2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
116 #include "ssl_locl.h"
117 #include <openssl/evp.h>
118 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
119 #include <openssl/rand.h>
121 #ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
122 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
125 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
126 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
127 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
128 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) || \
129 defined(__INTEL__) ) \
131 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
132 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
135 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
136 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
137 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
139 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
141 /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
142 * packet by another n bytes.
143 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
144 * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
145 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
146 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
153 if (n <= 0) return n;
157 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
161 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
162 align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
163 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
168 /* start with empty packet ... */
171 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
173 /* check if next packet length is large
174 * enough to justify payload alignment... */
175 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
176 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
177 && (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128)
179 /* Note that even if packet is corrupted
180 * and its length field is insane, we can
181 * only be led to wrong decision about
182 * whether memmove will occur or not.
183 * Header values has no effect on memmove
184 * arguments and therefore no buffer
185 * overrun can be triggered. */
186 memmove (rb->buf+align,pkt,left);
190 s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
191 s->packet_length = 0;
192 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
195 /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets
196 * because the read operation returns the whole packet
197 * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
200 if (left == 0 && extend)
202 if (left > 0 && n > left)
206 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
215 /* else we need to read more data */
217 len = s->packet_length;
219 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
220 * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
221 * 'left' extra ones at the end */
222 if (s->packet != pkt) /* len > 0 */
224 memmove(pkt, s->packet, len+left);
226 rb->offset = len + align;
229 if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) /* does not happen */
231 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
236 /* ignore max parameter */
242 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
243 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
248 /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf
249 * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to
250 * len+max if possible) */
255 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
256 i=BIO_read(s->rbio,pkt+len+left, max-left);
260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
267 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
270 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
274 /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because
275 * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed
276 * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */
280 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
284 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
287 s->packet_length += n;
288 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
292 /* MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that will
293 * be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an attacker
294 * could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and cause
295 * ssl3_get_record to loop forever. */
296 #define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32
298 /* Call this to get a new input record.
299 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
300 * or non-blocking IO.
301 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
302 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
303 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
304 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
306 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
307 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
309 int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
310 int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
314 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
316 unsigned mac_size, orig_len;
318 unsigned empty_record_count = 0;
323 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
324 extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
327 if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra)
329 /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
330 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
331 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
336 /* check if we have the header */
337 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
338 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
340 n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
341 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
342 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
346 s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
348 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
352 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
355 fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
358 /* Lets check version */
359 if (!s->first_packet)
361 if (version != s->version)
363 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
364 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00) && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
365 /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
366 s->version = (unsigned short)version;
367 al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
372 if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
374 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
378 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
380 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
381 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
385 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
388 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
390 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
392 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
394 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
395 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
396 /* now n == rr->length,
397 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
400 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
402 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
403 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
405 rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
407 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
408 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
409 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
410 * the decryption or by the decompression
411 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
412 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
414 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
415 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
417 /* check is not needed I believe */
418 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
420 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
421 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
425 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
428 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
430 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
431 * 1: if the padding is valid
432 * -1: if the padding is invalid */
435 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
436 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
441 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
442 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
446 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
447 if ((sess != NULL) &&
448 (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
449 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL))
451 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
452 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
453 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
454 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
455 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
457 /* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */
458 orig_len = rr->length+((unsigned int)rr->type>>8);
460 /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
461 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
462 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
463 * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
465 if (orig_len < mac_size ||
466 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
467 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
468 orig_len < mac_size+1))
470 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
471 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
475 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
477 /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
478 * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
479 * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
480 * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
483 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
484 rr->length -= mac_size;
488 /* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len|
489 * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
490 * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
491 rr->length -= mac_size;
492 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
495 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
496 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
498 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
504 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
505 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
506 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
507 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
508 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
509 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
510 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
514 /* r->length is now just compressed */
515 if (s->expand != NULL)
517 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
519 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
520 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
523 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
525 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
526 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
531 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
533 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
534 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
539 /* So at this point the following is true
540 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
541 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
542 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
543 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
547 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
550 /* just read a 0 length packet */
553 empty_record_count++;
554 if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS)
556 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
557 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
564 fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
570 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
575 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
577 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
581 rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
582 i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,
583 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);
593 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
595 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
599 wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
600 i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,
601 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
602 wr->input,(int)wr->length);
613 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
614 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
616 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
618 const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
621 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
622 unsigned int max_send_fragment;
624 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
627 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
628 OPENSSL_assert(s->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX);
632 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
634 i=s->handshake_func(s);
635 if (i < 0) return(i);
638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
643 /* ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write
644 * out than the the original len from a write which didn't complete
645 * for non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding
646 * the check for this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as
647 * it must never be possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large
648 * number that will then promptly send beyond the end of the users
649 * buffer ... so we trap and report the error in a way the user
654 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
658 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
659 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
662 i = ssl3_write_pending(s,type,&buf[tot],s->s3->wpend_tot);
665 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
669 tot += i; /* this might be last fragment */
672 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
674 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
675 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
676 * jumbo buffer to accomodate up to 8 records, but the
677 * compromise is considered worthy.
