2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
115 #include "ssl_locl.h"
116 #include <openssl/evp.h>
117 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
119 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
120 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
121 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
123 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
125 /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
126 * packet by another n bytes.
127 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
128 * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
129 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
130 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
137 if (n <= 0) return n;
141 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
145 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
146 align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
147 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
152 /* start with empty packet ... */
155 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
157 /* check if next packet length is large
158 * enough to justify payload alignment... */
159 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
160 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
161 && (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128)
163 /* Note that even if packet is corrupted
164 * and its length field is insane, we can
165 * only be led to wrong decision about
166 * whether memmove will occur or not.
167 * Header values has no effect on memmove
168 * arguments and therefore no buffer
169 * overrun can be triggered. */
170 memmove (rb->buf+align,pkt,left);
174 s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
175 s->packet_length = 0;
176 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
179 /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets
180 * because the read operation returns the whole packet
181 * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
182 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
184 if (left > 0 && n > left)
188 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
197 /* else we need to read more data */
199 len = s->packet_length;
201 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
202 * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
203 * 'left' extra ones at the end */
204 if (s->packet != pkt) /* len > 0 */
206 memmove(pkt, s->packet, len+left);
208 rb->offset = len + align;
211 if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) /* does not happen */
213 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
218 /* ignore max parameter */
224 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
225 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
230 /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf
231 * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to
232 * len+max if possible) */
237 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
238 i=BIO_read(s->rbio,pkt+len+left, max-left);
242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
249 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
250 SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
252 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
256 /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because
257 * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed
258 * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */
259 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
262 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
266 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
269 s->packet_length += n;
270 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
274 /* Call this to get a new input record.
275 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
276 * or non-blocking IO.
277 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
278 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
279 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
280 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
282 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
283 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
285 int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
286 int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
290 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
298 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
299 extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
302 if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra)
304 /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
305 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
306 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
311 /* check if we have the header */
312 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
313 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
315 n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
316 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
317 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
321 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
325 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
328 fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
331 /* Lets check version */
332 if (!s->first_packet)
334 if (version != s->version)
336 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
337 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00))
338 /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
339 s->version = (unsigned short)version;
340 al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
345 if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
347 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
351 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
353 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
354 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
358 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
361 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
363 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
365 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
367 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
368 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
369 /* now n == rr->length,
370 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
373 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
375 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
376 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
378 rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
380 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
381 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
382 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
383 * the decryption or by the decompression
384 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
385 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
387 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
388 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
390 /* check is not needed I believe */
391 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
393 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
394 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
398 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
400 rr->orig_len=rr->length;
402 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
404 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
405 * 1: if the padding is valid
406 * -1: if the padding is invalid */
409 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
410 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
415 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
416 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
420 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
421 if ((sess != NULL) &&
422 (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
423 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL))
425 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
426 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
427 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
428 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
429 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
431 /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
432 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
433 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
434 * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
436 if (rr->orig_len < mac_size ||
437 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
438 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
439 rr->orig_len < mac_size+1))
441 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
446 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
448 /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
449 * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
450 * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
451 * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
454 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size);
455 rr->length -= mac_size;
459 /* In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len|
460 * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
461 * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
462 rr->length -= mac_size;
463 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
466 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
467 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
469 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
475 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
476 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
477 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
478 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
479 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
480 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
481 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
485 /* r->length is now just compressed */
486 if (s->expand != NULL)
488 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
490 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
491 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
494 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
496 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
497 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
502 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
504 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
505 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
510 /* So at this point the following is true
511 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
512 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
513 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
514 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
518 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
521 /* just read a 0 length packet */
522 if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
525 fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
531 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
536 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
538 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
542 rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
543 i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,
544 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);
554 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
556 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
560 wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
561 i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,
562 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
563 wr->input,(int)wr->length);
574 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
575 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
577 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
579 const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
580 unsigned int tot,n,nw;
583 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
587 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
589 i=s->handshake_func(s);
590 if (i < 0) return(i);
593 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
601 if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
602 nw=s->max_send_fragment;
606 i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
614 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
615 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
617 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
618 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
619 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
629 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
630 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
632 unsigned char *p,*plen;
633 int i,mac_size,clear=0;
637 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
641 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
644 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
645 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
647 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
649 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
650 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
652 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
655 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
658 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
664 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
665 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
666 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
673 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
678 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
679 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
681 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
682 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
684 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
686 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
687 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
688 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
689 * together with the actual payload) */
690 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
695 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
697 /* insufficient space */
698 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
703 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
706 if (create_empty_fragment)
708 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
709 /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks,
710 * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so
711 * if we want to align the real payload, then we can
712 * just pretent we simply have two headers. */
713 align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
714 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
721 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
725 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
726 align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
727 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
733 /* write the header */
738 *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
739 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
741 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
745 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
748 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
750 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
753 /* first we compress */
754 if (s->compress != NULL)
756 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
758 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
764 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
768 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
769 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
770 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
774 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length]),1) < 0)
776 wr->length+=mac_size;
781 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
782 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
784 /* record length after mac and block padding */
785 s2n(wr->length,plen);
787 /* we should now have
788 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
790 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
791 wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
793 if (create_empty_fragment)
795 /* we are in a recursive call;
796 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
801 /* now let's set up wb */
802 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
804 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
805 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
806 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
807 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
808 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
810 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
811 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
816 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
817 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
821 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
824 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
825 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
826 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
827 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
829 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
838 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
840 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
841 (unsigned int)wb->left);
845 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
852 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
853 SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
854 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
855 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
856 return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
859 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION ||
860 s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
861 /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole
862 point in using a datagram service */
872 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
873 * 'type' is one of the following:
875 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
876 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
877 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
879 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
880 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
882 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
883 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
884 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
885 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
886 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
887 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
888 * Change cipher spec protocol
889 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
891 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
893 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
894 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
895 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
896 * Application data protocol
897 * none of our business
899 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
904 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
906 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
907 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
910 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
911 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
913 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
917 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
918 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
920 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
921 unsigned char *dst = buf;
926 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
929 len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
932 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
933 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
934 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
938 /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
940 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
942 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
943 i=s->handshake_func(s);
944 if (i < 0) return(i);
947 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
952 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
954 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
955 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
956 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
957 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
960 /* get new packet if necessary */
961 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
963 ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
964 if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
967 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
969 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
970 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
971 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
973 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
974 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
978 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
979 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
980 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
983 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
988 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
990 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
991 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
992 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
993 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
995 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
996 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1000 if (len <= 0) return(len);
1002 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
1005 n = (unsigned int)len;
1007 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
1012 if (rr->length == 0)
1014 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1016 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
1017 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1024 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
1025 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
1027 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
1028 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1031 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
1032 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1033 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
1035 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
1037 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1038 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1039 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
1041 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1043 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
1044 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
1045 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
1048 if (dest_maxlen > 0)
1050 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1052 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
1054 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1057 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1061 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1062 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1066 /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1067 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1068 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
1070 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1072 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1073 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1074 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
1076 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1078 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1079 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1080 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
1082 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1083 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1087 if (s->msg_callback)
1088 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1090 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1091 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1092 !s->s3->renegotiate)
1094 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1095 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
1097 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1098 if (i < 0) return(i);
1101 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1105 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1107 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1110 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1111 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1112 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1113 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1114 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1115 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1116 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1117 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1123 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1124 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1127 /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1128 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
1129 * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1132 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1133 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1134 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1135 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1136 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1137 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1138 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1141 /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/
1143 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1146 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
1148 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1149 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1151 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1153 if (s->msg_callback)
1154 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1156 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1157 cb=s->info_callback;
1158 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1159 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1163 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1164 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1167 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1169 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1170 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1172 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1175 /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1176 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with
1177 * a fatal alert because if application tried to
1178 * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and
1179 * expects it to succeed.
1181 * In future we might have a renegotiation where we
1182 * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on.
1184 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION)
1186 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1191 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1195 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1196 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1197 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1198 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1199 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1200 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1201 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1206 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1207 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1214 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1216 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1221 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1223 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1224 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1225 if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1226 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1228 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1233 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1234 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
1236 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1237 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1243 if (s->msg_callback)
1244 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1246 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1247 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1253 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1254 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake)
1256 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1257 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1259 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1260 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1261 * protocol violations): */
1262 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1266 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1270 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1271 if (i < 0) return(i);
1274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1278 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1280 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1283 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1284 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1285 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1286 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1287 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1288 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1289 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1290 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1300 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1301 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1302 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
1308 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1311 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1313 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1314 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1315 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1316 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1317 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1318 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1320 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1321 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1322 * but have application data. If the library was
1323 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1324 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1325 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1326 * we will indulge it.
1328 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1329 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1331 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1332 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1333 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1335 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1336 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1337 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1341 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1346 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1347 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1354 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1359 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1365 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1366 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1368 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1370 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
1372 if (s->session == NULL)
1374 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1379 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1380 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
1383 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
1386 /* we have to record the message digest at
1387 * this point so we can get it before we read
1388 * the finished message */
1389 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
1391 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1392 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1396 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1397 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1400 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
1401 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1406 int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1408 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1409 desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1410 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
1411 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
1412 if (desc < 0) return -1;
1413 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1414 if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
1415 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1417 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1418 s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
1419 s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
1420 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
1421 return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1422 /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
1423 * some time in the future */
1427 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1430 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1432 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1433 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1436 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1440 /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
1441 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
1442 * we will not worry too much. */
1443 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1444 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1446 if (s->msg_callback)
1447 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1449 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1450 cb=s->info_callback;
1451 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1452 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1456 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1457 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);