1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
153 #include "ssl_locl.h"
154 #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
155 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
156 #include <openssl/rand.h>
157 #include <openssl/objects.h>
158 #include <openssl/evp.h>
159 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
160 #include <openssl/x509.h>
161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
162 # include <openssl/dh.h>
164 #include <openssl/bn.h>
165 #include <openssl/md5.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
168 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
170 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
172 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
173 return (SSLv3_server_method());
178 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
180 ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method)
182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
183 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
185 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
187 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
189 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
190 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
191 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
193 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
197 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
199 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
206 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
209 unsigned long alg_k, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
210 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
212 int new_state, state, skip = 0;
214 RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
218 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
219 cb = s->info_callback;
220 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
221 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
223 /* init things to blank */
225 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) {
230 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
232 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
233 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
236 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
237 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
246 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
248 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
252 case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
253 case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
257 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
259 if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) {
260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
261 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
265 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) {
266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
270 s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
272 if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
273 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
275 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
278 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
281 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
287 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
289 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
294 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
295 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
297 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
299 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
301 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
303 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the
304 * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
306 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
308 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
312 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
313 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
314 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
315 } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
317 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
319 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
320 * support secure renegotiation.
322 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
323 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
324 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
326 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
330 * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
333 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
334 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
338 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
339 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
342 ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
345 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
346 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
349 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
352 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
353 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
356 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
357 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
358 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
360 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
363 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
364 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
365 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
368 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
370 * callback indicates firther work to be done
372 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
375 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
376 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
378 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
379 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
381 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
382 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
383 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
385 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
392 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
396 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
397 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
398 ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
401 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
403 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
404 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
406 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
410 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
413 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
417 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
418 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
419 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
420 /* normal PSK or SRP */
423 new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
424 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
425 ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
428 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
429 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
430 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
432 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
435 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
441 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
446 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
447 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
448 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
451 * clear this, it may get reset by
452 * send_server_key_exchange
454 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0;
457 * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a
458 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
459 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
460 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
461 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
466 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
469 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
470 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
472 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
473 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
474 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
476 || (alg_k & SSL_kDHE)
477 || (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
478 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
479 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
480 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
481 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys
482 [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) *
483 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
488 ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
494 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
498 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
499 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
500 if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
501 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
503 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
504 * during re-negotiation:
506 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
507 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
509 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
510 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
513 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
515 * ... except when the application insists on
516 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
519 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
520 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
521 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
523 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
526 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
527 /* no cert request */
529 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
530 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
531 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
532 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
533 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
538 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
539 ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
542 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
547 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
548 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
549 ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s);
552 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
553 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
557 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
560 * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending
561 * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as
562 * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely
563 * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of
564 * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush
568 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
569 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
573 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
575 s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
578 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
579 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
580 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
581 ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
586 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
589 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
590 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
591 ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
596 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
597 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
598 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
599 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
601 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
602 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
604 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
605 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
607 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
610 } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
611 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
613 if (!s->session->peer)
615 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
616 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
617 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
621 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
622 * extms we've done this already.
624 if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
625 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
626 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
627 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
635 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
639 * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert,
640 * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for
641 * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next
644 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
645 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
646 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
650 for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++)
651 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) {
654 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
663 EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
665 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
674 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
675 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
676 ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
680 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
681 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
683 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
684 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
686 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
691 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
692 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
693 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
695 * Enable CCS for NPN. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
696 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. This *should* be the
697 * first time we have received one - but we check anyway to be
699 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
700 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
701 * the client's Finished message is read.
703 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
704 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
706 ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
710 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
714 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
715 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
717 * Enable CCS for handshakes without NPN. In NPN the CCS flag has
718 * already been set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
719 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
720 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
721 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
722 * the client's Finished message is read.
724 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
725 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
726 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
727 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
731 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
732 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
733 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
734 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
737 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
741 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
742 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
743 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
744 ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
747 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
751 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
752 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
753 ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
756 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
762 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
763 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
765 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
766 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
768 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
772 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
774 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
778 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
781 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
782 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
785 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
791 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
792 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
793 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
794 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,
795 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
797 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
799 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
802 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
804 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
805 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
807 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
808 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
810 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
813 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
818 /* clean a few things up */
819 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
821 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
824 /* remove buffering on output */
825 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
829 if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a
834 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
836 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
838 s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept;
841 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
850 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
856 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
858 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
862 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
863 new_state = s->state;
865 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
866 s->state = new_state;
872 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
876 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
880 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
883 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) {
884 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0)) {
885 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_HELLO_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
888 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
891 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
892 return ssl_do_write(s);
895 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
897 int i, j, ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1;
898 unsigned int cookie_len;
901 unsigned char *p, *d;
903 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
905 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
907 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
909 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
913 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are
914 * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down
915 * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we
916 * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1.
918 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
919 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
922 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
923 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
924 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
925 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
926 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
931 d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
934 * 2 bytes for client version, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes for random, 1 byte
935 * for session id length
937 if (n < 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1) {
938 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
939 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
944 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
945 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
947 s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1];
950 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version &&
951 s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
952 : (s->client_version < s->version)) {
953 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
954 if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
955 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
957 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
960 s->version = s->client_version;
962 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
967 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just
968 * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check
971 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
972 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
974 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
976 if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) {
977 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
978 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
981 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
983 if (cookie_length == 0)
987 /* load the client random */
988 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
989 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
991 /* get the session-id */
995 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
996 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1002 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1003 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1004 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1005 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1006 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this
1007 * for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1008 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1009 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1010 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1011 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored.
1014 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1015 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1018 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1020 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1022 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1023 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1024 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1025 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1026 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1028 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { /* previous
1035 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1042 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1044 if (p + 1 > d + n) {
1045 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1046 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1049 cookie_len = *(p++);
1051 if (p + cookie_len > d + n) {
1052 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1053 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1058 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1059 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1060 * does not cause an overflow.
1062 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) {
1064 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1065 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1069 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1070 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) {
1071 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1073 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1074 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1076 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1077 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1078 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1081 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1083 /* default verification */
1084 else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1085 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1086 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1087 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1090 /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
1095 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1096 /* Select version to use */
1097 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1098 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) {
1099 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1100 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1101 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1102 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1103 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1104 s->version = s->client_version;
1105 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1107 } else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1108 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) {
1109 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1110 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1112 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1113 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1114 s->version = s->client_version;
1115 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1118 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1122 if (p + 2 > d + n) {
1123 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1124 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1130 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1131 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1135 /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
1136 if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) {
1137 /* not enough data */
1138 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1139 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1142 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers)) == NULL) {
1147 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1150 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1153 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1154 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1156 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1157 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1159 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1160 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1168 * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack:
1172 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1173 && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) {
1175 * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used
1176 * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead
1177 * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't
1178 * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the
1179 * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though.
1181 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1182 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) {
1183 s->session->cipher = c;
1190 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1193 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1195 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1202 if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
1203 /* not enough data */
1204 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1205 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1211 for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
1219 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1220 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1224 /* TLS extensions */
1225 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1226 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n)) {
1227 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1233 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1234 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1235 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1236 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1240 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1241 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1246 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1247 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1249 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1250 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1251 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
1253 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1255 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1256 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1260 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1262 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1267 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1268 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1269 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1273 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1274 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1275 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1276 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1277 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1283 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1284 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1285 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1287 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1288 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1289 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1290 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1291 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1292 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1293 /* Can't disable compression */
1294 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1295 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1296 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1299 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1300 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1301 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1302 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1303 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1307 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1308 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1309 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1312 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1313 for (m = 0; m < i; m++) {
1314 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1318 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1319 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1320 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1325 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1326 /* See if we have a match */
1327 int m, nn, o, v, done = 0;
1329 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1330 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1331 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1333 for (o = 0; o < i; o++) {
1343 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1349 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1350 * using compression.
1352 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1353 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1359 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1363 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1364 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1366 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1368 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1369 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1370 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1371 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1376 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1377 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1380 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1382 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1383 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1385 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1390 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1393 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1395 c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1398 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1399 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1402 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1403 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1404 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1405 s->session->not_resumable = s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1406 ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE))
1408 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1409 /* do not send a session ticket */
1410 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1412 /* Session-id reuse */
1413 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1416 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1417 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1422 * we now have the following setup.
1424 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1425 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1426 * compression - basically ignored right now
1427 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1428 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1429 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1430 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1433 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1434 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1435 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
1436 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1445 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1447 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1450 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1451 return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
1454 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1457 unsigned char *p, *d;
1462 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
1463 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1464 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1465 p = s->s3->server_random;
1466 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1467 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1471 /* Do the message type and length last */
1472 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1474 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
1475 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
1478 memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1479 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1482 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1483 * back in the server hello:
1484 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1485 * we send back the old session ID.
