2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
152 #include "ssl_locl.h"
153 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
154 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
155 #include <openssl/rand.h>
156 #include <openssl/objects.h>
157 #include <openssl/evp.h>
158 #include <openssl/md5.h>
159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
160 # include <openssl/dh.h>
162 #include <openssl/bn.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
164 # include <openssl/engine.h>
167 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
169 static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s);
172 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
173 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver)
175 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
176 return (SSLv3_client_method());
181 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_client_method,
182 ssl_undefined_function,
183 ssl3_connect, ssl3_get_client_method)
185 int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
188 unsigned long Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
189 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
191 int new_state, state, skip = 0;
193 RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
197 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
198 cb = s->info_callback;
199 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
200 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
203 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) {
208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
210 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
211 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
214 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
215 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
224 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
226 s->state = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
227 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
231 case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_CONNECT:
232 case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_CONNECT:
236 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
238 if ((s->version & 0xff00) != 0x0300) {
239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
244 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) {
245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
249 /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
250 s->type = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
252 if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
253 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
257 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
265 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
270 /* setup buffing BIO */
271 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 0)) {
276 /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */
278 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
280 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
281 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
283 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
285 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
287 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
290 case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
291 case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
294 ret = ssl3_client_hello(s);
297 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
300 /* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
301 if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
302 s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio);
306 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
307 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:
308 ret = ssl3_get_server_hello(s);
313 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
314 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
315 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
316 /* receive renewed session ticket */
317 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
321 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A;
325 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
326 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
327 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
328 /* Noop (ret = 0) for everything but EAP-FAST. */
329 ret = ssl3_check_finished(s);
334 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
339 /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH, SRP auth */
343 new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
344 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
345 ret = ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
348 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
349 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
350 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A;
352 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
355 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
361 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
366 case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A:
367 case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B:
368 ret = ssl3_get_key_exchange(s);
371 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A;
375 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
378 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
384 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A:
385 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B:
386 ret = ssl3_get_certificate_request(s);
389 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A;
393 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A:
394 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B:
395 ret = ssl3_get_server_done(s);
398 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
399 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
400 if ((ret = SRP_Calc_A_param(s)) <= 0) {
401 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
402 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
407 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
408 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
410 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
415 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A:
416 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B:
417 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C:
418 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D:
419 ret = ssl3_send_client_certificate(s);
422 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
426 case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A:
427 case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B:
428 ret = ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s);
432 * EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert sent back
435 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
436 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
439 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
440 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
441 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
442 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
444 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
445 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A;
447 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
449 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
450 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
456 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A:
457 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B:
458 ret = ssl3_send_client_verify(s);
461 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
465 case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
466 case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B:
467 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
469 SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
473 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
474 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
476 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
477 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A;
479 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
483 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
484 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
485 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
487 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
488 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
490 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
492 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
497 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
498 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
506 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
507 case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A:
508 case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B:
509 ret = ssl3_send_next_proto(s);
512 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
516 case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
517 case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B:
518 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
519 SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A,
520 SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B,
522 ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
524 ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
527 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
530 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
532 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
533 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED) {
534 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
535 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
536 s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret = 0;
539 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
541 * Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected
543 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
544 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
548 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
553 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
554 case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A:
555 case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B:
556 ret = ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s);
559 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
563 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A:
564 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B:
565 ret = ssl3_get_cert_status(s);
568 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
573 case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
574 case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
575 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
576 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
577 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
578 SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
583 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
585 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
589 case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH:
590 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
591 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
595 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
596 s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
600 /* clean a few things up */
601 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
603 if (s->init_buf != NULL) {
604 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
609 * If we are not 'joining' the last two packets, remove the
612 if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER))
613 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
614 /* else do it later in ssl3_write */
620 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
622 s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
626 s->handshake_func = ssl3_connect;
627 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
630 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
636 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
642 /* did we do anything */
643 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
645 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
649 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
650 new_state = s->state;
652 cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1);
653 s->state = new_state;
663 cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret);
667 int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
670 unsigned char *p, *d;
674 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
679 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
680 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
681 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
682 if ((sess == NULL) || (sess->ssl_version != s->version) ||
683 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
684 !sess->session_id_length ||
687 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
688 * "ticket" without a session ID.
