2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
125 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
126 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
129 #include "ssl_locl.h"
130 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
131 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
132 #include <openssl/rand.h>
133 #include <openssl/objects.h>
134 #include <openssl/evp.h>
135 #include <openssl/x509.h>
136 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
137 #include <openssl/dh.h>
139 #include <openssl/bn.h>
140 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
141 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
143 #include <openssl/md5.h>
145 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
147 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
148 static int nid2curve_id(int nid);
151 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
153 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
154 return(SSLv3_server_method());
159 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
161 ssl_undefined_function,
162 ssl3_get_server_method)
164 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
167 unsigned long l,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
168 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
171 int new_state,state,skip=0;
173 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
177 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
179 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
180 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
182 /* init things to blank */
184 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
198 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
200 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
204 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
205 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
208 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
210 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
215 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
217 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
219 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
224 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
232 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
240 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
242 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
243 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
245 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
247 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
248 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
249 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
253 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
254 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
255 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
256 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
260 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
261 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
264 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
265 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
266 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
267 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
270 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
273 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
277 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
278 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
279 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
282 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
283 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
284 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
287 switch (ssl_check_tlsext(s,&al))
289 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
290 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
291 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLS_EXT);
295 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
296 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
304 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
308 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
309 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
310 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
311 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
314 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
316 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
320 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
321 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
322 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH */
323 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
325 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
326 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
330 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
334 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
335 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
336 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
338 /* clear this, it may get reset by
339 * send_server_key_exchange */
340 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
341 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
343 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
345 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
346 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
347 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
348 * be able to handle this) */
349 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
351 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
354 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
355 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
357 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
358 * message only if the cipher suite is either
359 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
360 * server certificate contains the server's
361 * public key for key exchange.
363 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
365 || (l & (SSL_DH|SSL_kFZA))
367 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
368 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
369 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
375 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
376 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
381 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
385 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
386 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
387 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
388 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
389 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
390 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
391 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
392 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
393 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
394 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
395 * and in RFC 2246): */
396 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) &&
397 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
398 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
399 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
400 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
401 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
403 /* no cert request */
405 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
406 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
410 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
411 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
412 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
413 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
414 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
416 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
417 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
423 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
424 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
425 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
426 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
427 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
428 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
432 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
433 /* number of bytes to be flushed */
434 num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,NULL);
437 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
438 num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio);
439 if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; }
440 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
443 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
446 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
447 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
448 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
449 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
453 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
455 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
457 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
458 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
461 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
465 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
466 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
467 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
472 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
473 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
474 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
475 * message is not sent.
477 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
482 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
485 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
486 * a client cert, it can be verified
488 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
489 &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
490 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
491 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
492 &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
493 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
497 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
498 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
500 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
501 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
502 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
504 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
508 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
509 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
510 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
511 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
512 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
516 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
520 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
521 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
523 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
524 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
525 { ret= -1; goto end; }
527 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
528 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
530 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
531 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
534 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
535 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
543 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
544 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
545 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
546 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
547 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
548 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
549 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
550 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
552 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
554 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
559 /* clean a few things up */
560 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
562 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
565 /* remove buffering on output */
566 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
570 if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
572 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
573 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
577 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
579 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
581 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
583 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
591 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
597 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
601 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
606 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
610 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
617 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
621 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
625 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
629 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
631 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
632 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
637 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
638 /* number of bytes to write */
643 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
644 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
647 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
652 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
653 * so permit appropriate message length */
654 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
660 if (!ok) return((int)n);
661 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
662 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
664 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
665 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
666 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
667 * when a handshake is not completed ... */
668 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
669 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
671 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
672 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
680 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
682 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
683 unsigned int cookie_len;
686 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
688 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
691 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
693 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
694 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
695 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
696 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
699 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
702 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
704 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
705 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
706 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
707 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
708 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
711 if (!ok) return((int)n);
712 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
714 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
715 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
716 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
719 if (s->client_version < s->version)
721 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
722 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
724 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
725 s->version = s->client_version;
727 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
731 /* load the client random */
732 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
735 /* get the session-id */
739 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
740 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
741 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
742 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
743 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
744 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
745 * an earlier library version)
747 if (j == 0 || (s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
749 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
754 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s,p,j);
756 { /* previous session */
763 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
770 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION)
775 if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
776 s->d1->send_cookie == 0)
778 /* HelloVerifyMessage has already been sent */
779 if ( cookie_len != s->d1->cookie_len)
781 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
782 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
788 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
789 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
790 * does not cause an overflow.
