1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
183 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
185 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
187 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
189 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
190 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
192 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
194 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
195 we do so if There is no srp login name */
197 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
201 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
208 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
210 ssl_undefined_function,
211 ssl3_get_server_method)
213 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
216 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
217 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
219 int new_state,state,skip=0;
221 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
225 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
227 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
228 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
230 /* init things to blank */
232 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
241 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
242 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
243 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
245 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
247 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
258 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
260 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
264 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
265 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
268 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
270 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
275 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
277 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
279 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
284 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
292 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
299 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
300 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
302 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
304 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
305 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
307 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
309 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
310 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
311 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
313 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
314 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
316 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
317 * client that doesn't support secure
320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
321 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
327 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
328 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
329 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
330 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
334 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
335 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
338 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
339 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
340 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
341 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
344 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
347 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
351 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
352 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
353 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
355 if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP)
357 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
358 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
360 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
363 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
365 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
366 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
369 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
371 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
372 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
373 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
374 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
376 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
384 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
388 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
389 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
390 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
391 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
392 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
395 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
396 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
398 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
402 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
406 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A;
408 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
413 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
414 case SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A:
415 case SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B:
416 /* We promised to send an audit proof in the hello. */
417 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client)
419 ret = tls1_send_server_supplemental_data(s);
420 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
425 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
430 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
431 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
432 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
433 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
434 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
435 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
436 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
438 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
439 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
440 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
441 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
442 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
444 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
449 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
456 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
461 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
462 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
463 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
465 /* clear this, it may get reset by
466 * send_server_key_exchange */
467 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
468 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
469 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
470 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
472 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
473 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
474 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
475 * be able to handle this) */
476 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
478 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
481 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
482 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
484 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
486 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
487 * message only if the cipher suite is either
488 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
489 * server certificate contains the server's
490 * public key for key exchange.
492 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
493 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
494 * hint if provided */
495 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
496 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
498 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
499 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
500 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
502 || (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
503 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
504 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
505 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
506 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
507 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
513 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
514 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
519 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
523 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
524 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
525 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
526 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
527 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
528 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
529 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
530 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
531 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
532 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
533 * and in RFC 2246): */
534 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
535 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
536 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
537 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
538 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
539 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
540 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
541 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
542 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
544 /* no cert request */
546 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
547 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
548 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
549 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
554 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
555 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
556 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
557 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
558 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
560 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
561 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
567 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
568 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
569 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
570 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
571 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
572 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
576 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
578 /* This code originally checked to see if
579 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
580 * and then flushed. This caused problems
581 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
582 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
583 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
584 * still exist. So instead we just flush
588 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
589 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
594 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
596 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
599 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
600 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
601 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
602 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
606 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
608 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
610 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
611 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
614 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
618 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
619 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
620 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
625 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
626 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
627 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
628 * message is not sent.
629 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
630 * the client uses its key from the certificate
633 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
634 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
636 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
637 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
639 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
643 else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
645 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
647 if (!s->session->peer)
649 /* For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer
650 * at this point and digest cached records.
652 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
654 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
657 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
658 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
666 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
669 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
670 * a client cert, it can be verified
671 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
672 * should be generalized. But it is next step
674 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
675 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
677 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
678 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
682 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
683 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
694 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
695 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
697 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
698 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
699 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
701 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
702 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
704 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
705 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
707 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
712 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
713 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
714 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
715 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
716 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
718 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
722 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
723 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
724 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
725 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
726 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
729 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
730 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
731 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
734 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
738 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
739 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
740 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
741 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
742 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
743 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
747 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
748 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
749 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
750 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
751 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
757 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
758 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
760 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
761 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
762 { ret= -1; goto end; }
764 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
765 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
767 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
768 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
771 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
772 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
780 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
781 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
782 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
783 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
784 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
785 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
786 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
787 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
790 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
791 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
793 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
794 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
796 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
800 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
805 /* clean a few things up */
806 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
808 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
811 /* remove buffering on output */
812 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
816 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
821 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
823 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
825 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
827 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
835 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
841 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
845 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
850 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
854 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
861 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
865 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
869 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
873 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
875 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
876 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
881 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
882 /* number of bytes to write */
887 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
888 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
891 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
896 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
897 * so permit appropriate message length */
898 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
904 if (!ok) return((int)n);
905 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
906 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
908 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
910 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
912 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
915 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
916 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
917 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
918 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
920 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
921 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
924 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
925 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
927 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
928 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
931 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
937 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
939 int i,j,ok,al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,ret= -1;
940 unsigned int cookie_len;
945 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
949 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
951 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
952 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
953 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
954 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
957 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
960 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
963 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
964 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
965 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
966 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
967 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
970 if (!ok) return((int)n);
972 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
974 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
975 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
976 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
979 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
980 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
982 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
983 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
985 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
986 s->version = s->client_version;
988 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
992 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
993 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
994 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
996 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
998 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
1000 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1001 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
1003 if (cookie_length == 0)
1007 /* load the client random */
1008 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1009 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1011 /* get the session-id */
1015 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
1016 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
1017 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1018 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
1019 * won't even compile against older library versions).
