2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
115 #include "ssl_locl.h"
116 #include <openssl/evp.h>
117 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
118 #include <openssl/rand.h>
120 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
121 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
122 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
124 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
126 /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
127 * packet by another n bytes.
128 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
129 * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
130 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
131 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
138 if (n <= 0) return n;
142 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
146 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
147 align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
148 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
153 /* start with empty packet ... */
156 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
158 /* check if next packet length is large
159 * enough to justify payload alignment... */
160 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
161 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
162 && (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128)
164 /* Note that even if packet is corrupted
165 * and its length field is insane, we can
166 * only be led to wrong decision about
167 * whether memmove will occur or not.
168 * Header values has no effect on memmove
169 * arguments and therefore no buffer
170 * overrun can be triggered. */
171 memmove (rb->buf+align,pkt,left);
175 s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
176 s->packet_length = 0;
177 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
180 /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets
181 * because the read operation returns the whole packet
182 * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
183 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
185 if (left > 0 && n > left)
189 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
198 /* else we need to read more data */
200 len = s->packet_length;
202 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
203 * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
204 * 'left' extra ones at the end */
205 if (s->packet != pkt) /* len > 0 */
207 memmove(pkt, s->packet, len+left);
209 rb->offset = len + align;
212 if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) /* does not happen */
214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
219 /* ignore max parameter */
225 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
226 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
231 /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf
232 * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to
233 * len+max if possible) */
238 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
239 i=BIO_read(s->rbio,pkt+len+left, max-left);
243 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
250 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
251 SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
253 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
257 /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because
258 * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed
259 * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */
260 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
263 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
267 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
270 s->packet_length += n;
271 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
275 /* Call this to get a new input record.
276 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
277 * or non-blocking IO.
278 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
279 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
280 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
281 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
283 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
284 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
286 int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
287 int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
291 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
296 int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0;
297 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
302 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
303 extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
306 if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra)
308 /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
309 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
310 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
315 /* check if we have the header */
316 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
317 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
319 n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
320 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
321 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
325 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
329 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
332 fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
335 /* Lets check version */
336 if (!s->first_packet)
338 if (version != s->version)
340 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
341 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00))
342 /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
343 s->version = (unsigned short)version;
344 al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
349 if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
351 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
355 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
357 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
358 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
362 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
365 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
367 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
369 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
371 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
372 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
373 /* now n == rr->length,
374 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
377 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
379 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
380 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
382 rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
384 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
385 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
386 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
387 * the decryption or by the decompression
388 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
389 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
391 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
392 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
394 /* check is not needed I believe */
395 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
397 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
398 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
402 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
405 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
409 /* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
412 /* Otherwise enc_err == -1, which indicates bad padding
413 * (rec->length has not been changed in this case).
414 * To minimize information leaked via timing, we will perform
415 * the MAC computation anyway. */
416 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
420 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
421 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
425 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
426 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
427 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
428 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) == NULL))
433 /* !clear => s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
434 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
435 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size >= 0);
437 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
439 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
440 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
441 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
444 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
447 /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
448 if (rr->length >= (unsigned int)mac_size)
450 rr->length -= mac_size;
451 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
455 /* record (minus padding) is too short to contain a MAC */
456 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
457 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
458 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
461 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
465 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
466 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
468 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
472 if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac)
474 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
475 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
476 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
477 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
478 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
479 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
480 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
484 /* r->length is now just compressed */
485 if (s->expand != NULL)
487 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
489 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
490 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
493 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
495 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
496 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
501 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
503 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
504 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
509 /* So at this point the following is true
510 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
511 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
512 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
513 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
517 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
520 /* just read a 0 length packet */
521 if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
524 fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
530 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
535 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
537 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
541 rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
542 i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,
543 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);
553 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
555 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
559 wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
560 i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,
561 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
562 wr->input,(int)wr->length);
573 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
574 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
576 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
578 const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
579 unsigned int tot,n,nw;
582 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
586 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
588 i=s->handshake_func(s);
589 if (i < 0) return(i);
592 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
600 if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
601 nw=s->max_send_fragment;
605 i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
613 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
614 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
616 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
617 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
618 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
628 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
629 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
631 unsigned char *p,*plen;
632 int i,mac_size,clear=0;
637 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
641 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
644 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
645 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
647 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
649 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
650 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
652 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
655 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
658 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
664 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
665 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
666 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
669 clear=s->enc_write_ctx?0:1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
677 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
682 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
683 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
685 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
686 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
688 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
690 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
691 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
692 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
693 * together with the actual payload) */
694 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
699 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
701 /* insufficient space */
702 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
707 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
710 if (create_empty_fragment)
712 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
713 /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks,
714 * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so
715 * if we want to align the real payload, then we can
716 * just pretent we simply have two headers. */
717 align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
718 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
725 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
729 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
730 align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
731 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
737 /* write the header */
742 *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
743 /* Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256
744 * bytes and record version number > TLS 1.0
746 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
748 && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
751 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
753 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
756 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers and TLS version 1.1 or later */
757 if (s->enc_write_ctx && s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION)
759 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
760 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
762 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
766 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
767 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
768 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
775 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
778 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
780 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
783 /* first we compress */
784 if (s->compress != NULL)
786 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
788 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
794 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
798 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
799 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
800 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
804 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + eivlen]),1) < 0)
806 wr->length+=mac_size;
814 /* if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0)
816 wr->length += eivlen;
819 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
820 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
822 /* record length after mac and block padding */
823 s2n(wr->length,plen);
825 /* we should now have
826 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
828 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
829 wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
831 if (create_empty_fragment)
833 /* we are in a recursive call;
834 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
839 /* now let's set up wb */
840 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
842 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
843 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
844 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
845 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
846 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
848 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
849 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
854 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
855 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
859 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
862 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
863 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
864 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
865 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
867 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
