ssl/s3_pkt.c

   1 /* ssl/s3_pkt.c */
   2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
   3  * All rights reserved.
   4  *
   5  * This package is an SSL implementation written
   6  * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
   7  * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
   8  *
   9  * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
  10  * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
  11  * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
  12  * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
  13  * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
  14  * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
  15  *
  16  * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
  17  * the code are not to be removed.
  18  * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
  19  * as the author of the parts of the library used.
  20  * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
  21  * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
  22  *
  23  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  24  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
  25  * are met:
  26  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
  27  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
  28  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
  29  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
  30  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
  31  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
  32  *    must display the following acknowledgement:
  33  *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
  34  *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
  35  *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
  36  *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
  37  * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
  38  *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
  39  *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
  40  *
  41  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
  42  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
  43  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
  44  * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
  45  * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
  46  * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
  47  * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
  48  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
  49  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  50  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  51  * SUCH DAMAGE.
  52  *
  53  * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
  54  * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
  55  * copied and put under another distribution licence
  56  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  57  */
  58 /* ====================================================================
  59  * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  60  *
  61  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  62  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
  63  * are met:
  64  *
  65  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
  66  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
  67  *
  68  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
  69  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
  70  *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
  71  *    distribution.
  72  *
  73  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
  74  *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
  75  *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
  76  *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
  77  *
  78  * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
  79  *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
  80  *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
  81  *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
  82  *
  83  * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
  84  *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
  85  *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
  86  *
  87  * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
  88  *    acknowledgment:
  89  *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
  90  *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
  91  *
  92  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
  93  * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
  94  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
  95  * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
  96  * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
  97  * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
  98  * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
  99  * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
 100  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
 101  * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
 102  * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
 103  * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 104  * ====================================================================
 105  *
 106  * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
 107  * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
 108  * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
 109  *
 110  */
 111
 112 #include <stdio.h>
 113 #include <errno.h>
 114 #define USE_SOCKETS
 115 #include "ssl_locl.h"
 116 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 117 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
 118
 119 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
 120                          unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
 121 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
 122
 123 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
 124         {
 125         /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
 126          * packet by another n bytes.
 127          * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
 128          * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
 129          * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
 130          * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
 131          */
 132         int i,off,newb;
 133
 134         if (!extend)
 135                 {
 136                 /* start with empty packet ... */
 137                 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0)
 138                         s->s3->rbuf.offset = 0;
 139                 s->packet = s->s3->rbuf.buf + s->s3->rbuf.offset;
 140                 s->packet_length = 0;
 141                 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
 142                 }
 143
 144         /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets
 145          * because the read operation returns the whole packet
 146          * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
 147         if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION)
 148                 {
 149                 if ( s->s3->rbuf.left > 0 && n > s->s3->rbuf.left)
 150                         n = s->s3->rbuf.left;
 151                 }
 152
 153         /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
 154         if (s->s3->rbuf.left >= (int)n)
 155                 {
 156                 s->packet_length+=n;
 157                 s->s3->rbuf.left-=n;
 158                 s->s3->rbuf.offset+=n;
 159                 return(n);
 160                 }
 161
 162         /* else we need to read more data */
 163         if (!s->read_ahead)
 164                 max=n;
 165
 166         {
 167                 /* avoid buffer overflow */
 168                 int max_max = s->s3->rbuf.len - s->packet_length;
 169                 if (max > max_max)
 170                         max = max_max;
 171         }
 172         if (n > max) /* does not happen */
 173                 {
 174                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 175                 return -1;
 176                 }
 177
 178         off = s->packet_length;
 179         newb = s->s3->rbuf.left;
 180         /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
 181          * 'off' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
 182          * 'newb' extra ones at the end */
 183         if (s->packet != s->s3->rbuf.buf)
 184                 {
 185                 /*  off > 0 */
 186                 memmove(s->s3->rbuf.buf, s->packet, off+newb);
 187                 s->packet = s->s3->rbuf.buf;
 188                 }
 189
 190         while (newb < n)
 191                 {
 192                 /* Now we have off+newb bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and need
 193                  * to read in more until we have off+n (up to off+max if possible) */
 194
 195                 clear_sys_error();
 196                 if (s->rbio != NULL)
 197                         {
 198                         s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
 199                         i=BIO_read(s->rbio,     &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[off+newb]), max-newb);
 200                         }
 201                 else
 202                         {
 203                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
 204                         i = -1;
 205                         }
 206
 207                 if (i <= 0)
 208                         {
 209                         s->s3->rbuf.left = newb;
 210                         return(i);
 211                         }
 212                 newb+=i;
 213                 /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because
 214                  * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed
 215                  * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */
 216                 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION)
 217                         {
 218                         if (n > newb)
 219                                 n = newb; /* makes the while condition false */
 220                         }
 221                 }
 222
 223         /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
 224         s->s3->rbuf.offset = off + n;
 225         s->s3->rbuf.left = newb - n;
 226         s->packet_length += n;
 227         s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
 228         return(n);
 229         }
 230
 231 /* Call this to get a new input record.
