2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
116 #include "ssl_locl.h"
117 #include <openssl/evp.h>
118 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
119 #include <openssl/rand.h>
121 #ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
122 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
125 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
126 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
127 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
128 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) || \
129 defined(__INTEL__) ) \
131 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
132 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
135 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
136 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
137 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
139 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
142 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
143 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
144 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
145 * s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
146 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
158 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
162 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
163 align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
164 align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
168 /* start with empty packet ... */
171 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
173 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
176 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
177 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
178 && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) {
180 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
181 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
182 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
183 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
184 * overrun can be triggered.
186 memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
190 s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
191 s->packet_length = 0;
192 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
196 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
197 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
200 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
201 if (left == 0 && extend)
203 if (left > 0 && n > left)
207 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
209 s->packet_length += n;
215 /* else we need to read more data */
217 len = s->packet_length;
218 pkt = rb->buf + align;
220 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
221 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
223 if (s->packet != pkt) { /* len > 0 */
224 memmove(pkt, s->packet, len + left);
226 rb->offset = len + align;
229 if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) { /* does not happen */
230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
235 /* ignore max parameter */
240 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
241 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
246 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
247 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
252 if (s->rbio != NULL) {
253 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
254 i = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
262 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
264 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
269 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
270 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
271 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
273 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
275 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
279 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
282 s->packet_length += n;
283 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
288 * MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that
289 * will be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an
290 * attacker could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and
291 * cause ssl3_get_record to loop forever.
293 #define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32
296 * Call this to get a new input record.
297 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
298 * or non-blocking IO.
299 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
300 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
301 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
302 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
304 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
305 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
307 int ssl_major, ssl_minor, al;
308 int enc_err, n, i, ret = -1;
312 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
314 unsigned mac_size, orig_len;
316 unsigned empty_record_count = 0;
321 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
322 extra = SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
325 if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra) {
327 * An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER set after
328 * ssl3_setup_buffers() was done
330 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
335 /* check if we have the header */
336 if ((s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
337 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
338 n = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
340 return (n); /* error or non-blocking */
341 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
345 s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s,
346 s->msg_callback_arg);
348 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
352 version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor;
355 fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
358 /* Lets check version */
359 if (!s->first_packet) {
360 if (version != s->version) {
361 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
362 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00)
363 && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
365 * Send back error using their minor version number :-)
367 s->version = (unsigned short)version;
368 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
373 if ((version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
374 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
378 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
379 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
380 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
384 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
387 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
389 if (rr->length > s->packet_length - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
390 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
392 n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1);
394 return (n); /* error or non-blocking io */
396 * now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
401 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
404 * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
405 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
407 rr->input = &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
410 * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points
411 * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either
412 * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into
413 * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer
417 * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length
418 * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff.
421 /* check is not needed I believe */
422 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH + extra) {
423 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
424 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
428 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
429 rr->data = rr->input;
431 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0);
434 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
435 * 1: if the padding is valid
436 * -1: if the padding is invalid
439 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
440 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
444 printf("dec %d\n", rr->length);
447 for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++)
448 printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
453 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
454 if ((sess != NULL) &&
455 (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) {
456 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
457 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
458 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
459 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
460 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
463 * kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type
465 orig_len = rr->length + ((unsigned int)rr->type >> 8);
468 * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
469 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
470 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount
471 * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
473 if (orig_len < mac_size ||
474 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
475 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
476 orig_len < mac_size + 1)) {
477 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
478 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
482 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
484 * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be
485 * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in
486 * constant time from within the record, without leaking the
487 * contents of the padding bytes.
490 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
491 rr->length -= mac_size;
494 * In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len| equals
495 * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for
498 rr->length -= mac_size;
499 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
502 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ );
503 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL
504 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
506 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra + mac_size)
512 * A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
513 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
514 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, we should
515 * not reveal which kind of error occured -- this might become
516 * visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile)
518 al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
519 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
520 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
524 /* r->length is now just compressed */
525 if (s->expand != NULL) {
526 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra) {
527 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
528 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
531 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) {
532 al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
533 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
538 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + extra) {
539 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
540 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
546 * So at this point the following is true
547 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
548 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
549 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
550 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
554 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
555 s->packet_length = 0;
557 /* just read a 0 length packet */
558 if (rr->length == 0) {
559 empty_record_count++;
560 if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) {
561 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
562 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
568 fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type,
575 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
580 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
582 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
586 rr = &(ssl->s3->rrec);
587 i = COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand, rr->comp,
588 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, rr->data,
599 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
601 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
605 wr = &(ssl->s3->wrec);
606 i = COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress, wr->data,
607 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
608 wr->input, (int)wr->length);
614 wr->input = wr->data;
620 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
621 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
623 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
625 const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
628 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
629 unsigned int max_send_fragment;
631 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf);
634 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
635 OPENSSL_assert(s->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX);
639 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) {
640 i = s->handshake_func(s);
644 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
650 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
651 * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
652 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
653 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
654 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
655 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
656 * report the error in a way the user will notice
659 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
664 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
665 * will happen with non blocking IO
668 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->s3->wpend_tot);
670 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
674 tot += i; /* this might be last fragment */
676 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
678 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
679 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
680 * jumbo buffer to accomodate up to 8 records, but the
681 * compromise is considered worthy.
