 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2985 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2986 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2990 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2992 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2993 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2997 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2999 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
3000 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3004 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3005 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3006 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3007 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
3008 * signature without length field */
3009 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3010 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
3016 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3018 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
3019 /* Should never happen */
3022 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3023 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3026 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
3027 if (sigalg != (int)p[1])
3029 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
3030 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3033 md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
3036 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
3037 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3041 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3050 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3051 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3055 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3056 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
3058 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3059 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3063 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3067 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3070 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3071 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3075 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3078 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3079 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3081 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3082 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3086 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3088 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3089 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3094 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3095 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3097 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3098 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3102 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3103 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3108 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3109 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3115 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3116 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3118 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3119 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3120 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3124 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3125 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3132 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3134 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3135 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3136 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3140 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3141 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3142 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3148 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3149 { unsigned char signature[64];
3151 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3152 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3154 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3156 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3157 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3159 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3160 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3163 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3164 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3165 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3171 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3172 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3181 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3184 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3186 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3187 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3188 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3190 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3191 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3195 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3197 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3199 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3200 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3202 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3204 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3211 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3213 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3215 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3216 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3218 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3219 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3222 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3223 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3225 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3226 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3229 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3233 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3235 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3239 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3241 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3243 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3250 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3254 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3257 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3259 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3265 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3273 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3277 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3279 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3286 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3288 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3289 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3291 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3292 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3295 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3296 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3297 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3299 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3300 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3303 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3304 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3306 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3312 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3315 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3316 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
3321 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3322 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3323 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3324 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3326 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3327 * when we arrive here. */
3328 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3330 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3331 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3333 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3337 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3338 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3339 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3340 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3341 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3349 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3352 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3353 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3357 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3362 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3364 cpk=ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3367 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3368 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3369 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3371 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3376 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,cpk);
3377 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3382 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3383 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3386 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3387 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3388 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3390 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3392 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3393 const unsigned char *const_p;
3394 int len, slen_full, slen;
3399 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3400 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3401 unsigned char key_name[16];
3403 /* get session encoding length */
3404 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3405 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3408 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3410 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3414 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3416 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3418 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3424 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3426 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3427 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3433 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3434 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3436 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3437 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3438 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3439 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3440 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3441 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3443 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3444 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
3445 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3448 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3450 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
3451 /* Skip message length for now */
3453 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3454 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3455 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3456 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3459 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3461 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3470 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3471 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3472 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3473 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3474 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3475 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3478 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3479 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3480 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3481 * as their sessions. */
3482 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3484 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3486 /* Output key name */
3488 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3491 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3492 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3493 /* Encrypt session data */
3494 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3496 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3498 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3500 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3501 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3502 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3505 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3507 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3508 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
3509 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
3511 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
3513 /* number of bytes to write */
3515 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3520 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3521 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3524 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3526 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3529 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3530 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3531 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3534 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3537 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3540 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3541 /* message length */
3542 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3544 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3545 /* length of OCSP response */
3546 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3547 /* actual response */
3548 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3549 /* number of bytes to write */
3550 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3551 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3555 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3556 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3559 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3560 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3561 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3562 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3565 int proto_len, padding_len;
3567 const unsigned char *p;
3569 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3570 * extension in their ClientHello */
3571 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3573 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3577 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3578 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3579 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3581 514, /* See the payload format below */
3587 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3588 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3589 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3590 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3592 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3597 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3599 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3601 /* The payload looks like:
3603 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3604 * uint8 padding_len;
3605 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3608 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3610 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3611 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3614 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3615 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3617 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3620 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3621 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;