1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
182 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
184 ssl_undefined_function,
185 ssl3_get_server_method)
187 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
190 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
191 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
194 int new_state,state,skip=0;
196 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
200 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
202 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
203 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
205 /* init things to blank */
207 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
221 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
223 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
227 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
228 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
231 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
233 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
238 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
240 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
242 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
247 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
255 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
263 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
265 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
266 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
268 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
270 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
271 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
272 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
276 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
277 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
278 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
279 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
283 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
284 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
287 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
288 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
289 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
290 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
293 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
296 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
300 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
301 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
302 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
305 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
306 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
309 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
313 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
314 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
315 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
316 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
319 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
321 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
325 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
326 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
327 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
328 /* normal PSK or KRB5 */
329 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
330 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
331 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
333 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
334 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
335 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
336 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
337 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
339 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
344 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
351 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
356 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
357 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
358 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
360 /* clear this, it may get reset by
361 * send_server_key_exchange */
362 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
363 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
364 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
365 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
367 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
368 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
369 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
370 * be able to handle this) */
371 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
373 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
376 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
377 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
379 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
381 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
382 * message only if the cipher suite is either
383 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
384 * server certificate contains the server's
385 * public key for key exchange.
387 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
388 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
389 * hint if provided */
390 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
391 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
393 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH))
394 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
395 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
396 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
397 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
398 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
404 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
405 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
410 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
414 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
415 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
416 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
417 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
418 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
419 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
420 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
421 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
422 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
423 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
424 * and in RFC 2246): */
425 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
426 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
427 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
428 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
429 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
430 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
431 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
432 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
433 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
435 /* no cert request */
437 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
438 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
442 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
443 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
444 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
445 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
446 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
448 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
449 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
455 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
456 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
457 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
458 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
459 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
460 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
464 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
465 /* number of bytes to be flushed */
466 num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,NULL);
469 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
470 num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio);
471 if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; }
472 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
475 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
478 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
479 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
480 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
481 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
485 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
487 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
489 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
490 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
493 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
497 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
498 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
499 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
504 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
505 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
506 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
507 * message is not sent.
509 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
514 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
517 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
518 * a client cert, it can be verified
519 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
520 * should be generalized. But it is next step
523 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
525 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
526 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
528 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
532 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
533 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
535 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
536 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
537 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
539 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
543 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
544 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
545 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
546 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
547 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
550 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
551 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
552 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
555 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
559 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
560 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
561 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
562 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
563 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
564 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
568 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
569 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
570 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
571 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
572 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
578 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
579 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
581 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
582 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
583 { ret= -1; goto end; }
585 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
586 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
588 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
589 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
592 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
593 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
601 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
602 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
603 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
604 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
605 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
606 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
607 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
608 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
610 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
612 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
617 /* clean a few things up */
618 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
620 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
623 /* remove buffering on output */
624 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
628 if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
630 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
631 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
635 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
637 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
639 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
641 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
649 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
655 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
659 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
664 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
668 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
675 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
679 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
683 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
687 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
689 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
690 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
695 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
696 /* number of bytes to write */
701 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
702 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
705 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
710 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
711 * so permit appropriate message length */
712 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
718 if (!ok) return((int)n);
719 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
720 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
722 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
723 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
724 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
725 * when a handshake is not completed ... */
726 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
727 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
729 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
730 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
738 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
740 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
741 unsigned int cookie_len;
744 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
746 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
749 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
751 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
752 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
753 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
754 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
757 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
759 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
762 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
763 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
764 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
765 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
766 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
769 if (!ok) return((int)n);
771 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
773 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
774 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
775 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
778 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
779 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
781 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
782 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
784 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
785 s->version = s->client_version;
787 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
791 /* load the client random */
792 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
795 /* get the session-id */
799 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
800 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
801 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
802 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
803 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
804 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
805 * an earlier library version)
807 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
809 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
814 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
816 { /* previous session */
823 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
830 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION)
835 if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
836 s->d1->send_cookie == 0)
838 /* HelloVerifyMessage has already been sent */
839 if ( cookie_len != s->d1->cookie_len)
841 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
842 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
848 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
849 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
850 * does not cause an overflow.
