2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
125 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
126 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
129 #include "ssl_locl.h"
130 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
131 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
132 #include <openssl/rand.h>
133 #include <openssl/objects.h>
134 #include <openssl/evp.h>
135 #include <openssl/x509.h>
136 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
137 #include <openssl/dh.h>
139 #include <openssl/bn.h>
140 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
141 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
143 #include <openssl/md5.h>
145 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
147 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
148 static int nid2curve_id(int nid);
151 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
153 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
154 return(SSLv3_server_method());
159 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
161 ssl_undefined_function,
162 ssl3_get_server_method)
164 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
167 unsigned long l,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
168 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
171 int new_state,state,skip=0;
173 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
177 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
179 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
180 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
182 /* init things to blank */
184 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
198 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
200 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
204 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
205 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
208 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
210 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
215 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
217 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
219 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
224 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
232 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
240 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
242 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
243 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
245 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
247 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
248 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
249 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
253 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
254 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
255 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
256 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
260 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
261 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
264 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
265 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
266 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
267 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
270 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
273 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
277 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
278 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
279 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
282 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
283 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
284 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
286 int extension_error = 0,al;
287 if ((al = ssl_check_Hello_TLS_extensions(s,&extension_error)) != SSL_ERROR_NONE){
289 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLS_EXT);
290 ssl3_send_alert(s,al,extension_error);
296 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
300 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
301 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
302 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
303 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
306 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
308 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
312 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
313 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
314 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH */
315 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
317 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
318 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
322 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
326 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
327 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
328 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
330 /* clear this, it may get reset by
331 * send_server_key_exchange */
332 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
333 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
335 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
337 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
338 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
339 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
340 * be able to handle this) */
341 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
343 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
346 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
347 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
349 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
350 * message only if the cipher suite is either
351 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
352 * server certificate contains the server's
353 * public key for key exchange.
355 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
357 || (l & (SSL_DH|SSL_kFZA))
359 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
360 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
361 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
367 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
368 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
373 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
377 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
378 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
379 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
380 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
381 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
382 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
383 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
384 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
385 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
386 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
387 * and in RFC 2246): */
388 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) &&
389 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
390 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
391 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
392 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
393 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
395 /* no cert request */
397 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
398 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
402 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
403 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
404 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
405 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
406 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
408 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
409 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
415 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
416 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
417 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
418 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
419 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
420 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
424 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
425 /* number of bytes to be flushed */
426 num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,NULL);
429 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
430 num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio);
431 if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; }
432 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
435 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
438 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
439 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
440 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
441 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
445 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
447 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
449 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
450 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
453 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
457 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
458 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
459 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
464 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
465 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
466 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
467 * message is not sent.
469 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
474 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
477 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
478 * a client cert, it can be verified
480 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
481 &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
482 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
483 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
484 &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
485 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
489 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
490 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
492 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
493 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
494 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
496 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
500 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
501 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
502 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
503 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
504 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
508 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
512 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
513 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
515 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
516 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
517 { ret= -1; goto end; }
519 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
520 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
522 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
523 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
526 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
527 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
535 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
536 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
537 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
538 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
539 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
540 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
541 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
542 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
544 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
546 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
551 /* clean a few things up */
552 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
554 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
557 /* remove buffering on output */
558 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
562 if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
564 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
565 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
569 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
571 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
573 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
575 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
583 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
589 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
593 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
598 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
602 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
609 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
613 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
617 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
621 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
623 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
624 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
629 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
630 /* number of bytes to write */
635 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
636 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
639 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
644 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
645 * so permit appropriate message length */
646 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
652 if (!ok) return((int)n);
653 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
654 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
656 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
657 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
658 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
659 * when a handshake is not completed ... */
660 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
661 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
663 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
664 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
672 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
674 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
675 unsigned int cookie_len;
678 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
680 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
683 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
685 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
686 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
687 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
688 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
691 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
694 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
696 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
697 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
698 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
699 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
700 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
703 if (!ok) return((int)n);
704 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
706 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
707 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
708 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
711 if (s->client_version < s->version)
713 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
714 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
716 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
717 s->version = s->client_version;
719 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
723 /* load the client random */
724 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
727 /* get the session-id */
731 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
732 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
733 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
734 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
735 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
736 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
737 * an earlier library version)
739 if (j == 0 || (s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
741 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
746 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s,p,j);
748 { /* previous session */
755 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
762 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION)
767 if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
768 s->d1->send_cookie == 0)
770 /* HelloVerifyMessage has already been sent */
771 if ( cookie_len != s->d1->cookie_len)
773 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
774 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
780 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
781 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
782 * does not cause an overflow.
784 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
787 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
788 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
792 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
793 if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
796 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
798 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
800 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
803 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
804 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
805 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
808 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
810 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
811 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
813 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
814 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
815 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
824 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
826 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
827 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
828 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
833 /* not enough data */
834 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
835 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
838 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
845 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
846 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
849 id=s->session->cipher->id;
852 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
854 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
856 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
858 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
859 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
869 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
871 /* Very bad for multi-threading.... */
872 s->session->cipher=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
876 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
877 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
878 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
879 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
889 /* not enough data */
890 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
891 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
897 if (p[j] == 0) break;
904 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
905 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
909 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
910 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
911 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
912 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
913 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
914 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
915 { /* See if we have a match */
918 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
921 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
934 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
940 /* TLS does not mind if there is extra stuff */
941 #if 0 /* SSL 3.0 does not mind either, so we should disable this test
942 * (was enabled in 0.9.6d through 0.9.6j and 0.9.7 through 0.9.7b,
943 * in earlier SSLeay/OpenSSL releases this test existed but was buggy) */
944 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
948 /* wrong number of bytes,
949 * there could be more to follow */
950 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
951 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
956 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
958 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
960 if ((al = ssl_parse_ClientHello_TLS_extensions(s,&p,d,n)) != SSL_ERROR_NONE){
961 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLS_EXT);
962 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
968 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
973 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
974 s->session->compress_meth=0;
976 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
978 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
979 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
980 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
983 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
984 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
988 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
993 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
994 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
997 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1001 /* Session-id reuse */
1002 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1003 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1004 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1005 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1007 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1009 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1010 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1012 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1013 if (c->algorithms & SSL_eNULL)
1015 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1019 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1020 else if (ec != NULL)
1021 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1023 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1027 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1030 /* we now have the following setup.
1032 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1033 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1034 * compression - basically ignored right now
1035 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1036 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1037 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1038 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1045 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1048 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1052 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1055 unsigned char *p,*d;
1057 unsigned long l,Time;
1059 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1061 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1062 p=s->s3->server_random;
1063 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1065 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1067 /* Do the message type and length last */
1070 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1071 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1074 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1075 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1077 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1078 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1079 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1080 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1081 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1082 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1083 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1085 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER))
1086 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1088 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1089 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1091 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1095 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1098 /* put the cipher */
1099 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1102 /* put the compression method */
1103 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1106 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1109 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1111 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1112 if ((p = ssl_add_ServerHello_TLS_extensions(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1114 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1122 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1125 s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
1126 /* number of bytes to write */
1131 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
1132 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1135 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1139 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1141 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1144 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1149 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1150 /* number of bytes to write */
1155 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
1156 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1159 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1165 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1171 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1172 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1173 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1176 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1179 unsigned char *p,*d;
1189 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1190 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1192 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_MKEY_MASK;
1197 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1199 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1200 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1203 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1205 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1206 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1207 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1210 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1219 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1220 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1225 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1229 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1230 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1233 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1234 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1235 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1236 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1239 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1244 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1247 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1251 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1253 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1258 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1259 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1260 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1262 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1264 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1271 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1272 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1273 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1274 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1276 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1286 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1287 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1289 const EC_GROUP *group;
1291 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1292 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1294 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1295 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1296 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1300 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1301 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1305 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1307 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
1308 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1312 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1315 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1318 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp))
1320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1325 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1326 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1327 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1328 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1330 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1332 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1337 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1338 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1339 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1341 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1345 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1346 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1352 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1353 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1354 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1357 nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1360 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1364 /* Encode the public key.
1365 * First check the size of encoding and
1366 * allocate memory accordingly.
1368 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1369 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1370 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1373 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1374 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1375 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1376 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1383 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1384 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1385 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1386 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1388 if (encodedlen == 0)
1390 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1394 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1396 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1397 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1398 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1399 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1404 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1405 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1413 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1415 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1416 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1419 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1421 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1425 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
1427 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
1430 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1433 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1441 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1443 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1446 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1449 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1456 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1457 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1459 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1460 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1461 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1462 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1463 * the actual encoded point itself
1465 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1473 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1474 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1476 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1484 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1485 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1486 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1487 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1491 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1493 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1494 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1495 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1496 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1497 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1498 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1499 (unsigned int *)&i);
1503 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1504 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1506 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1514 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1515 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1518 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
1519 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1520 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1521 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1522 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1523 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1525 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
1533 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1534 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1536 /* let's do ECDSA */
1537 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
1538 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1539 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1540 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1541 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1542 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1544 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
1553 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1554 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1555 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1560 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1563 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1569 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1570 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1571 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1573 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1575 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1576 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1577 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1579 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1583 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1585 unsigned char *p,*d;
1587 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
1591 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
1595 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
1597 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1599 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
1608 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1612 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
1614 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
1615 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
1616 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
1618 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1621 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
1622 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
1625 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1632 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1633 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
1639 /* else no CA names */
1640 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
1643 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
1644 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1647 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1652 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1653 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
1656 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1663 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
1666 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1667 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1672 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1678 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1680 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1682 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1686 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1688 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1690 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1691 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
1692 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
1693 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
1694 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1697 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1698 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1699 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
1700 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1704 if (!ok) return((int)n);
1705 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1707 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
1709 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1712 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
1713 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
1715 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
1716 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
1717 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
1718 * be sent already */
1721 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1722 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
1729 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
1730 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
1731 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
1732 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
1734 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1735 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
1742 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
1747 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
1749 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1759 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
1763 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
1765 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1766 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
1769 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
1771 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
1772 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
1773 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
1774 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
1775 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
1777 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
1778 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
1779 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
1781 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1782 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
1784 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
1785 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
1786 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
1787 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
1788 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
1789 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
1790 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
1796 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
1797 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
1798 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
1800 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
1801 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
1802 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
1803 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
1807 s->session->master_key_length=
1808 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1809 s->session->master_key,
1811 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1815 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1816 if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
1821 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
1823 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1833 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
1835 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1836 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
1841 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
1843 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1844 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1848 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
1851 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
1854 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
1858 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
1862 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1866 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
1871 s->session->master_key_length=
1872 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1873 s->session->master_key,p,i);
1874 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1878 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1881 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
1882 krb5_data enc_ticket;
1883 krb5_data authenticator;
1885 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
1886 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
1887 EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
1888 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
1889 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
1890 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
1892 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
1893 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
1895 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
1897 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
1900 enc_ticket.length = i;
1902 if (n < enc_ticket.length + 6)
1904 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1905 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1909 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
1910 p+=enc_ticket.length;
1913 authenticator.length = i;
1915 if (n < enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)
1917 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1918 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1922 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
1923 p+=authenticator.length;
1927 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
1930 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
1933 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
1935 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1936 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1940 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
1941 enc_pms.length + 6))
1943 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1944 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1948 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
1952 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
1953 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
1955 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
1956 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1957 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1962 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
1963 ** but will return authtime == 0.
