1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
183 static int SSL_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *ad)
185 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
187 *ad = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
189 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
190 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
192 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
194 /* There isn't any srp login extension !!! */
195 ret = SSL3_AL_WARNING;
196 *ad = SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME;
200 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,ad);
207 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
209 ssl_undefined_function,
210 ssl3_get_server_method)
212 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
215 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
216 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
218 int new_state,state,skip=0;
219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
220 int srp_no_username=0;
221 int extension_error,al;
224 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
228 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
230 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
231 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
233 /* init things to blank */
235 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
249 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
251 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
255 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
256 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
259 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
261 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
263 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
266 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
268 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
270 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
275 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
283 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
291 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
293 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
294 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
296 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
298 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
299 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
300 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
302 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
303 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
305 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
306 * client that doesn't support secure
309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
310 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
316 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
317 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
318 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
319 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
323 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
324 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
327 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
328 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
329 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
330 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
333 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
336 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
340 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
341 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
342 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
343 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
344 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_SRP_USERNAME:
348 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
349 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
350 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
352 if ((al = SSL_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&extension_error)) != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
354 ssl3_send_alert(s,al,extension_error);
355 if (extension_error == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
357 if (srp_no_username) goto end;
360 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_SRP_USERNAME;
361 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
362 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) goto end;
367 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
373 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
377 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
378 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
379 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
380 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
381 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
384 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
385 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
387 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
391 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
394 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
398 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
399 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
400 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
401 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
402 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
403 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
404 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
406 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
407 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
408 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
409 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
410 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
412 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
417 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
424 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
429 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
430 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
431 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
433 /* clear this, it may get reset by
434 * send_server_key_exchange */
435 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
436 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
437 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
438 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
440 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
441 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
442 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
443 * be able to handle this) */
444 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
446 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
449 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
450 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
452 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
454 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
455 * message only if the cipher suite is either
456 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
457 * server certificate contains the server's
458 * public key for key exchange.
460 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
461 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
462 * hint if provided */
463 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
464 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
466 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
467 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
468 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
470 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH))
471 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
472 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
473 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
474 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
475 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
481 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
482 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
487 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
491 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
492 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
493 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
494 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
495 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
496 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
497 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
498 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
499 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
500 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
501 * and in RFC 2246): */
502 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
503 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
504 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
505 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
506 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
507 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
508 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
509 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
510 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
512 /* no cert request */
514 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
515 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
519 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
520 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
521 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
522 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
523 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
525 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
526 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
532 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
533 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
534 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
535 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
536 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
537 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
541 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
543 /* This code originally checked to see if
544 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
545 * and then flushed. This caused problems
546 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
547 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
548 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
549 * still exist. So instead we just flush
553 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
554 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
559 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
561 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
564 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
565 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
566 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
567 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
571 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
573 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
575 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
576 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
579 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
583 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
584 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
585 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
590 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
591 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
592 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
593 * message is not sent.
594 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
595 * the client uses its key from the certificate
598 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
606 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
609 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
610 * a client cert, it can be verified
611 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
612 * should be generalized. But it is next step
614 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
615 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
617 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
618 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
622 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
623 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
634 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
635 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
637 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
638 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
639 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
641 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
645 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
646 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
647 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
648 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
649 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
650 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
651 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
652 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
660 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
664 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
665 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
666 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
667 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
668 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
669 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
673 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
674 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
675 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
676 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
677 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
683 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
684 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
686 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
687 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
688 { ret= -1; goto end; }
690 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
691 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
693 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
694 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
697 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
698 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
706 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
707 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
708 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
709 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
710 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
711 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
712 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
713 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
715 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
717 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
722 /* clean a few things up */
723 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
725 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
728 /* remove buffering on output */
729 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
733 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
735 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
736 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
741 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
743 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
745 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
747 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
755 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
761 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
765 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
770 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
774 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
781 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
785 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
789 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
793 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
795 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
796 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
801 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
802 /* number of bytes to write */
807 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
808 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
811 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
816 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
817 * so permit appropriate message length */
818 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
824 if (!ok) return((int)n);
825 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
826 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
828 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
829 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
830 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
831 * when a handshake is not completed ... */
832 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
833 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
835 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
836 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
844 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
846 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
847 unsigned int cookie_len;
850 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
852 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
855 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
857 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
858 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
859 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
860 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
863 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
864 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
865 || (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_SRP_USERNAME)
869 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
872 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
873 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
874 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
875 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
876 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
879 if (!ok) return((int)n);
881 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
883 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
884 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
885 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
888 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
889 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
891 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
892 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
894 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
895 s->version = s->client_version;
897 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
901 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
902 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
903 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
905 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
907 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
909 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
910 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
912 if (cookie_length == 0)
916 /* load the client random */
917 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
920 /* get the session-id */
924 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
925 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
926 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
927 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
928 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
929 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
930 * an earlier library version)
932 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
934 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
939 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
941 { /* previous session */
948 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
955 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
961 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
962 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
963 * does not cause an overflow.
