2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
116 #include "ssl_locl.h"
117 #include <openssl/evp.h>
118 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
119 #include <openssl/rand.h>
121 #ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
122 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
125 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
126 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
127 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
128 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) || \
129 defined(__INTEL__) ) \
131 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
132 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
135 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
136 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
137 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
140 * Return values are as per SSL_read(), i.e.
141 * >0 The number of read bytes
142 * 0 Failure (not retryable)
143 * <0 Failure (may be retryable)
145 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
148 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
149 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
150 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
151 * s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
152 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
164 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
168 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
169 align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
170 align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
174 /* start with empty packet ... */
177 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
179 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
182 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
183 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
184 && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) {
186 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
187 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
188 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
189 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
190 * overrun can be triggered.
192 memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
196 s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
197 s->packet_length = 0;
198 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
202 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
203 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
206 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
207 if (left == 0 && extend)
209 if (left > 0 && n > left)
213 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
215 s->packet_length += n;
221 /* else we need to read more data */
223 len = s->packet_length;
224 pkt = rb->buf + align;
226 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
227 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
229 if (s->packet != pkt) { /* len > 0 */
230 memmove(pkt, s->packet, len + left);
232 rb->offset = len + align;
235 if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) { /* does not happen */
236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
240 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
241 if (!s->read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
242 /* ignore max parameter */
247 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
248 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
253 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
254 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
259 if (s->rbio != NULL) {
260 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
261 i = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
263 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
269 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
271 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
276 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
277 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
278 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
280 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
282 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
286 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
289 s->packet_length += n;
290 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
295 * MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that
296 * will be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an
297 * attacker could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and
298 * cause ssl3_get_record to loop forever.
300 #define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32
303 * Call this to get a new input record.
304 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
305 * or non-blocking IO.
306 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
307 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
308 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
309 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
311 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
312 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
314 int ssl_major, ssl_minor, al;
315 int enc_err, n, i, ret = -1;
319 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
321 unsigned mac_size, orig_len;
323 unsigned empty_record_count = 0;
328 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
329 extra = SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
332 if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra) {
334 * An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER set after
335 * ssl3_setup_buffers() was done
337 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
342 /* check if we have the header */
343 if ((s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
344 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
345 n = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
347 return (n); /* error or non-blocking */
348 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
352 s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s,
353 s->msg_callback_arg);
355 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
359 version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor;
362 fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
365 /* Lets check version */
366 if (!s->first_packet) {
367 if (version != s->version) {
368 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
369 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00)
370 && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
371 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
373 * The record is using an incorrect version number, but
374 * what we've got appears to be an alert. We haven't
375 * read the body yet to check whether its a fatal or
376 * not - but chances are it is. We probably shouldn't
377 * send a fatal alert back. We'll just end.
382 * Send back error using their minor version number :-)
384 s->version = (unsigned short)version;
386 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
391 if ((version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
392 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
396 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
397 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
398 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
402 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
405 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
407 if (rr->length > s->packet_length - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
408 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
410 n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1);
412 return (n); /* error or non-blocking io */
414 * now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
419 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
422 * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
423 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
425 rr->input = &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
428 * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points
429 * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either
430 * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into
431 * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer
435 * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length
436 * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff.
439 /* check is not needed I believe */
440 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH + extra) {
441 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
446 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
447 rr->data = rr->input;
449 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0);
452 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
453 * 1: if the padding is valid
454 * -1: if the padding is invalid
457 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
458 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
462 printf("dec %d\n", rr->length);
465 for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++)
466 printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
471 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
472 if ((sess != NULL) &&
473 (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) {
474 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
475 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
476 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
477 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
478 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
481 * kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type
483 orig_len = rr->length + ((unsigned int)rr->type >> 8);
486 * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
487 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
488 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount
489 * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
491 if (orig_len < mac_size ||
492 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
493 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
494 orig_len < mac_size + 1)) {
495 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
496 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
500 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
502 * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be
503 * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in
504 * constant time from within the record, without leaking the
505 * contents of the padding bytes.
508 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
509 rr->length -= mac_size;
512 * In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len| equals
513 * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for
516 rr->length -= mac_size;
517 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
520 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ );
521 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL
522 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
524 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra + mac_size)
530 * A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
531 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
532 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, we should
533 * not reveal which kind of error occured -- this might become
534 * visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile)
536 al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
537 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
538 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
542 /* r->length is now just compressed */
543 if (s->expand != NULL) {
544 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra) {
545 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
546 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
549 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) {
550 al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
551 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
556 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + extra) {
557 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
558 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
564 * So at this point the following is true
565 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
566 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
567 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
568 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
572 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
573 s->packet_length = 0;
575 /* just read a 0 length packet */
576 if (rr->length == 0) {
577 empty_record_count++;
578 if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) {
579 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
580 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
586 fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type,
593 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
598 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
600 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
604 rr = &(ssl->s3->rrec);
605 i = COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand, rr->comp,
606 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, rr->data,
617 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
619 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
623 wr = &(ssl->s3->wrec);
624 i = COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress, wr->data,
625 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
626 wr->input, (int)wr->length);
632 wr->input = wr->data;
638 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
639 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
641 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
643 const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
646 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
647 unsigned int max_send_fragment;
649 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf);
652 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
653 OPENSSL_assert(s->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX);
657 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) {
658 i = s->handshake_func(s);
662 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
668 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
669 * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
670 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
671 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
672 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
673 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
674 * report the error in a way the user will notice
677 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
682 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
683 * will happen with non blocking IO
686 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->s3->wpend_tot);
688 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
692 tot += i; /* this might be last fragment */
694 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
696 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
697 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
698 * jumbo buffer to accomodate up to 8 records, but the
699 * compromise is considered worthy.
