2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
116 #include "ssl_locl.h"
117 #include <openssl/evp.h>
118 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
119 #include <openssl/rand.h>
121 #ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
122 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
125 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
126 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
127 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
128 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) || \
129 defined(__INTEL__) ) \
131 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
132 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
135 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
136 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
137 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
139 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
141 /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
142 * packet by another n bytes.
143 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
144 * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
145 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
146 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
153 if (n <= 0) return n;
157 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
161 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
162 align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
163 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
168 /* start with empty packet ... */
171 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
173 /* check if next packet length is large
174 * enough to justify payload alignment... */
175 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
176 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
177 && (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128)
179 /* Note that even if packet is corrupted
180 * and its length field is insane, we can
181 * only be led to wrong decision about
182 * whether memmove will occur or not.
183 * Header values has no effect on memmove
184 * arguments and therefore no buffer
185 * overrun can be triggered. */
186 memmove (rb->buf+align,pkt,left);
190 s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
191 s->packet_length = 0;
192 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
195 /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets
196 * because the read operation returns the whole packet
197 * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
200 if (left == 0 && extend)
202 if (left > 0 && n > left)
206 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
215 /* else we need to read more data */
217 len = s->packet_length;
219 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
220 * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
221 * 'left' extra ones at the end */
222 if (s->packet != pkt) /* len > 0 */
224 memmove(pkt, s->packet, len+left);
226 rb->offset = len + align;
229 if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) /* does not happen */
231 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
236 /* ignore max parameter */
242 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
243 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
248 /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf
249 * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to
250 * len+max if possible) */
255 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
256 i=BIO_read(s->rbio,pkt+len+left, max-left);
260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
267 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
270 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
274 /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because
275 * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed
276 * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */
280 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
284 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
287 s->packet_length += n;
288 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
292 /* MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that will
293 * be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an attacker
294 * could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and cause
295 * ssl3_get_record to loop forever. */
296 #define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32
299 * Call this to get a new input record.
300 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
301 * or non-blocking IO.
302 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
303 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
304 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
305 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
307 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
308 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
310 int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
311 int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
315 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
317 unsigned mac_size, orig_len;
319 unsigned empty_record_count = 0;
324 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
325 extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
328 if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra)
330 /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
331 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
332 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
337 /* check if we have the header */
338 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
339 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
341 n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
342 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
343 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
347 s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
349 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
353 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
356 fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
359 /* Lets check version */
360 if (!s->first_packet)
362 if (version != s->version)
364 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
365 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00) && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
366 /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
367 s->version = (unsigned short)version;
368 al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
373 if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
379 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
381 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
382 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
386 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
389 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
391 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
393 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
395 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
396 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
397 /* now n == rr->length,
398 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
401 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
403 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
404 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
406 rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
408 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
409 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
410 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
411 * the decryption or by the decompression
412 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
413 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
415 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
416 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
418 /* check is not needed I believe */
419 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
421 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
422 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
426 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
429 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
432 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
433 * 1: if the padding is valid
434 * -1: if the padding is invalid
438 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
439 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
444 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
445 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
449 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
450 if ((sess != NULL) &&
451 (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
452 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL))
454 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
455 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
456 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
457 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
458 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
460 /* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */
461 orig_len = rr->length+((unsigned int)rr->type>>8);
463 /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
464 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
465 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
466 * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
468 if (orig_len < mac_size ||
469 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
470 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
471 orig_len < mac_size+1))
473 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
474 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
478 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
480 /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
481 * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
482 * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
483 * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
486 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
487 rr->length -= mac_size;
491 /* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len|
492 * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
493 * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
494 rr->length -= mac_size;
495 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
498 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
499 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
501 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
507 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
508 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
509 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
510 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
511 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
512 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
513 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
517 /* r->length is now just compressed */
518 if (s->expand != NULL)
520 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
522 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
523 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
526 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
528 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
529 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
534 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
536 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
537 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
543 * So at this point the following is true
544 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
545 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
546 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
547 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
551 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
554 /* just read a 0 length packet */
557 empty_record_count++;
558 if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS)
560 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
561 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
568 fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
574 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
579 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
581 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
585 rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
586 i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,
587 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);
597 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
603 wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
604 i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,
605 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
606 wr->input,(int)wr->length);
617 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
618 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
620 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
622 const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
625 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
626 unsigned int max_send_fragment;
628 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
631 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
632 OPENSSL_assert(s->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX);
636 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
638 i=s->handshake_func(s);
639 if (i < 0) return(i);
642 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
647 /* ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write
648 * out than the the original len from a write which didn't complete
649 * for non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding
650 * the check for this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as
651 * it must never be possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large
652 * number that will then promptly send beyond the end of the users
653 * buffer ... so we trap and report the error in a way the user
658 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
662 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
663 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
666 i = ssl3_write_pending(s,type,&buf[tot],s->s3->wpend_tot);
669 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
673 tot += i; /* this might be last fragment */
676 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
678 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
679 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
680 * jumbo buffer to accomodate up to 8 records, but the
681 * compromise is considered worthy.
