1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
153 #include "ssl_locl.h"
154 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
155 #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
156 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
157 #include <openssl/rand.h>
158 #include <openssl/objects.h>
159 #include <openssl/evp.h>
160 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
161 #include <openssl/x509.h>
162 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
163 # include <openssl/dh.h>
165 #include <openssl/bn.h>
166 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
167 # include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
169 #include <openssl/md5.h>
171 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return (SSLv3_server_method());
182 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
184 ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method)
186 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
187 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
189 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
191 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
193 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
194 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
195 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
197 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
201 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
203 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
210 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
213 unsigned long alg_k, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
214 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
216 int new_state, state, skip = 0;
218 RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
222 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
223 cb = s->info_callback;
224 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
225 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
227 /* init things to blank */
229 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) {
234 if (s->cert == NULL) {
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
238 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
240 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
241 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
244 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
245 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
254 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
256 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
260 case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
261 case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
265 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
267 if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) {
268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
272 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) {
273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
277 s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
279 if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
280 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
284 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
292 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
298 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
299 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
301 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
303 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
305 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
307 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the
308 * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
310 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
315 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
316 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
317 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
318 } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
320 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
322 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
323 * support secure renegotiation.
325 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
326 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
327 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
332 * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
335 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
336 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
340 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
341 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
344 ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
347 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
348 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
351 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
354 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
355 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
358 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
359 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
360 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
362 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
365 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
366 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
367 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
370 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
372 * callback indicates firther work to be done
374 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
377 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
378 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
380 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
381 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
383 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
385 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
393 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
397 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
398 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
399 ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
402 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
404 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
405 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
407 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
411 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
414 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
418 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
419 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
420 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
421 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
424 new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5 |
426 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
427 ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
430 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
431 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
432 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
434 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
437 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
443 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
448 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
449 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
450 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
453 * clear this, it may get reset by
454 * send_server_key_exchange
456 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0;
459 * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a
460 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
461 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
462 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
463 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
468 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
471 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
472 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
474 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
475 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
476 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
478 || (alg_k & SSL_kDHE)
479 || (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
480 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
481 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
482 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
483 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys
484 [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) *
485 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
490 ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
496 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
500 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
501 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
502 if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
503 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
505 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
506 * during re-negotiation:
508 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
509 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
511 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
512 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
515 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
517 * ... except when the application insists on
518 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
521 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
523 * never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites
525 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
526 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
527 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
529 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
532 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
533 /* no cert request */
535 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
536 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
537 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
538 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
541 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
542 ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
545 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
550 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
551 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
552 ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s);
555 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
556 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
560 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
563 * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending
564 * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as
565 * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely
566 * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of
567 * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush
571 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
572 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
576 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
578 s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
581 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
582 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
583 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
584 ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
589 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
592 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
593 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
594 ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
599 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
600 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
601 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
602 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
604 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
605 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
607 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
608 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
610 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
613 } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
614 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
616 if (!s->session->peer)
618 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
619 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
623 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
624 * extms we've done this already.
626 if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
627 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
628 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
635 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
639 * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert,
640 * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for
641 * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next
644 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
645 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
647 for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++)
648 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) {
651 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
660 EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
670 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
671 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
673 * This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be
674 * extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need
675 * to set this here because we don't know if we're
676 * expecting a CertificateVerify or not.
678 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
679 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
680 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
681 ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
685 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
686 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
688 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
689 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
691 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
696 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
697 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
698 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
700 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes with NPN.
701 * In a full handshake with NPN, we end up here through
702 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
703 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
704 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
705 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
706 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
707 * the client's Finished message is read.
709 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
710 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
712 ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
716 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
720 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
721 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
723 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes without NPN.
724 * In a full handshake, we end up here through
725 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
726 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
727 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
728 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
729 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
730 * the client's Finished message is read.