679 if (type==SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
680 len >= 4*(int)(max_send_fragment=s->max_send_fragment) &&
681 s->compress==NULL && s->msg_callback==NULL &&
682 SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
683 EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK)
685 unsigned char aad[13];
686 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
689 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
690 if ((max_send_fragment&0xfff) == 0)
691 max_send_fragment -= 512;
693 if (tot==0 || wb->buf==NULL) /* allocate jumbo buffer */
695 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
697 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
698 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
699 max_send_fragment,NULL);
701 if (len>=8*(int)max_send_fragment) packlen *= 8;
704 wb->buf=OPENSSL_malloc(packlen);
707 else if (tot==len) /* done? */
709 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
717 if (n < 4*max_send_fragment)
719 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
724 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
726 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
734 if (n >= 8*max_send_fragment)
735 nw = max_send_fragment*(mb_param.interleave=8);
737 nw = max_send_fragment*(mb_param.interleave=4);
739 memcpy(aad,s->s3->write_sequence,8);
741 aad[9]=(unsigned char)(s->version>>8);
742 aad[10]=(unsigned char)(s->version);
749 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
750 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
751 sizeof(mb_param),&mb_param);
753 if (packlen<=0 || packlen>(int)wb->len) /* never happens */
755 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
760 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
761 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
764 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
765 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
766 sizeof(mb_param),&mb_param)<=0)
769 s->s3->write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
770 if (s->s3->write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave)
773 while (j>=0 && (++s->s3->write_sequence[j--])==0) ;
779 s->s3->wpend_tot = nw;
780 s->s3->wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
781 s->s3->wpend_type= type;
782 s->s3->wpend_ret = nw;
784 i = ssl3_write_pending(s,type,&buf[tot],nw);
789 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf);
797 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
807 if (tot==len) /* done? */
809 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
811 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
820 if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
821 nw=s->max_send_fragment;
825 i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
828 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
834 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
835 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
837 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
838 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
839 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
841 if ((i==(int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
843 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
853 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
854 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
856 unsigned char *p,*plen;
857 int i,mac_size,clear=0;
862 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
866 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
867 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
869 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
871 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
872 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
874 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
877 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
881 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
884 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
890 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
891 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
892 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
895 clear=s->enc_write_ctx?0:1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
903 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
908 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
909 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
911 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
912 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
914 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
916 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
917 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
918 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
919 * together with the actual payload) */
920 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
925 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
927 /* insufficient space */
928 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
933 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
936 if (create_empty_fragment)
938 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
939 /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks,
940 * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so
941 * if we want to align the real payload, then we can
942 * just pretent we simply have two headers. */
943 align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
944 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
951 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
955 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
956 align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
957 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
963 /* write the header */
968 *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
969 /* Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256
970 * bytes and record version number > TLS 1.0
972 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
974 && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
977 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
979 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
982 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
983 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s))
985 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
986 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
988 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
992 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
993 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
994 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
1001 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
1002 wr->data=p + eivlen;
1003 wr->length=(int)len;
1004 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
1006 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
1009 /* first we compress */
1010 if (s->compress != NULL)
1012 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
1014 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
1020 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
1024 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
1025 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
1026 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
1030 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + eivlen]),1) < 0)
1032 wr->length+=mac_size;
1040 /* if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0)
1042 wr->length += eivlen;
1045 if(s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1)<1) goto err;
1047 /* record length after mac and block padding */
1048 s2n(wr->length,plen);
1050 if (s->msg_callback)
1051 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, plen - 5, 5, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1053 /* we should now have
1054 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
1055 * wr->length long */
1056 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
1057 wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1059 if (create_empty_fragment)
1061 /* we are in a recursive call;
1062 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
1067 /* now let's set up wb */
1068 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
1070 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
1071 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
1072 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
1073 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
1074 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
1076 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1077 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
1082 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
1083 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
1087 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
1090 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
1091 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
1092 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
1093 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
1095 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
1102 if (s->wbio != NULL)
1104 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
1105 i=BIO_write(s->wbio,
1106 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
1107 (unsigned int)wb->left);
1111 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
1118 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1119 return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
1122 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION ||
1123 s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
1124 /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole
1125 point in using a datagram service */
1135 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1136 * 'type' is one of the following:
1138 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1139 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1140 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1142 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1143 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1145 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1146 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
1147 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
1148 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1149 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1150 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1151 * Change cipher spec protocol
1152 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1154 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1155 * Handshake protocol
1156 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1157 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1158 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1159 * Application data protocol
1160 * none of our business
1162 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
1167 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
1169 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
1170 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
1173 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) ||
1174 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
1176 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1180 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1181 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1183 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1184 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1189 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1192 len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
1195 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1196 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1197 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1201 /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
1203 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
1205 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1206 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1207 if (i < 0) return(i);
1210 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1215 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1217 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
1218 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
1219 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1220 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
1221 rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
1223 /* get new packet if necessary */
1224 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
1226 ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
1227 if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
1230 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1232 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1233 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1234 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
1236 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1237 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1241 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
1242 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
1243 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
1246 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1251 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
1253 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
1254 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
1255 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1256 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
1258 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1259 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1263 if (len <= 0) return(len);
1265 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
1268 n = (unsigned int)len;
1270 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
1275 if (rr->length == 0)
