2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
116 #include "ssl_locl.h"
117 #include <openssl/evp.h>
118 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
119 #include <openssl/rand.h>
121 #ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
122 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
125 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
126 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
127 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
128 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) || \
129 defined(__INTEL__) ) \
131 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
132 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
135 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
136 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
137 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
140 * Return values are as per SSL_read()
142 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
145 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
146 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
147 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
148 * s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
149 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
161 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
165 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
166 align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
167 align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
171 /* start with empty packet ... */
174 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
176 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
179 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
180 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
181 && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) {
183 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
184 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
185 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
186 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
187 * overrun can be triggered.
189 memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
193 s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
194 s->packet_length = 0;
195 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
199 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
200 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
203 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
204 if (left == 0 && extend)
206 if (left > 0 && n > left)
210 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
212 s->packet_length += n;
218 /* else we need to read more data */
220 len = s->packet_length;
221 pkt = rb->buf + align;
223 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
224 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
226 if (s->packet != pkt) { /* len > 0 */
227 memmove(pkt, s->packet, len + left);
229 rb->offset = len + align;
232 if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) { /* does not happen */
233 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
237 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
238 if (!s->read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
239 /* ignore max parameter */
244 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
245 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
250 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
251 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
256 if (s->rbio != NULL) {
257 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
258 i = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
266 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
268 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
273 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
274 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
275 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
277 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
279 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
283 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
286 s->packet_length += n;
287 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
292 * MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that
293 * will be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an
294 * attacker could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and
295 * cause ssl3_get_record to loop forever.
297 #define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32
300 * Call this to get a new input record.
301 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
302 * or non-blocking IO.
303 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
304 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
305 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
306 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
308 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
309 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
311 int ssl_major, ssl_minor, al;
312 int enc_err, n, i, ret = -1;
316 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
318 unsigned mac_size, orig_len;
320 unsigned empty_record_count = 0;
325 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
326 extra = SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
329 if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra) {
331 * An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER set after
332 * ssl3_setup_buffers() was done
334 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
339 /* check if we have the header */
340 if ((s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
341 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
342 n = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
344 return (n); /* error or non-blocking */
345 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
349 s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s,
350 s->msg_callback_arg);
352 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
356 version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor;
359 fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
362 /* Lets check version */
363 if (!s->first_packet) {
364 if (version != s->version) {
365 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
366 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00)
367 && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
368 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
370 * The record is using an incorrect version number, but
371 * what we've got appears to be an alert. We haven't
372 * read the body yet to check whether its a fatal or
373 * not - but chances are it is. We probably shouldn't
374 * send a fatal alert back. We'll just end.
379 * Send back error using their minor version number :-)
381 s->version = (unsigned short)version;
383 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
388 if ((version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
389 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
393 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
394 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
395 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
399 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
402 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
404 if (rr->length > s->packet_length - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
405 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
407 n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1);
409 return (n); /* error or non-blocking io */
411 * now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
416 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
419 * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
420 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
422 rr->input = &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
425 * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points
426 * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either
427 * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into
428 * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer
432 * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length
433 * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff.
436 /* check is not needed I believe */
437 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH + extra) {
438 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
439 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
443 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
444 rr->data = rr->input;
446 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0);
449 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
450 * 1: if the padding is valid
451 * -1: if the padding is invalid
454 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
455 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
459 printf("dec %d\n", rr->length);
462 for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++)
463 printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
468 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
469 if ((sess != NULL) &&
470 (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) {
471 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
472 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
473 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
474 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
475 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
478 * kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type
480 orig_len = rr->length + ((unsigned int)rr->type >> 8);
483 * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
484 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
485 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount
486 * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
488 if (orig_len < mac_size ||
489 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
490 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
491 orig_len < mac_size + 1)) {
492 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
493 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
497 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
499 * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be
500 * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in
501 * constant time from within the record, without leaking the
502 * contents of the padding bytes.
505 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
506 rr->length -= mac_size;
509 * In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len| equals
510 * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for
513 rr->length -= mac_size;
514 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
517 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ );
518 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL
519 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
521 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra + mac_size)
527 * A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
528 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
529 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, we should
530 * not reveal which kind of error occured -- this might become
531 * visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile)
533 al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
534 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
535 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
539 /* r->length is now just compressed */
540 if (s->expand != NULL) {
541 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra) {
542 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
543 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
546 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) {
547 al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
548 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
553 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + extra) {
554 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
555 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
561 * So at this point the following is true
562 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
563 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
564 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
565 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
569 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
570 s->packet_length = 0;
572 /* just read a 0 length packet */
573 if (rr->length == 0) {
574 empty_record_count++;
575 if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) {
576 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
577 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
583 fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type,
590 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
595 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
597 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
601 rr = &(ssl->s3->rrec);
602 i = COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand, rr->comp,
603 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, rr->data,
614 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
616 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
620 wr = &(ssl->s3->wrec);
621 i = COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress, wr->data,
622 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
623 wr->input, (int)wr->length);
629 wr->input = wr->data;
635 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
636 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
638 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
640 const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
643 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
644 unsigned int max_send_fragment;
646 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf);
649 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
650 OPENSSL_assert(s->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX);
654 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) {
655 i = s->handshake_func(s);
659 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
665 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
666 * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
667 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
668 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
669 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
670 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
671 * report the error in a way the user will notice
674 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
679 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
680 * will happen with non blocking IO
683 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->s3->wpend_tot);
685 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
689 tot += i; /* this might be last fragment */
691 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
693 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
694 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
695 * jumbo buffer to accomodate up to 8 records, but the
696 * compromise is considered worthy.
698 if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
699 len >= 4 * (int)(max_send_fragment = s->max_send_fragment) &&
700 s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL &&
701 SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
702 EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher) &
703 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) {
704 unsigned char aad[13];
705 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
708 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
709 if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0)
710 max_send_fragment -= 512;
712 if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
713 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
715 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
716 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
717 max_send_fragment, NULL);
719 if (len >= 8 * (int)max_send_fragment)
724 wb->buf = OPENSSL_malloc(packlen);
726 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
730 } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */
731 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
738 if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) {
739 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
744 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
745 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
752 if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
753 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8);
755 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4);
757 memcpy(aad, s->s3->write_sequence, 8);
759 aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
760 aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
767 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
768 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
769 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param);
771 if (packlen <= 0 || packlen > (int)wb->len) { /* never happens */
772 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
777 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
778 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
781 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
782 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
783 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0)
786 s->s3->write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
787 if (s->s3->write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) {
789 while (j >= 0 && (++s->s3->write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ;
795 s->s3->wpend_tot = nw;
796 s->s3->wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
797 s->s3->wpend_type = type;
798 s->s3->wpend_ret = nw;
800 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw);
802 if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) {
803 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf);
810 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
819 if (tot == len) { /* done? */
820 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
821 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
828 if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
829 nw = s->max_send_fragment;
833 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
835 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
841 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
842 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
844 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
845 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
847 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
849 if ((i == (int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
851 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
861 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
862 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
864 unsigned char *p, *plen;
865 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
870 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf);
874 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
875 * will happen with non blocking IO
878 return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len));
880 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
881 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
882 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
885 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
889 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
892 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
898 if ((sess == NULL) ||
899 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
900 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) {
902 clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
908 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
914 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
916 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) {
918 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
919 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
922 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
924 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
925 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
926 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
929 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
934 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
936 /* insufficient space */
937 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
942 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
945 if (create_empty_fragment) {
946 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
948 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
949 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
950 * payload, then we can just pretent we simply have two headers.
952 align = (long)wb->buf + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
953 align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
957 } else if (prefix_len) {
958 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
960 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
961 align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
962 align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
968 /* write the header */
970 *(p++) = type & 0xff;
973 *(p++) = (s->version >> 8);
975 * Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
976 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
978 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
979 && !s->renegotiate && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
982 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
984 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
987 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
988 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
989 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
990 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
991 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
995 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
996 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
997 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
1003 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
1004 wr->data = p + eivlen;
1005 wr->length = (int)len;
1006 wr->input = (unsigned char *)buf;
1009 * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data
1012 /* first we compress */
1013 if (s->compress != NULL) {
1014 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) {
1015 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
1019 memcpy(wr->data, wr->input, wr->length);
1020 wr->input = wr->data;
1024 * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from
1025 * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the
1029 if (mac_size != 0) {
1030 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &(p[wr->length + eivlen]), 1) < 0)
1032 wr->length += mac_size;
1040 * if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) goto err;
1042 wr->length += eivlen;
1045 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 1) < 1)
1048 /* record length after mac and block padding */
1049 s2n(wr->length, plen);
1051 if (s->msg_callback)
1052 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, plen - 5, 5, s,
1053 s->msg_callback_arg);
1056 * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
1059 wr->type = type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
1060 wr->length += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1062 if (create_empty_fragment) {
1064 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
1070 /* now let's set up wb */
1071 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
1074 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
1077 s->s3->wpend_tot = len;
1078 s->s3->wpend_buf = buf;
1079 s->s3->wpend_type = type;
1080 s->s3->wpend_ret = len;
1082 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1083 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len);
1088 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this
1090 * Return values are as per SSL_write(), i.e.
1092 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
1096 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf);
1099 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
1100 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
1101 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
1102 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type)) {
1103 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
1109 if (s->wbio != NULL) {
1110 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
1111 i = BIO_write(s->wbio,
1112 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
1113 (unsigned int)wb->left);
1115 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
1118 if (i == wb->left) {
1121 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1122 return (s->s3->wpend_ret);
1123 } else if (i <= 0) {
1124 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1126 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
1127 * using a datagram service
1139 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1140 * 'type' is one of the following:
1142 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1143 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1144 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1146 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1147 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1149 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1150 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
1151 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
1152 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1153 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1154 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1155 * Change cipher spec protocol
1156 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1158 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1159 * Handshake protocol
1160 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1161 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1162 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1163 * Application data protocol
1164 * none of our business
1166 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
1171 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
1173 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
1174 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
1177 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
1178 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek
1180 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
1181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1185 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1186 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1188 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1189 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1194 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
1197 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
1200 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1201 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1202 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1207 * Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1210 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) {
1211 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1212 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1221 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1224 * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
1225 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
1226 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1227 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
1229 rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
1231 /* get new packet if necessary */
1232 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) {
1233 ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
1239 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
1240 * record that isn't an alert.
1242 if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT && rr->length != 0)
1243 s->cert->alert_count = 0;
1245 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1247 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1248 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1249 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
1250 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1256 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1259 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
1261 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1265 if (type == rr->type) { /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1266 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
1268 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1269 * doing a handshake for the first time
1271 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1272 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
1273 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1281 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
1284 n = (unsigned int)len;
1286 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
1290 if (rr->length == 0) {
1291 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1293 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
1294 && s->s3->rbuf.left == 0)
1295 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1302 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1303 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello).
1307 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
1308 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1311 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
1312 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1313 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
1315 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1316 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1317 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1318 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
1319 } else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
1320 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
1321 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
1322 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
1324 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1325 else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) {
1326 tls1_process_heartbeat(s);
1328 /* Exit and notify application to read again */
1330 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1331 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1332 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1337 if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
1338 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1340 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
1342 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1344 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1348 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1349 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1354 * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1355 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1356 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1359 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1361 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1362 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1363 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
1364 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1366 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1367 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1368 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
1369 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1370 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1374 if (s->msg_callback)
1375 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1376 s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s,
1377 s->msg_callback_arg);
1379 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1380 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1381 !s->s3->renegotiate) {
1382 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1383 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
1384 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1388 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1389 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1393 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1394 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */
1397 * In the case where we try to read application data,
1398 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1399 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1400 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world
1402 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1403 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1404 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1405 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1412 * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
1413 * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
1418 * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1419 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
1420 * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1423 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1424 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1425 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1426 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1427 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1428 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1429 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
1431 * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1434 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1437 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2) {
1438 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1439 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1441 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1443 if (s->msg_callback)
1444 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1445 s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1447 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1448 cb = s->info_callback;
1449 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1450 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1453 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1454 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1457 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
1458 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1460 s->cert->alert_count++;
1461 if (s->cert->alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) {
1462 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1463 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS);
1467 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
1468 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1472 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1473 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1474 * alert because if application tried to renegotiatie it
1475 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1476 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1477 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1479 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
1480 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1481 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1484 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1485 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
1488 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1491 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1492 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1493 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1494 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
1495 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
1496 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1497 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
1500 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1501 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1508 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
1510 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1515 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1517 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know exactly
1518 * what the record payload has to look like
1520 if ((rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1521 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
1522 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1523 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1527 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1528 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
1529 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1530 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1534 if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK)) {
1535 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1536 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1540 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
1544 if (s->msg_callback)
1545 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
1546 rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1548 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
1549 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1556 * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
1558 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake) {
1559 if (((s->state & SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1560 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) {
1561 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences
1562 * are not as expected (and because this is
1563 * not really needed for clients except for
1564 * detecting protocol violations): */
1565 s->state = SSL_ST_BEFORE | (s->server)
1566 ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1568 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1573 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1577 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1581 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1582 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */
1585 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1586 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1587 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1588 * problems in the blocking world
1590 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1591 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1592 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1593 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1603 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
1604 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
1605 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
1606 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
1607 * record types, using up resources processing them.
1609 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1610 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1612 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1614 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1616 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1617 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that should not
1618 * happen when type != rr->type
1620 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1621 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1623 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1625 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1626 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1627 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1628 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1629 * started), we will indulge it.
1631 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1632 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1633 (((s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1634 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1635 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1636 ) || ((s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1637 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1638 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1641 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1644 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1645 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1652 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1657 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1663 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1664 i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1666 i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1668 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL) {
1669 if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0) {
1670 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1671 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
1672 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1676 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1677 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
1681 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, i))
1685 * we have to record the message digest at this point so we can get it
1686 * before we read the finished message
1688 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) {
1689 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1690 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1692 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1693 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1696 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
1698 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1700 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1703 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = i;
1708 int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1710 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1711 desc = s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1712 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
1713 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have
1714 * protocol_version alerts */
1717 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1718 if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
1719 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
1721 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
1722 s->s3->send_alert[0] = level;
1723 s->s3->send_alert[1] = desc;
1724 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
1725 return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1727 * else data is still being written out, we will get written some time in
1733 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1736 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
1738 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0;
1739 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1741 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
1744 * Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now. If the
1745 * message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO, we will not
1748 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1749 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1751 if (s->msg_callback)
1752 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert,
1753 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1755 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1756 cb = s->info_callback;
1757 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1758 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1761 j = (s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1];
1762 cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j);