1486 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1487 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1488 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1489 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1491 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1492 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1493 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1494 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1497 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1498 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1500 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1502 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1503 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1504 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1505 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1509 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
1512 /* put the cipher */
1513 i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
1516 /* put the compression method */
1517 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1520 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1523 *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1525 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1526 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1527 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1528 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1532 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
1534 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1535 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1536 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1542 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l)) {
1543 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1546 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1549 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1550 return ssl_do_write(s);
1553 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1556 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
1557 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0)) {
1558 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1561 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1564 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1565 return ssl_do_write(s);
1568 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1570 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1574 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1577 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1578 DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
1580 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1581 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp;
1582 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1585 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1588 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1589 unsigned char *p, *d;
1599 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1600 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
1601 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1606 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1608 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1609 if (type & SSL_kRSA) {
1610 rsa = cert->rsa_tmp;
1611 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1612 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1613 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1615 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1618 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1619 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1620 SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1624 cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
1627 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1628 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1629 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1634 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1;
1637 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1638 if (type & SSL_kDHE) {
1639 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
1640 dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
1642 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1643 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1644 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1649 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1650 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1651 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1653 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1656 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1657 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1658 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1661 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
1662 DH_security_bits(dhp), 0, dhp)) {
1663 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1664 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1665 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1668 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
1669 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1670 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1674 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto)
1676 else if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
1677 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1682 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1683 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1684 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) {
1685 if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
1686 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1690 dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1691 dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1692 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) {
1693 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1702 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1703 if (type & SSL_kECDHE) {
1704 const EC_GROUP *group;
1706 ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp;
1707 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
1708 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1709 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1710 if (nid != NID_undef)
1711 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1712 } else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) {
1713 ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1714 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1716 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->
1717 s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1719 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1720 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1721 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1722 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1726 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
1727 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1728 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1732 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1733 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1734 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1737 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1739 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) {
1740 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1744 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh;
1745 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1746 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1747 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
1748 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
1749 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1755 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1756 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1757 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) {
1758 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1762 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1763 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
1764 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1765 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1770 * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named
1771 * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is
1775 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1777 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1778 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1783 * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
1784 * allocate memory accordingly.
1786 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1787 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1788 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1791 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1792 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char));
1793 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1794 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
1795 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1796 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1800 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1801 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1802 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1803 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1805 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1806 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1810 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1814 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in
1815 * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four
1816 * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1822 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1823 * can set these to NULLs
1830 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1831 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1832 if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
1834 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
1836 n += 2 + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1838 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1839 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1840 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
1841 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1842 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1843 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
1844 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1845 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1848 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
1849 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
1850 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
1851 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
1855 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1856 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1857 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1860 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1861 nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1862 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1863 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1870 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
1871 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
1872 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
1874 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1877 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1883 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) {
1884 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
1887 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1889 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1890 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1891 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
1901 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1902 if (type & SSL_kECDHE) {
1904 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
1905 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
1906 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
1907 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
1909 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1917 memcpy(p, encodedPoint, encodedlen);
1918 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1919 encodedPoint = NULL;
1924 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1925 if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
1926 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1927 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1928 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
1929 strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1930 p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1937 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1938 * points to the space at the end.
1940 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1941 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1944 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
1945 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1946 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1947 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
1948 ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1949 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1951 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1953 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
1954 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, (unsigned int *)&i);
1958 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1959 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
1960 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA);
1968 /* send signature algorithm */
1969 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1970 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
1971 /* Should never happen */
1972 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1973 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1974 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1980 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1982 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
1983 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1985 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1987 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
1988 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]),
1989 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) {
1990 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
1995 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1998 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1999 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2000 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2001 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2006 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) {
2007 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2008 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2013 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2014 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2015 return ssl_do_write(s);
2017 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2019 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2020 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2021 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2023 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2024 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2028 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2030 unsigned char *p, *d;
2031 int i, j, nl, off, n;
2032 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
2036 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
2039 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2041 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2043 n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
2048 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2049 const unsigned char *psigs;
2050 unsigned char *etmp = p;
2051 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2052 /* Skip over length for now */
2054 nl = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, p, psigs, nl);
2055 /* Now fill in length */
2065 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2068 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
2069 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
2070 j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
2071 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
2072 (buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) {
2073 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2077 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2079 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2084 /* else no CA names */
2085 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2088 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n)) {
2089 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2093 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2096 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2097 return ssl_do_write(s);
2099 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2103 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2107 unsigned long alg_k;
2109 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2111 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2113 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2115 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2119 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2120 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2121 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2122 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2125 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2126 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2127 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2128 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok);
2132 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2134 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2136 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2137 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
2138 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2140 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2143 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2144 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) {
2145 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2146 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2148 * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already
2151 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2152 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2153 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2158 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2159 if ((pkey == NULL) ||
2160 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
2161 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2162 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2163 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2166 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
2169 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2170 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2173 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) {
2174 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2175 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2176 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2185 * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
2186 * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
2187 * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
2188 * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
2189 * bound is sufficient to be safe.