965 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
968 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
969 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
973 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
974 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
977 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
979 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
981 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
984 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
985 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
986 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
989 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
991 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
992 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
994 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
995 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
996 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1007 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1009 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1010 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1011 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1016 /* not enough data */
1017 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1018 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1021 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1028 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1029 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1032 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1035 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1037 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1039 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1041 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1042 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1050 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1051 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1054 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1056 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1057 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1058 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1059 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1060 * enabled, though. */
1061 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1062 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1064 s->session->cipher = c;
1071 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1072 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1073 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1074 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1083 /* not enough data */
1084 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1085 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1091 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1098 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1099 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1103 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1105 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1107 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
1109 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1114 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1115 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1119 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1120 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1121 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1122 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1126 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1127 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1129 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1131 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1136 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1138 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1140 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1141 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1142 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1145 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1146 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1150 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1151 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1152 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1154 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1155 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1159 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1162 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1164 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1165 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1167 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1168 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1173 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1174 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1175 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1176 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1177 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1178 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1179 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1181 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1182 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1183 /* Can't disable compression */
1184 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1186 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1190 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1191 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1193 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1194 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1196 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1200 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1202 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1203 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1206 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1207 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1209 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1214 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1215 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1221 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1222 { /* See if we have a match */
1223 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1225 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1226 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1228 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1241 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1246 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1247 * using compression.
1249 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1251 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1257 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1262 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1263 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1265 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1267 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1268 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1269 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1270 if (ciphers == NULL)
1272 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1277 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1278 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1282 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1283 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1286 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1290 /* Session-id reuse */
1291 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1292 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1293 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1294 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1296 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1298 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1299 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1301 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1302 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1304 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1308 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1309 else if (ec != NULL)
1310 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1312 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1316 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1319 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1322 /* we now have the following setup.
1324 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1325 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1326 * compression - basically ignored right now
1327 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1328 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1329 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1330 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1337 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1340 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1344 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1347 unsigned char *p,*d;
1350 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1354 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1356 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1357 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1358 p=s->s3->server_random;
1359 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
1360 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1362 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1365 /* Do the message type and length last */
1368 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1369 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1372 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1373 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1375 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1376 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1377 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1378 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1379 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1380 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1381 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1383 * We also have an additional case where stateless session
1384 * resumption is successful: we always send back the old
1385 * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can
1386 * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful
1387 * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality
1390 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1392 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1394 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1395 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1397 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1401 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1404 /* put the cipher */
1405 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1408 /* put the compression method */
1409 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1412 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1415 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1417 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1418 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1420 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1423 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1425 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1432 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1435 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1436 /* number of bytes to write */
1441 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1442 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1445 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1449 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1451 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1454 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1459 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1460 /* number of bytes to write */
1465 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1466 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1469 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1471 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1475 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1478 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1481 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1482 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1483 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1486 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1489 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1490 unsigned char *p,*d;
1500 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1501 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1503 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1508 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1510 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1511 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1514 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1516 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1517 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1518 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1521 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1522 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1530 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1531 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1536 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1540 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1541 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1544 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1545 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1546 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1547 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1550 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1551 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1555 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1558 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1562 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1564 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1569 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1570 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1571 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1573 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1575 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1582 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1583 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1584 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1585 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1587 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1597 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1598 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1600 const EC_GROUP *group;
1602 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1603 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1605 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1606 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1607 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1611 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1612 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1616 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1618 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
1619 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1623 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1626 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1629 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp))
1631 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1636 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1637 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1638 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1639 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1641 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1643 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1648 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1649 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1650 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1652 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1656 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1657 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1659 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1663 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1664 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1665 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1668 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1671 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1675 /* Encode the public key.
1676 * First check the size of encoding and
1677 * allocate memory accordingly.