852 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
855 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
856 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
860 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
861 if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
864 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
866 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
868 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
871 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
872 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
873 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
876 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
878 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
879 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
881 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
882 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
883 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
892 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
894 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
895 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
896 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
901 /* not enough data */
902 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
903 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
906 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
913 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
914 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
917 id=s->session->cipher->id;
920 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
922 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
924 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
926 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
927 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
937 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
939 /* Very bad for multi-threading.... */
940 s->session->cipher=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
944 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
945 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
946 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
947 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
957 /* not enough data */
958 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
959 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
965 if (p[j] == 0) break;
972 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
973 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
977 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
979 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
981 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
983 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
984 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
988 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
989 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
994 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
995 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
996 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
997 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
998 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
999 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1000 { /* See if we have a match */
1001 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1003 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1004 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1006 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1019 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1025 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1030 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1031 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1033 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1035 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1036 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1037 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1038 if (ciphers == NULL)
1040 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1041 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1045 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1046 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1050 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1051 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1054 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1055 ssl3_digest_cached_records(s);
1059 /* Session-id reuse */
1060 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1061 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1062 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1063 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1065 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1067 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1068 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1070 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1071 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1073 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1077 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1078 else if (ec != NULL)
1079 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1081 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1085 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1086 /* Clear cached handshake records */
1087 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
1088 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
1091 /* we now have the following setup.
1093 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1094 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1095 * compression - basically ignored right now
1096 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1097 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1098 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1099 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1106 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1109 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1113 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1116 unsigned char *p,*d;
1118 unsigned long l,Time;
1120 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1122 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1123 p=s->s3->server_random;
1124 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1126 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1128 /* Do the message type and length last */
1131 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1132 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1135 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1136 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1138 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1139 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1140 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1141 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1142 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1143 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1144 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1146 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER))
1147 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1149 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1150 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1152 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1156 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1159 /* put the cipher */
1160 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1163 /* put the compression method */
1164 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1167 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1170 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1172 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1173 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1175 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1178 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1188 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1191 s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
1192 /* number of bytes to write */
1197 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
1198 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1201 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1205 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1207 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1210 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1215 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1216 /* number of bytes to write */
1221 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
1222 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1225 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1227 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1231 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1234 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1237 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1238 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1239 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1242 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1245 unsigned char *p,*d;
1255 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1256 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1258 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1263 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1265 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1266 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1269 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1271 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1272 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1273 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1276 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1285 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1286 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1291 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1295 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1296 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1299 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1300 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1301 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1302 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1305 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1306 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1310 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1313 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1317 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1319 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1324 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1325 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1326 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1328 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1330 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1337 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1338 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1339 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1340 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1342 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1352 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1353 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1355 const EC_GROUP *group;
1357 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1358 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1360 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1361 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1362 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1366 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1367 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1371 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1373 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
1374 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1378 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1381 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1384 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp))
1386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1391 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1392 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1393 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1394 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1396 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1398 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1403 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1404 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1405 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1407 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1411 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1412 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1414 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1418 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1419 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1420 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1423 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1426 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1430 /* Encode the public key.
1431 * First check the size of encoding and
1432 * allocate memory accordingly.