683 if (type==SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
684 len >= 4*(int)(max_send_fragment=s->max_send_fragment) &&
685 s->compress==NULL && s->msg_callback==NULL &&
686 SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
687 EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK)
689 unsigned char aad[13];
690 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
693 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
694 if ((max_send_fragment&0xfff) == 0)
695 max_send_fragment -= 512;
697 if (tot==0 || wb->buf==NULL) /* allocate jumbo buffer */
699 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
701 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
702 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
703 max_send_fragment,NULL);
705 if (len>=8*(int)max_send_fragment) packlen *= 8;
708 wb->buf=OPENSSL_malloc(packlen);
711 else if (tot==len) /* done? */
713 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
721 if (n < 4*max_send_fragment)
723 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
728 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
730 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
738 if (n >= 8*max_send_fragment)
739 nw = max_send_fragment*(mb_param.interleave=8);
741 nw = max_send_fragment*(mb_param.interleave=4);
743 memcpy(aad,s->s3->write_sequence,8);
745 aad[9]=(unsigned char)(s->version>>8);
746 aad[10]=(unsigned char)(s->version);
753 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
754 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
755 sizeof(mb_param),&mb_param);
757 if (packlen<=0 || packlen>(int)wb->len) /* never happens */
759 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
764 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
765 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
768 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
769 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
770 sizeof(mb_param),&mb_param)<=0)
773 s->s3->write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
774 if (s->s3->write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave)
777 while (j>=0 && (++s->s3->write_sequence[j--])==0) ;
783 s->s3->wpend_tot = nw;
784 s->s3->wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
785 s->s3->wpend_type= type;
786 s->s3->wpend_ret = nw;
788 i = ssl3_write_pending(s,type,&buf[tot],nw);
793 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf);
801 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
811 if (tot==len) /* done? */
813 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
815 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
824 if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
825 nw=s->max_send_fragment;
829 i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
832 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
838 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
839 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
841 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
842 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
843 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
845 if ((i==(int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
847 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
857 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
858 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
860 unsigned char *p,*plen;
861 int i,mac_size,clear=0;
866 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
870 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
871 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
873 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
875 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
876 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
878 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
881 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
885 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
888 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
894 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
895 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
896 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
899 clear=s->enc_write_ctx?0:1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
907 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
912 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
913 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
915 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
916 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
918 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
920 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
921 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
922 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
923 * together with the actual payload) */
924 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
929 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
931 /* insufficient space */
932 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
937 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
940 if (create_empty_fragment)
942 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
943 /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks,
944 * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so
945 * if we want to align the real payload, then we can
946 * just pretent we simply have two headers. */
947 align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
948 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
955 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
959 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
960 align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
961 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
967 /* write the header */
972 *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
973 /* Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256
974 * bytes and record version number > TLS 1.0
976 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
978 && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
981 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
983 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
986 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
987 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s))
989 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
990 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
992 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
996 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
997 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
998 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
1005 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
1006 wr->data=p + eivlen;
1007 wr->length=(int)len;
1008 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
1010 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
1013 /* first we compress */
1014 if (s->compress != NULL)
1016 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
1018 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
1024 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
1028 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
1029 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
1030 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
1034 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + eivlen]),1) < 0)
1036 wr->length+=mac_size;
1044 /* if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0)
1046 wr->length += eivlen;
1049 if(s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1)<1) goto err;
1051 /* record length after mac and block padding */
1052 s2n(wr->length,plen);
1054 if (s->msg_callback)
1055 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, plen - 5, 5, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1057 /* we should now have
1058 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
1059 * wr->length long */
1060 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
1061 wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1063 if (create_empty_fragment)
1065 /* we are in a recursive call;
1066 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
1071 /* now let's set up wb */
1072 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
1074 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
1075 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
1076 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
1077 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
1078 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
1080 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1081 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
1086 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
1087 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
1091 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
1094 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
1095 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
1096 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
1097 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
1099 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
1106 if (s->wbio != NULL)
1108 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
1109 i=BIO_write(s->wbio,
1110 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
1111 (unsigned int)wb->left);
1115 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
1122 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1123 return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
1126 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION ||
1127 s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
1128 /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole
1129 point in using a datagram service */
1140 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1141 * 'type' is one of the following:
1143 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1144 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1145 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1147 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1148 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1150 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1151 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
1152 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
1153 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1154 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1155 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1156 * Change cipher spec protocol
1157 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1159 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1160 * Handshake protocol
1161 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1162 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1163 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1164 * Application data protocol
1165 * none of our business
1167 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
1172 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
1174 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
1175 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
1178 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) ||
1179 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
1181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1185 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1186 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1188 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1189 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1194 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1197 len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
1200 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1201 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1202 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1206 /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
1208 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
1210 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1211 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1212 if (i < 0) return(i);
1215 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1220 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1223 * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
1224 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
1225 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1226 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
1228 rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
1230 /* get new packet if necessary */
1231 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
1233 ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
1234 if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
1237 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1239 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1240 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1241 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
1243 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1244 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1248 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
1249 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
1250 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
1253 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1258 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
1260 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
1261 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
1262 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1263 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
1265 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1270 if (len <= 0) return(len);
1272 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
1275 n = (unsigned int)len;
1277 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
1282 if (rr->length == 0)