1679 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1680 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1681 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1684 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1685 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1686 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1687 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1689 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1694 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1695 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1696 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1697 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1699 if (encodedlen == 0)
1701 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1705 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1707 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1708 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1709 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1710 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1715 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1716 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1724 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1725 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1726 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1728 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1729 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1732 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1733 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1734 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1736 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1737 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1738 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1739 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1741 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1752 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1753 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1756 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1758 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1759 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1760 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1767 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1768 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1770 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1773 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1776 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1784 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1786 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1789 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1792 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1794 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1795 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1807 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1808 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1810 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1811 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1812 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1813 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1814 * the actual encoded point itself
1816 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1824 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1825 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1827 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1832 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1833 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1835 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1836 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1837 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1838 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1845 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1846 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1847 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1848 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
1849 && s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION)
1853 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1855 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1856 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1857 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1858 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1859 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1860 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1861 (unsigned int *)&i);
1865 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1866 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1868 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1878 /* For TLS1.2 and later send signature
1880 if (s->version >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1882 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
1884 /* Should never happen */
1885 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1886 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1892 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
1895 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
1896 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1897 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1898 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1899 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1900 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1902 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
1907 if (s->version >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1912 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1913 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1914 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1919 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1922 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1928 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1929 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1930 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1932 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1934 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1935 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1936 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1938 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1942 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1944 unsigned char *p,*d;
1946 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
1950 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
1954 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
1956 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1958 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
1967 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1971 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
1973 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
1974 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
1975 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
1977 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1980 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
1981 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
1984 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1991 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1992 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
1998 /* else no CA names */
1999 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
2002 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
2003 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
2006 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2011 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2012 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2015 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2022 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2025 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2026 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2031 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2035 unsigned long alg_k;
2037 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2039 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2041 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2045 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2047 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2049 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2050 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2051 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2052 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2053 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2056 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2057 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2058 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2059 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2063 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2064 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2066 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2068 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2069 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2071 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2072 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2074 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2075 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2076 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2077 * be sent already */
2080 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2081 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2088 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2089 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2090 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2091 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2093 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2094 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2100 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2101 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2106 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2108 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2118 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2122 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2124 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2125 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
2128 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2130 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2131 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2132 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2133 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2134 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2136 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2137 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2138 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2140 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2141 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2143 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2144 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2145 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2146 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
2147 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
2148 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
2149 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
2155 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
2156 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
2157 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2159 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2160 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2161 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2162 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2166 s->session->master_key_length=
2167 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2168 s->session->master_key,
2170 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2174 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2175 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2180 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2182 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2192 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
2194 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2195 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
2200 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2202 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2203 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2207 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2210 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2213 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2217 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2221 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2225 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2230 s->session->master_key_length=
2231 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2232 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2233 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2237 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2238 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2240 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2241 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2242 krb5_data authenticator;
2244 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2245 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2246 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2247 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2248 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2249 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2251 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2252 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2254 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2256 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2259 enc_ticket.length = i;
2261 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2263 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2264 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2268 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2269 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2272 authenticator.length = i;
2274 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2276 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2277 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2281 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2282 p+=authenticator.length;
2286 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2289 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2292 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2294 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2295 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2299 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2300 enc_pms.length + 6))
2302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2303 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2307 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2311 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2312 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2314 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2315 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2316 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2321 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2322 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2324 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2325 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2328 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2329 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2331 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2332 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2333 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2338 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2340 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2345 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2346 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2348 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2352 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2354 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2356 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2357 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2360 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2361 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2363 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2364 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2367 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2369 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2370 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2373 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2376 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2380 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2382 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2383 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2386 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2388 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2389 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2390 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2391 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2392 * the protocol version.
2393 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2394 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2396 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2398 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2399 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2404 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2406 s->session->master_key_length=
2407 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2408 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2410 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2412 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2413 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2415 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2416 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2421 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2422 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2423 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2424 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2428 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2430 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2431 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2436 const EC_GROUP *group;
2437 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2439 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2440 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2443 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2447 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2448 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2450 /* use the certificate */
2451 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2455 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2456 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2458 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2461 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2462 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2464 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2465 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2467 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2472 /* Let's get client's public key */
2473 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2475 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2476 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2482 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2484 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2486 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2487 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2490 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2492 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2494 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2495 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2496 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2497 * never executed. When that support is
2498 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2499 * received in the certificate is
2500 * authorized for key agreement.
