2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
152 #include "ssl_locl.h"
153 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
154 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
155 #include <openssl/rand.h>
156 #include <openssl/objects.h>
157 #include <openssl/evp.h>
158 #include <openssl/md5.h>
159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
160 # include <openssl/dh.h>
162 #include <openssl/bn.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
164 # include <openssl/engine.h>
167 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
169 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
170 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver)
172 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
173 return (SSLv3_client_method());
178 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_client_method,
179 ssl_undefined_function,
180 ssl3_connect, ssl3_get_client_method)
182 int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
185 unsigned long Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
186 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
188 int new_state, state, skip = 0;
190 RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
194 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
195 cb = s->info_callback;
196 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
197 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
200 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) {
205 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
207 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
208 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
211 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
212 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
221 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
223 s->state = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
224 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
228 case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_CONNECT:
229 case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_CONNECT:
233 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
235 if ((s->version & 0xff00) != 0x0300) {
236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
241 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) {
242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
246 /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
247 s->type = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
249 if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
250 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
254 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
262 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
267 /* setup buffing BIO */
268 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 0)) {
273 /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */
275 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
277 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
278 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
280 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
282 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
284 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
287 case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
288 case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
291 ret = ssl3_client_hello(s);
294 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
297 /* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
298 if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
299 s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio);
303 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
304 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:
305 ret = ssl3_get_server_hello(s);
310 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
311 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
312 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
313 /* receive renewed session ticket */
314 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
318 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A;
322 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
323 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
324 /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH, SRP auth */
328 new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
329 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
330 ret = ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
333 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
334 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
335 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A;
337 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
340 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
346 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
351 case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A:
352 case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B:
353 ret = ssl3_get_key_exchange(s);
356 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A;
360 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
363 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
369 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A:
370 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B:
371 ret = ssl3_get_certificate_request(s);
374 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A;
378 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A:
379 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B:
380 ret = ssl3_get_server_done(s);
383 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
384 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
385 if ((ret = SRP_Calc_A_param(s)) <= 0) {
386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
387 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
392 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
393 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
395 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
400 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A:
401 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B:
402 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C:
403 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D:
404 ret = ssl3_send_client_certificate(s);
407 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
411 case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A:
412 case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B:
413 ret = ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s);
417 * EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert sent back
420 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
421 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
424 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
425 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
426 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
427 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
429 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
430 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A;
432 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
434 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
435 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
441 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A:
442 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B:
443 ret = ssl3_send_client_verify(s);
446 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
450 case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
451 case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B:
452 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
454 SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
458 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
459 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
461 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
462 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A;
464 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
468 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
469 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
470 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
472 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
473 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
475 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
477 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
482 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
483 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
491 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
492 case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A:
493 case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B:
494 ret = ssl3_send_next_proto(s);
497 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
501 case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
502 case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B:
503 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
504 SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A,
505 SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B,
507 ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
509 ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
512 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
515 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
517 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
518 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED) {
519 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
520 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
521 s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret = 0;
524 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
526 * Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected
528 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
529 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
533 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
538 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
539 case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A:
540 case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B:
541 ret = ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s);
544 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
548 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A:
549 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B:
550 ret = ssl3_get_cert_status(s);
553 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
558 case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
559 case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
560 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
561 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
562 SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
567 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
569 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
573 case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH:
574 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
575 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
579 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
580 s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
584 /* clean a few things up */
585 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
587 if (s->init_buf != NULL) {
588 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
593 * If we are not 'joining' the last two packets, remove the
596 if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER))
597 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
598 /* else do it later in ssl3_write */
604 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
606 s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
610 s->handshake_func = ssl3_connect;
611 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
614 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
620 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
626 /* did we do anything */
627 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
629 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
633 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
634 new_state = s->state;
636 cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1);
637 s->state = new_state;
647 cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret);
651 int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
654 unsigned char *p, *d;
658 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
663 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
664 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
665 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
666 if ((sess == NULL) ||
667 (sess->ssl_version != s->version) ||
668 !sess->session_id_length || (sess->not_resumable)) {
669 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
672 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
673 /* Determine which DTLS version to use */
674 int options = s->options;
675 /* If DTLS 1.2 disabled correct the version number */
676 if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2) {
677 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
678 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,
679 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
683 * Disabling all versions is silly: return an error.