1284 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1286 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && s->s3->rbuf.left == 0)
1287 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1294 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
1295 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
1297 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
1298 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1301 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
1302 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1303 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
1305 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
1307 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1308 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1309 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
1311 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1313 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
1314 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
1315 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
1317 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1318 else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT)
1320 tls1_process_heartbeat(s);
1322 /* Exit and notify application to read again */
1324 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1325 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1326 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1331 if (dest_maxlen > 0)
1333 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1335 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
1337 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1340 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1344 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1345 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1350 * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1351 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1352 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1355 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1357 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1358 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1359 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
1361 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1363 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1364 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1365 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
1367 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1368 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1372 if (s->msg_callback)
1373 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1375 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1376 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1377 !s->s3->renegotiate)
1379 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1380 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
1382 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1383 if (i < 0) return(i);
1386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1390 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1392 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1395 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1396 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1397 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1398 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1399 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1400 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1401 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1402 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1408 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1409 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1412 /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1413 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
1414 * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1417 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1418 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1419 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1420 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1421 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1422 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1423 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1426 /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/
1428 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1431 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
1433 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1434 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1436 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1438 if (s->msg_callback)
1439 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1441 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1442 cb=s->info_callback;
1443 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1444 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1448 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1449 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1452 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1454 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1455 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1457 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1460 /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1461 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with
1462 * a fatal alert because if application tried to
1463 * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and
1464 * expects it to succeed.
1466 * In future we might have a renegotiation where we
1467 * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on.
1469 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION)
1471 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1472 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1475 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1476 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
1480 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1484 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1485 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1486 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1487 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1488 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1489 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1490 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1495 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1496 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1503 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1505 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1510 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1512 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1513 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1514 if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1515 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1517 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1518 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1522 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1523 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
1525 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1526 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1530 if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK))
1532 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1533 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1537 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
1541 if (s->msg_callback)
1542 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1544 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1545 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1551 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1552 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake)
1554 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1555 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1557 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1558 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1559 * protocol violations): */
1560 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1564 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1569 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1570 if (i < 0) return(i);
1573 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1577 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1579 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1582 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1583 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1584 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1585 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1586 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1587 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1588 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1589 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1600 /* TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types:
1601 * TLS v1.2 give an unexpected message alert.
1603 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION)
1609 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1610 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1612 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1614 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1615 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1616 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1617 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1618 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1619 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1621 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1622 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1623 * but have application data. If the library was
1624 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1625 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1626 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1627 * we will indulge it.
1629 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1630 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1632 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1633 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1634 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1636 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1637 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1638 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1642 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1647 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1648 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1655 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1660 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1666 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1667 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1669 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1671 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
1673 if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0)
1675 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1676 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1680 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1681 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
1684 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
1687 /* we have to record the message digest at
1688 * this point so we can get it before we read
1689 * the finished message */
1690 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
1692 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1693 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1697 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1698 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1701 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
1702 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1705 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1708 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = i;
1713 int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1715 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1716 desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1717 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
1718 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
1719 if (desc < 0) return -1;
1720 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1721 if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
1722 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1724 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1725 s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
1726 s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
1727 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
1728 return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1729 /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
1730 * some time in the future */
1734 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1737 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1739 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1740 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1743 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1747 /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
1748 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
1749 * we will not worry too much. */
1750 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1751 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1753 if (s->msg_callback)
1754 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1756 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1757 cb=s->info_callback;
1758 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1759 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1763 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1764 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);