 232  * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
 233  * or non-blocking IO.
 234  * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
 235  * ssl->s3->rrec.type    - is the type of record
 236  * ssl->s3->rrec.data,   - data
 237  * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
 238  */
 239 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
 240 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
 241         {
 242         int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
 243         int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
 244         SSL3_RECORD *rr;
 245         SSL_SESSION *sess;
 246         unsigned char *p;
 247         unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
 248         short version;
 249         unsigned mac_size;
 250         int clear=0;
 251         size_t extra;
 252
 253         rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
 254         sess=s->session;
 255
 256         if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
 257                 extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
 258         else
 259                 extra=0;
 260         if (extra != s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE)
 261                 {
 262                 /* actually likely an application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
 263                  * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
 264                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 265                 return -1;
 266                 }
 267
 268 again:
 269         /* check if we have the header */
 270         if (    (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
 271                 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
 272                 {
 273                 n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
 274                 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
 275                 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
 276
 277                 p=s->packet;
 278
 279                 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
 280                 rr->type= *(p++);
 281                 ssl_major= *(p++);
 282                 ssl_minor= *(p++);
 283                 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
 284                 n2s(p,rr->length);
 285
 286                 /* Lets check version */
 287                 if (!s->first_packet)
 288                         {
 289                         if (version != s->version)
 290                                 {
 291                                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
 292                                 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00))
 293                                         /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
 294                                         s->version = (unsigned short)version;
 295                                 al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
 296                                 goto f_err;
 297                                 }
 298                         }
 299
 300                 if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
 301                         {
 302                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
 303                         goto err;
 304                         }
 305
 306                 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
 307                         {
 308                         al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
 309                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
 310                         goto f_err;
 311                         }
 312
 313                 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
 314                 }
 315
 316         /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
 317
 318         if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
 319                 {
 320                 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
 321                 i=rr->length;
 322                 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
 323                 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
 324                 /* now n == rr->length,
 325                  * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
 326                 }
 327
 328         s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
 329
 330         /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
 331          * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
 332          */
 333         rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
 334
 335         /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
 336          * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
 337          * need to be copied into rr->data by either
 338          * the decryption or by the decompression
 339          * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
 340          * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
 341
 342         /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
 343          * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
 344
 345         /* check is not needed I believe */
 346         if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
 347                 {
 348                 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
 349                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
 350                 goto f_err;
 351                 }
 352
 353         /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
 354         rr->data=rr->input;
 355         rr->orig_len=rr->length;
 356
 357         enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
 358         /* enc_err is:
 359          *    0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
 360          *    1: if the padding is valid
 361          *    -1: if the padding is invalid */
 362         if (enc_err == 0)
 363                 {
 364                 /* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
 365                 goto err;
 366                 }
 367
 368 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
 369 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
 370 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
 371 printf("\n");
 372 #endif
 373
 374         /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
 375         if (    (sess == NULL) ||
 376                 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
 377                 (s->read_hash == NULL))
 378                 clear=1;
 379
 380         if (!clear)
 381                 {
 382                 /* !clear => s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
 383                 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
 384                 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
 385                 mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash);
 386                 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
 387
 388                 /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
 389                  * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
 390                  * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
 391                  * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
 392                  */
 393                 if (rr->orig_len < mac_size ||
 394                     /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
 395                     (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
 396                      rr->orig_len < mac_size+1))
 397                         {
 398                         al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 399                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
 400                         goto f_err;
 401                         }
 402