1021 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
1022 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
1023 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1024 * setting will be ignored.
1026 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
1028 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1033 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1035 { /* previous session */
1042 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1049 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1052 cookie_len = *(p++);
1055 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1056 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1057 * does not cause an overflow.
1059 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1062 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1063 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1067 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1068 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1071 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1073 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1075 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1078 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1079 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1080 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1083 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1085 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1086 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1088 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1089 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1090 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1101 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1103 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1104 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1105 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1110 /* not enough data */
1111 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1112 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1115 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1122 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1123 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1126 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1129 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1131 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1133 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1135 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1136 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1144 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1145 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1148 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1150 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1151 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1152 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1153 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1154 * enabled, though. */
1155 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1156 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1158 s->session->cipher = c;
1165 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1166 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1167 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1168 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1177 /* not enough data */
1178 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1179 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1187 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1194 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1195 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1199 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1201 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1203 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n))
1205 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1210 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1211 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1212 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1213 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1217 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1218 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1220 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1226 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1228 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1230 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1231 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1232 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1235 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1236 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1240 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1241 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1242 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1244 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1249 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1252 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1254 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1255 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1257 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1258 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1263 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1264 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1265 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1266 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1267 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1268 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1269 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1271 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1272 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1273 /* Can't disable compression */
1274 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1276 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1279 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1280 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1282 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1283 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1285 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1289 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1291 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1294 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1295 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1297 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1302 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1303 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1309 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1310 { /* See if we have a match */
1311 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1313 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1314 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1316 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1329 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1334 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1335 * using compression.
1337 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1339 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1344 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1349 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1350 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1352 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1354 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1355 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1356 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1357 if (ciphers == NULL)
1359 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1360 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1364 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1365 if (s->cert->cert_cb
1366 && s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg) <= 0)
1368 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1369 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1372 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1373 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1377 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1381 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1382 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1383 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1384 s->session->not_resumable=s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1385 ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kEECDH)) != 0));
1386 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1387 /* do not send a session ticket */
1388 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1392 /* Session-id reuse */
1393 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1394 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1395 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1396 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1398 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1400 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1401 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1403 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1404 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1406 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1410 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1411 else if (ec != NULL)
1412 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1414 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1418 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1421 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1423 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1427 /* we now have the following setup.
1429 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1430 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1431 * compression - basically ignored right now
1432 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1433 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1434 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1435 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1438 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1439 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1441 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
1443 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1452 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1455 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1459 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1462 unsigned char *p,*d;
1465 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1469 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1471 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1472 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1473 p=s->s3->server_random;
1474 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
1475 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1477 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1480 /* Do the message type and length last */
1483 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1484 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1487 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1488 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1490 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1491 * back in the server hello:
1492 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1493 * we send back the old session ID.