683 if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
684 len >= 4 * (int)(max_send_fragment = s->max_send_fragment) &&
685 s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL &&
686 SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
688 enc_write_ctx->cipher) &
689 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) {
690 unsigned char aad[13];
691 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
694 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
695 if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0)
696 max_send_fragment -= 512;
698 if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
699 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
701 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
702 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
703 max_send_fragment, NULL);
705 if (len >= 8 * (int)max_send_fragment)
710 wb->buf = OPENSSL_malloc(packlen);
712 } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */
713 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
720 if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) {
721 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
726 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
727 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
734 if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
735 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8);
737 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4);
739 memcpy(aad, s->s3->write_sequence, 8);
741 aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
742 aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
749 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
750 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
751 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param);
753 if (packlen <= 0 || packlen > (int)wb->len) { /* never happens */
754 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
759 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
760 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
763 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
764 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
765 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0)
768 s->s3->write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
769 if (s->s3->write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) {
771 while (j >= 0 && (++s->s3->write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ;
777 s->s3->wpend_tot = nw;
778 s->s3->wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
779 s->s3->wpend_type = type;
780 s->s3->wpend_ret = nw;
782 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw);
785 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf);
792 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
801 if (tot == len) { /* done? */
802 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
803 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
810 if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
811 nw = s->max_send_fragment;
815 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
817 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
823 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
824 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
826 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
827 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
829 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
831 if ((i == (int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
833 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
843 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
844 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
846 unsigned char *p, *plen;
847 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
852 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf);
856 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
857 * will happen with non blocking IO
860 return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len));
862 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
863 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
864 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
867 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
871 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
874 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
880 if ((sess == NULL) ||
881 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
882 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) {
884 clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
890 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
896 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
898 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) {
900 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
901 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
904 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
906 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
907 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
908 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
911 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
916 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
918 /* insufficient space */
919 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
924 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
927 if (create_empty_fragment) {
928 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
930 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
931 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
932 * payload, then we can just pretent we simply have two headers.
934 align = (long)wb->buf + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
935 align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
939 } else if (prefix_len) {
940 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
942 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
943 align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
944 align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
950 /* write the header */
952 *(p++) = type & 0xff;
955 *(p++) = (s->version >> 8);
957 * Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
958 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
960 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
961 && !s->renegotiate && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
964 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
966 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
969 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
970 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
971 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
972 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
973 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
977 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
978 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
979 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
985 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
986 wr->data = p + eivlen;
987 wr->length = (int)len;
988 wr->input = (unsigned char *)buf;
991 * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data
994 /* first we compress */
995 if (s->compress != NULL) {
996 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) {
997 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
1001 memcpy(wr->data, wr->input, wr->length);
1002 wr->input = wr->data;
1006 * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from
1007 * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the
1011 if (mac_size != 0) {
1012 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &(p[wr->length + eivlen]), 1) < 0)
1014 wr->length += mac_size;
1022 * if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) goto err;
1024 wr->length += eivlen;
1027 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 1) < 1)
1030 /* record length after mac and block padding */
1031 s2n(wr->length, plen);
1033 if (s->msg_callback)
1034 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, plen - 5, 5, s,
1035 s->msg_callback_arg);
1038 * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
1041 wr->type = type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
1042 wr->length += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1044 if (create_empty_fragment) {
1046 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
1052 /* now let's set up wb */
1053 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
1056 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
1059 s->s3->wpend_tot = len;
1060 s->s3->wpend_buf = buf;
1061 s->s3->wpend_type = type;
1062 s->s3->wpend_ret = len;
1064 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1065 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len);
1070 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
1071 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
1075 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf);
1078 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
1079 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
1080 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
1081 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type)) {
1082 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
1088 if (s->wbio != NULL) {
1089 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
1090 i = BIO_write(s->wbio,
1091 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
1092 (unsigned int)wb->left);
1094 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
1097 if (i == wb->left) {
1100 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1101 return (s->s3->wpend_ret);
1102 } else if (i <= 0) {
1103 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
1105 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
1106 * using a datagram service
1118 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1119 * 'type' is one of the following:
1121 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1122 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1123 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1125 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1126 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1128 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1129 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
1130 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
1131 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1132 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1133 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1134 * Change cipher spec protocol
1135 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1137 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1138 * Handshake protocol
1139 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1140 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1141 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1142 * Application data protocol
1143 * none of our business
1145 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
1150 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
1152 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
1153 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
1156 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
1157 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek
1159 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
1160 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1164 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1165 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1167 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1168 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1173 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
1176 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
1179 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1180 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1181 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1186 * Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1189 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) {
1190 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1191 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1195 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1200 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1203 * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
1204 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
1205 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1206 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
1208 rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
1210 /* get new packet if necessary */
1211 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) {
1212 ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
1217 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1219 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1220 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1221 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
1222 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1223 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1228 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1231 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
1233 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1237 if (type == rr->type) { /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1238 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
1240 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1241 * doing a handshake for the first time
1243 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1244 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
1245 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1246 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1253 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
1256 n = (unsigned int)len;
1258 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
1262 if (rr->length == 0) {
1263 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1265 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
1266 && s->s3->rbuf.left == 0)
1267 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1274 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1275 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello).