 403                 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
 404                         {
 405                         /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
 406                          * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
 407                          * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
 408                          * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
 409                          * */
 410                         mac = mac_tmp;
 411                         ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size);
 412                         rr->length -= mac_size;
 413                         }
 414                 else
 415                         {
 416                         /* In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len|
 417                          * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
 418                          * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
 419                         rr->length -= mac_size;
 420                         mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
 421                         }
 422
 423                 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
 424                 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
 425                         enc_err = -1;
 426                 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
 427                         enc_err = -1;
 428                 }
 429
 430         if (enc_err < 0)
 431                 {
 432                 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
 433                  * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'.  But unless a decryption
 434                  * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
 435                  * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
 436                  * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
 437                 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
 438                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
 439                 goto f_err;
 440                 }
 441
 442         /* r->length is now just compressed */
 443         if (s->expand != NULL)
 444                 {
 445                 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
 446                         {
 447                         al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
 448                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
 449                         goto f_err;
 450                         }
 451                 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
 452                         {
 453                         al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
 454                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
 455                         goto f_err;
 456                         }
 457                 }
 458
 459         if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
 460                 {
 461                 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
 462                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
 463                 goto f_err;
 464                 }
 465
 466         rr->off=0;
 467         /* So at this point the following is true
 468          * ssl->s3->rrec.type   is the type of record
 469          * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
 470          * ssl->s3->rrec.off    == offset to first valid byte
 471          * ssl->s3->rrec.data   == where to take bytes from, increment
 472          *                         after use :-).
 473          */
 474
 475         /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
 476         s->packet_length=0;
 477
 478         /* just read a 0 length packet */
 479         if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
 480
 481         return(1);
 482
 483 f_err:
 484         ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
 485 err:
 486         return(ret);
 487         }
 488
 489 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
 490         {
 491 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
 492         int i;
 493         SSL3_RECORD *rr;
 494
 495         rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
 496         i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,
 497                 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);
 498         if (i < 0)
 499                 return(0);
 500         else
 501                 rr->length=i;
 502         rr->data=rr->comp;
 503 #endif
 504         return(1);
 505         }
 506
 507 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
 508         {
 509 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
 510         int i;
 511         SSL3_RECORD *wr;
 512
 513         wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
 514         i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,
 515                 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
 516                 wr->input,(int)wr->length);
 517         if (i < 0)
 518                 return(0);
 519         else
 520                 wr->length=i;
 521
 522         wr->input=wr->data;
 523 #endif
 524         return(1);
 525         }
 526
 527 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
 528  * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
 529  */
 530 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
 531         {
 532         const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
 533         unsigned int tot,n,nw;
 534         int i;
 535
 536         s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
 537         tot=s->s3->wnum;
 538         s->s3->wnum=0;
 539
 540         if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
 541                 {
 542                 i=s->handshake_func(s);
 543                 if (i < 0) return(i);
 544                 if (i == 0)
 545                         {
 546                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
 547                         return -1;
 548                         }
 549                 }
 550
 551         n=(len-tot);
 552         for (;;)
 553                 {
 554                 if (n > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
 555                         nw=SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
 556                 else
 557                         nw=n;
 558
 559                 i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
 560                 if (i <= 0)
 561                         {
 562                         s->s3->wnum=tot;
 563                         return i;
 564                         }
 565
 566                 if ((i == (int)n) ||
 567                         (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
 568                          (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
 569                         {
 570                         /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
 571                          * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
 572                         s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
 573
 574                         return tot+i;
 575                         }
 576
 577                 n-=i;
 578                 tot+=i;
 579                 }
 580         }
 581
 582 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
 583                          unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
 584         {
 585         unsigned char *p,*plen;
 586         int i,mac_size,clear=0;
 587         int prefix_len = 0;
 588         SSL3_RECORD *wr;
 589         SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
 590         SSL_SESSION *sess;
 591
 592         /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
 593          * out.  This will happen with non blocking IO */