690 (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
692 (sess->not_resumable)) {
693 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
696 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
697 /* Determine which DTLS version to use */
698 int options = s->options;
699 /* If DTLS 1.2 disabled correct the version number */
700 if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2) {
701 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
702 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,
703 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
707 * Disabling all versions is silly: return an error.
709 if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1) {
710 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
714 * Update method so we don't use any DTLS 1.2 features.
716 s->method = DTLSv1_client_method();
717 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
720 * We only support one version: update method
722 if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)
723 s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method();
724 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
726 s->client_version = s->version;
728 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
730 p = s->s3->client_random;
733 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
734 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
736 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
739 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
748 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p,
749 sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
752 /* Do the message type and length last */
753 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
756 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
757 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
758 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
759 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
760 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
761 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
762 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
763 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
766 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
767 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
768 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
769 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
770 * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
771 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
772 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
773 * know that is maximum server supports.
774 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
775 * containing version 1.0.
777 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
778 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
779 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
780 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
781 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
782 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
783 * the negotiated version.
785 *(p++) = s->client_version >> 8;
786 *(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff;
789 memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
790 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
796 i = s->session->session_id_length;
799 if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
800 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
803 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i);
807 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
808 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
809 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
810 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
813 *(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len;
814 memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
815 p += s->d1->cookie_len;
818 /* Ciphers supported */
819 i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &(p[2]), 0);
821 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
824 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
826 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
827 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
830 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
831 && i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH)
832 i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
838 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
842 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s) || !s->ctx->comp_methods)
845 j = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
847 for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
848 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
852 *(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
854 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
856 if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
857 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
861 ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
863 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
864 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
870 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l)) {
871 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
872 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
875 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
878 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
879 return ssl_do_write(s);
884 int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
886 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
889 unsigned char *p, *d;
890 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ok;
893 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
897 * Hello verify request and/or server hello version may not match so set
898 * first packet if we're negotiating version.
903 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
904 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A,
905 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B, -1, 20000, &ok);
910 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
912 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
913 if (s->d1->send_cookie == 0) {
914 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
916 } else { /* already sent a cookie */
918 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
919 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
925 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
926 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
927 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
931 d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
932 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
933 /* Work out correct protocol version to use */
934 int hversion = (p[0] << 8) | p[1];
935 int options = s->options;
936 if (hversion == DTLS1_2_VERSION && !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2))
937 s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method();
938 else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
939 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
940 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
941 s->version = hversion;
942 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
944 } else if (hversion == DTLS1_VERSION && !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1))
945 s->method = DTLSv1_client_method();
947 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
948 s->version = hversion;
949 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
952 s->version = s->method->version;
955 if ((p[0] != (s->version >> 8)) || (p[1] != (s->version & 0xff))) {
956 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
957 s->version = (s->version & 0xff00) | p[1];
958 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
963 /* load the server hello data */
964 /* load the server random */
965 memcpy(s->s3->server_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
966 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
970 /* get the session-id */
973 if ((j > sizeof s->session->session_id) || (j > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE)) {
974 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
975 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
978 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
980 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
981 * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
982 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
983 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
984 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
985 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
986 * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
987 * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
988 * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
989 * server wants to resume.
991 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb &&
992 s->session->tlsext_tick) {
993 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
994 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
995 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
996 &s->session->master_key_length,
998 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
999 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1000 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p + j);
1002 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1003 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1007 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
1009 if (j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length
1010 && memcmp(p, s->session->session_id, j) == 0) {
1011 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1012 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1013 /* actually a client application bug */
1014 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1015 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
1016 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1022 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1023 * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1024 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1025 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1026 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1028 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
1029 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1033 s->session->session_id_length = j;
1034 memcpy(s->session->session_id, p, j); /* j could be 0 */
1037 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p);
1039 /* unknown cipher */
1040 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1041 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1044 /* Set version disabled mask now we know version */
1045 if (!SSL_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1046 ct->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1050 * If it is a disabled cipher we didn't send it in client hello, so
1053 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) {
1054 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1055 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1058 p += ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s, NULL, NULL);
1060 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1061 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1063 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1064 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1065 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1070 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1071 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1072 * set and use it for comparison.
1074 if (s->session->cipher)
1075 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1076 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1077 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1078 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
1079 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1082 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1084 * Don't digest cached records if no sigalgs: we may need them for client
1087 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1089 /* lets get the compression algorithm */
1091 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1093 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1094 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
1095 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1099 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1100 * using compression.
1102 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1103 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1108 if (s->hit && j != s->session->compress_meth) {
1109 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
1111 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1116 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1117 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1118 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1121 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, j);
1123 if ((j != 0) && (comp == NULL)) {
1124 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1125 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
1126 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1129 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1133 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1134 /* TLS extensions */
1135 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n)) {
1136 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1142 /* wrong packet length */
1143 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1144 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
1150 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1155 int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
1157 int al, i, ok, ret = -1;
1158 unsigned long n, nc, llen, l;
1160 const unsigned char *q, *p;
1162 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1164 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1165 int need_cert = 1; /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth ==
1168 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1171 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
1176 if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) ||
1177 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) &&
1178 (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE))) {
1179 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
1183 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
1184 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1185 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
1188 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1190 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1191 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1196 if (llen + 3 != n) {
1197 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1201 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
1203 if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
1204 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1205 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1206 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1211 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &q, l);
1213 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1218 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1219 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1220 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1223 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1224 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1232 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1233 if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0)
1234 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1235 && !((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
1236 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
1237 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1239 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
1240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1241 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1244 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1246 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1247 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1251 sc = ssl_sess_cert_new();
1255 ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
1256 s->session->sess_cert = sc;
1258 sc->cert_chain = sk;
1260 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1261 * which we don't include in s3_srvr.c
1263 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1266 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1269 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
1271 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
1272 need_cert = ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
1273 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
1277 fprintf(stderr, "pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey, x);
1278 fprintf(stderr, "ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x, pkey));
1279 fprintf(stderr, "cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %lx, %d\n",
1280 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name,
1281 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey,
1282 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, need_cert);
1283 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1285 if (need_cert && ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))) {
1288 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1289 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1293 i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
1294 if (need_cert && i < 0) {
1297 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1298 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1303 int exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
1304 if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx) {
1306 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1307 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1308 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1311 sc->peer_cert_type = i;
1312 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
1314 * Why would the following ever happen? We just created sc a couple
1317 X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
1318 sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 = x;
1319 sc->peer_key = &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]);
1321 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1322 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
1323 s->session->peer = x;
1325 sc->peer_cert_type = i;
1326 sc->peer_key = NULL;
1328 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1329 s->session->peer = NULL;
1331 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1337 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1340 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1342 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1346 int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1348 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1349 unsigned char *q, md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
1352 unsigned char *param, *p;
1354 long i, param_len, n, alg_k, alg_a;
1355 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1356 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1357 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1360 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1363 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1364 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
1365 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1366 EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
1368 int encoded_pt_len = 0;
1371 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1374 * use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request() as
1375 * ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped
1377 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1378 SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1379 SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B,
1380 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
1384 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1386 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
1388 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
1391 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) {
1392 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1393 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1396 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1398 * In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be omitted if no
1399 * identity hint is sent. Set session->sess_cert anyway to avoid
1402 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
1403 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
1404 OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1405 s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1408 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
1412 param = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1413 if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL) {
1414 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1415 RSA_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp);
1416 s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp = NULL;
1418 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1419 DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp);
1420 s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = NULL;
1422 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1423 EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp);
1424 s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = NULL;
1427 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
1430 /* Total length of the parameters including the length prefix */
1433 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1435 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1437 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1438 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
1439 char tmp_id_hint[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
1442 if (param_len > n) {
1443 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1449 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1450 * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1451 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1454 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1455 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1456 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1459 if (i > n - param_len) {
1460 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1461 SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH);
1467 * If received PSK identity hint contains NULL characters, the hint
1468 * is truncated from the first NULL. p may not be ending with NULL,
1469 * so create a NULL-terminated string.
1471 memcpy(tmp_id_hint, p, i);
1472 memset(tmp_id_hint + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
1473 OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1474 s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint);
1475 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
1476 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1477 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1484 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1485 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1486 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
1488 if (param_len > n) {
1489 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1494 if (i > n - param_len) {
1495 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH);
1500 if (!(s->srp_ctx.N = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1501 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1506 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1507 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1514 if (i > n - param_len) {
1515 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH);
1520 if (!(s->srp_ctx.g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1521 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1526 if (1 > n - param_len) {
1527 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1532 i = (unsigned int)(p[0]);
1535 if (i > n - param_len) {
1536 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH);
1541 if (!(s->srp_ctx.s = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1542 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1547 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1548 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1555 if (i > n - param_len) {
1556 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH);
1561 if (!(s->srp_ctx.B = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1562 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1568 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, &al)) {
1569 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
1573 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1574 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1575 if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
1577 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1578 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
1582 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1583 else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
1585 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1586 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].
1590 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
1591 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1592 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
1593 /* Temporary RSA keys only allowed in export ciphersuites */
1594 if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
1595 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1596 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1599 if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) {
1600 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1605 if (param_len > n) {
1606 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1611 if (i > n - param_len) {
1612 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH);
1617 if (!(rsa->n = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->n))) {
1618 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1623 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1624 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1631 if (i > n - param_len) {
1632 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH);
1637 if (!(rsa->e = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->e))) {
1638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1644 /* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
1645 if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
1647 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1648 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
1650 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1653 s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp = rsa;
1656 #else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
1659 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1660 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
1661 if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) {
1662 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1667 if (param_len > n) {
1668 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1673 if (i > n - param_len) {
1674 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH);
1679 if (!(dh->p = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1680 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1685 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1686 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1693 if (i > n - param_len) {
1694 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH);
1699 if (!(dh->g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1700 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1705 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1706 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1713 if (i > n - param_len) {
1714 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH);
1719 if (!(dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1720 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1726 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
1727 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1728 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1731 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1732 if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
1734 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1735 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
1739 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1740 else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
1742 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1743 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].
1746 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1748 s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = dh;
1751 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
1753 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1754 else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
1756 const EC_GROUP *group;
1758 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
1759 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1764 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1765 * public key. Keep accumulating lengths of various components in
1766 * param_len and make sure it never exceeds n.
1770 * XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves and the
1771 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. We also need one
1772 * byte for the length of the encoded point
1775 if (param_len > n) {
1776 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1780 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1781 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1783 if (!tls1_check_curve(s, p, 3)) {
1784 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1788 if ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0) {
1789 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1790 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1791 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
1795 ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid);
1796 if (ngroup == NULL) {
1797 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1800 if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0) {
1801 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1804 EC_GROUP_free(ngroup);
1806 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);
1808 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1809 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
1810 al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
1811 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1812 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1818 /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
1819 if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) ||
1820 ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)) {
1821 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1825 encoded_pt_len = *p; /* length of encoded point */
1828 if ((encoded_pt_len > n - param_len) ||
1829 (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint,
1830 p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0)) {
1831 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
1834 param_len += encoded_pt_len;
1837 p += encoded_pt_len;
1840 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1841 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1845 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1846 else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
1848 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1849 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
1851 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1852 else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1854 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1855 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
1857 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1858 EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint);
1859 s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = ecdh;
1861 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1863 EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
1864 srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
1866 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1867 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1870 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1872 /* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */
1874 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1876 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1879 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1882 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
1889 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1897 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1902 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1905 * Check signature length. If n is 0 then signature is empty
1907 if ((i != n) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
1908 /* wrong packet length */
1909 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
1912 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1913 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1919 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
1920 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1921 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
1922 ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1923 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1925 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1927 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len);
1928 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, &size);
1932 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n, pkey->pkey.rsa);
1934 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1935 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
1940 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1941 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
1947 EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
1948 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1950 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1952 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len);
1953 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx, p, (int)n, pkey) <= 0) {
1955 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1956 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
1961 /* aNULL, aSRP or kPSK do not need public keys */
1962 if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
1963 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
1964 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s))
1965 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
1966 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1969 /* still data left over */
1971 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
1975 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1976 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1979 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1981 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1982 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1985 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1988 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1989 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1990 EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
1993 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1997 int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2000 unsigned long n, nc, l;
2001 unsigned int llen, ctype_num, i;
2002 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
2003 const unsigned char *p, *q;
2005 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
2007 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2008 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A,
2009 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B,
2010 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
2015 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
2017 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
2018 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
2020 * If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records as we
2021 * wont be doing client auth.
2023 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
2024 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
2030 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
2031 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2032 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2036 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
2037 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
2038 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) {
2039 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2040 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2041 SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER);
2046 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2048 if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
2049 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2053 /* get the certificate types */
2055 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes);
2056 s->cert->ctypes = NULL;
2057 if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) {
2058 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
2059 s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num);
2060 if (s->cert->ctypes == NULL) {
2061 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2064 memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, p, ctype_num);
2065 s->cert->ctype_num = (size_t)ctype_num;
2066 ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
2068 for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++)
2069 s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = p[i];
2071 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2074 * Check we have enough room for signature algorithms and following
2077 if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen + 2) > n) {
2078 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2079 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2080 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2083 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2084 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2085 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
2086 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
2088 if ((llen & 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, p, llen)) {
2089 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2090 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2091 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2094 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2095 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2096 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2102 /* get the CA RDNs */
2105 if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen) != n) {
2106 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2107 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2111 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
2113 if ((l + nc + 2) > llen) {
2114 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2115 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG);
2121 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &q, l)) == NULL) {
2122 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2123 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2128 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2129 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2130 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2133 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2134 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2142 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2143 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2144 s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
2145 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2146 s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
2151 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2155 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2157 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
2160 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
2161 int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
2163 int ok, al, ret = 0, ticklen;
2165 const unsigned char *p;
2168 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2169 SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A,
2170 SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B,
2171 SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, 16384, &ok);
2177 /* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */
2178 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2179 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2183 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2184 n2l(p, s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint);
2186 /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
2187 if (ticklen + 6 != n) {
2188 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2189 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2192 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
2193 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
2194 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2195 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) {
2196 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2199 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, p, ticklen);
2200 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
2202 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2203 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2204 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2205 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2206 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2207 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2208 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2209 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2210 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2212 EVP_Digest(p, ticklen,
2213 s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
2214 EVP_sha256(), NULL);
2218 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2223 int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s)
2226 unsigned long resplen, n;
2227 const unsigned char *p;
2229 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2230 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A,
2231 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B,
2232 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, 16384, &ok);
2237 /* need at least status type + length */
2238 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2242 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2243 if (*p++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2244 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2249 if (resplen + 4 != n) {
2250 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2254 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2255 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = BUF_memdup(p, resplen);
2256 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) {
2257 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2261 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
2262 if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2264 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2266 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2267 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2271 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2278 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2283 int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s)
2288 /* Second to last param should be very small, like 0 :-) */
2289 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2290 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A,
2291 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B,
2292 SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 30, &ok);
2297 /* should contain no data */
2298 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2299 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2306 int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2310 unsigned long alg_k;
2311 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2313 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2315 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2317 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2318 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2319 EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
2320 const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
2321 EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL;
2322 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2323 int encoded_pt_len = 0;
2324 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2326 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2329 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
2330 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2332 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2334 /* Fool emacs indentation */
2337 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2338 else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
2340 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2341 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2345 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
2347 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2349 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2350 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2354 if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
2355 rsa = s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
2358 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
2359 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].
2361 if ((pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2362 || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
2363 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2364 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2367 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
2368 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2371 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2372 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2373 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, pmslen - 2) <= 0)
2377 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2378 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
2380 n = RSA_public_encrypt(pmslen, pms, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2382 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
2384 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
2388 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2389 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2393 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2394 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
2400 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2401 else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
2402 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2403 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2404 /* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */
2405 krb5_data *enc_ticket;
2406 krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL;
2407 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2408 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2409 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2410 unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2411 unsigned char epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2412 int padl, outl = sizeof(epms);
2414 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2417 fprintf(stderr, "ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
2419 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2422 # ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH
2424 authp = &authenticator;
2425 # endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */
2427 krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp, &kssl_err);
2428 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2433 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
2434 if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
2435 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n",
2438 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2441 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2447 * 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
2448 * in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
2450 * Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
2451 * n = krb5_ap_req.length;
2452 * memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
2453 * if (krb5_ap_req.data)
2454 * kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
2456 * Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
2457 * (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
2458 * Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
2459 * with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
2461 * KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
2462 * Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with
2463 * optional authenticator omitted.
2466 /* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */
2467 s2n(enc_ticket->length, p);
2468 memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length);
2469 p += enc_ticket->length;
2470 n = enc_ticket->length + 2;
2472 /* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */
2473 if (authp && authp->length) {
2474 s2n(authp->length, p);
2475 memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length);
2477 n += authp->length + 2;
2483 s2n(0, p); /* null authenticator length */
2487 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2488 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2492 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2493 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2494 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, pmslen - 2) <= 0)
2498 * 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
2499 * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
2500 * EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
2501 * kssl_ctx->length);
2502 * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
2505 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2506 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv);
2507 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, epms, &outl, pms, pmslen);
2508 EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(epms[outl]), &padl);
2510 if (outl > (int)sizeof epms) {
2511 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2512 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2515 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2517 /* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */
2519 memcpy(p, epms, outl);
2522 OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl);
2525 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2526 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
2527 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt;
2528 SESS_CERT *scert = s->session->sess_cert;
2530 if (scert == NULL) {
2531 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2532 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2533 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2537 if (scert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
2538 dh_srvr = scert->peer_dh_tmp;
2540 /* we get them from the cert */
2541 int idx = scert->peer_cert_type;
2542 EVP_PKEY *spkey = NULL;
2545 spkey = X509_get_pubkey(scert->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
2547 dh_srvr = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(spkey);
2548 EVP_PKEY_free(spkey);
2550 if (dh_srvr == NULL) {
2551 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2552 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2556 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
2557 /* Use client certificate key */
2558 EVP_PKEY *clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
2561 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2562 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
2563 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2564 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2568 /* generate a new random key */
2569 if ((dh_clnt = DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL) {
2570 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2573 if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt)) {
2574 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2580 pmslen = DH_size(dh_clnt);
2581 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2586 * use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but make sure to
2587 * clear it out afterwards
2590 n = DH_compute_key(pms, dh_srvr->pub_key, dh_clnt);
2591 if (scert->peer_dh_tmp == NULL)
2595 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2601 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY)
2604 /* send off the data */
2605 n = BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key);
2607 BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key, p);
2613 /* perhaps clean things up a bit EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2617 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2618 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2619 const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
2621 int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
2624 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
2625 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2626 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2627 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2632 * Did we send out the client's ECDH share for use in premaster
2633 * computation as part of client certificate? If so, set
2634 * ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
2636 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL)) {
2638 * XXX: For now, we do not support client
2639 * authentication using ECDH certificates.
2640 * To add such support, one needs to add
2641 * code that checks for appropriate
2642 * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
2643 * For example, the cert have an ECC
2644 * key on the same curve as the server's
2645 * and the key should be authorized for
2648 * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
2649 * to skip sending the certificate verify
2652 * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
2653 * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
2654 * EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
2655 * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
2659 if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) {
2660 tkey = s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp;
2662 /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
2664 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
2665 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
2666 if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL)
2667 || (srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
2668 || (srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL)) {
2669 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2670 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2674 tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec;
2677 srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2678 srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey);
2680 if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL)) {
2681 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2682 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2686 if ((clnt_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
2687 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2688 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2692 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group)) {
2693 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2696 if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
2698 * Reuse key info from our certificate We only need our
2699 * private key to perform the ECDH computation.
2701 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2702 tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
2703 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2704 if (priv_key == NULL) {
2705 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2706 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2709 if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key)) {
2710 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2714 /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
2715 if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh))) {
2716 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2723 * use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but make sure to
2724 * clear it out afterwards
2727 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group);
2728 if (field_size <= 0) {
2729 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2732 pmslen = (field_size + 7) / 8;
2733 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2736 n = ECDH_compute_key(pms, pmslen, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, NULL);
2737 if (n <= 0 || pmslen != (size_t)n) {
2738 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2742 if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
2743 /* Send empty client key exch message */
2747 * First check the size of encoding and allocate memory
2751 EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
2752 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
2753 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
2756 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
2757 OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len * sizeof(unsigned char));
2758 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
2759 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
2760 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2761 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2765 /* Encode the public key */
2766 n = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
2767 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
2768 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
2769 encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx);
2771 *p = n; /* length of encoded point */
2772 /* Encoded point will be copied here */
2774 /* copy the point */
2775 memcpy((unsigned char *)p, encodedPoint, n);
2776 /* increment n to account for length field */
2780 /* Free allocated memory */
2781 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2782 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2783 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
2784 EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
2786 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2787 else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2788 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2789 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2792 unsigned int md_len;
2794 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
2795 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash;
2799 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2804 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2808 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype = SSL_PKEY_GOST01)].x509;
2812 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype = SSL_PKEY_GOST94)].x509;
2814 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2815 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
2819 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key =
2820 X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
2822 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2824 * * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2825 * certificate key for key exchange
2828 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2830 EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2831 /* Generate session key */
2832 if (RAND_bytes(pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2833 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2834 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2835 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2839 * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
2841 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) {
2842 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer
2843 (pkey_ctx, s->cert->key->privatekey) <= 0) {
2845 * If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
2852 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2855 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
2856 EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash,
2857 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94));
2858 EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
2860 EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
2862 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len);
2863 EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash);
2864 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2865 (pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8,
2867 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2871 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2873 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2875 *(p++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
2877 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) < 0) {
2878 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2882 if (msglen >= 0x80) {
2884 *(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
2887 *(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
2890 memcpy(p, tmp, msglen);
2891 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2892 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2893 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) {
2894 /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
2895 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
2897 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2898 EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key);
2901 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2902 else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2903 if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) {
2904 /* send off the data */
2905 n = BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A);
2907 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, p);
2910 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2911 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2914 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2915 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2916 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2917 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2918 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2923 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2924 else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2926 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2927 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2930 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 2];
2931 size_t identity_len;
2932 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2933 unsigned int psk_len = 0;
2937 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2938 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2939 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2943 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2944 /* Allocate maximum size buffer */
2945 pmslen = PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4;
2946 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2950 psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
2951 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2953 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2954 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2955 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2957 } else if (psk_len == 0) {
2958 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2959 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2962 /* Change pmslen to real length */
2963 pmslen = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
2964 identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1] = '\0';
2965 identity_len = strlen(identity);
2966 if (identity_len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2967 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2968 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2971 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2973 memmove(pms + psk_len + 4, pms, psk_len);
2975 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2979 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2980 s->session->psk_identity_hint =
2981 BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2982 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL
2983 && s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
2984 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2985 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2989 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2990 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity);
2991 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
2992 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2993 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2997 s2n(identity_len, p);
2998 memcpy(p, identity, identity_len);
2999 n = 2 + identity_len;
3002 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
3004 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
3010 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
3011 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3015 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) {
3016 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
3017 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3021 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B;
3024 /* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
3025 n = ssl_do_write(s);
3026 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3028 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3030 * If everything written generate master key: no need to save PMS as
3031 * SRP_generate_client_master_secret generates it internally.
3034 if ((s->session->master_key_length =
3035 SRP_generate_client_master_secret(s,
3036 s->session->master_key)) <
3038 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3039 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3045 /* If we haven't written everything save PMS */
3048 s->cert->pmslen = pmslen;
3050 /* If we don't have a PMS restore */
3053 pmslen = s->cert->pmslen;
3056 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3057 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3060 s->session->master_key_length =
3061 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
3063 session->master_key,
3065 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3066 s->cert->pms = NULL;
3067 if (s->session->master_key_length < 0) {
3068 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3069 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3075 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3076 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3078 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3079 s->cert->pms = NULL;
3080 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3081 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
3082 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
3083 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
3084 EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
3089 int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
3092 unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
3094 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
3100 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
3102 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A) {
3103 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3104 pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
3105 /* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */
3106 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
3107 EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx);
3108 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1()) > 0) {
3109 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3110 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
3113 [MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
3118 * For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using agreed
3119 * digest and cached handshake records.
3121 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
3124 const EVP_MD *md = s->cert->key->digest;
3125 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3126 if (hdatalen <= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
3127 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3132 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client alg %s\n",
3135 if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3136 || !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
3137 || !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) {
3138 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3144 * For extended master secret we've already digested cached
3147 if (s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
3148 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3149 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3150 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3151 } else if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3154 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3155 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
3156 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_md5, &(data[0]));
3157 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data,
3158 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
3159 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
3160 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
3167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3168 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
3169 if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
3170 &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3171 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
3172 (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.dsa)) {
3173 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
3180 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3181 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3182 if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
3183 &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3184 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
3185 (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.ec)) {
3186 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
3193 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
3194 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
3195 unsigned char signbuf[64];
3197 size_t sigsize = 64;
3198 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
3199 NID_id_GostR3411_94, data);
3200 if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, signbuf, &sigsize, data, 32) <= 0) {
3201 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3204 for (i = 63, j = 0; i >= 0; j++, i--) {
3205 p[2 + j] = signbuf[i];
3210 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3213 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n)) {
3214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3217 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B;
3219 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3220 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3221 return ssl_do_write(s);
3223 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3224 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3229 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3230 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3231 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3233 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3235 unsigned long alg_k;
3236 if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey)
3238 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3239 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->cert->key->digest)
3242 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3243 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3245 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3246 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3248 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3249 /* See if we can use client certificate for fixed DH */
3250 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
3251 SESS_CERT *scert = s->session->sess_cert;
3252 int i = scert->peer_cert_type;
3253 EVP_PKEY *clkey = NULL, *spkey = NULL;
3254 clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
3255 /* If client key not DH assume it can be used */
3256 if (EVP_PKEY_id(clkey) != EVP_PKEY_DH)
3259 spkey = X509_get_pubkey(scert->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
3261 /* Compare server and client parameters */
3262 i = EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, spkey);
3263 EVP_PKEY_free(spkey);
3267 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
3272 int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3275 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3278 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A) {
3279 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3280 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3281 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3283 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3287 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3290 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3292 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3293 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
3295 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
3298 /* We need to get a client cert */
3299 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B) {
3301 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3302 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3305 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3307 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3310 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3311 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3312 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
3313 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3315 } else if (i == 1) {
3317 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3318 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3323 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3324 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3327 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3328 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3329 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3332 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3336 /* Ok, we have a cert */
3337 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
3340 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C) {
3341 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D;
3342 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,
3343 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req ==
3344 2) ? NULL : s->cert->key)) {
3345 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3346 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3350 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
3351 return ssl_do_write(s);
3354 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3356 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3360 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3362 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3365 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3369 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3370 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3372 /* we don't have a certificate */
3373 if ((alg_a & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5)) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
3376 sc = s->session->sess_cert;
3378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3381 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3382 rsa = s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
3384 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3385 dh = s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
3388 /* This is the passed certificate */
3390 idx = sc->peer_cert_type;
3391 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3392 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
3393 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, s) == 0) {
3395 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3400 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
3401 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3402 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3404 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
3405 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_ECDH_CERT);
3409 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
3410 i = X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, pkey);
3411 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3413 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3414 if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3415 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3416 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3419 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3420 else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3421 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3422 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3426 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3427 if ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) &&
3428 !(has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC) || (rsa != NULL))) {
3429 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3430 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3434 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3435 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) &&
3436 !(has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKT_EXCH) || (dh != NULL))) {
3437 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY);
3439 } else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) &&
3440 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_RSA)) {
3441 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3442 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT);
3445 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3446 else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) &&
3447 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_DSA)) {
3448 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3449 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT);
3455 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PKT_EXP)) {
3456 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3457 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
3459 || RSA_size(rsa) * 8 >
3460 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
3461 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3462 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
3467 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3468 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
3470 || DH_size(dh) * 8 >
3471 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
3472 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3473 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
3479 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3480 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
3486 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
3491 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3493 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session from
3494 * the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on the next server
3495 * message after the ServerHello to determine if the server is resuming.
3496 * Therefore, we allow EAP-FAST to peek ahead.
3497 * ssl3_check_finished returns 1 if we are resuming from an external
3498 * pre-shared secret, we have a "ticket" and the next server handshake message
3499 * is Finished; and 0 otherwise. It returns -1 upon an error.
3501 static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s)
3505 if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION || !s->tls_session_secret_cb ||
3506 !s->session->tlsext_tick)
3509 /* Need to permit this temporarily, in case the next message is Finished. */
3510 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
3512 * This function is called when we might get a Certificate message instead,
3513 * so permit appropriate message length.
3514 * We ignore the return value as we're only interested in the message type
3515 * and not its length.
3517 s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3520 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
3521 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
3526 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
3528 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
3531 /* If we're not done, then the CCS arrived early and we should bail. */
3532 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
3533 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_FINISHED, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
3534 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3541 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3542 int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s)
3544 unsigned int len, padding_len;
3547 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A) {
3548 len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
3549 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3550 d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3552 memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len);
3553 d[5 + len] = padding_len;
3554 memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len);
3555 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
3556 l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d);
3557 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B;
3558 s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len;
3562 return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
3567 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3570 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3571 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3572 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3573 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3574 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3579 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3580 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);