1434 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1435 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1436 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1439 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1440 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1441 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1442 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1444 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1449 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1450 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1451 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1452 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1454 if (encodedlen == 0)
1456 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1460 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1462 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1463 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1464 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1465 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1470 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1471 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1479 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1480 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1481 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1483 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1484 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1487 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1489 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1490 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1493 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1495 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1499 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1500 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1502 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
1505 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1508 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1516 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1518 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1521 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1524 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1531 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1532 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1534 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1535 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1536 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1537 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1538 * the actual encoded point itself
1540 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1548 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1549 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1551 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1556 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1557 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1559 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1560 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1561 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1562 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1569 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1570 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1571 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1572 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1576 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1578 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1579 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1580 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1581 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1582 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1583 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1584 (unsigned int *)&i);
1588 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1589 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1591 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1599 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1600 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1603 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
1604 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1605 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1606 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1607 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1608 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1610 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
1618 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1619 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1621 /* let's do ECDSA */
1622 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
1623 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1624 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1625 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1626 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1627 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1629 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
1638 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1639 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1640 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1645 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1648 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1654 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1655 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1656 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1658 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1660 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1661 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1662 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1664 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1668 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1670 unsigned char *p,*d;
1672 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
1676 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
1680 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
1682 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1684 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
1693 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1697 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
1699 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
1700 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
1701 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
1703 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1706 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
1707 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
1710 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1717 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1718 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
1724 /* else no CA names */
1725 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
1728 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
1729 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1732 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1737 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1738 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
1741 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1748 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
1751 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1752 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1757 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1761 unsigned long alg_k;
1763 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1765 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1767 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1771 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1773 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1775 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1776 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
1777 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
1778 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
1779 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1782 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1783 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1784 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
1785 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1789 if (!ok) return((int)n);
1790 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1792 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1794 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1795 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
1797 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
1798 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
1800 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
1801 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
1802 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
1803 * be sent already */
1806 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1807 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
1814 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
1815 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
1816 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
1817 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
1819 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1820 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
1826 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
1827 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
1832 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
1834 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1844 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
1848 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
1850 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1851 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
1854 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
1856 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
1857 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
1858 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
1859 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
1860 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
1862 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
1863 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
1864 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
1866 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1867 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
1869 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
1870 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
1871 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
1872 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
1873 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
1874 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
1875 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
1881 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
1882 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
1883 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
1885 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
1886 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
1887 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
1888 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
1892 s->session->master_key_length=
1893 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1894 s->session->master_key,
1896 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1900 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1901 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
1906 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
1908 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1918 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
1920 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1921 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
1926 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
1928 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1929 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1933 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
1936 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
1939 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
1943 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
1947 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1951 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
1956 s->session->master_key_length=
1957 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1958 s->session->master_key,p,i);
1959 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1963 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1964 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
1966 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
1967 krb5_data enc_ticket;
1968 krb5_data authenticator;
1970 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
1971 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
1972 EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
1973 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
1974 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
1975 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
1977 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
1978 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
1980 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
1982 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
1985 enc_ticket.length = i;
1987 if (n < enc_ticket.length + 6)
1989 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1990 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1994 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
1995 p+=enc_ticket.length;
1998 authenticator.length = i;
2000 if (n < enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)
2002 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2003 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2007 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2008 p+=authenticator.length;
2012 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2015 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2018 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2020 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2021 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2025 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2026 enc_pms.length + 6))
2028 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2029 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2033 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2037 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2038 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2040 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2041 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2042 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2047 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2048 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2050 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2051 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2054 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2055 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2057 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2058 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2059 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2064 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2066 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2071 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2072 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2074 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2078 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2080 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2082 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2083 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2086 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2087 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2089 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2090 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2093 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2095 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2096 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2099 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2101 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2102 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2106 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2108 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2109 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2112 if (!((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2114 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2115 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2116 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2117 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2118 * the protocol version.
2119 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2120 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2122 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2123 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2125 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2126 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2131 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2133 s->session->master_key_length=
2134 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2135 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2137 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2139 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2140 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2142 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2143 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2148 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2149 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2150 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2151 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2155 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2157 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2158 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2163 const EC_GROUP *group;
2164 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2166 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2167 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2170 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2174 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2175 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2177 /* use the certificate */
2178 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2182 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2183 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2185 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2188 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2189 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2191 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2192 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2199 /* Let's get client's public key */
2200 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2203 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2209 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2211 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2213 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2217 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2219 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2221 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2222 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2223 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2224 * never executed. When that support is
2225 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2226 * received in the certificate is
2227 * authorized for key agreement.