701 if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
702 len >= 4 * (int)(max_send_fragment = s->max_send_fragment) &&
703 s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL &&
704 SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
705 EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher) &
706 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) {
707 unsigned char aad[13];
708 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
711 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
712 if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0)
713 max_send_fragment -= 512;
715 if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
716 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
718 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
719 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
720 max_send_fragment, NULL);
722 if (len >= 8 * (int)max_send_fragment)
727 wb->buf = OPENSSL_malloc(packlen);
729 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
733 } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */
734 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
741 if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) {
742 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
747 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
748 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
755 if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
756 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8);
758 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4);
760 memcpy(aad, s->s3->write_sequence, 8);
762 aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
763 aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
770 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
771 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
772 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param);
774 if (packlen <= 0 || packlen > (int)wb->len) { /* never happens */
775 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
780 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
781 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
784 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
785 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
786 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0)
789 s->s3->write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
790 if (s->s3->write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) {
792 while (j >= 0 && (++s->s3->write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ;
798 s->s3->wpend_tot = nw;
799 s->s3->wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
800 s->s3->wpend_type = type;
801 s->s3->wpend_ret = nw;
803 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw);
805 if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) {
806 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf);
813 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
822 if (tot == len) { /* done? */
823 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
824 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
831 if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
832 nw = s->max_send_fragment;
836 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
838 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
844 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
845 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
847 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
848 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
850 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
852 if ((i == (int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
854 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
864 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
865 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
867 unsigned char *p, *plen;
868 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
873 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf);
877 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
878 * will happen with non blocking IO
881 return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len));
883 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
884 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
885 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
888 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
892 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
895 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
901 if ((sess == NULL) ||
902 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
903 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) {
905 clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
911 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
917 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
919 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) {
921 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
922 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
925 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
927 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
928 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
929 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
932 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
937 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
939 /* insufficient space */
940 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
945 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
948 if (create_empty_fragment) {
949 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
951 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
952 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
953 * payload, then we can just pretent we simply have two headers.
955 align = (long)wb->buf + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
956 align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
960 } else if (prefix_len) {
961 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
963 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
964 align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
965 align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
971 /* write the header */
973 *(p++) = type & 0xff;
976 *(p++) = (s->version >> 8);
978 * Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
979 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
981 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
982 && !s->renegotiate && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
985 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
987 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
990 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
991 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
992 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
993 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
994 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
998 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
999 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
1000 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
1006 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
1007 wr->data = p + eivlen;
1008 wr->length = (int)len;
1009 wr->input = (unsigned char *)buf;
1012 * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data
1015 /* first we compress */
1016 if (s->compress != NULL) {
1017 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) {
1018 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
1022 memcpy(wr->data, wr->input, wr->length);
1023 wr->input = wr->data;
1027 * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from
1028 * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the
1032 if (mac_size != 0) {
1033 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &(p[wr->length + eivlen]), 1) < 0)
1035 wr->length += mac_size;
1043 * if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) goto err;
1045 wr->length += eivlen;
1048 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 1) < 1)
1051 /* record length after mac and block padding */
1052 s2n(wr->length, plen);
1054 if (s->msg_callback)
1055 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, plen - 5, 5, s,
1056 s->msg_callback_arg);
1059 * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
1062 wr->type = type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
1063 wr->length += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1065 if (create_empty_fragment) {
1067 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
1073 /* now let's set up wb */
1074 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
1077 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
1080 s->s3->wpend_tot = len;
1081 s->s3->wpend_buf = buf;
1082 s->s3->wpend_type = type;
1083 s->s3->wpend_ret = len;
1085 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1086 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len);
1091 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this
1093 * Return values are as per SSL_write(), i.e.