 594         if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0)
 595                 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
 596
 597         /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
 598         if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
 599                 {
 600                 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
 601                 if (i <= 0)
 602                         return(i);
 603                 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
 604                 }
 605
 606         if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
 607                 return 0;
 608
 609         wr= &(s->s3->wrec);
 610         wb= &(s->s3->wbuf);
 611         sess=s->session;
 612
 613         if (    (sess == NULL) ||
 614                 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
 615                 (s->write_hash == NULL))
 616                 clear=1;
 617
 618         if (clear)
 619                 mac_size=0;
 620         else
 621                 mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->write_hash);
 622
 623         /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
 624         if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
 625                 {
 626                 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
 627                  * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
 628
 629                 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
 630                         {
 631                         /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
 632                          * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
 633                          * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
 634                          * together with the actual payload) */
 635                         prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
 636                         if (prefix_len <= 0)
 637                                 goto err;
 638
 639                         if (s->s3->wbuf.len < (size_t)prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE)
 640                                 {
 641                                 /* insufficient space */
 642                                 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 643                                 goto err;
 644                                 }
 645                         }
 646
 647                 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
 648                 }
 649
 650         p = wb->buf + prefix_len;
 651
 652         /* write the header */
 653
 654         *(p++)=type&0xff;
 655         wr->type=type;
 656
 657         *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
 658         *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
 659
 660         /* field where we are to write out packet length */
 661         plen=p;
 662         p+=2;
 663
 664         /* lets setup the record stuff. */
 665         wr->data=p;
 666         wr->length=(int)len;
 667         wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
 668
 669         /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
 670          * wr->data */
 671
 672         /* first we compress */
 673         if (s->compress != NULL)
 674                 {
 675                 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
 676                         {
 677                         SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
 678                         goto err;
 679                         }
 680                 }
 681         else
 682                 {
 683                 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
 684                 wr->input=wr->data;
 685                 }
 686
 687         /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
 688          * from wr->input.  Length should be wr->length.
 689          * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
 690
 691         if (mac_size != 0)
 692                 {
 693                 s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length]),1);
 694                 wr->length+=mac_size;
 695                 wr->input=p;
 696                 wr->data=p;
 697                 }
 698
 699         /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
 700         s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
 701
 702         /* record length after mac and block padding */
 703         s2n(wr->length,plen);
 704
 705         /* we should now have
 706          * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
 707          * wr->length long */
 708         wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
 709         wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
 710
 711         if (create_empty_fragment)
 712                 {
 713                 /* we are in a recursive call;
 714                  * just return the length, don't write out anything here
 715                  */
 716                 return wr->length;
 717                 }
 718
 719         /* now let's set up wb */
 720         wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
 721         wb->offset = 0;
 722
 723         /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
 724         s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
 725         s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
 726         s->s3->wpend_type=type;
 727         s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
 728
 729         /* we now just need to write the buffer */
 730         return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
 731 err:
 732         return -1;
 733         }
 734
 735 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
 736 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
 737         unsigned int len)
 738         {
 739         int i;
 740
 741 /* XXXX */
 742         if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
 743                 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
 744                         !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
 745                 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
 746                 {
 747                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
 748                 return(-1);
 749                 }
 750
 751         for (;;)
 752                 {
 753                 clear_sys_error();
 754                 if (s->wbio != NULL)
 755                         {
 756                         s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
 757                         i=BIO_write(s->wbio,
 758                                 (char *)&(s->s3->wbuf.buf[s->s3->wbuf.offset]),
 759                                 (unsigned int)s->s3->wbuf.left);
 760                         }
 761                 else
 762                         {
 763                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
 764                         i= -1;
 765                         }
 766                 if (i == s->s3->wbuf.left)
 767                         {
 768                         s->s3->wbuf.left=0;
 769                         s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
 770                         return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
 771                         }
 772                 else if (i <= 0) {
 773                         if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION ||
 774                             s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
 775                                 /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole
 776                                    point in using a datagram service */
 777                                 s->s3->wbuf.left = 0;
 778                         }
 779                         return(i);
 780                 }
 781                 s->s3->wbuf.offset+=i;
 782                 s->s3->wbuf.left-=i;
