2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
115 #include "ssl_locl.h"
116 #include <openssl/evp.h>
117 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
119 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
120 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
121 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
123 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
125 /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
126 * packet by another n bytes.
127 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
128 * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
129 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
130 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
136 /* start with empty packet ... */
137 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0)
138 s->s3->rbuf.offset = 0;
139 s->packet = s->s3->rbuf.buf + s->s3->rbuf.offset;
140 s->packet_length = 0;
141 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
144 /* extend reads should not span multiple packets for DTLS */
145 if ( SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION &&
148 if ( s->s3->rbuf.left > 0 && n > s->s3->rbuf.left)
149 n = s->s3->rbuf.left;
152 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
153 if (s->s3->rbuf.left >= (int)n)
157 s->s3->rbuf.offset+=n;
161 /* else we need to read more data */
166 /* avoid buffer overflow */
167 int max_max = s->s3->rbuf.len - s->packet_length;
171 if (n > max) /* does not happen */
173 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
177 off = s->packet_length;
178 newb = s->s3->rbuf.left;
179 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
180 * 'off' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
181 * 'newb' extra ones at the end */
182 if (s->packet != s->s3->rbuf.buf)
185 memmove(s->s3->rbuf.buf, s->packet, off+newb);
186 s->packet = s->s3->rbuf.buf;
191 /* Now we have off+newb bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and need
192 * to read in more until we have off+n (up to off+max if possible) */
197 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
198 i=BIO_read(s->rbio, &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[off+newb]), max-newb);
202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
208 s->s3->rbuf.left = newb;
214 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
215 s->s3->rbuf.offset = off + n;
216 s->s3->rbuf.left = newb - n;
217 s->packet_length += n;
218 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
222 /* Call this to get a new input record.
223 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
224 * or non-blocking IO.
225 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
226 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
227 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
228 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
230 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
231 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
233 int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
234 int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
238 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
240 unsigned int mac_size;
243 int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0;
244 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
249 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
250 extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
253 if (extra != s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE)
255 /* actually likely an application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
256 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
262 /* check if we have the header */
263 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
264 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
266 n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
267 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
268 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
272 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
276 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
279 /* Lets check version */
286 if (version != s->version)
288 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
289 /* Send back error using their
290 * version number :-) */
292 al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
297 if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
299 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
303 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
305 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
306 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
310 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
313 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
315 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
317 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
319 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
320 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
321 /* now n == rr->length,
322 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
325 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
327 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
328 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
330 rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
332 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
333 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
334 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
335 * the decryption or by the decompression
336 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
337 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
339 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
340 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
342 /* check is not needed I believe */
343 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
345 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
346 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
350 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
353 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
357 /* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
360 /* Otherwise enc_err == -1, which indicates bad padding
361 * (rec->length has not been changed in this case).
362 * To minimize information leaked via timing, we will perform
363 * the MAC computation anyway. */
364 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
368 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
369 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
373 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
374 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
375 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
376 (s->read_hash == NULL))
381 mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash);
383 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
385 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
386 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
387 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
390 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
393 /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
394 if (rr->length >= mac_size)
396 rr->length -= mac_size;
397 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
401 /* record (minus padding) is too short to contain a MAC */
402 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
403 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
404 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
407 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
411 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
412 if (mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0)
414 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
418 if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac)
420 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
421 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
422 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
423 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
424 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
425 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
426 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
430 /* r->length is now just compressed */
431 if (s->expand != NULL)
433 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
435 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
436 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
439 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
441 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
447 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
449 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
450 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
455 /* So at this point the following is true
456 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
457 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
458 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
459 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
463 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
466 /* just read a 0 length packet */
467 if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
472 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
477 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
482 rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
483 i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,
484 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);
494 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
499 wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
500 i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,
501 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
502 wr->input,(int)wr->length);
512 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
513 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
515 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
517 const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
518 unsigned int tot,n,nw;
521 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
525 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
527 i=s->handshake_func(s);
528 if (i < 0) return(i);
531 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
539 if (n > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
540 nw=SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
544 i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
552 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
553 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
555 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
556 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
557 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
567 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
568 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
570 unsigned char *p,*plen;
571 int i,mac_size,clear=0;
577 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
578 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
579 if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0)
580 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
582 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
583 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
585 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
588 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
591 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
598 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
599 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
600 (s->write_hash == NULL))
606 mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->write_hash);
608 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
609 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
611 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
612 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
614 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
616 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
617 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
618 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
619 * together with the actual payload) */
620 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
624 if (s->s3->wbuf.len < (size_t)prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE)
626 /* insufficient space */
627 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
632 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
635 p = wb->buf + prefix_len;
637 /* write the header */
642 *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
643 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
645 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
649 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
652 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
654 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
657 /* first we compress */
658 if (s->compress != NULL)
660 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
662 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
668 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
672 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
673 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
674 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
678 s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length]),1);
679 wr->length+=mac_size;
684 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
685 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
687 /* record length after mac and block padding */
688 s2n(wr->length,plen);
690 /* we should now have
691 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
693 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
694 wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
696 if (create_empty_fragment)
698 /* we are in a recursive call;
699 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
704 /* now let's set up wb */
705 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
708 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
709 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
710 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
711 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
712 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
714 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
715 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
720 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
721 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
727 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
728 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
729 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
730 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
732 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
741 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
743 (char *)&(s->s3->wbuf.buf[s->s3->wbuf.offset]),
744 (unsigned int)s->s3->wbuf.left);
748 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
751 if (i == s->s3->wbuf.left)
754 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
755 return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
759 s->s3->wbuf.offset+=i;
764 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
765 * 'type' is one of the following:
767 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