685 if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1) {
686 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
690 * Update method so we don't use any DTLS 1.2 features.
692 s->method = DTLSv1_client_method();
693 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
696 * We only support one version: update method
698 if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)
699 s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method();
700 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
702 s->client_version = s->version;
704 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
706 p = s->s3->client_random;
709 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
710 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
712 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
715 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
724 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p,
725 sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
728 /* Do the message type and length last */
729 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
732 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
733 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
734 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
735 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
736 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
737 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
738 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
739 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
742 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
743 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
744 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
745 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
746 * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
747 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
748 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
749 * know that is maximum server supports.
750 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
751 * containing version 1.0.
753 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
754 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
755 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
756 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
757 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
758 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
759 * the negotiated version.
761 *(p++) = s->client_version >> 8;
762 *(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff;
765 memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
766 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
772 i = s->session->session_id_length;
775 if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
776 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
779 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i);
783 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
784 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
785 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
786 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
789 *(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len;
790 memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
791 p += s->d1->cookie_len;
794 /* Ciphers supported */
795 i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &(p[2]), 0);
797 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
800 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
802 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
803 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
806 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
807 && i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH)
808 i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
814 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
818 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s) || !s->ctx->comp_methods)
821 j = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
823 for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
824 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
828 *(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
830 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
832 if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
833 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
837 ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
839 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
840 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
846 if(!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l)) {
847 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
848 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
851 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
854 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
855 return ssl_do_write(s);
860 int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
862 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
865 unsigned char *p, *d;
866 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ok;
869 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
873 * Hello verify request and/or server hello version may not match so set
874 * first packet if we're negotiating version.
879 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
880 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A,
881 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B, -1, 20000, &ok);
886 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
888 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
889 if (s->d1->send_cookie == 0) {
890 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
892 } else { /* already sent a cookie */
894 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
895 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
901 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
902 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
903 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
907 d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
908 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
909 /* Work out correct protocol version to use */
910 int hversion = (p[0] << 8) | p[1];
911 int options = s->options;
912 if (hversion == DTLS1_2_VERSION && !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2))
913 s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method();
914 else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
915 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
916 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
917 s->version = hversion;
918 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
920 } else if (hversion == DTLS1_VERSION && !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1))
921 s->method = DTLSv1_client_method();
923 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
924 s->version = hversion;
925 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
928 s->version = s->method->version;
931 if ((p[0] != (s->version >> 8)) || (p[1] != (s->version & 0xff))) {
932 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
933 s->version = (s->version & 0xff00) | p[1];
934 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
939 /* load the server hello data */
940 /* load the server random */
941 memcpy(s->s3->server_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
942 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
946 /* get the session-id */
949 if ((j > sizeof s->session->session_id) || (j > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE)) {
950 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
951 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
954 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
956 * check if we want to resume the session based on external pre-shared
959 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
960 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
961 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
962 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
963 &s->session->master_key_length,
965 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
966 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
967 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p + j);
971 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
973 if (!s->hit && j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length
974 && memcmp(p, s->session->session_id, j) == 0) {
975 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
976 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
977 /* actually a client application bug */
978 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
979 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
980 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
985 /* a miss or crap from the other end */
988 * If we were trying for session-id reuse, make a new SSL_SESSION so
989 * we don't stuff up other people
991 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
992 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
996 s->session->session_id_length = j;
997 memcpy(s->session->session_id, p, j); /* j could be 0 */
1000 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p);
1002 /* unknown cipher */
1003 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1004 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1007 /* Set version disabled mask now we know version */
1008 if (!SSL_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1009 ct->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1013 * If it is a disabled cipher we didn't send it in client hello, so
1016 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) {
1017 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1018 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1021 p += ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s, NULL, NULL);
1023 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1024 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1026 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1027 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1028 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1033 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1034 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1035 * set and use it for comparison.
1037 if (s->session->cipher)
1038 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1039 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1040 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1041 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
1042 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1045 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1047 * Don't digest cached records if no sigalgs: we may need them for client
1050 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1052 /* lets get the compression algorithm */
1054 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1056 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1057 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
1058 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1062 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1063 * using compression.