 783                 }
 784         }
 785
 786 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
 787  * 'type' is one of the following:
 788  *
 789  *   -  SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
 790  *   -  SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
 791  *   -  0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
 792  *
 793  * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
 794  * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
 795  *
 796  * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
 797  * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
 798  * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
 799  * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
 800  * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
 801  * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
 802  *     Change cipher spec protocol
 803  *             just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
 804  *     Alert protocol
 805  *             2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
 806  *     Handshake protocol
 807  *             4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
 808  *             to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
 809  *             here, anything else is handled by higher layers
 810  *     Application data protocol
 811  *             none of our business
 812  */
 813 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
 814         {
 815         int al,i,j,ret;
 816         unsigned int n;
 817         SSL3_RECORD *rr;
 818         void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
 819
 820         if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
 821                 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
 822                         return(-1);
 823
 824         if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
 825             (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
 826                 {
 827                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 828                 return -1;
 829                 }
 830
 831         if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
 832                 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
 833                 {
 834                 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
 835                 unsigned char *dst = buf;
 836                 unsigned int k;
 837
 838                 /* peek == 0 */
 839                 n = 0;
 840                 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
 841                         {
 842                         *dst++ = *src++;
 843                         len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
 844                         n++;
 845                         }
 846                 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
 847                 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
 848                         s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
 849                 return n;
 850         }
 851
 852         /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
 853
 854         if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
 855                 {
 856                 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
 857                 i=s->handshake_func(s);
 858                 if (i < 0) return(i);
 859                 if (i == 0)
 860                         {
 861                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
 862                         return(-1);
 863                         }
 864                 }
 865 start:
 866         s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
 867
 868         /* s->s3->rrec.type         - is the type of record
 869          * s->s3->rrec.data,    - data
 870          * s->s3->rrec.off,     - offset into 'data' for next read
 871          * s->s3->rrec.length,  - number of bytes. */
 872         rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
 873
 874         /* get new packet if necessary */
 875         if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
 876                 {
 877                 ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
 878                 if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
 879                 }
 880
 881         /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
 882
 883         if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
 884                                        * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
 885                 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
 886                 {
 887                 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
 888                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
 889                 goto f_err;
 890                 }
 891
 892         /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
 893          * (even in 'peek' mode) */
 894         if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
 895                 {
 896                 rr->length=0;
 897                 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
 898                 return(0);
 899                 }
 900
 901
 902         if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
 903                 {
 904                 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
 905                  * are doing a handshake for the first time */
 906                 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
 907                         (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
 908                         {
 909                         al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
 910                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
 911                         goto f_err;
 912                         }
 913
 914                 if (len <= 0) return(len);
 915
 916                 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
 917                         n = rr->length;
 918                 else
 919                         n = (unsigned int)len;
 920
 921                 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
 922                 if (!peek)
 923                         {
 924                         rr->length-=n;
 925                         rr->off+=n;
 926                         if (rr->length == 0)
 927                                 {
 928                                 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
 929                                 rr->off=0;
 930                                 }
 931                         }
 932                 return(n);
 933                 }
 934
 935
 936         /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
 937          * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
 938
 939         /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
 940          * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
 941          */
 942                 {
 943                 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
 944                 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
 945                 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
 946
 947                 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
 948                         {
 949                         dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
 950                         dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
 951                         dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
 952                         }
 953                 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
 954                         {
 955                         dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
 956                         dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