1094 * >0 The number of read bytes
1095 * 0 Failure (not retryable)
1096 * <0 Failure (may be retryable)
1098 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
1102 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf);
1105 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
1106 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
1107 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
1108 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type)) {
1109 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
1115 if (s->wbio != NULL) {
1116 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
1117 i = BIO_write(s->wbio,
1118 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
1119 (unsigned int)wb->left);
1121 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
1124 if (i == wb->left) {
1127 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1128 return (s->s3->wpend_ret);
1129 } else if (i <= 0) {
1130 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1132 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
1133 * using a datagram service
1145 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1146 * 'type' is one of the following:
1148 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1149 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1150 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1152 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1153 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1155 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1156 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
1157 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
1158 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1159 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1160 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1161 * Change cipher spec protocol
1162 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1164 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1165 * Handshake protocol
1166 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1167 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1168 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1169 * Application data protocol
1170 * none of our business
1172 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
1177 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
1179 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
1180 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
1183 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
1184 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek
1186 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
1187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1191 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1192 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1194 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1195 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1200 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
1203 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
1206 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1207 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1208 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1213 * Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1216 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) {
1217 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1218 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1222 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1227 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1230 * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
1231 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
1232 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1233 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
1235 rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
1237 /* get new packet if necessary */
1238 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) {
1239 ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
1245 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
1246 * record that isn't an alert.
1248 if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT && rr->length != 0)
1249 s->cert->alert_count = 0;
1251 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1253 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1254 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1255 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
1256 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1262 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1265 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
1267 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1271 if (type == rr->type) { /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1272 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
1274 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1275 * doing a handshake for the first time
1277 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1278 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
1279 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1280 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1287 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
1290 n = (unsigned int)len;
1292 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
1296 if (rr->length == 0) {
1297 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1299 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
1300 && s->s3->rbuf.left == 0)
1301 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1308 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1309 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello).
1313 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
1314 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1317 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
1318 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1319 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
1321 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1322 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1323 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1324 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
1325 } else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
1326 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
1327 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
1328 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
1330 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1331 else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) {
1332 tls1_process_heartbeat(s);
1334 /* Exit and notify application to read again */
1336 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1337 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1338 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1343 if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
1344 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1346 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
1348 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1350 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1354 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1355 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1360 * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1361 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1362 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1365 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1367 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1368 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1369 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
1370 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1372 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1373 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1374 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
1375 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1376 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1380 if (s->msg_callback)
1381 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1382 s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s,
1383 s->msg_callback_arg);
1385 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1386 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1387 !s->s3->renegotiate) {
1388 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1389 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
1390 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1394 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1395 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1399 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1400 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */
1403 * In the case where we try to read application data,
1404 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1405 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1406 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world
1408 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1409 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1410 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1411 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1418 * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
1419 * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
1424 * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1425 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
1426 * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1429 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1430 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1431 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1432 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1433 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1434 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1435 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
1437 * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1440 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1443 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2) {
1444 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1445 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1447 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1449 if (s->msg_callback)
1450 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1451 s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1453 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1454 cb = s->info_callback;
1455 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1456 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1459 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1460 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1463 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
1464 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1466 s->cert->alert_count++;
1467 if (s->cert->alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) {
1468 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1469 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS);
1473 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
1474 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1478 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1479 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1480 * alert because if application tried to renegotiatie it
1481 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1482 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1483 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1485 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
1486 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1487 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1490 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1491 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
1494 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1497 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1498 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1499 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1500 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
1501 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
1502 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1503 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
1506 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1507 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1514 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
1516 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1521 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1523 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know exactly
1524 * what the record payload has to look like
1526 if ((rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1527 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
1528 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1529 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1533 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1534 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
1535 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1536 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1540 if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK)) {
1541 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1542 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1546 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
1550 if (s->msg_callback)
1551 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
1552 rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1554 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
1555 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1562 * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
1564 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake) {
1565 if (((s->state & SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1566 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) {
1567 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences
1568 * are not as expected (and because this is
1569 * not really needed for clients except for
1570 * detecting protocol violations): */
1571 s->state = SSL_ST_BEFORE | (s->server)
1572 ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1574 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1579 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1583 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1587 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1588 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */
1591 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1592 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1593 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1594 * problems in the blocking world
1596 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1597 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1598 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1599 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1609 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
1610 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
1611 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
1612 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
1613 * record types, using up resources processing them.
1615 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1616 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1618 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1620 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1622 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1623 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that should not
1624 * happen when type != rr->type
1626 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1627 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1629 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1631 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1632 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1633 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1634 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1635 * started), we will indulge it.
1637 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1638 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1639 (((s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1640 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1641 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1642 ) || ((s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1643 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1644 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1647 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1650 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1651 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1658 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1663 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1669 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1670 i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1672 i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1674 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL) {
1675 if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0) {
1676 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1677 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
1678 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1682 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1683 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
1687 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, i))
1691 * we have to record the message digest at this point so we can get it
1692 * before we read the finished message
1694 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) {
1695 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1696 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1698 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1699 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1702 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
1704 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1706 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1709 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = i;
1714 int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1716 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1717 desc = s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1718 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
1719 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have
1720 * protocol_version alerts */
1723 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1724 if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
1725 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
1727 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
1728 s->s3->send_alert[0] = level;
1729 s->s3->send_alert[1] = desc;
1730 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
1731 return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1733 * else data is still being written out, we will get written some time in
1739 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1742 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
1744 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0;
1745 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1747 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
1750 * Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now. If the
1751 * message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO, we will not
1754 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1755 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1757 if (s->msg_callback)
1758 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert,
1759 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1761 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1762 cb = s->info_callback;
1763 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1764 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1767 j = (s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1];
1768 cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j);