1065 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1066 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1071 if (s->hit && j != s->session->compress_meth) {
1072 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1073 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
1074 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1079 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1080 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1081 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1084 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, j);
1086 if ((j != 0) && (comp == NULL)) {
1087 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1088 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
1089 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1092 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1096 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1097 /* TLS extensions */
1098 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n)) {
1099 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1105 /* wrong packet length */
1106 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1107 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
1113 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1118 int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
1120 int al, i, ok, ret = -1;
1121 unsigned long n, nc, llen, l;
1123 const unsigned char *q, *p;
1125 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1127 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1128 int need_cert = 1; /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth ==
1131 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1134 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
1139 if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) ||
1140 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) &&
1141 (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE))) {
1142 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
1146 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
1147 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1148 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
1151 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1153 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1154 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1159 if (llen + 3 != n) {
1160 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1161 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1164 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
1166 if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
1167 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1168 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1169 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1174 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &q, l);
1176 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1177 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1181 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1182 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1183 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1186 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1195 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1196 if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0)
1197 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1198 && !((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
1199 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
1200 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1202 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
1203 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1204 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1207 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1209 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1210 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1214 sc = ssl_sess_cert_new();
1218 if (s->session->sess_cert)
1219 ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
1220 s->session->sess_cert = sc;
1222 sc->cert_chain = sk;
1224 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1225 * which we don't include in s3_srvr.c
1227 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1230 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1233 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
1235 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
1236 need_cert = ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
1237 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
1241 fprintf(stderr, "pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey, x);
1242 fprintf(stderr, "ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x, pkey));
1243 fprintf(stderr, "cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %lx, %d\n",
1244 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name,
1245 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey,
1246 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, need_cert);
1247 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1249 if (need_cert && ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))) {
1252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1253 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1257 i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
1258 if (need_cert && i < 0) {
1261 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1262 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1267 int exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
1268 if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx) {
1270 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1271 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1272 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1275 sc->peer_cert_type = i;
1276 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
1278 * Why would the following ever happen? We just created sc a couple
1281 if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
1282 X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
1283 sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 = x;
1284 sc->peer_key = &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]);
1286 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
1287 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1288 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
1289 s->session->peer = x;
1291 sc->peer_cert_type = i;
1292 sc->peer_key = NULL;
1294 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
1295 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1296 s->session->peer = NULL;
1298 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1304 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1307 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1309 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1313 int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1315 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1316 unsigned char *q, md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
1319 unsigned char *param, *p;
1321 long i, param_len, n, alg_k, alg_a;
1322 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1323 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1324 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1327 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1330 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1331 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
1332 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1333 EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
1335 int encoded_pt_len = 0;
1338 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1341 * use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request() as
1342 * ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped
1344 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1345 SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1346 SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B,
1347 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
1351 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1353 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
1355 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
1358 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) {
1359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1360 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1363 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1365 * In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be omitted if no
1366 * identity hint is sent. Set session->sess_cert anyway to avoid
1369 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
1370 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
1371 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
1372 OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1373 s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1376 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
1380 param = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1381 if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL) {
1382 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1383 if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL) {
1384 RSA_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp);
1385 s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp = NULL;
1388 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1389 if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp) {
1390 DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp);
1391 s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = NULL;
1394 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1395 if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp) {
1396 EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp);
1397 s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = NULL;
1401 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
1404 /* Total length of the parameters including the length prefix */
1407 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1409 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1411 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1412 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
1413 char tmp_id_hint[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
1416 if (param_len > n) {
1417 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1423 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1424 * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1425 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1428 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1429 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1430 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1433 if (i > n - param_len) {
1434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1435 SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH);
1441 * If received PSK identity hint contains NULL characters, the hint
1442 * is truncated from the first NULL. p may not be ending with NULL,
1443 * so create a NULL-terminated string.
1445 memcpy(tmp_id_hint, p, i);
1446 memset(tmp_id_hint + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
1447 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
1448 OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1449 s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint);
1450 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
1451 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1452 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1459 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1460 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1461 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
1463 if (param_len > n) {
1464 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1469 if (i > n - param_len) {
1470 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH);
1475 if (!(s->srp_ctx.N = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1476 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1481 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1482 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1489 if (i > n - param_len) {
1490 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH);
1495 if (!(s->srp_ctx.g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1496 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1501 if (1 > n - param_len) {
1502 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1507 i = (unsigned int)(p[0]);
1510 if (i > n - param_len) {
1511 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH);
1516 if (!(s->srp_ctx.s = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1517 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1522 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1523 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1530 if (i > n - param_len) {
1531 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH);
1536 if (!(s->srp_ctx.B = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1537 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1543 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, &al)) {
1544 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
1548 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1549 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1550 if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
1552 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1553 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
1557 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1558 else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
1560 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1561 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].
1565 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
1566 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1567 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
1568 /* Temporary RSA keys only allowed in export ciphersuites */
1569 if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
1570 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1571 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1574 if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) {
1575 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1580 if (param_len > n) {
1581 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1586 if (i > n - param_len) {
1587 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH);
1592 if (!(rsa->n = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->n))) {
1593 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1598 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1599 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1606 if (i > n - param_len) {
1607 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH);
1612 if (!(rsa->e = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->e))) {
1613 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1619 /* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
1620 if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
1622 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1623 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
1625 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1628 s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp = rsa;
1631 #else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
1634 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1635 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
1636 if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) {
1637 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1642 if (param_len > n) {
1643 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1648 if (i > n - param_len) {
1649 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH);
1654 if (!(dh->p = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1655 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1660 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1661 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1668 if (i > n - param_len) {
1669 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH);
1674 if (!(dh->g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1675 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1680 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1681 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1688 if (i > n - param_len) {
1689 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH);
1694 if (!(dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1701 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
1702 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1703 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1706 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1707 if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
1709 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1710 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
1714 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1715 else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
1717 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1718 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].
1721 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1723 s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = dh;
1725 } else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) || (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)) {
1726 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1727 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1728 SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
1731 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
1733 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1734 else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
1736 const EC_GROUP *group;
1738 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
1739 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1744 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1745 * public key. Keep accumulating lengths of various components in
1746 * param_len and make sure it never exceeds n.
1750 * XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves and the
1751 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. We also need one
1752 * byte for the length of the encoded point
1755 if (param_len > n) {
1756 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1760 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1761 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1763 if (!tls1_check_curve(s, p, 3)) {
1764 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1768 if ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0) {
1769 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1770 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1771 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
1775 ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid);
1776 if (ngroup == NULL) {
1777 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1780 if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0) {
1781 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1784 EC_GROUP_free(ngroup);
1786 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);
1788 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1789 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
1790 al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
1791 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1792 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1798 /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
1799 if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) ||
1800 ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)) {
1801 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1805 encoded_pt_len = *p; /* length of encoded point */
1808 if ((encoded_pt_len > n - param_len) ||
1809 (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint,
1810 p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0)) {
1811 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
1814 param_len += encoded_pt_len;
1817 p += encoded_pt_len;
1820 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1821 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1825 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1826 else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
1828 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1829 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
1831 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1832 else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1834 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1835 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
1837 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1838 EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint);
1839 s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = ecdh;
1841 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1843 EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
1844 srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
1846 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1847 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1850 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1852 /* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */
1854 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1856 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1859 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1862 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
1869 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1877 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1882 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1885 * Check signature length. If n is 0 then signature is empty
1887 if ((i != n) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
1888 /* wrong packet length */
1889 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
1892 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1893 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1899 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
1900 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1901 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
1902 ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1903 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1905 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1907 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len);
1908 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, &size);
1912 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n, pkey->pkey.rsa);
1914 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1915 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
1920 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1921 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
1927 EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
1928 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1930 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1932 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len);
1933 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx, p, (int)n, pkey) <= 0) {
1935 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1936 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
1941 /* aNULL, aSRP or kPSK do not need public keys */
1942 if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
1943 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
1944 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s))
1945 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
1946 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1949 /* still data left over */
1951 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
1955 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1956 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1959 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1961 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1962 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1966 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1970 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1971 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1972 EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
1976 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1980 int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1983 unsigned long n, nc, l;
1984 unsigned int llen, ctype_num, i;
1985 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
1986 const unsigned char *p, *q;
1988 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
1990 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1991 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A,
1992 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B,
1993 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
1998 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
2000 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
2001 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
2003 * If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records as we
2004 * wont be doing client auth.
2006 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
2007 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
2013 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
2014 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2015 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2019 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
2020 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
2021 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) {
2022 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2023 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2024 SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER);
2029 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2031 if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
2032 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2036 /* get the certificate types */
2038 if (s->cert->ctypes) {
2039 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes);
2040 s->cert->ctypes = NULL;
2042 if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) {
2043 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
2044 s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num);
2045 if (s->cert->ctypes == NULL) {
2046 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2049 memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, p, ctype_num);
2050 s->cert->ctype_num = (size_t)ctype_num;
2051 ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
2053 for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++)
2054 s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = p[i];
2056 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2059 * Check we have enough room for signature algorithms and following
2062 if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen + 2) > n) {
2063 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2064 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2065 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2068 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2069 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2070 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
2071 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
2073 if ((llen & 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, p, llen)) {
2074 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2075 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2076 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2079 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2080 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2081 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2087 /* get the CA RDNs */
2090 if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen) != n) {
2091 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2092 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2096 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
2098 if ((l + nc + 2) > llen) {
2099 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2100 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG);
2106 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &q, l)) == NULL) {
2107 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2108 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2113 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2114 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2115 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2118 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2119 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2127 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2128 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2129 s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
2130 if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL)
2131 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2132 s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
2138 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2142 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2144 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
2147 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
2148 int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
2150 int ok, al, ret = 0, ticklen;
2152 const unsigned char *p;
2155 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2156 SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A,
2157 SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B,
2158 SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, 16384, &ok);
2164 /* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */
2165 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2166 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2170 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2171 n2l(p, s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint);
2173 /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
2174 if (ticklen + 6 != n) {
2175 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2176 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2179 if (s->session->tlsext_tick) {
2180 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
2181 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
2183 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2184 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) {
2185 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2188 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, p, ticklen);
2189 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
2191 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2192 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2193 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2194 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2195 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2196 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2197 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2198 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2199 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2201 EVP_Digest(p, ticklen,
2202 s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
2203 EVP_sha256(), NULL);
2207 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2212 int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s)
2215 unsigned long resplen, n;
2216 const unsigned char *p;
2218 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2219 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A,
2220 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B,
2221 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, 16384, &ok);
2226 /* need at least status type + length */
2227 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2228 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2231 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2232 if (*p++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2233 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2238 if (resplen + 4 != n) {
2239 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2243 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2244 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2245 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = BUF_memdup(p, resplen);
2246 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) {
2247 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2248 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2251 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
2252 if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2254 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2256 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2261 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2262 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2268 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2273 int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s)
2278 /* Second to last param should be very small, like 0 :-) */
2279 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2280 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A,
2281 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B,
2282 SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 30, &ok);
2287 /* should contain no data */
2288 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2289 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2296 int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2300 unsigned long alg_k;
2301 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2303 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2305 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2307 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2308 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2309 EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
2310 const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
2311 EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL;
2312 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2313 int encoded_pt_len = 0;
2314 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2316 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2319 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
2320 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2322 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2324 /* Fool emacs indentation */
2327 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2328 else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
2330 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2331 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2335 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
2337 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2339 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2340 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2344 if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
2345 rsa = s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
2348 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
2349 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].
2351 if ((pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2352 || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
2353 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2354 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2357 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
2358 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2361 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2362 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2363 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, pmslen - 2) <= 0)
2367 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2368 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
2370 n = RSA_public_encrypt(pmslen, pms, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2372 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
2374 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
2378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2379 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2383 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2384 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
2390 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2391 else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
2392 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2393 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2394 /* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */
2395 krb5_data *enc_ticket;
2396 krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL;
2397 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2398 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2399 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2400 unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2401 unsigned char epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2402 int padl, outl = sizeof(epms);
2404 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2407 fprintf(stderr, "ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
2409 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2412 # ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH
2414 authp = &authenticator;
2415 # endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */
2417 krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp, &kssl_err);
2418 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2423 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
2424 if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
2425 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n",
2428 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2431 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2437 * 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
2438 * in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
2440 * Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
2441 * n = krb5_ap_req.length;
2442 * memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
2443 * if (krb5_ap_req.data)
2444 * kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
2446 * Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
2447 * (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
2448 * Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
2449 * with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
2451 * KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
2452 * Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with
2453 * optional authenticator omitted.