792 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
795 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
796 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
800 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
801 if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
804 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
806 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
808 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
811 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
812 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
813 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
816 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
818 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
819 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
821 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
822 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
823 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
832 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
834 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
835 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
836 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
841 /* not enough data */
842 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
843 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
846 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
853 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
854 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
857 id=s->session->cipher->id;
860 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
862 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
864 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
866 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
867 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
877 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
879 /* Very bad for multi-threading.... */
880 s->session->cipher=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
884 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
885 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
886 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
887 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
897 /* not enough data */
898 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
899 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
905 if (p[j] == 0) break;
912 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
913 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
917 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
918 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
919 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
920 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
921 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
922 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
923 { /* See if we have a match */
926 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
929 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
942 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
948 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
950 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
952 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
954 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
955 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLS_EXT);
961 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
966 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
967 s->session->compress_meth=0;
969 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
971 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
972 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
973 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
976 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
977 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
981 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
986 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
987 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
990 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
994 /* Session-id reuse */
995 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
996 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1000 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1002 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1003 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1005 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1006 if (c->algorithms & SSL_eNULL)
1008 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1012 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1013 else if (ec != NULL)
1014 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1016 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1020 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1023 /* we now have the following setup.
1025 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1026 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1027 * compression - basically ignored right now
1028 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1029 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1030 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1031 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1038 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1041 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1045 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1048 unsigned char *p,*d;
1050 unsigned long l,Time;
1052 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1054 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1055 p=s->s3->server_random;
1056 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1058 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1060 /* Do the message type and length last */
1063 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1064 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1067 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1068 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1070 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1071 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1072 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1073 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1074 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1075 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1076 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1078 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER))
1079 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1081 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1082 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1084 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1088 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1091 /* put the cipher */
1092 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1095 /* put the compression method */
1096 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1099 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1102 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1104 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1105 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1107 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1115 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1118 s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
1119 /* number of bytes to write */
1124 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
1125 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1128 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1132 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1134 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1137 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1142 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1143 /* number of bytes to write */
1148 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
1149 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1152 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1154 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1158 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1165 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1166 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1169 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1172 unsigned char *p,*d;
1182 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1183 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1185 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_MKEY_MASK;
1190 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1192 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1193 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1196 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1198 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1199 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1200 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1203 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1204 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1212 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1213 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1218 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1222 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1223 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1226 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1227 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1228 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1229 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1232 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1233 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1237 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1244 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1246 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1251 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1252 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1253 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1255 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1264 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1265 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1266 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1267 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1269 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1279 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1280 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1282 const EC_GROUP *group;
1284 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1285 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1287 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1288 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1289 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1293 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1294 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1298 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1300 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
1301 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1305 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1308 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1311 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp))
1313 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1318 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1319 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1320 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1321 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1323 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1325 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1330 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1331 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1332 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1334 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1338 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1339 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1341 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1345 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1346 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1347 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1350 nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1353 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1357 /* Encode the public key.
1358 * First check the size of encoding and
1359 * allocate memory accordingly.
1361 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1362 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1363 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1366 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1367 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1368 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1369 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1371 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1376 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1377 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1378 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1379 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1381 if (encodedlen == 0)
1383 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1387 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1389 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1390 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1391 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1392 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1397 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1398 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1406 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1408 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1409 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1412 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1414 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1418 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
1420 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
1423 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1426 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1434 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1436 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1439 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1442 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1449 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1450 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1452 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1453 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1454 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1455 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1456 * the actual encoded point itself
1458 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1466 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1467 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1469 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1477 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1478 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1479 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1480 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1484 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1486 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1487 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1488 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1489 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1490 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1491 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1492 (unsigned int *)&i);
1496 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1497 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1499 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1507 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1508 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1511 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
1512 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1513 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1514 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1515 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1516 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1518 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
1526 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1527 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1529 /* let's do ECDSA */
1530 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
1531 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1532 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1533 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1534 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1535 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1537 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
1546 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1547 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1548 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1553 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1556 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1562 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1563 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1564 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1566 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1568 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1569 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1570 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1572 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1576 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1578 unsigned char *p,*d;
1580 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
1584 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
1588 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
1590 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1592 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
1601 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1605 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
1607 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
1608 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
1609 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
1611 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1614 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
1615 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
1618 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1625 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1626 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
1632 /* else no CA names */
1633 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
1636 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
1637 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1640 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1645 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1646 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
1649 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1656 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
1659 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1660 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1665 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1671 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1673 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1675 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1679 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1681 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1683 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1684 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
1685 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
1686 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
1687 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1690 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1691 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1692 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
1693 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1697 if (!ok) return((int)n);
1698 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1700 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
1702 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1705 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
1706 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
1708 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
1709 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
1710 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
1711 * be sent already */
1714 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1715 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
1722 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
1723 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
1724 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
1725 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
1727 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1728 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
1735 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
1740 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
1742 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1752 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
1756 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
1758 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1759 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
1762 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
1764 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
1765 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
1766 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
1767 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
1768 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
1770 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
1771 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
1772 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
1774 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1775 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
1777 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
1778 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
1779 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
1780 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
1781 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
1782 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
1783 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
1789 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
1790 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
1791 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
1793 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
1794 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
1795 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
1796 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
1800 s->session->master_key_length=
1801 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1802 s->session->master_key,
1804 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1808 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1809 if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
1814 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
1816 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1826 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
1828 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1829 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
1834 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
1836 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1837 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1841 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
1844 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
1847 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
1851 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
1855 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1859 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
1864 s->session->master_key_length=
1865 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1866 s->session->master_key,p,i);
1867 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1871 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1874 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
1875 krb5_data enc_ticket;
1876 krb5_data authenticator;
1878 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
1879 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
1880 EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
1881 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
1882 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
1883 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
1885 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
1886 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
1888 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
1890 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
1893 enc_ticket.length = i;
1895 if (n < enc_ticket.length + 6)
1897 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1898 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1902 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
1903 p+=enc_ticket.length;
1906 authenticator.length = i;
1908 if (n < enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)
1910 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1911 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1915 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
1916 p+=authenticator.length;
1920 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
1923 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
1926 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
1928 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1929 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1933 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
1934 enc_pms.length + 6))
1936 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1937 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1941 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
1945 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
1946 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
1948 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
1949 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1950 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1955 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
1956 ** but will return authtime == 0.