732 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
733 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
734 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
735 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
739 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
740 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
741 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
742 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
745 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
749 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
750 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
751 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
752 ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
755 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
759 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
760 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
761 ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
764 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
770 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
771 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
773 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
774 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
779 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
781 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
785 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
788 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
789 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
797 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
798 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
799 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
800 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,
801 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
803 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
805 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
808 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
810 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
811 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
813 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
814 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
816 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
819 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
824 /* clean a few things up */
825 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
827 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
830 /* remove buffering on output */
831 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
835 if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a
840 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
842 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
844 s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept;
847 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
855 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
861 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
863 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
867 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
868 new_state = s->state;
870 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
871 s->state = new_state;
877 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
881 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
885 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
888 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) {
889 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
890 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
893 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
894 return ssl_do_write(s);
897 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
899 int i, j, ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1;
900 unsigned int cookie_len;
903 unsigned char *p, *d;
905 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
907 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
909 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
911 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
915 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are
916 * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down
917 * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we
918 * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1.
920 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
921 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
924 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
925 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
926 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
927 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
928 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
933 d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
936 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
937 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
939 s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1];
942 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version &&
943 s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
944 : (s->client_version < s->version)) {
945 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
946 if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
947 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
949 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
952 s->version = s->client_version;
954 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
959 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just
960 * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check
963 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
964 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
966 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
967 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
969 if (cookie_length == 0)
973 /* load the client random */
974 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
975 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
977 /* get the session-id */
982 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
983 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
984 * ignore resumption requests with flag
985 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
986 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this
987 * for security won't even compile against older library versions).
988 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
989 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
990 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
991 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored.
994 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
995 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
998 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1000 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1002 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1003 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1004 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1005 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1006 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1008 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { /* previous
1015 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1022 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1024 cookie_len = *(p++);
1027 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1028 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1029 * does not cause an overflow.
1031 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) {
1033 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1034 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1038 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1039 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) {
1040 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1042 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1043 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1045 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1046 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1047 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1050 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1052 /* default verification */
1053 else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1054 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1055 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1056 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1059 /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
1064 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1065 /* Select version to use */
1066 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1067 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) {
1068 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1069 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1070 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1071 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1072 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1073 s->version = s->client_version;
1074 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1076 } else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1077 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) {
1078 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1079 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1081 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1082 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1083 s->version = s->client_version;
1084 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1087 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1092 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0)) {
1093 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1094 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1095 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1098 if ((p + i) >= (d + n)) {
1099 /* not enough data */
1100 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1101 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1104 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers))
1110 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1111 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0)) {
1113 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1116 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1117 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1119 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1120 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1122 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1123 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1131 * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack:
1135 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1136 && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) {
1138 * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used
1139 * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead
1140 * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't
1141 * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the
1142 * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though.
1144 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1145 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) {
1146 s->session->cipher = c;
1153 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1156 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1157 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1158 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1165 if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
1166 /* not enough data */
1167 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1168 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1171 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1174 for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
1182 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1183 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1186 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1187 /* TLS extensions */
1188 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1189 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n)) {
1190 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1196 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1197 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1198 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1199 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1203 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1204 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1209 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1210 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1212 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1213 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1214 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
1216 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1218 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1219 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1223 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1225 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1230 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1231 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1232 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1236 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1239 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1241 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1242 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1244 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1245 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1251 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1252 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1253 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1255 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1256 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1257 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1258 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1259 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1260 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1261 /* Can't disable compression */
1262 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1263 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1264 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1267 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1268 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1269 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1270 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1271 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1275 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1276 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1277 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1280 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1281 for (m = 0; m < i; m++) {
1282 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1286 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1287 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1288 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1293 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1294 /* See if we have a match */
1295 int m, nn, o, v, done = 0;
1297 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1298 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1299 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1301 for (o = 0; o < i; o++) {
1311 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1317 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1318 * using compression.
1320 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1321 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1327 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1331 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1332 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1334 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1336 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1337 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1338 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1339 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1340 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1341 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1345 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1346 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1349 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1351 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1352 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1354 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1359 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1362 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1364 c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1367 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1368 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1371 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1372 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1373 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1374 s->session->not_resumable = s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1375 ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE))
1377 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1378 /* do not send a session ticket */
1379 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1381 /* Session-id reuse */
1382 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1385 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1386 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1391 * we now have the following setup.