2501 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2502 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2505 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2506 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2507 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2511 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2512 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2514 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2518 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2522 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2523 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2525 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2527 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2528 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2532 /* Get encoded point length */
2535 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2536 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2538 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2542 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2543 * currently, so set it to the start
2545 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2548 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2549 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2550 if (field_size <= 0)
2552 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2556 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2559 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2564 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2565 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2566 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2567 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2568 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2569 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2571 /* Compute the master secret */
2572 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2573 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2575 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2580 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2581 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2583 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2584 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2585 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2587 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2589 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2594 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2595 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2598 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2600 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2601 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2604 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2606 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2607 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2611 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2612 * string for the callback */
2613 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2614 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2615 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2616 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2617 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2619 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2621 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2622 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2625 else if (psk_len == 0)
2627 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2628 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2629 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2630 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2634 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2635 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2637 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2639 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2643 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2644 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2645 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2646 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2648 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2649 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2653 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2654 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2655 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2656 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2657 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2659 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2660 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2664 s->session->master_key_length=
2665 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2666 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2669 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2675 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2676 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2684 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2685 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2688 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2690 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2693 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2694 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2695 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2696 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2698 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2699 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2703 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2705 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2712 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2713 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2716 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2717 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2718 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2719 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2720 unsigned long alg_a;
2722 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2723 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2724 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2725 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2726 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2727 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2729 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2730 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2731 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2732 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2733 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2734 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2735 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2736 if (client_pub_pkey)
2738 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2741 /* Decrypt session key */
2742 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)))
2744 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2752 else if (p[1] < 0x80)
2759 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2762 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2765 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2768 /* Generate master secret */
2769 s->session->master_key_length=
2770 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2771 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2772 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2773 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2778 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2779 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2787 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2788 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2789 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2795 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2796 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2799 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2800 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2801 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2802 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2803 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2804 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2809 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2811 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2818 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2819 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2820 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2825 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2827 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2829 peer=s->session->peer;
2830 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2831 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2839 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2841 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2842 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2844 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2845 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2854 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2855 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2859 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2861 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2862 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2866 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2868 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2869 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2873 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2874 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2875 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2876 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
2877 * signature without length field */
2878 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
2879 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
2889 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2890 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2894 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2895 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
2897 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2898 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2902 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2903 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2905 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2906 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2910 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2911 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2916 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2917 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2923 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2924 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2926 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2927 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2928 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
2932 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2933 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
2939 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2940 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
2942 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2943 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2944 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
2948 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2949 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2950 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2956 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
2957 { unsigned char signature[64];
2959 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
2960 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
2962 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
2964 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
2965 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
2967 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
2968 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2971 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2972 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2973 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2979 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2980 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
2989 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2992 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2996 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2998 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3000 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3001 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3003 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3005 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3012 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3014 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3016 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3017 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3019 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3020 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3023 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3024 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3026 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3027 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3030 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3034 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3036 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3037 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3040 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3042 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3044 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3051 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3052 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3055 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3058 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3060 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3061 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3066 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3069 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3074 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3075 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3078 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3080 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3087 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3089 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3090 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3092 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3096 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3097 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3098 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3100 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3101 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3107 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3110 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3111 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
3116 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3117 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3118 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3119 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3121 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3122 * when we arrive here. */
3123 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3125 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3126 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3128 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3132 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3133 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3134 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3135 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3136 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3144 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3147 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3148 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3152 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3157 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3159 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
3162 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3163 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3164 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3166 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3171 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
3172 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3177 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3178 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3180 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3181 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3183 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3185 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3190 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3191 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3192 unsigned char key_name[16];
3194 /* get session encoding length */
3195 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3196 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3201 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3202 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3203 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3204 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3205 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3206 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3208 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3209 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
3210 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3212 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
3216 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3218 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3220 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
3221 /* Skip message length for now */
3223 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3224 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3225 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3226 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3229 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3231 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3240 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3241 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3242 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3243 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3244 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3245 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3247 l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
3248 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3250 /* Output key name */
3252 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3255 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3256 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3257 /* Encrypt session data */
3258 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3260 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3262 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3264 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3265 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3266 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3269 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3271 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3272 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
3273 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
3275 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
3277 /* number of bytes to write */
3279 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3284 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3285 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3288 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3290 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3293 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3294 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3295 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3298 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3301 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3304 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3305 /* message length */
3306 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3308 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3309 /* length of OCSP response */
3310 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3311 /* actual response */
3312 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3313 /* number of bytes to write */
3314 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3315 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3319 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3320 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));