1494 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1495 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1496 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1497 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1499 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1500 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1501 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1502 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1505 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1506 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1508 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1510 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1511 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1513 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1517 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1520 /* put the cipher */
1521 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1524 /* put the compression method */
1525 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1528 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1531 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1533 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1534 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1536 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1539 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1541 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1548 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1551 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1552 /* number of bytes to write */
1557 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1558 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1561 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1565 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1567 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1570 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1575 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1576 /* number of bytes to write */
1581 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1582 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1585 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1587 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1591 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1594 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1597 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1598 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1599 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1602 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1605 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1606 unsigned char *p,*d;
1616 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1617 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1619 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1624 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1626 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1627 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1630 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1632 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1633 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1634 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1637 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1646 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1647 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1652 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1656 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1657 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1660 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1661 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1662 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1663 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1666 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1667 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1671 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1673 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1677 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1679 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1684 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1685 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1686 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1688 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1690 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1697 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1698 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1699 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1700 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1702 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1712 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1713 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1715 const EC_GROUP *group;
1717 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1718 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1720 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1721 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1722 if (nid != NID_undef)
1723 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1725 else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
1727 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1728 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1729 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1733 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1734 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1738 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1740 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1744 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1747 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1750 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1752 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1754 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1758 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1759 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1760 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1761 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1763 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1765 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1770 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1771 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1772 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1774 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1778 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1779 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1781 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1785 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1786 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1787 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1790 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1793 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1797 /* Encode the public key.
1798 * First check the size of encoding and
1799 * allocate memory accordingly.
1801 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1802 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1803 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1806 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1807 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1808 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1809 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1811 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1816 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1817 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1818 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1819 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1821 if (encodedlen == 0)
1823 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1827 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1829 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1830 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1831 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1832 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1837 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1838 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1846 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1847 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1848 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1850 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1851 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1854 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1855 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1856 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1858 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1859 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1860 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1861 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1863 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1874 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1875 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1878 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1880 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1881 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1882 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1889 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1890 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1892 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1895 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1898 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1906 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1908 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1911 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1914 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1916 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1917 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1929 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1930 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1932 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1933 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1934 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1935 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1936 * the actual encoded point itself
1938 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1946 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1947 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1949 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1950 encodedPoint = NULL;
1955 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1956 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1958 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1959 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1960 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1961 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1968 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1969 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1970 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1971 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
1972 && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
1976 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1978 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1979 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1980 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1981 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1982 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1983 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1984 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1985 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1986 (unsigned int *)&i);
1990 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1991 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1993 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
2003 /* For TLS1.2 and later send signature
2005 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2007 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
2009 /* Should never happen */
2010 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2011 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2017 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
2020 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
2021 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2022 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2023 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
2024 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
2025 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
2027 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
2032 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2037 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2038 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2039 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2044 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
2047 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2053 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2054 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2055 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2057 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2059 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2060 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2061 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2063 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2067 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2069 unsigned char *p,*d;
2071 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2075 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2079 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
2081 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2083 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2088 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2090 const unsigned char *psigs;
2091 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2093 memcpy(p, psigs, nl);
2102 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2106 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2108 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2109 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2110 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
2112 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2115 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
2116 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2119 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2126 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2127 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2133 /* else no CA names */
2134 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
2137 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
2138 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
2141 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2146 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2147 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2150 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2157 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2160 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2161 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2166 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2170 unsigned long alg_k;
2172 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2174 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2176 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2178 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2180 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2182 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2184 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2185 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2186 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2187 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2188 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2191 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2192 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2193 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2194 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2198 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2199 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2201 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2203 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2204 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2206 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2207 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2209 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2210 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2211 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2212 * be sent already */
2215 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2223 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2224 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2225 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2226 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2228 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2235 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2236 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2241 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2243 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2253 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2257 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2259 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2260 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
2263 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2265 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2266 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2267 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2268 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2269 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2271 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2272 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2273 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2275 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2276 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2278 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2279 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2280 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2281 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
2282 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
2283 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
2284 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
2290 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
2291 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
2292 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2294 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2295 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2296 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2297 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2301 s->session->master_key_length=
2302 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2303 s->session->master_key,
2305 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2309 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2310 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2313 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2320 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2322 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2331 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2332 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2333 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2334 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2337 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2338 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2339 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) ||
2340 (skey->pkey.dh == NULL))
2342 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2343 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2346 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2348 else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2350 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2351 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2355 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2359 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2360 EVP_PKEY *clkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2363 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2364 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2366 if (dh_clnt == NULL)
2368 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2369 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2372 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2373 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2376 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2383 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2387 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2392 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2399 s->session->master_key_length=
2400 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2401 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2402 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2408 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2409 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2411 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2412 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2413 krb5_data authenticator;
2415 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2416 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2417 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2418 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2419 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2420 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2422 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2423 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2425 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2427 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2430 enc_ticket.length = i;
2432 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2435 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2439 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2440 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2443 authenticator.length = i;
2445 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2447 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2448 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2452 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2453 p+=authenticator.length;
2457 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2460 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2463 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2465 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2466 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2470 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2471 enc_pms.length + 6))
2473 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2474 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2478 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2482 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2483 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2485 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2486 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2487 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2492 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2493 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2495 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2496 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2499 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2500 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2502 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2503 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2504 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2509 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2511 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2516 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2517 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2519 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2523 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2525 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2527 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2528 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2531 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2532 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2534 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2535 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2538 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2540 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2541 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2544 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2546 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2547 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2551 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2553 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2554 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2557 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2559 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2560 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2561 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2562 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2563 * the protocol version.
2564 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2565 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2567 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2569 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2570 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2575 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2577 s->session->master_key_length=
2578 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2579 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2581 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2583 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2584 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2586 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2587 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2592 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2593 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2594 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2595 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2599 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2601 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2602 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2607 const EC_GROUP *group;
2608 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2610 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2611 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2613 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2614 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2618 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2619 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2621 /* use the certificate */
2622 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2626 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2627 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2629 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2632 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2633 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2635 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2636 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2643 /* Let's get client's public key */
2644 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2646 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2647 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2653 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2655 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2657 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2658 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2661 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2663 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2665 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2666 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2667 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2668 * never executed. When that support is
2669 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2670 * received in the certificate is
2671 * authorized for key agreement.
2672 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2673 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2676 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2677 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2678 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2682 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2683 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2685 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2689 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2693 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2694 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2696 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2698 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2699 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2703 /* Get encoded point length */
2708 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2712 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2713 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2715 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2719 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2720 * currently, so set it to the start
2722 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2725 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2726 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2727 if (field_size <= 0)
2729 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2733 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2736 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2741 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2742 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2743 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2744 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2745 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2746 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2748 /* Compute the master secret */
2749 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2750 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2752 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2757 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2758 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2760 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2761 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2762 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2764 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2766 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2771 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2772 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2775 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2777 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2778 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2781 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2783 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2784 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2788 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2789 * string for the callback */
2790 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2791 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2792 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2793 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2794 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2796 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2798 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2799 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2802 else if (psk_len == 0)
2804 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2805 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2806 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2807 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2811 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2812 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2814 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2816 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2820 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2821 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2822 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2823 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2825 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2826 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2830 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2831 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2832 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2833 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2834 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2836 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2837 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2841 s->session->master_key_length=
2842 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2843 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2846 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2852 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2853 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2861 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2862 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2865 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2867 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2870 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2871 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2872 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2873 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2875 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2876 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2880 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2882 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2889 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2890 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2893 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2894 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2895 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2896 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2897 unsigned long alg_a;
2899 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2900 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2901 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2902 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2903 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2904 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2906 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2907 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2908 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2909 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2910 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2911 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2912 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2913 if (client_pub_pkey)
2915 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2918 /* Decrypt session key */
2919 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)))
2921 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2929 else if (p[1] < 0x80)
2936 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2939 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2942 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2945 /* Generate master secret */
2946 s->session->master_key_length=
2947 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2948 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2949 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2950 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2955 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2956 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2964 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2965 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2966 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2972 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2973 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2976 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2977 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2978 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2979 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2980 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2981 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2986 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2988 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2994 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2996 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2998 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2999 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
3000 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
3002 516, /* Enough for 4096 bit RSA key with TLS v1.2 */
3005 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3007 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
3009 peer=s->session->peer;
3010 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
3011 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
3019 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
3021 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3022 if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3024 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3025 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
3034 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
3035 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3039 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3041 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
3042 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3046 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3048 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
3049 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3053 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3054 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3055 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3056 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
3057 * signature without length field */
3058 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3059 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
3065 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3067 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
3070 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3075 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3079 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3088 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3089 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3093 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3094 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
3096 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3097 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3101 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3105 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3108 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3109 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3113 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3116 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3117 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3119 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3120 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3124 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3126 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3127 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3132 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3133 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3135 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3136 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3140 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3141 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3146 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3147 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3153 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3154 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3156 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3157 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3158 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3162 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3163 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3169 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3170 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3172 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3173 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3174 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3178 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3179 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3180 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3186 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3187 { unsigned char signature[64];
3189 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3190 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3192 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3194 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3195 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3197 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3198 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3201 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3203 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3209 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3210 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3219 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3222 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3224 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3225 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3226 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3228 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3229 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3233 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3235 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3237 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3238 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3240 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3242 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3249 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3251 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3253 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3254 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3257 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3260 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3261 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3263 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3264 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3267 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3271 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3273 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3277 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3279 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3281 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3288 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3289 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3292 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3295 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3297 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3298 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3303 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3306 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3311 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3312 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3315 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3317 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3324 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3326 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3327 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3329 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3330 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3333 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3334 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3335 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3337 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3338 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3341 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3342 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3344 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3350 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3353 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3354 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3359 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3360 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3361 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3362 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3364 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3365 * when we arrive here. */
3366 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3368 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3369 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3371 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3375 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3376 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3377 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3378 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3379 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3387 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3390 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3391 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3395 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3400 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3402 cpk=ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3405 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3406 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3407 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3409 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3414 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,cpk);
3415 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3420 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3421 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3424 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3425 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3426 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3428 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3430 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3431 const unsigned char *const_p;
3432 int len, slen_full, slen;
3437 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3438 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3439 unsigned char key_name[16];
3441 /* get session encoding length */
3442 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3443 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3446 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3448 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3452 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3454 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3456 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3462 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3464 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3465 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3471 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3472 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3474 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3475 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3476 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3477 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3478 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3479 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3481 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3482 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
3483 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3486 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3488 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
3489 /* Skip message length for now */
3491 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3492 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3493 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3494 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3497 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3499 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3508 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3509 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3510 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3511 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3512 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3513 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3516 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3517 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3518 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3519 * as their sessions. */
3520 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3522 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3524 /* Output key name */
3526 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3529 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3530 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3531 /* Encrypt session data */
3532 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3534 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3536 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3538 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3539 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3540 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3543 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3545 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3546 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
3547 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
3549 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
3551 /* number of bytes to write */
3553 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3558 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3559 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3562 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3564 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3567 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3568 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3569 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3572 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3575 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3578 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3579 /* message length */
3580 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3582 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3583 /* length of OCSP response */
3584 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3585 /* actual response */
3586 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3587 /* number of bytes to write */
3588 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3589 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3593 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3594 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3597 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3598 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3599 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3600 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3603 int proto_len, padding_len;
3605 const unsigned char *p;
3607 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3608 * extension in their ClientHello */
3609 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3611 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3615 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3616 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3617 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3619 514, /* See the payload format below */
3625 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3626 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3627 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3628 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3630 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3635 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3637 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3639 /* The payload looks like:
3641 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3642 * uint8 padding_len;
3643 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3646 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3648 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3649 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3652 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3653 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3655 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3658 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3659 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
3665 int tls1_send_server_supplemental_data(SSL *s)
3668 const unsigned char *authz, *orig_authz;
3670 size_t authz_length, i;
3672 if (s->state != SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A)
3673 return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
3675 orig_authz = authz = ssl_get_authz_data(s, &authz_length);
3678 /* This should never occur. */
3682 /* First we walk over the authz data to see how long the handshake
3683 * message will be. */
3684 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
3691 /* n2s increments authz by 2*/
3694 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
3696 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
3697 length += 1 /* authz type */ + 2 /* length */ + len;
3703 length += 1 /* handshake type */ +
3704 3 /* handshake length */ +
3705 3 /* supplemental data length */ +
3706 2 /* supplemental entry type */ +
3707 2 /* supplemental entry length */;
3709 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, length))
3711 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
3715 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3716 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA;
3717 /* Handshake length */
3718 l2n3(length - 4, p);
3719 /* Length of supplemental data */
3720 l2n3(length - 7, p);
3721 /* Supplemental data type */
3722 s2n(TLSEXT_SUPPLEMENTALDATATYPE_authz_data, p);
3724 s2n(length - 11, p);
3728 /* Walk over the authz again and append the selected elements. */
3729 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
3736 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
3739 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
3741 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
3745 memcpy(p, authz, len);
3753 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B;
3754 s->init_num = length;
3757 return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);