1965 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
1966 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
1969 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
1970 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
1972 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
1973 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1974 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1979 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
1981 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
1986 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
1987 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1989 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
1993 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
1995 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
1997 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1998 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2001 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2002 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2004 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2005 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2008 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2010 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2011 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2014 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2016 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2017 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2021 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2023 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2024 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2027 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2029 s->session->master_key_length=
2030 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2031 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2033 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2035 int len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2036 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2038 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2039 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2044 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2045 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2046 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2047 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2051 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2053 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2054 if ((l & SSL_kECDH) || (l & SSL_kECDHE))
2059 const EC_GROUP *group;
2060 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2062 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2063 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2065 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2066 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2070 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2073 /* use the certificate */
2074 tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
2078 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2079 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2081 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2084 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2085 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2087 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2088 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2090 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2095 /* Let's get client's public key */
2096 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2098 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2099 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2105 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2109 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2113 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2115 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2117 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2118 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2119 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2120 * never executed. When that support is
2121 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2122 * received in the certificate is
2123 * authorized for key agreement.
2124 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2125 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2128 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2129 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2130 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2134 EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2135 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec));
2136 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2140 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2141 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2143 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2145 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2146 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2150 /* Get encoded point length */
2153 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2154 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2156 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2160 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2161 * currently, so set it to the start
2163 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2166 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2167 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2168 if (field_size <= 0)
2170 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2174 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2177 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2182 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2183 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2184 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2185 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2186 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2188 /* Compute the master secret */
2189 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2190 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2192 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2198 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2199 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2200 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2206 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2207 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
2210 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2211 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2212 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2213 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2214 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2215 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2220 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2222 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2229 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2230 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2231 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2236 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2238 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2240 peer=s->session->peer;
2241 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2242 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2250 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2252 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2253 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2255 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2266 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2270 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2273 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2277 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2279 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2280 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2284 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2285 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2290 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2291 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2295 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2296 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
2298 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2299 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2303 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2304 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2306 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2307 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2311 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2312 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2317 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2318 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2324 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2325 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2327 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2328 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2329 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
2333 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2334 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
2340 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2341 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
2343 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2344 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2345 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
2349 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2350 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2351 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2358 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2359 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
2368 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2371 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2375 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2377 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
2379 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
2380 const unsigned char *p,*q;
2382 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
2384 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2391 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2393 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
2395 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2396 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2398 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2399 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2402 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
2403 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
2405 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
2406 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2409 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2413 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
2415 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2416 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2419 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2421 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
2423 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2430 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2431 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2434 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
2437 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
2439 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2440 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2445 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
2448 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2453 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2454 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2457 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
2459 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2466 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
2468 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2469 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2471 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2472 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2475 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2476 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2477 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2479 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2480 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2486 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
2489 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2490 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
2495 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
2496 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2497 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
2498 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2500 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
2501 * when we arrive here. */
2502 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2504 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
2505 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2507 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2511 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
2512 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
2513 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
2514 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
2515 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
2523 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2526 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
2527 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
2531 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
2536 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
2538 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
2540 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
2541 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms
2542 & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
2543 != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))
2545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2549 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
2550 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
2555 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
2556 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2560 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2561 /* This is the complement of curve_id2nid in s3_clnt.c. */
2562 static int nid2curve_id(int nid)
2564 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001)
2565 * (no changes in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt [June 2003]) */
2567 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
2569 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
2571 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
2573 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
2575 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
2577 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
2579 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
2581 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
2583 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
2585 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
2587 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
2589 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
2591 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
2593 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
2595 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
2597 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
2599 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
2601 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
2603 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
2605 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
2607 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
2609 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
2611 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
2613 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
2615 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */