2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
116 #include "ssl_locl.h"
117 #include <openssl/evp.h>
118 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
119 #include <openssl/rand.h>
121 #ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
122 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
125 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
126 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
127 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
128 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) || \
129 defined(__INTEL__) ) \
131 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
132 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
135 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
136 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
137 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
139 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
141 /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
142 * packet by another n bytes.
143 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
144 * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
145 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
146 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
153 if (n <= 0) return n;
157 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
161 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
162 align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
163 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
168 /* start with empty packet ... */
171 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
173 /* check if next packet length is large
174 * enough to justify payload alignment... */
175 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
176 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
177 && (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128)
179 /* Note that even if packet is corrupted
180 * and its length field is insane, we can
181 * only be led to wrong decision about
182 * whether memmove will occur or not.
183 * Header values has no effect on memmove
184 * arguments and therefore no buffer
185 * overrun can be triggered. */
186 memmove (rb->buf+align,pkt,left);
190 s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
191 s->packet_length = 0;
192 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
195 /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets
196 * because the read operation returns the whole packet
197 * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
200 if (left > 0 && n > left)
204 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
213 /* else we need to read more data */
215 len = s->packet_length;
217 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
218 * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
219 * 'left' extra ones at the end */
220 if (s->packet != pkt) /* len > 0 */
222 memmove(pkt, s->packet, len+left);
224 rb->offset = len + align;
227 if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) /* does not happen */
229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
234 /* ignore max parameter */
240 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
241 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
246 /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf
247 * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to
248 * len+max if possible) */
253 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
254 i=BIO_read(s->rbio,pkt+len+left, max-left);
258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
265 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
268 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
272 /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because
273 * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed
274 * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */
278 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
282 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
285 s->packet_length += n;
286 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
290 /* Call this to get a new input record.
291 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
292 * or non-blocking IO.
293 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
294 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
295 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
296 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
298 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
299 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
301 int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
302 int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
306 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
308 unsigned mac_size, orig_len;
314 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
315 extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
318 if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra)
320 /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
321 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
322 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
327 /* check if we have the header */
328 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
329 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
331 n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
332 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
333 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
337 s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
339 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
343 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
346 fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
349 /* Lets check version */
350 if (!s->first_packet)
352 if (version != s->version)
354 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
355 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00) && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
356 /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
357 s->version = (unsigned short)version;
358 al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
363 if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
365 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
369 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
371 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
376 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
379 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
381 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
383 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
385 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
386 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
387 /* now n == rr->length,
388 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
391 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
393 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
394 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
396 rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
398 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
399 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
400 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
401 * the decryption or by the decompression
402 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
403 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
405 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
406 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
408 /* check is not needed I believe */
409 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
411 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
412 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
416 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
419 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
421 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
422 * 1: if the padding is valid
423 * -1: if the padding is invalid */
426 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
427 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
432 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
433 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
437 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
438 if ((sess != NULL) &&
439 (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
440 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL))
442 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
443 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
444 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
445 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
446 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
448 /* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */
449 orig_len = rr->length+((unsigned int)rr->type>>8);
451 /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
452 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
453 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
454 * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
456 if (orig_len < mac_size ||
457 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
458 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
459 orig_len < mac_size+1))
461 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
462 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
466 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
468 /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
469 * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
470 * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
471 * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
474 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
475 rr->length -= mac_size;
479 /* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len|
480 * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
481 * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
482 rr->length -= mac_size;
483 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
486 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
487 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
489 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
495 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
496 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
497 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
498 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
499 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
500 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
501 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
505 /* r->length is now just compressed */
506 if (s->expand != NULL)
508 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
510 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
511 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
514 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
516 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
517 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
522 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
524 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
525 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
530 /* So at this point the following is true
531 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
532 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
533 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
534 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
538 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
541 /* just read a 0 length packet */
542 if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
545 fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
551 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
556 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
558 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
562 rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
563 i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,
564 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);
574 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
576 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
580 wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
581 i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,
582 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
583 wr->input,(int)wr->length);
594 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
595 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
597 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
599 const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
602 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
603 unsigned int max_send_fragment;
605 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
608 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
609 OPENSSL_assert(s->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX);
613 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
615 i=s->handshake_func(s);
616 if (i < 0) return(i);
619 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
624 /* ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write
625 * out than the the original len from a write which didn't complete
626 * for non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding
627 * the check for this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as
628 * it must never be possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large
629 * number that will then promptly send beyond the end of the users
630 * buffer ... so we trap and report the error in a way the user
635 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
639 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
640 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
643 i = ssl3_write_pending(s,type,&buf[tot],s->s3->wpend_tot);
646 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
650 tot += i; /* this might be last fragment */
653 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
655 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
656 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
657 * jumbo buffer to accomodate up to 8 records, but the
658 * compromise is considered worthy.
660 if (type==SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
661 len >= 4*(int)(max_send_fragment=s->max_send_fragment) &&
662 s->compress==NULL && s->msg_callback==NULL &&
663 SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
664 EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK)
666 unsigned char aad[13];
667 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
670 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
671 if ((max_send_fragment&0xfff) == 0)
672 max_send_fragment -= 512;
674 if (tot==0 || wb->buf==NULL) /* allocate jumbo buffer */
676 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
678 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
679 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
680 max_send_fragment,NULL);
682 if (len>=8*(int)max_send_fragment) packlen *= 8;
685 wb->buf=OPENSSL_malloc(packlen);
688 else if (tot==len) /* done? */
690 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
698 if (n < 4*max_send_fragment)
700 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
705 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
707 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
715 if (n >= 8*max_send_fragment)
716 nw = max_send_fragment*(mb_param.interleave=8);
718 nw = max_send_fragment*(mb_param.interleave=4);
720 memcpy(aad,s->s3->write_sequence,8);
722 aad[9]=(unsigned char)(s->version>>8);
723 aad[10]=(unsigned char)(s->version);
730 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
731 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
732 sizeof(mb_param),&mb_param);
734 if (packlen<=0 || packlen>(int)wb->len) /* never happens */
736 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
741 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
742 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
745 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
746 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
747 sizeof(mb_param),&mb_param)<=0)
750 s->s3->write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
751 if (s->s3->write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave)
754 while (j>=0 && (++s->s3->write_sequence[j--])==0) ;
760 s->s3->wpend_tot = nw;
761 s->s3->wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
762 s->s3->wpend_type= type;
763 s->s3->wpend_ret = nw;
765 i = ssl3_write_pending(s,type,&buf[tot],nw);
770 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf);
778 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
788 if (tot==len) /* done? */
790 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
792 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
801 if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
802 nw=s->max_send_fragment;
806 i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
809 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
815 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
816 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
818 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
819 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
820 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
822 if ((i==(int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
824 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
834 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
835 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
837 unsigned char *p,*plen;
838 int i,mac_size,clear=0;
843 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
847 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
848 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
850 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
852 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
853 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
855 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
858 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
862 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
865 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
871 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
872 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
873 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
876 clear=s->enc_write_ctx?0:1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
884 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
889 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
890 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
892 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
893 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
895 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
897 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
898 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
899 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
900 * together with the actual payload) */
901 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
906 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
908 /* insufficient space */
909 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
914 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
917 if (create_empty_fragment)
919 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
920 /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks,
921 * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so
922 * if we want to align the real payload, then we can
923 * just pretent we simply have two headers. */
924 align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
925 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
932 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
936 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
937 align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
938 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
944 /* write the header */
949 *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
950 /* Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256
951 * bytes and record version number > TLS 1.0
953 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
955 && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
958 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
960 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
963 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
964 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s))
966 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
967 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
969 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
973 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
974 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
975 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
982 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
985 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
987 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
990 /* first we compress */
991 if (s->compress != NULL)
993 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
995 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
1001 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
1005 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
1006 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
1007 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
1011 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + eivlen]),1) < 0)
1013 wr->length+=mac_size;
1021 /* if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0)
1023 wr->length += eivlen;
1026 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
1027 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
1029 /* record length after mac and block padding */
1030 s2n(wr->length,plen);
1032 if (s->msg_callback)
1033 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, plen - 5, 5, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1035 /* we should now have
1036 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
1037 * wr->length long */
1038 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
1039 wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1041 if (create_empty_fragment)
1043 /* we are in a recursive call;
1044 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
1049 /* now let's set up wb */
1050 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
1052 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
1053 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
1054 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
1055 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
1056 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
1058 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1059 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
1064 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
1065 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
1069 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
1072 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
1073 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
1074 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
1075 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
1077 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
1084 if (s->wbio != NULL)
1086 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
1087 i=BIO_write(s->wbio,
1088 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
1089 (unsigned int)wb->left);
1093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
1100 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1101 return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
1104 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION ||
1105 s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
1106 /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole
1107 point in using a datagram service */
1117 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1118 * 'type' is one of the following:
1120 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1121 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1122 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1124 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1125 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1127 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1128 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
1129 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
1130 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1131 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1132 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1133 * Change cipher spec protocol
1134 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1136 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1137 * Handshake protocol
1138 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1139 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1140 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1141 * Application data protocol
1142 * none of our business
1144 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
1149 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
1151 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
1152 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
1155 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) ||
1156 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
1158 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1162 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1163 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1165 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1166 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1171 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1174 len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
1177 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1178 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1179 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1183 /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
1185 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
1187 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1188 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1189 if (i < 0) return(i);
1192 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1197 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1199 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
1200 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
1201 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1202 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
1203 rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
1205 /* get new packet if necessary */
1206 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
1208 ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
1209 if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
1212 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1214 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1215 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1216 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
1218 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1219 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1223 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
1224 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
1225 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
1228 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1233 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
1235 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
1236 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
1237 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1238 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
1240 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1241 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1245 if (len <= 0) return(len);
1247 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
1250 n = (unsigned int)len;
1252 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
1257 if (rr->length == 0)