2456 /* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */
2457 s2n(enc_ticket->length, p);
2458 memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length);
2459 p += enc_ticket->length;
2460 n = enc_ticket->length + 2;
2462 /* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */
2463 if (authp && authp->length) {
2464 s2n(authp->length, p);
2465 memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length);
2467 n += authp->length + 2;
2473 s2n(0, p); /* null authenticator length */
2477 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2478 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2482 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2483 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2484 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, pmslen - 2) <= 0)
2488 * 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
2489 * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
2490 * EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
2491 * kssl_ctx->length);
2492 * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
2495 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2496 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv);
2497 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, epms, &outl, pms, pmslen);
2498 EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(epms[outl]), &padl);
2500 if (outl > (int)sizeof epms) {
2501 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2502 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2505 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2507 /* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */
2509 memcpy(p, epms, outl);
2512 OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl);
2515 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2516 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
2517 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt;
2518 SESS_CERT *scert = s->session->sess_cert;
2520 if (scert == NULL) {
2521 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2522 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2523 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2527 if (scert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
2528 dh_srvr = scert->peer_dh_tmp;
2530 /* we get them from the cert */
2531 int idx = scert->peer_cert_type;
2532 EVP_PKEY *spkey = NULL;
2535 spkey = X509_get_pubkey(scert->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
2537 dh_srvr = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(spkey);
2538 EVP_PKEY_free(spkey);
2540 if (dh_srvr == NULL) {
2541 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2542 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2546 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
2547 /* Use client certificate key */
2548 EVP_PKEY *clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
2551 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2552 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
2553 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2554 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2558 /* generate a new random key */
2559 if ((dh_clnt = DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL) {
2560 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2563 if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt)) {
2564 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2570 pmslen = DH_size(dh_clnt);
2571 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2576 * use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but make sure to
2577 * clear it out afterwards
2580 n = DH_compute_key(pms, dh_srvr->pub_key, dh_clnt);
2581 if (scert->peer_dh_tmp == NULL)
2585 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2591 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY)
2594 /* send off the data */
2595 n = BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key);
2597 BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key, p);
2603 /* perhaps clean things up a bit EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2607 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2608 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2609 const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
2611 int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
2614 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
2615 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2616 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2617 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2622 * Did we send out the client's ECDH share for use in premaster
2623 * computation as part of client certificate? If so, set
2624 * ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
2626 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL)) {
2628 * XXX: For now, we do not support client
2629 * authentication using ECDH certificates.
2630 * To add such support, one needs to add
2631 * code that checks for appropriate
2632 * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
2633 * For example, the cert have an ECC
2634 * key on the same curve as the server's
2635 * and the key should be authorized for
2638 * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
2639 * to skip sending the certificate verify
2642 * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
2643 * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
2644 * EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
2645 * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
2649 if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) {
2650 tkey = s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp;
2652 /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
2654 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
2655 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
2656 if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL)
2657 || (srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
2658 || (srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL)) {
2659 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2660 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2664 tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec;
2667 srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2668 srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey);
2670 if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL)) {
2671 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2672 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2676 if ((clnt_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
2677 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2678 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2682 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group)) {
2683 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2686 if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
2688 * Reuse key info from our certificate We only need our
2689 * private key to perform the ECDH computation.