1393 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1394 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1395 * compression - basically ignored right now
1396 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1397 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1398 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1399 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1402 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1403 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1404 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
1405 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1414 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1417 if (ciphers != NULL)
1418 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1419 return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
1422 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1425 unsigned char *p, *d;
1430 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
1431 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1432 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1433 p = s->s3->server_random;
1434 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1437 /* Do the message type and length last */
1438 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1440 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
1441 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
1444 memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1445 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1448 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1449 * back in the server hello:
1450 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1451 * we send back the old session ID.
1452 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1453 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1454 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1455 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1457 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1458 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1459 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1460 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1463 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1464 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1466 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1468 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1469 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1470 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1474 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
1477 /* put the cipher */
1478 i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
1481 /* put the compression method */
1482 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1485 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1488 *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1490 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1491 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1492 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1496 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
1498 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1499 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1505 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
1506 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1509 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1510 return ssl_do_write(s);
1513 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1516 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
1517 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
1518 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1521 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1522 return ssl_do_write(s);
1525 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1527 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1531 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1534 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1535 DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
1537 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1538 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp;
1539 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1542 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1545 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1546 unsigned char *p, *d;
1556 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1557 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
1558 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1563 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1565 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1566 if (type & SSL_kRSA) {
1567 rsa = cert->rsa_tmp;
1568 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1569 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1570 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1572 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1575 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1576 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1577 SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1581 cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
1584 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1585 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1586 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1591 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1;
1594 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1595 if (type & SSL_kDHE) {
1596 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
1597 dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
1599 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1600 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1601 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1606 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1607 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1608 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1610 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1613 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1614 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1615 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1618 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
1619 DH_security_bits(dhp), 0, dhp)) {
1620 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1621 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1622 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1625 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
1626 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1627 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1631 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto)
1633 else if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
1634 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1639 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1640 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1641 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) {
1642 if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
1643 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1647 dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1648 dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1649 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) {
1650 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1659 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1660 if (type & SSL_kECDHE) {
1661 const EC_GROUP *group;
1663 ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp;
1664 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
1665 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1666 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1667 if (nid != NID_undef)
1668 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1669 } else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) {
1670 ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1671 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1673 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->
1674 s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1676 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1677 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1678 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1679 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1683 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
1684 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1685 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1689 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1690 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1691 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1694 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1696 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) {
1697 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1701 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh;
1702 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1703 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1704 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
1705 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
1706 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1712 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1713 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1714 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) {
1715 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1719 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1720 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
1721 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1722 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1727 * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named
1728 * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is
1732 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1734 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1735 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1740 * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
1741 * allocate memory accordingly.
1743 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1744 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1745 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1748 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1749 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char));
1750 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1751 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
1752 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1753 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1757 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1758 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1759 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1760 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1762 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1763 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1767 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1771 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in
1772 * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four
1773 * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1779 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1780 * can set these to NULLs
1787 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1788 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1789 if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
1791 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
1793 n += 2 + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1795 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1796 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1797 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
1798 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1799 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1800 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
1801 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1802 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1805 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
1806 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
1807 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
1808 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
1812 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1813 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1814 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1817 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1818 nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1819 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1820 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1827 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
1828 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
1829 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
1831 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1834 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1840 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) {
1841 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
1844 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1846 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1847 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1848 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
1858 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1859 if (type & SSL_kECDHE) {
1861 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
1862 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
1863 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
1864 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
1866 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1874 memcpy((unsigned char *)p,
1875 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen);
1876 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1877 encodedPoint = NULL;
1882 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1883 if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
1884 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1885 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1886 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
1887 strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1888 p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1895 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1896 * points to the space at the end.
1898 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1899 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1902 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
1903 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1904 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1905 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
1906 ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1907 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1909 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1911 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
1912 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, (unsigned int *)&i);
1916 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1917 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
1918 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA);
1926 /* send signature algorithm */
1927 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1928 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
1929 /* Should never happen */
1930 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1931 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1932 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1938 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1940 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
1941 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1943 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1945 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
1946 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]),
1947 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) {
1948 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
1953 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1956 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1957 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1958 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1959 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1964 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
1967 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1968 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1969 return ssl_do_write(s);
1971 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1973 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1974 if (encodedPoint != NULL)
1975 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1976 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1978 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1982 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1984 unsigned char *p, *d;
1985 int i, j, nl, off, n;
1986 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
1990 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
1993 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1995 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1997 n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
2002 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2003 const unsigned char *psigs;
2004 unsigned char *etmp = p;
2005 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2006 /* Skip over length for now */
2008 nl = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, p, psigs, nl);
2009 /* Now fill in length */
2019 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2022 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
2023 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
2024 j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
2025 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
2026 (buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) {
2027 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2031 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2033 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2038 /* else no CA names */
2039 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2042 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
2044 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2047 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2048 return ssl_do_write(s);
2053 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2057 unsigned long alg_k;
2059 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2061 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2063 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2065 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2067 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2069 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2071 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2072 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2073 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2074 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2075 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2078 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2079 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2080 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2081 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok);
2085 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2087 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2089 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2090 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
2091 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2093 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2096 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2097 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) {
2098 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2099 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2101 * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already
2104 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2105 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2106 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2111 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2112 if ((pkey == NULL) ||
2113 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
2114 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2115 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2116 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2119 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
2122 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2123 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2126 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) {
2127 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2128 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2129 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2138 * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
2139 * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
2140 * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
2141 * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
2142 * bound is sufficient to be safe.
2144 if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2145 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2146 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2147 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2152 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2153 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2154 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2155 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2156 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2160 * should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure.
2162 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2163 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2166 RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2170 * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
2171 * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
2174 constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2177 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2178 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2179 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2180 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2181 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2182 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2185 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2187 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2190 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2191 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2192 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2193 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2194 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2195 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2198 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2199 unsigned char workaround_good;
2201 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2203 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2204 version_good |= workaround_good;
2208 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2209 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2211 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2214 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2215 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2216 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2217 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2219 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2220 p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j],
2221 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2224 s->session->master_key_length =
2225 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2227 session->master_key,
2230 (rand_premaster_secret));
2231 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
2232 if(s->session->master_key_length < 0) {
2233 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2239 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2240 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
2242 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2246 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
2247 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2248 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2249 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2254 if (n && n != i + 2) {
2255 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) {
2256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2257 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2264 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2265 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2266 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2267 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2269 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2270 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2271 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) || (skey->pkey.dh == NULL)) {
2272 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2274 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2277 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2278 } else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) {
2279 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2280 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2281 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2284 dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh;
2287 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2288 EVP_PKEY *clkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2290 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2291 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2293 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
2294 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2295 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2296 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2299 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2300 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2302 pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL);
2304 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2308 i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr);
2311 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2316 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2317 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
2323 s->session->master_key_length =
2324 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2326 session->master_key,
2328 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2329 if(s->session->master_key_length < 0) {
2330 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2331 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2338 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2339 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
2340 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2341 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2342 krb5_data authenticator;
2344 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2345 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2346 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2347 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2348 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2350 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2351 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2353 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2356 kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2359 enc_ticket.length = i;
2361 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) {
2362 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2363 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2367 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2368 p += enc_ticket.length;
2371 authenticator.length = i;
2373 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) {
2374 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2375 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2379 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2380 p += authenticator.length;
2384 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2385 p += enc_pms.length;
2388 * Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption
2390 if (enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) {
2391 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2392 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2396 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2397 enc_pms.length + 6)) {
2398 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2399 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2403 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2406 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2407 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2409 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2410 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2411 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2416 * Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will
2417 * return authtime == 0.
2419 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2420 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) {
2422 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2423 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2425 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2426 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2427 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2431 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) {
2432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2436 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2437 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2439 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2443 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2445 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv)) {
2446 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2447 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2450 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms, &outl,
2451 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2453 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2454 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2457 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2458 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2459 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2462 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) {
2463 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2464 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2468 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2469 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2470 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2473 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8))
2474 && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) {
2476 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2477 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely,
2478 * the protocol does not offer such protection for DH
2479 * ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random
2480 * bytes instead of the protocol version. If
2481 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2482 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos
2485 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) {
2486 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2487 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2492 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2494 s->session->master_key_length =
2495 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2497 session->master_key,
2499 if(s->session->master_key_length < 0) {
2500 al = SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2501 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2505 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) {
2506 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2507 if (len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH) {
2508 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2509 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ, kssl_ctx->client_princ,
2514 /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2515 * but it caused problems for apache.
2516 * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2517 * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2520 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2522 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2523 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2527 const EC_GROUP *group;
2528 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2530 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2531 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
2532 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2536 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2537 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2538 /* use the certificate */
2539 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2542 * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
2543 * ServerKeyExchange msg.
2545 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2548 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2549 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2551 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2552 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) {
2553 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2557 /* Let's get client's public key */
2558 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
2559 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2564 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2566 if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
2567 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2568 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2569 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2572 if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2573 == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
2575 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
2576 * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the
2577 * code is never executed. When that support is added, we
2578 * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is
2579 * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly
2580 * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group.
2582 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2583 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2584 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2588 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2589 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->
2591 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2594 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2597 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2598 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2600 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
2601 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2602 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2606 /* Get encoded point length */
2610 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2613 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
2614 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2618 * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it
2621 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2624 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2625 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2626 if (field_size <= 0) {
2627 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2630 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh,
2633 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2637 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2638 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2639 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2640 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2641 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2642 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2644 /* Compute the master secret */
2645 s->session->master_key_length =
2646 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2648 session->master_key,
2651 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2652 if(s->session->master_key_length < 0) {
2653 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2654 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2660 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2661 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2662 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2663 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4];
2664 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2666 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2668 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2672 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2675 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2676 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2677 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2680 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2681 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2682 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2687 * Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback
2689 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2690 memset(tmp_id + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
2691 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2693 sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2694 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1);
2696 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2697 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2699 } else if (psk_len == 0) {
2701 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2703 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2704 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2705 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2709 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2710 pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
2712 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2714 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2718 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2719 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2720 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2721 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
2722 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2726 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2727 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2728 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2729 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2730 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
2731 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2735 s->session->master_key_length =
2736 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2738 session->master_key,
2741 if(s->session->master_key_length < 0) {
2742 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2743 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2748 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2753 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2754 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2759 if (param_len > n) {
2760 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2761 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2762 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2765 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
2766 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2769 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2770 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2771 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2772 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2773 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2776 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2777 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2778 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2779 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2780 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2784 if ((s->session->master_key_length =
2785 SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,
2786 s->session->master_key)) < 0) {
2787 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2793 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2794 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2796 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2797 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2798 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2799 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2800 unsigned long alg_a;
2804 /* Get our certificate private key */
2805 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2806 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2807 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2808 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2809 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2811 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2812 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2814 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2815 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2816 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2817 * client certificate for authorization only.
2819 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2820 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2821 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2824 /* Decrypt session key */
2826 ((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass,
2827 n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
2828 || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2829 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2830 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2835 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2836 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2837 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2838 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2841 /* Generate master secret */
2842 s->session->master_key_length =
2843 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2845 session->master_key,
2846 premaster_secret, 32);
2847 if(s->session->master_key_length < 0) {
2848 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2849 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2852 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2853 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2854 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2859 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2860 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2866 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2867 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2873 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2874 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2877 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2878 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2879 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2880 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2881 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2882 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2887 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2889 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2891 int al, ok, ret = 0;
2895 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2897 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2899 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2900 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2901 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2902 -1, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
2907 if (s->session->peer != NULL) {
2908 peer = s->session->peer;
2909 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2910 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
2916 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
2917 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
2919 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2920 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2928 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2929 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2933 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2934 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2935 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2936 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2940 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
2941 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2942 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2946 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2947 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2948 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2950 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
2953 if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
2954 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)) {
2957 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2958 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
2960 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2962 } else if (rv == 0) {
2963 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2967 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2975 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2976 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2980 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2981 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
2982 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2983 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2987 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2990 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2991 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
2992 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2993 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2997 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3000 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3001 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
3002 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3003 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3007 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) {
3008 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3009 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3013 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3014 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
3015 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3016 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3019 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3020 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3024 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3025 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3030 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3031 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
3032 j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3033 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3034 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa);
3037 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3038 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3043 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3044 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3045 j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3046 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3047 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec);
3050 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3051 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3056 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
3057 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
3058 unsigned char signature[64];
3060 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
3061 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3063 fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", i);
3065 for (idx = 0; idx < 64; idx++) {
3066 signature[63 - idx] = p[idx];
3068 j = EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, signature, 64, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3070 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3072 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3073 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3077 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3078 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3085 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3088 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
3089 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3090 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3091 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3093 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3094 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3098 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3100 int i, ok, al, ret = -1;
3102 unsigned long l, nc, llen, n;
3103 const unsigned char *p, *q;
3105 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3107 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3110 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
3115 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
3116 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3117 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3118 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3119 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3120 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3124 * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list
3126 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
3127 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3128 SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3129 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3132 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
3136 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
3137 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3138 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3141 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3143 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3144 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3149 if (llen + 3 != n) {
3150 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3151 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3154 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
3156 if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
3157 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3158 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3159 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3164 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, l);
3166 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3170 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3171 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3172 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3175 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3176 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3183 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3184 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3185 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3186 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3188 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3191 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3192 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3193 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3195 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3196 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3199 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3200 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
3201 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3206 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3208 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3209 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3210 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3215 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3218 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3220 al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3221 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3222 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3225 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3228 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3229 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3230 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3231 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3234 * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we
3237 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
3238 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3239 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
3240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3244 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3245 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3246 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk;
3248 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3249 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
3257 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3263 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3267 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3271 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
3272 cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3274 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3275 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3276 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) {
3277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
3278 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3283 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) {
3284 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3287 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3290 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3291 return ssl_do_write(s);
3294 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3295 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3296 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3298 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3302 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
3303 unsigned char *p, *macstart;
3304 const unsigned char *const_p;
3305 int len, slen_full, slen;
3308 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3309 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3310 unsigned char key_name[16];
3312 /* get session encoding length */
3313 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3315 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3318 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00)
3320 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3324 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3325 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3328 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3332 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3335 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3338 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3340 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3341 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3342 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3346 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3347 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3350 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3353 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3354 * follows handshake_header_length +
3355 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3356 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3357 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3358 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3360 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3361 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3362 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3365 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3367 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3368 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3370 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3371 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3375 if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0)
3377 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3378 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
3380 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3381 EVP_sha256(), NULL))
3383 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3387 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3388 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3389 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3391 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3393 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3395 /* Output key name */
3397 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3400 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3401 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3402 /* Encrypt session data */
3403 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
3406 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len))
3410 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
3412 if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen))
3415 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3416 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3419 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3421 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3422 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
3423 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3424 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3426 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3430 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3431 return ssl_do_write(s);
3435 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3436 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3440 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3442 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) {
3445 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3446 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3447 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3450 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3453 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3456 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3457 /* message length */
3458 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3460 *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
3461 /* length of OCSP response */
3462 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3463 /* actual response */
3464 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3465 /* number of bytes to write */
3466 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3467 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3471 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3472 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3475 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3477 * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3478 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3480 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3483 int proto_len, padding_len;
3485 const unsigned char *p;
3488 * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3489 * extension in their ClientHello
3491 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
3492 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,
3493 SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3497 /* See the payload format below */
3498 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3499 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3500 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3501 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok);
3507 * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in
3508 * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by
3509 * ssl3_get_finished).
3511 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
3512 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3517 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3519 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3522 * The payload looks like:
3524 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3525 * uint8 padding_len;
3526 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3529 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3531 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3532 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3535 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3536 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
3537 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3540 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3541 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;