1279 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
1280 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1283 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
1284 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1285 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
1287 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1288 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1289 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1290 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
1291 } else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
1292 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
1293 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
1294 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
1296 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1297 else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) {
1298 tls1_process_heartbeat(s);
1300 /* Exit and notify application to read again */
1302 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1303 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1304 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1309 if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
1310 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1312 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
1314 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1316 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1320 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1321 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1326 * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1327 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1328 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1331 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1333 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1334 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1335 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
1336 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1338 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1339 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1340 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
1341 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1342 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1346 if (s->msg_callback)
1347 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1348 s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s,
1349 s->msg_callback_arg);
1351 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1352 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1353 !s->s3->renegotiate) {
1354 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1355 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
1356 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1360 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1361 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1365 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1366 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */
1369 * In the case where we try to read application data,
1370 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1371 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1372 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world
1374 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1375 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1376 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1377 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1384 * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
1385 * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
1390 * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1391 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
1392 * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1395 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1396 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1397 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1398 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1399 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1400 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1401 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
1403 * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1406 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1409 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2) {
1410 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1411 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1413 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1415 if (s->msg_callback)
1416 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1417 s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1419 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1420 cb = s->info_callback;
1421 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1422 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1425 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1426 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1429 if (alert_level == 1) { /* warning */
1430 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1431 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
1432 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1436 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1437 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1438 * alert because if application tried to renegotiatie it
1439 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1440 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1441 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1443 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
1444 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1445 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1448 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1449 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
1452 } else if (alert_level == 2) { /* fatal */
1455 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1456 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1457 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1458 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
1459 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
1460 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1461 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
1464 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1465 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1472 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
1474 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1479 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1481 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know exactly
1482 * what the record payload has to look like
1484 if ((rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1485 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
1486 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1487 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1491 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1492 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
1493 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1494 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1498 if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK)) {
1499 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1500 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1504 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
1508 if (s->msg_callback)
1509 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
1510 rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1512 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
1513 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1520 * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
1522 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake) {
1523 if (((s->state & SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1524 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) {
1525 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences
1526 * are not as expected (and because this is
1527 * not really needed for clients except for
1528 * detecting protocol violations): */
1529 s->state = SSL_ST_BEFORE | (s->server)
1530 ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1532 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1537 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1541 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1545 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1546 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */
1549 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1550 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1551 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1552 * problems in the blocking world
1554 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1555 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1556 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1557 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1566 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1568 * TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types: TLS v1.2 give
1569 * an unexpected message alert.
1571 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION) {
1576 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1577 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1579 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1581 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1583 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1584 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that should not
1585 * happen when type != rr->type
1587 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1588 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1590 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1592 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1593 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1594 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1595 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1596 * started), we will indulge it.
1598 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1599 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1600 (((s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1601 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1602 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1603 ) || ((s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1604 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1605 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1608 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1611 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1612 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1619 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1624 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1630 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1631 i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1633 i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1635 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL) {
1636 if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0) {
1637 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
1639 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1643 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1644 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
1648 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, i))
1652 * we have to record the message digest at this point so we can get it
1653 * before we read the finished message
1655 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) {
1656 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1657 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1659 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1660 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1663 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
1665 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1667 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1670 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = i;
1675 int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1677 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1678 desc = s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1679 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
1680 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have
1681 * protocol_version alerts */
1684 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1685 if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
1686 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
1688 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
1689 s->s3->send_alert[0] = level;
1690 s->s3->send_alert[1] = desc;
1691 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
1692 return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1694 * else data is still being written out, we will get written some time in
1700 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1703 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
1705 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0;
1706 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1708 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
1711 * Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now. If the
1712 * message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO, we will not
1715 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1716 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1718 if (s->msg_callback)
1719 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert,
1720 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1722 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1723 cb = s->info_callback;
1724 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1725 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1728 j = (s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1];
1729 cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j);