876 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
878 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
879 (unsigned int)wb->left);
883 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
890 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
891 SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
892 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
893 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
894 return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
897 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION ||
898 s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
899 /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole
900 point in using a datagram service */
910 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
911 * 'type' is one of the following:
913 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
914 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
915 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
917 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
918 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
920 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
921 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
922 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
923 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
924 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
925 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
926 * Change cipher spec protocol
927 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
929 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
931 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
932 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
933 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
934 * Application data protocol
935 * none of our business
937 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
942 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
944 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
945 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
948 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
949 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
951 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
955 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
956 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
958 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
959 unsigned char *dst = buf;
964 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
967 len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
970 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
971 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
972 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
976 /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
978 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
980 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
981 i=s->handshake_func(s);
982 if (i < 0) return(i);
985 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
990 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
992 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
993 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
994 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
995 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
998 /* get new packet if necessary */
999 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
1001 ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
1002 if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
1005 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1007 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1008 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1009 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
1011 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1012 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1016 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
1017 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
1018 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
1021 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1026 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
1028 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
1029 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
1030 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1031 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
1033 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1034 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1038 if (len <= 0) return(len);
1040 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
1043 n = (unsigned int)len;
1045 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
1050 if (rr->length == 0)
1052 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1054 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
1055 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1062 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
1063 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
1065 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
1066 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1069 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
1070 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1071 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
1073 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
1075 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1076 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1077 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
1079 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1081 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
1082 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
1083 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
1085 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1086 else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT)
1088 tls1_process_heartbeat(s);
1090 /* Exit and notify application to read again */
1092 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1093 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1094 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1099 if (dest_maxlen > 0)
1101 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1103 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
1105 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1108 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1112 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1113 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1117 /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1118 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1119 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
1121 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1123 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1124 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1125 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
1127 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1129 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1130 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1131 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
1133 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1134 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1138 if (s->msg_callback)
1139 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1141 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1142 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1143 !s->s3->renegotiate)
1145 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1146 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
1148 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1149 if (i < 0) return(i);
1152 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1156 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1158 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1161 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1162 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1163 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1164 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1165 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1166 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1167 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1168 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1174 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1175 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1178 /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1179 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
1180 * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1183 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1184 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1185 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1186 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1187 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1188 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1189 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1192 /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/
1194 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1197 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
1199 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1200 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1202 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1204 if (s->msg_callback)
1205 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1207 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1208 cb=s->info_callback;
1209 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1210 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1214 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1215 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1218 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1220 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1221 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1223 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1226 /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1227 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with
1228 * a fatal alert because if application tried to
1229 * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and
1230 * expects it to succeed.
1232 * In future we might have a renegotiation where we
1233 * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on.
1235 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION)
1237 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1241 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1242 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
1246 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1250 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1251 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1253 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1254 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1255 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1256 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1261 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1262 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1269 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1271 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1276 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1278 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1279 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1280 if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1281 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1283 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1284 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1288 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1289 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
1291 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1292 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1298 if (s->msg_callback)
1299 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1301 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1302 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1308 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1309 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake)
1311 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1312 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1314 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1315 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1316 * protocol violations): */
1317 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1321 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1326 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1327 if (i < 0) return(i);
1330 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1334 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1336 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1339 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1340 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1341 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1342 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1343 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1344 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1345 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1346 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1356 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1357 /* TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types:
1358 * TLS v1.2 give an unexpected message alert.
1360 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION)
1366 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1367 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1369 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1371 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1372 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1373 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1374 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1375 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1376 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1378 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1379 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1380 * but have application data. If the library was
1381 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1382 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1383 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1384 * we will indulge it.
1386 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1387 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1389 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1390 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1391 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1393 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1394 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1395 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1399 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1404 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1405 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1412 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1417 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1423 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1424 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1426 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1428 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
1430 if (s->session == NULL)
1432 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1433 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1437 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1438 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
1441 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
1444 /* we have to record the message digest at
1445 * this point so we can get it before we read
1446 * the finished message */
1447 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
1449 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1450 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1454 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1455 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1458 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
1459 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1464 int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1466 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1467 desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1468 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
1469 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
1470 if (desc < 0) return -1;
1471 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1472 if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
1473 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1475 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1476 s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
1477 s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
1478 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
1479 return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1480 /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
1481 * some time in the future */
1485 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1488 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1490 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1491 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1494 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1498 /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
1499 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
1500 * we will not worry too much. */
1501 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1502 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1504 if (s->msg_callback)
1505 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1507 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1508 cb=s->info_callback;
1509 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1510 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1514 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1515 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);