1958 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
1959 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
1962 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
1963 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
1965 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
1966 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1967 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1972 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
1974 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
1979 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
1980 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1982 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
1986 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
1988 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
1990 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1991 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
1994 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
1995 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
1997 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1998 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2001 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2003 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2004 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2007 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2009 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2010 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2014 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2016 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2017 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2020 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2022 s->session->master_key_length=
2023 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2024 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2026 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2028 int len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2029 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2031 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2032 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2037 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2038 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2039 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2040 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2044 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2046 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2047 if ((l & SSL_kECDH) || (l & SSL_kECDHE))
2052 const EC_GROUP *group;
2053 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2055 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2056 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2058 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2059 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2063 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2066 /* use the certificate */
2067 tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
2071 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2072 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2074 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2077 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2078 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2080 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2081 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2083 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2088 /* Let's get client's public key */
2089 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2091 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2092 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2098 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2102 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2103 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2106 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2108 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2110 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2111 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2112 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2113 * never executed. When that support is
2114 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2115 * received in the certificate is
2116 * authorized for key agreement.
2117 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2118 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2121 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2122 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2123 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2127 EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2128 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec));
2129 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2133 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2134 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2136 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2138 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2139 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2143 /* Get encoded point length */
2146 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2147 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2149 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2153 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2154 * currently, so set it to the start
2156 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2159 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2160 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2161 if (field_size <= 0)
2163 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2167 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2170 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2175 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2176 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2177 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2178 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2179 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2181 /* Compute the master secret */
2182 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2183 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2185 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2191 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2192 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2193 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2199 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2200 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
2203 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2204 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2205 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2206 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2207 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2208 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2213 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2215 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2222 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2223 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2224 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2229 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2231 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2233 peer=s->session->peer;
2234 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2235 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2243 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2245 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2246 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2248 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2259 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2263 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2266 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2270 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2273 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2277 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2278 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2283 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2284 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2288 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2289 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
2291 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2292 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2296 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2297 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2299 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2300 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2304 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2305 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2310 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2311 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2317 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2318 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2320 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2321 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2322 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
2326 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2327 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
2333 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2334 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
2336 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2337 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2338 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
2342 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2343 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2344 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2351 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2352 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
2361 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2364 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2368 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2370 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
2372 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
2373 const unsigned char *p,*q;
2375 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
2377 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2384 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2386 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
2388 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2389 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2391 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2392 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2395 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
2396 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
2398 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
2399 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2402 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2406 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
2408 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2409 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2412 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2414 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
2416 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2423 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2424 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2427 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
2430 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
2432 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2433 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2438 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
2441 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2446 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2447 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2450 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
2452 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2459 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
2461 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2462 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2464 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2465 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2468 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2469 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2470 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2472 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2473 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2479 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
2482 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2483 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
2488 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
2489 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2490 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
2491 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2493 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
2494 * when we arrive here. */
2495 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2497 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
2498 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2500 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2504 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
2505 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
2506 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
2507 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
2508 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
2516 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2519 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
2520 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
2524 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
2529 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
2531 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
2533 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
2534 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms
2535 & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
2536 != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))
2538 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2542 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
2543 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
2548 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
2549 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2553 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2554 /* This is the complement of curve_id2nid in s3_clnt.c. */
2555 static int nid2curve_id(int nid)
2557 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001)
2558 * (no changes in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt [June 2003]) */
2560 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
2562 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
2564 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
2566 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
2568 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
2570 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
2572 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
2574 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
2576 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
2578 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
2580 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
2582 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
2584 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
2586 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
2588 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
2590 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
2592 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
2594 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
2596 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
2598 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
2600 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
2602 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
2604 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
2606 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
2608 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */