2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
115 #include "ssl_locl.h"
116 #include <openssl/evp.h>
117 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
119 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
120 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
121 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
123 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
125 /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
126 * packet by another n bytes.
127 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
128 * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
129 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
130 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
137 if (n <= 0) return n;
141 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
145 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
146 align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
147 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
152 /* start with empty packet ... */
155 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
157 /* check if next packet length is large
158 * enough to justify payload alignment... */
159 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
160 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
161 && (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128)
163 /* Note that even if packet is corrupted
164 * and its length field is insane, we can
165 * only be led to wrong decision about
166 * whether memmove will occur or not.
167 * Header values has no effect on memmove
168 * arguments and therefore no buffer
169 * overrun can be triggered. */
170 memmove (rb->buf+align,pkt,left);
174 s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
175 s->packet_length = 0;
176 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
179 /* extend reads should not span multiple packets for DTLS */
180 if ( SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION &&
183 if ( left > 0 && n > left)
187 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
196 /* else we need to read more data */
198 len = s->packet_length;
200 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
201 * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
202 * 'left' extra ones at the end */
203 if (s->packet != pkt) /* len > 0 */
205 memmove(pkt, s->packet, len+left);
207 rb->offset = len + align;
210 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
211 if (n > max) /* does not happen */
213 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
222 /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf
223 * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to
224 * len+max if possible) */
229 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
230 i=BIO_read(s->rbio,pkt+len+left, max-left);
234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
241 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
243 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
249 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
252 s->packet_length += n;
253 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
257 /* Call this to get a new input record.
258 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
259 * or non-blocking IO.
260 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
261 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
262 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
263 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
265 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
266 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
268 int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
269 int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
273 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
275 unsigned int mac_size;
278 int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0;
279 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
284 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
285 extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
288 if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra)
290 /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
291 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
292 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
297 /* check if we have the header */
298 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
299 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
301 n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
302 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
303 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
307 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
311 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
314 fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
317 /* Lets check version */
318 if (!s->first_packet)
320 if (version != s->version)
322 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
323 /* Send back error using their
324 * version number :-) */
326 al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
331 if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
333 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
337 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
339 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
340 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
344 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
347 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
349 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
351 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
353 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
354 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
355 /* now n == rr->length,
356 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
359 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
361 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
362 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
364 rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
366 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
367 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
368 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
369 * the decryption or by the decompression
370 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
371 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
373 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
374 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
376 /* check is not needed I believe */
377 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
379 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
380 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
384 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
387 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
391 /* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
394 /* Otherwise enc_err == -1, which indicates bad padding
395 * (rec->length has not been changed in this case).
396 * To minimize information leaked via timing, we will perform
397 * the MAC computation anyway. */
398 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
402 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
403 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
407 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
408 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
409 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
410 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) == NULL))
415 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
417 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
419 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
420 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
421 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
424 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
427 /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
428 if (rr->length >= mac_size)
430 rr->length -= mac_size;
431 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
435 /* record (minus padding) is too short to contain a MAC */
436 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
437 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
438 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
441 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
445 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
446 if (mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0)
448 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
452 if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac)
454 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
455 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
456 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
457 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
458 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
459 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
460 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
464 /* r->length is now just compressed */
465 if (s->expand != NULL)
467 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
469 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
470 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
473 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
475 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
476 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
481 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
483 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
484 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
489 /* So at this point the following is true
490 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
491 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
492 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
493 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
497 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
500 /* just read a 0 length packet */
501 if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
504 fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
510 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
515 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
517 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
521 rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
522 i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,
523 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);
533 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
535 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
539 wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
540 i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,
541 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
542 wr->input,(int)wr->length);
553 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
554 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
556 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
558 const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
559 unsigned int tot,n,nw;
562 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
566 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
568 i=s->handshake_func(s);
569 if (i < 0) return(i);
572 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
580 if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
581 nw=s->max_send_fragment;
585 i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
593 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
594 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
596 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
597 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
598 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
608 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
609 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
611 unsigned char *p,*plen;
612 int i,mac_size,clear=0;
616 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
620 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
623 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
624 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
626 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
628 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
629 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
631 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
634 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
637 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
643 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
644 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
645 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
651 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
653 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
654 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
656 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
657 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
659 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
661 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
662 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
663 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
664 * together with the actual payload) */
665 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
670 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
672 /* insufficient space */
673 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
678 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
681 if (create_empty_fragment)
683 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
684 /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks,
685 * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so
686 * if we want to align the real payload, then we can
687 * just pretent we simply have two headers. */
688 align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
689 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
696 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
700 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
701 align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
702 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
708 /* write the header */
713 *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
714 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
716 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
720 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
723 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
725 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
728 /* first we compress */
729 if (s->compress != NULL)
731 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
733 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
739 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
743 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
744 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
745 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
749 s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length]),1);
750 wr->length+=mac_size;
755 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
756 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
758 /* record length after mac and block padding */
759 s2n(wr->length,plen);
761 /* we should now have
762 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
764 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
765 wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
767 if (create_empty_fragment)
769 /* we are in a recursive call;
770 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
775 /* now let's set up wb */
776 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
778 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
779 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
780 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
781 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
782 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
784 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
785 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
790 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
791 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
795 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
798 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
799 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
800 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
801 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
803 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
812 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
814 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
815 (unsigned int)wb->left);
819 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
826 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
827 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
828 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
829 return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
838 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
839 * 'type' is one of the following:
841 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
842 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
843 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
845 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
846 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
848 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
849 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
850 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
851 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
852 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
853 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
854 * Change cipher spec protocol
855 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
857 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
859 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
860 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
861 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
862 * Application data protocol
863 * none of our business
865 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
870 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
872 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
873 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
876 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
877 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
879 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
883 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
884 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
886 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
887 unsigned char *dst = buf;
892 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
895 len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
898 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
899 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
900 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
904 /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
906 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
908 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
909 i=s->handshake_func(s);
910 if (i < 0) return(i);
913 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
918 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
920 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
921 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
922 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
923 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
926 /* get new packet if necessary */
927 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
929 ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
930 if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
933 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
935 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
936 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
937 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
939 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
940 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
944 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
945 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
946 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
949 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
954 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
956 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
957 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
958 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
959 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
961 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
962 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
966 if (len <= 0) return(len);
968 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
971 n = (unsigned int)len;
973 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
980 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
982 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
983 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
990 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
991 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
993 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
994 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
997 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
998 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
999 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
1001 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
1003 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1004 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1005 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
1007 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1009 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
1010 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
1011 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
1014 if (dest_maxlen > 0)
1016 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1018 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
1020 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1023 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1027 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1028 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1032 /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1033 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1034 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
1036 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1038 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1039 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1040 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
1042 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1044 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1045 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1046 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
1048 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1049 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1053 if (s->msg_callback)
1054 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1056 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1057 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1058 !s->s3->renegotiate)
1060 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1061 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
1063 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1064 if (i < 0) return(i);
1067 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1071 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1073 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1076 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1077 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1078 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1079 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1080 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1081 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1082 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1083 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1089 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1090 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1094 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
1096 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1097 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1099 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1101 if (s->msg_callback)
1102 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1104 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1105 cb=s->info_callback;
1106 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1107 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1111 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1112 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1115 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1117 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1118 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1120 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1124 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1128 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1129 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1130 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1131 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1132 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1133 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1134 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1139 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1140 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1147 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1149 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1154 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1156 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1157 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1158 if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1159 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1161 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1162 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1166 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1167 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
1169 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1170 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1176 if (s->msg_callback)
1177 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1179 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1180 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1186 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1187 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake)
1189 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1190 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1192 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1193 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1194 * protocol violations): */
1195 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1199 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1203 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1204 if (i < 0) return(i);
1207 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1211 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1213 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1216 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1217 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1218 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1219 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1220 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1221 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1222 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1223 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1233 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1234 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1235 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
1241 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1244 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1246 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1247 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1248 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1249 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1250 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1253 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1254 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1255 * but have application data. If the library was
1256 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1257 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1258 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1259 * we will indulge it.
1261 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1262 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1264 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1265 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1266 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1268 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1269 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1270 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1274 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1279 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1280 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1287 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1292 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1298 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1299 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1301 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1303 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
1305 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1306 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
1309 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
1312 /* we have to record the message digest at
1313 * this point so we can get it before we read
1314 * the finished message */
1315 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
1317 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1318 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1322 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1323 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1326 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
1327 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1332 void ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1334 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1335 desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1336 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
1337 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
1338 if (desc < 0) return;
1339 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1340 if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
1341 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1343 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1344 s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
1345 s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
1346 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
1347 s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1348 /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
1349 * some time in the future */
1352 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1355 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1357 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1358 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1361 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1365 /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
1366 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
1367 * we will not worry too much. */
1368 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1369 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1371 if (s->msg_callback)
1372 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1374 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1375 cb=s->info_callback;
1376 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1377 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1381 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1382 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);