 957                         dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
 958                         }
 959
 960                 if (dest_maxlen > 0)
 961                         {
 962                         n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
 963                         if (rr->length < n)
 964                                 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
 965
 966                         /* now move 'n' bytes: */
 967                         while (n-- > 0)
 968                                 {
 969                                 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
 970                                 rr->length--;
 971                                 }
 972
 973                         if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
 974                                 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
 975                         }
 976                 }
 977
 978         /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4  iff  rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
 979          * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2      iff  rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
 980          * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
 981
 982         /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
 983         if ((!s->server) &&
 984                 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
 985                 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
 986                 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
 987                 {
 988                 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
 989
 990                 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
 991                         (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
 992                         (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
 993                         {
 994                         al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 995                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
 996                         goto f_err;
 997                         }
 998
 999                 if (s->msg_callback)
1000                         s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1001
1002                 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1003                         !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1004                         !s->s3->renegotiate)
1005                         {
1006                         ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1007                         if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
1008                                 {
1009                                 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1010                                 if (i < 0) return(i);
1011                                 if (i == 0)
1012                                         {
1013                                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1014                                         return(-1);
1015                                         }
1016
1017                                 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1018                                         {
1019                                         if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1020                                                 {
1021                                                 BIO *bio;
1022                                                 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1023                                                  * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1024                                                  * the retry option set.  Otherwise renegotiation may
1025                                                  * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1026                                                 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1027                                                 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1028                                                 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1029                                                 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1030                                                 return(-1);
1031                                                 }
1032                                         }
1033                                 }
1034                         }
1035                 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1036                  * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1037                 goto start;
1038                 }
1039         /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1040          * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
1041          * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1042          */
1043         if (s->server &&
1044                 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1045                 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1046                 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1047                 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1048                 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1049                 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1050                 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1051
1052                 {
1053                 /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/
1054                 rr->length = 0;
1055                 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1056                 goto start;
1057                 }
1058         if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
1059                 {
1060                 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1061                 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1062
1063                 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1064
1065                 if (s->msg_callback)
1066                         s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1067
1068                 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1069                         cb=s->info_callback;
1070                 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1071                         cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1072
1073                 if (cb != NULL)
1074                         {
1075                         j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1076                         cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1077                         }
1078
1079                 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1080                         {
1081                         s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1082                         if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1083                                 {
1084                                 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1085                                 return(0);
1086                                 }
1087                         /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1088                          * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with
1089                          * a fatal alert because if application tried to
1090                          * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and
1091                          * expects it to succeed.
1092                          *
1093                          * In future we might have a renegotiation where we
1094                          * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on.