1259 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1261 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && s->s3->rbuf.left == 0)
1262 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1269 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
1270 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
1272 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
1273 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1276 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
1277 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1278 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
1280 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
1282 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1283 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1284 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
1286 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1288 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
1289 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
1290 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
1292 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1293 else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT)
1295 tls1_process_heartbeat(s);
1297 /* Exit and notify application to read again */
1299 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1300 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1301 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1306 if (dest_maxlen > 0)
1308 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1310 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
1312 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1315 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1319 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1320 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1324 /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1325 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1326 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
1328 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1330 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1331 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1332 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
1334 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1336 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1337 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1338 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
1340 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1341 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1345 if (s->msg_callback)
1346 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1348 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1349 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1350 !s->s3->renegotiate)
1352 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1353 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
1355 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1356 if (i < 0) return(i);
1359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1363 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1365 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1368 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1369 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1370 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1371 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1372 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1373 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1374 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1375 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1381 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1382 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1385 /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1386 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
1387 * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1390 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1391 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1392 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1393 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1394 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1395 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1396 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1399 /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/
1401 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1404 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
1406 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1407 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1409 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1411 if (s->msg_callback)
1412 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1414 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1415 cb=s->info_callback;
1416 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1417 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1421 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1422 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1425 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1427 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1428 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1430 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1433 /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1434 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with
1435 * a fatal alert because if application tried to
1436 * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and
1437 * expects it to succeed.
1439 * In future we might have a renegotiation where we
1440 * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on.
1442 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION)
1444 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1445 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1448 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1449 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
1453 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1457 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1458 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1459 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1460 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1461 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1462 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1463 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1468 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1469 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1476 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1478 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1483 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1485 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1486 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1487 if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1488 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1490 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1491 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1495 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1496 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
1498 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1499 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1503 if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK))
1505 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1506 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1510 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
1514 if (s->msg_callback)
1515 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1517 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1518 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1524 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1525 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake)
1527 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1528 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1530 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1531 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1532 * protocol violations): */
1533 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1537 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1542 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1543 if (i < 0) return(i);
1546 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1550 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1552 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1555 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1556 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1557 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1558 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1559 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1560 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1561 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1562 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1572 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1573 /* TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types:
1574 * TLS v1.2 give an unexpected message alert.
1576 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION)
1582 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1583 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1585 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1587 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1588 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1589 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1590 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1591 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1592 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1594 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1595 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1596 * but have application data. If the library was
1597 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1598 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1599 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1600 * we will indulge it.
1602 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1603 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1605 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1606 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1607 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1609 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1610 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1611 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1615 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1620 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1621 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1628 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1633 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1639 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1640 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1642 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1644 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
1646 if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0)
1648 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1649 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1653 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1654 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
1657 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
1660 /* we have to record the message digest at
1661 * this point so we can get it before we read
1662 * the finished message */
1663 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
1665 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1666 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1670 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1671 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1674 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
1675 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1678 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1681 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = i;
1686 int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1688 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1689 desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1690 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
1691 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
1692 if (desc < 0) return -1;
1693 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1694 if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
1695 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1697 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1698 s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
1699 s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
1700 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
1701 return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1702 /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
1703 * some time in the future */
1707 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1710 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1712 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1713 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1716 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1720 /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
1721 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
1722 * we will not worry too much. */
1723 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1724 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1726 if (s->msg_callback)
1727 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1729 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1730 cb=s->info_callback;
1731 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1732 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1736 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1737 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);