2228 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2229 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2232 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2233 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2234 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2238 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2239 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2241 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2245 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2249 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2250 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2252 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2254 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2255 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2259 /* Get encoded point length */
2262 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2263 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2269 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2270 * currently, so set it to the start
2272 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2275 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2276 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2277 if (field_size <= 0)
2279 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2283 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2286 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2291 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2292 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2293 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2294 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2295 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2297 /* Compute the master secret */
2298 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2299 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2301 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2306 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2307 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2309 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2310 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2311 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2313 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2315 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2321 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2324 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2327 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2330 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2332 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2333 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2337 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2338 * string for the callback */
2339 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2340 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2341 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2342 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2343 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2345 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2347 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2348 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2351 else if (psk_len == 0)
2353 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2354 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2355 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2356 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2360 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2361 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2363 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2365 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2369 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2370 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2371 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2372 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2374 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2375 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2379 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2380 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2381 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2382 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2383 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2386 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2390 s->session->master_key_length=
2391 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2392 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2395 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2402 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2403 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2404 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2410 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2411 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
2414 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2415 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2416 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2417 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2418 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2419 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2424 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2426 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2433 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2434 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2435 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2440 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2442 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2444 peer=s->session->peer;
2445 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2446 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2454 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2456 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2457 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2459 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2460 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2469 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2470 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2474 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2476 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2477 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2481 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2483 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2484 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2488 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2489 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2494 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2495 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2499 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2500 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
2502 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2503 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2507 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2508 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2510 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2511 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2515 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2516 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2521 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2522 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2528 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2529 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2531 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2532 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2533 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
2537 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2538 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
2544 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2545 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
2547 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2548 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2549 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
2553 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2554 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2555 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2562 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2563 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
2572 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2575 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2579 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2581 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
2583 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
2584 const unsigned char *p,*q;
2586 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
2588 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2595 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2597 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
2599 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2600 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2602 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2603 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2606 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
2607 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
2609 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
2610 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2613 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2617 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
2619 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2620 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2623 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2625 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
2627 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2634 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2635 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2638 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
2641 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
2643 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2644 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2649 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
2652 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2657 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2658 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2661 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
2663 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2670 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
2672 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2673 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2675 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2676 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2679 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2680 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2681 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2683 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2684 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2690 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
2693 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2694 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
2699 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
2700 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2701 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
2702 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2704 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
2705 * when we arrive here. */
2706 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2708 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
2709 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2711 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2715 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
2716 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
2717 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
2718 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
2719 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
2727 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2730 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
2731 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
2735 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
2740 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
2742 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
2745 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
2746 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
2747 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
2749 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2754 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
2755 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
2760 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
2761 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2763 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
2764 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
2766 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
2768 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
2774 /* get session encoding length */
2775 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
2776 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
2781 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
2782 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
2783 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
2784 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
2785 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
2786 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
2788 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
2789 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
2790 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
2792 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
2796 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
2798 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2800 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
2801 /* Skip message length for now */
2803 l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
2804 /* Skip ticket length for now */
2806 /* Output key name */
2808 memcpy(p, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
2810 /* Generate and output IV */
2811 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
2812 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
2813 /* Encrypt session data */
2814 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
2815 s->ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, p);
2817 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
2819 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
2821 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2823 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
2824 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
2825 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
2826 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
2827 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
2828 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
2831 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
2833 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2834 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
2835 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
2837 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
2839 /* number of bytes to write */
2841 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
2846 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
2847 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2850 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
2852 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
2855 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
2856 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
2857 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
2860 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
2863 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2866 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
2867 /* message length */
2868 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
2870 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
2871 /* length of OCSP response */
2872 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
2873 /* actual response */
2874 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
2875 /* number of bytes to write */
2876 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
2877 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
2881 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
2882 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));