2191 if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2192 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2193 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2194 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2199 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2200 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2201 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2202 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2203 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2206 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2207 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2210 RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2214 * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
2215 * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
2218 constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2221 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2222 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2223 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2224 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2225 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2226 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2229 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2231 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2234 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2235 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2236 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2237 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2238 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2239 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2242 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2243 unsigned char workaround_good;
2245 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2247 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2248 version_good |= workaround_good;
2252 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2253 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2255 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2258 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2259 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2260 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2261 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2263 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2264 p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j],
2265 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2268 s->session->master_key_length =
2269 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2271 session->master_key,
2274 (rand_premaster_secret));
2275 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
2276 if (s->session->master_key_length < 0) {
2277 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2278 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2283 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2284 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
2286 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2290 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
2291 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2292 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2293 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2298 if (n && n != i + 2) {
2299 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) {
2300 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2301 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2308 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2309 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2310 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2311 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2313 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2314 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2315 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) || (skey->pkey.dh == NULL)) {
2316 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2317 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2318 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2321 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2322 } else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) {
2323 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2324 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2325 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2328 dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh;
2331 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2332 EVP_PKEY *clkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2334 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2335 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2337 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
2338 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2339 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2340 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2343 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2344 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2346 pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL);
2348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2352 i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr);
2355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2360 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2361 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
2367 s->session->master_key_length =
2368 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2370 session->master_key,
2372 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2373 if (s->session->master_key_length < 0) {
2374 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2383 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2384 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2388 const EC_GROUP *group;
2389 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2391 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2392 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
2393 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2397 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2398 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2399 /* use the certificate */
2400 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2403 * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
2404 * ServerKeyExchange msg.
2406 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2409 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2410 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2412 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2413 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) {
2414 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2418 /* Let's get client's public key */
2419 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
2420 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2425 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2427 if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
2428 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2429 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2430 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2433 if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2434 == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
2436 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
2437 * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the
2438 * code is never executed. When that support is added, we
2439 * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is
2440 * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly
2441 * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group.
2443 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2444 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2445 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2449 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2450 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->
2452 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2455 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2458 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2459 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2461 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
2462 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2463 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2467 /* Get encoded point length */
2471 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2474 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
2475 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2479 * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it
2482 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2485 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2486 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2487 if (field_size <= 0) {
2488 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2491 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh,
2494 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2498 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2499 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2500 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2501 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2502 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2503 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2505 /* Compute the master secret */
2506 s->session->master_key_length =
2507 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2509 session->master_key,
2512 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2513 if (s->session->master_key_length < 0) {
2514 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2515 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2521 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2522 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2523 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2524 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4];
2525 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2527 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2529 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2533 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2536 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2537 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2538 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2541 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2542 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2543 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2548 * Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback
2550 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2551 memset(tmp_id + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
2552 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2554 sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2555 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1);
2557 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2558 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2560 } else if (psk_len == 0) {
2562 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2564 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2565 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2566 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2570 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2571 pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
2573 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2575 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2579 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2580 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2581 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
2582 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2586 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2587 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2588 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2589 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
2590 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2594 s->session->master_key_length =
2595 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2597 session->master_key,
2600 if (s->session->master_key_length < 0) {
2601 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2602 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2607 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2612 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2613 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2618 if (param_len > n) {
2619 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2620 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2621 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2624 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
2625 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2628 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2629 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2630 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2631 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2632 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2635 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2636 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2637 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2642 if ((s->session->master_key_length =
2643 SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,
2644 s->session->master_key)) < 0) {
2645 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2651 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2652 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2654 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2655 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2656 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2657 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2658 unsigned long alg_a;
2662 /* Get our certificate private key */
2663 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2664 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2665 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2666 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2667 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2669 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2670 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2672 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2673 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2674 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2675 * client certificate for authorization only.
2677 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2678 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2679 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2682 /* Decrypt session key */
2684 ((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass,
2685 n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
2686 || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2687 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2688 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2693 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2694 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2696 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2699 /* Generate master secret */
2700 s->session->master_key_length =
2701 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2703 session->master_key,
2704 premaster_secret, 32);
2705 if (s->session->master_key_length < 0) {
2706 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2707 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2710 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2711 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2712 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2717 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2718 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2723 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2724 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2730 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2731 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2734 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2735 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2736 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2737 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2738 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2740 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2744 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2746 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2748 int al, ok, ret = 0;
2752 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2754 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2757 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have received
2758 * a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| will be non
2759 * NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is not required even
2760 * if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in the case of static
2761 * DH). In that case the ClientKeyExchange processing will skip the
2762 * CertificateVerify state so we should not arrive here.
2764 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2769 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2770 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2771 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2772 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,
2773 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
2778 peer = s->session->peer;
2779 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2780 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
2782 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2783 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2784 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2785 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2789 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2790 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2791 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2793 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
2796 if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
2797 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)) {
2800 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2801 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
2803 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2805 } else if (rv == 0) {
2806 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2810 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2818 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2819 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2823 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2824 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
2825 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2826 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2830 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2833 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2834 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
2835 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2836 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2840 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
2843 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
2844 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
2845 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2846 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2850 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) {
2851 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2852 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2856 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2857 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
2858 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2859 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2862 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2863 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2867 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2868 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2873 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2874 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
2875 j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2876 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2877 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa);
2880 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2881 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
2886 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2887 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
2888 j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2889 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2890 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec);
2893 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2894 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2899 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
2900 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
2901 unsigned char signature[64];
2903 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2904 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
2906 fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", i);
2908 for (idx = 0; idx < 64; idx++) {
2909 signature[63 - idx] = p[idx];
2911 j = EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, signature, 64, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2913 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2915 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2916 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2920 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2921 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
2928 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2929 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2932 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
2933 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
2934 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
2935 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
2936 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2940 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2942 int i, ok, al, ret = -1;
2944 unsigned long l, nc, llen, n;
2945 const unsigned char *p, *q;
2947 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
2949 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2952 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
2957 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
2958 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2959 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
2960 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2961 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2962 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2966 * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list
2968 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
2969 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2970 SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
2971 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2974 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
2978 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
2979 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2980 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2983 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2985 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
2986 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2991 if (llen + 3 != n) {
2992 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2993 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2996 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
2998 if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
2999 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3000 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3001 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3006 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, l);
3008 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3012 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3013 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3014 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3017 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3018 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3025 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3026 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3027 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3028 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3029 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3030 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3033 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3034 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3035 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3036 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3037 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3038 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3041 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3042 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
3043 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3048 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3050 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3051 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3052 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3056 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3057 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3060 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3062 al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3063 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3064 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3067 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3070 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3071 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3072 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3075 * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we
3078 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
3079 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3080 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
3081 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3085 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3086 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk;
3088 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3089 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
3096 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3098 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3100 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3104 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3108 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
3109 cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3111 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3112 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3116 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) {
3117 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3118 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3121 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3124 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3125 return ssl_do_write(s);
3128 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3129 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3130 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3132 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3136 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
3137 unsigned char *p, *macstart;
3138 const unsigned char *const_p;
3139 int len, slen_full, slen;
3142 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3143 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3144 unsigned char key_name[16];
3146 /* get session encoding length */
3147 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3149 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3152 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3153 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3156 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3158 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3162 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3163 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3166 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3170 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3173 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3176 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3178 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3179 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3180 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3184 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3185 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3188 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3191 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3192 * follows handshake_header_length +
3193 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3194 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3195 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3196 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3198 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3199 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3200 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3203 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3205 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3206 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3208 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3209 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3213 if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0)
3215 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3216 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
3218 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3219 EVP_sha256(), NULL))
3221 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3225 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3226 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3227 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3229 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3231 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3233 /* Output key name */
3235 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3238 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3239 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3240 /* Encrypt session data */
3241 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
3244 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len))
3248 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
3250 if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen))
3253 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3254 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3257 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3259 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3260 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3261 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3263 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len))
3265 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3269 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3270 return ssl_do_write(s);
3273 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3274 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3275 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3279 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3281 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) {
3284 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3285 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3286 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3289 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
3290 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3294 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3297 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3298 /* message length */
3299 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3301 *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
3302 /* length of OCSP response */
3303 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3304 /* actual response */
3305 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3306 /* number of bytes to write */
3307 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3308 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3312 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3313 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3316 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3318 * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3319 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3321 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3324 int proto_len, padding_len;
3326 const unsigned char *p;
3329 * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3330 * extension in their ClientHello
3332 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
3333 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,
3334 SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3335 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3339 /* See the payload format below */
3340 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3341 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3342 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3343 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok);
3349 * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in
3350 * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by
3351 * ssl3_get_finished).
3353 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
3354 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3355 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3360 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3361 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3364 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3367 * The payload looks like:
3369 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3370 * uint8 padding_len;
3371 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3374 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) {
3375 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3378 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3379 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) {
3380 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3384 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3385 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
3386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3387 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3390 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3391 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;