1095                          */
1096                         else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION)
1097                                 {
1098                                 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1099                                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1100                                 goto f_err;
1101                                 }
1102                         }
1103                 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1104                         {
1105                         char tmp[16];
1106
1107                         s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1108                         s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1109                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1110                         BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1111                         ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1112                         s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1113                         SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1114                         return(0);
1115                         }
1116                 else
1117                         {
1118                         al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1119                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1120                         goto f_err;
1121                         }
1122
1123                 goto start;
1124                 }
1125
1126         if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1127                 {
1128                 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1129                 rr->length=0;
1130                 return(0);
1131                 }
1132
1133         if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1134                 {
1135                 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1136                  * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1137                 if (    (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1138                         (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1139                         {
1140                         al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1141                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1142                         goto f_err;
1143                         }
1144
1145                 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1146                 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
1147                         {
1148                         al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1149                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1150                         goto f_err;
1151                         }
1152
1153                 rr->length=0;
1154
1155                 if (s->msg_callback)
1156                         s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1157
1158                 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1159                 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1160                         goto err;
1161                 else
1162                         goto start;
1163                 }
1164
1165         /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1166         if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&     !s->in_handshake)
1167                 {
1168                 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1169                         !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1170                         {
1171 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1172        * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1173        * protocol violations): */
1174                         s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1175                                 ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT
1176                                 :SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1177 #else
1178                         s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1179 #endif
1180                         s->new_session=1;
1181                         }
1182                 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1183                 if (i < 0) return(i);
1184                 if (i == 0)
1185                         {
1186                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1187                         return(-1);
1188                         }
1189
1190                 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1191                         {
1192                         if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1193                                 {
1194                                 BIO *bio;
1195                                 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1196                                  * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1197                                  * the retry option set.  Otherwise renegotiation may
1198                                  * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1199                                 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1200                                 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1201                                 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1202                                 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1203                                 return(-1);
1204                                 }
1205                         }
1206                 goto start;
1207                 }
1208
1209         switch (rr->type)
1210                 {
1211         default:
1212 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1213                 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1214                 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
1215                         {
1216                         rr->length = 0;
1217                         goto start;
1218                         }
1219 #endif
1220                 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1221                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1222                 goto f_err;
1223         case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1224         case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
1225         case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1226                 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1227                  * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1228                  * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1229                 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1230                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1231                 goto f_err;
1232         case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1233                 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1234                  * but have application data.  If the library was
1235                  * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1236                  * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1237                  * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1238                  * we will indulge it.
1239                  */
1240                 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1241                         (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1242                         ((
1243                                 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1244                                 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1245                                 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1246                                 ) || (
1247                                         (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1248                                         (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1249                                         (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1250                                         )
1251                                 ))
1252                         {
1253                         s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1254                         return(-1);
1255                         }
1256                 else
1257                         {
1258                         al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1259                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1260                         goto f_err;
1261                         }
1262                 }
1263         /* not reached */
1264
1265 f_err:
1266         ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1267 err:
1268         return(-1);
1269         }
1270
1271 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1272         {
1273         int i;
1274         const char *sender;
1275         int slen;
1276
1277         if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1278                 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1279         else
1280                 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1281
1282         if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
1283                 {
1284                 if (s->session == NULL)
1285                         {
1286                         /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1287                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1288                         return (0);
1289                         }
1290
1291                 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1292                 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
1293                 }
1294
1295         if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
1296                 return(0);
1297
1298         /* we have to record the message digest at
1299          * this point so we can get it before we read
1300          * the finished message */
1301         if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
1302                 {
1303                 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1304                 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1305                 }
1306         else
1307                 {
1308                 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1309                 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1310                 }
1311
1312         s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
1313                 &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
1314                 &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
1315                 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1316
1317         return(1);
1318         }
1319
1320 int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1321         {
1322         /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1323         desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1324         if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
1325                 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
1326         if (desc < 0) return -1;
1327         /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1328         if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
1329                 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1330
1331         s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1332         s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
1333         s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
1334         if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
1335                 return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1336         /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
1337          * some time in the future */
1338         return -1;
1339         }
1340
1341 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1342         {
1343         int i,j;
1344         void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1345
1346         s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1347         i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1348         if (i <= 0)
1349                 {
1350                 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1351                 }
1352         else
1353                 {
1354                 /* Alert sent to BIO.  If it is important, flush it now.
1355                  * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
1356                  * we will not worry too much. */
1357                 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1358                         (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1359
1360                 if (s->msg_callback)
1361                         s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1362
1363                 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1364                         cb=s->info_callback;
1365                 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1366                         cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1367
1368                 if (cb != NULL)
1369                         {
1370                         j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1371                         cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
1372                         }
1373                 }
1374         return(i);
1375         }