1277 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1279 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && s->s3->rbuf.left == 0)
1280 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1287 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
1288 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
1290 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
1291 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1294 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
1295 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1296 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
1298 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
1300 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1301 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1302 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
1304 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1306 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
1307 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
1308 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
1310 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1311 else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT)
1313 tls1_process_heartbeat(s);
1315 /* Exit and notify application to read again */
1317 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1318 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1319 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1324 if (dest_maxlen > 0)
1326 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1328 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
1330 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1333 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1337 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1338 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1342 /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1343 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1344 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
1346 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1348 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1349 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1350 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
1352 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1354 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1355 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1356 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
1358 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1363 if (s->msg_callback)
1364 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1366 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1367 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1368 !s->s3->renegotiate)
1370 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1371 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
1373 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1374 if (i < 0) return(i);
1377 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1381 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1383 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1386 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1387 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1388 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1389 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1390 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1391 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1392 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1393 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1399 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1400 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1403 /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1404 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
1405 * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1408 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1409 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1410 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1411 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1412 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1413 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1414 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1417 /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/
1419 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1422 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
1424 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1425 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1427 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1429 if (s->msg_callback)
1430 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1432 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1433 cb=s->info_callback;
1434 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1435 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1439 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1440 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1443 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1445 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1446 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1448 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1451 /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1452 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with
1453 * a fatal alert because if application tried to
1454 * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and
1455 * expects it to succeed.
1457 * In future we might have a renegotiation where we
1458 * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on.
1460 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION)
1462 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1463 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1466 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1467 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
1471 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1475 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1476 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1477 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1478 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1479 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1480 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1481 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1486 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1487 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1494 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1496 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1501 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1503 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1504 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1505 if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1506 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1508 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1509 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1513 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1514 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
1516 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1517 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1521 if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK))
1523 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1524 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1528 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
1532 if (s->msg_callback)
1533 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1535 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1536 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1542 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1543 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake)
1545 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1546 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1548 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1549 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1550 * protocol violations): */
1551 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1555 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1560 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1561 if (i < 0) return(i);
1564 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1568 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1570 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1573 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1574 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1575 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1576 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1577 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1578 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1579 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1580 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1590 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1591 /* TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types:
1592 * TLS v1.2 give an unexpected message alert.
1594 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION)
1600 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1601 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1603 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1605 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1606 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1607 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1608 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1609 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1610 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1612 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1613 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1614 * but have application data. If the library was
1615 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1616 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1617 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1618 * we will indulge it.
1620 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1621 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1623 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1624 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1625 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1627 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1628 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1629 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1633 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1638 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1639 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1646 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1651 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1657 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1658 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1660 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1662 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
1664 if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0)
1666 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1667 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1671 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1672 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
1675 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
1678 /* we have to record the message digest at
1679 * this point so we can get it before we read
1680 * the finished message */
1681 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
1683 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1684 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1688 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1689 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1692 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
1693 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1696 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1699 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = i;
1704 int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1706 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1707 desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1708 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
1709 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
1710 if (desc < 0) return -1;
1711 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1712 if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
1713 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1715 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1716 s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
1717 s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
1718 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
1719 return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1720 /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
1721 * some time in the future */
1725 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1728 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1730 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1731 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1734 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1738 /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
1739 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
1740 * we will not worry too much. */
1741 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1742 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1744 if (s->msg_callback)
1745 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1747 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1748 cb=s->info_callback;
1749 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1750 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1754 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1755 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);