768 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
769 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
771 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
772 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
774 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
775 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
776 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
777 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
778 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
779 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
780 * Change cipher spec protocol
781 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
783 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
785 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
786 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
787 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
788 * Application data protocol
789 * none of our business
791 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
796 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
798 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
799 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
802 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
803 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
805 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
809 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
810 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
812 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
813 unsigned char *dst = buf;
818 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
821 len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
824 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
825 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
826 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
830 /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
832 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
834 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
835 i=s->handshake_func(s);
836 if (i < 0) return(i);
839 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
844 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
846 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
847 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
848 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
849 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
852 /* get new packet if necessary */
853 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
855 ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
856 if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
859 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
861 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
862 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
863 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
865 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
866 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
870 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
871 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
872 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
875 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
880 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
882 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
883 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
884 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
885 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
887 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
888 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
892 if (len <= 0) return(len);
894 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
897 n = (unsigned int)len;
899 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
906 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
914 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
915 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
917 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
918 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
921 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
922 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
923 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
925 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
927 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
928 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
929 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
931 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
933 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
934 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
935 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
940 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
942 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
944 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
947 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
951 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
952 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
956 /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
957 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
958 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
960 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
962 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
963 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
964 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
966 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
968 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
969 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
970 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
972 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
973 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
978 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
980 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
981 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
985 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
987 i=s->handshake_func(s);
988 if (i < 0) return(i);
991 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
995 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
997 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1000 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1001 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1002 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1003 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1004 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1005 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1006 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1007 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1013 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1014 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1018 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
1020 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1021 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1023 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1025 if (s->msg_callback)
1026 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1028 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1029 cb=s->info_callback;
1030 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1031 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1035 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1036 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1039 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1041 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1042 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1044 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1048 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1052 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1053 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1054 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1055 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1056 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1057 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1058 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1063 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1064 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1071 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1073 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1078 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1080 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1081 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1082 if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1083 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1085 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1086 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1090 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1091 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
1093 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1094 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1100 if (s->msg_callback)
1101 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1103 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1104 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1110 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1111 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake)
1113 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1114 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1116 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1117 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1118 * protocol violations): */
1119 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1123 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1127 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1128 if (i < 0) return(i);
1131 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1135 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1137 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1140 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1141 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1142 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1143 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1144 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1145 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1146 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1147 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1157 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1158 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1159 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
1165 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1166 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1168 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1170 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1171 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1172 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1173 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1174 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1175 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1177 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1178 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1179 * but have application data. If the library was
1180 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1181 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1182 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1183 * we will indulge it.
1185 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1186 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1188 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1189 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1190 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1192 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1193 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1194 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1198 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1203 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1204 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1211 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1216 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1222 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1223 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1225 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1227 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
1229 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1230 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
1233 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
1236 /* we have to record the message digest at
1237 * this point so we can get it before we read
1238 * the finished message */
1239 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
1241 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1242 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1246 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1247 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1250 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
1251 &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
1252 &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
1253 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1258 void ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1260 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1261 desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1262 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
1263 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
1264 if (desc < 0) return;
1265 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1266 if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
1267 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1269 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1270 s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
1271 s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
1272 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
1273 s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1274 /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
1275 * some time in the future */
1278 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1281 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1283 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1284 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1287 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1291 /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
1292 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
1293 * we will not worry too much. */
1294 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1295 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1297 if (s->msg_callback)
1298 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1300 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1301 cb=s->info_callback;
1302 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1303 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1307 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1308 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);