2691 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2692 tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
2693 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2694 if (priv_key == NULL) {
2695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2696 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2699 if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key)) {
2700 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2704 /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
2705 if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh))) {
2706 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2713 * use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but make sure to
2714 * clear it out afterwards
2717 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group);
2718 if (field_size <= 0) {
2719 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2722 pmslen = (field_size + 7) / 8;
2723 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2726 n = ECDH_compute_key(pms, pmslen, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, NULL);
2727 if (n <= 0 || pmslen != (size_t)n) {
2728 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2732 if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
2733 /* Send empty client key exch message */
2737 * First check the size of encoding and allocate memory
2741 EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
2742 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
2743 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
2746 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
2747 OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len * sizeof(unsigned char));
2748 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
2749 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
2750 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2751 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2755 /* Encode the public key */
2756 n = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
2757 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
2758 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
2759 encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx);
2761 *p = n; /* length of encoded point */
2762 /* Encoded point will be copied here */
2764 /* copy the point */
2765 memcpy((unsigned char *)p, encodedPoint, n);
2766 /* increment n to account for length field */
2770 /* Free allocated memory */
2771 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2772 if (encodedPoint != NULL)
2773 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2774 if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
2775 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
2776 EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
2778 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2779 else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2780 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2781 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2784 unsigned int md_len;
2786 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
2787 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash;
2791 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2796 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2800 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype = SSL_PKEY_GOST01)].x509;
2804 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype = SSL_PKEY_GOST94)].x509;
2806 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2807 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
2811 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key =
2812 X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
2814 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2816 * * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2817 * certificate key for key exchange
2820 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2822 EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2823 /* Generate session key */
2824 RAND_bytes(pms, pmslen);
2826 * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
2828 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) {
2829 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer
2830 (pkey_ctx, s->cert->key->privatekey) <= 0) {
2832 * If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
2839 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2842 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
2843 EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash,
2844 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94));
2845 EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
2847 EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
2849 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len);
2850 EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash);
2851 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2852 (pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8,
2854 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2858 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2860 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2862 *(p++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
2864 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) < 0) {
2865 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2869 if (msglen >= 0x80) {
2871 *(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
2874 *(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
2877 memcpy(p, tmp, msglen);
2878 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2879 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2880 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) {
2881 /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
2882 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
2884 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2885 EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key);
2888 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2889 else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2890 if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) {
2891 /* send off the data */
2892 n = BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A);
2894 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, p);
2897 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2898 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2901 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2902 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2903 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2904 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2905 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2906 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2911 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2912 else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2914 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2915 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2918 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 2];
2919 size_t identity_len;
2920 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2921 unsigned int psk_len = 0;
2925 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2926 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2927 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2931 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2932 /* Allocate maximum size buffer */
2933 pmslen = PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4;
2934 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2938 psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
2939 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2941 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2942 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2943 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2945 } else if (psk_len == 0) {
2946 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2947 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2950 /* Change pmslen to real length */
2951 pmslen = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
2952 identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1] = '\0';
2953 identity_len = strlen(identity);
2954 if (identity_len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2955 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2956 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2959 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2961 memmove(pms + psk_len + 4, pms, psk_len);
2963 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2967 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2968 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2969 s->session->psk_identity_hint =
2970 BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2971 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL
2972 && s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
2973 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2974 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2978 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2979 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2980 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity);
2981 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
2982 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2983 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2987 s2n(identity_len, p);
2988 memcpy(p, identity, identity_len);
2989 n = 2 + identity_len;
2992 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2994 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
3000 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
3001 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3005 if(!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) {
3006 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
3007 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3011 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B;
3014 /* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
3015 n = ssl_do_write(s);
3016 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3018 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3020 * If everything written generate master key: no need to save PMS as
3021 * SRP_generate_client_master_secret generates it internally.
3024 if ((s->session->master_key_length =
3025 SRP_generate_client_master_secret(s,
3026 s->session->master_key)) <
3028 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3029 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3035 /* If we haven't written everything save PMS */
3038 s->cert->pmslen = pmslen;
3040 /* If we don't have a PMS restore */
3043 pmslen = s->cert->pmslen;
3046 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3047 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3050 s->session->master_key_length =
3051 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
3053 session->master_key,
3055 OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pmslen);
3057 s->cert->pms = NULL;
3058 if(s->session->master_key_length < 0) {
3059 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3060 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3066 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3067 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3070 OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pmslen);
3072 s->cert->pms = NULL;
3074 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3075 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
3076 if (encodedPoint != NULL)
3077 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
3078 if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
3079 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
3080 EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
3085 int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
3088 unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
3090 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
3096 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
3098 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A) {
3099 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3100 pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
3101 /* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */
3102 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
3103 EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx);
3104 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1()) > 0) {
3105 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3106 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
3109 [MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
3114 * For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using agreed
3115 * digest and cached handshake records.
3117 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
3120 const EVP_MD *md = s->cert->key->digest;
3121 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3122 if (hdatalen <= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
3123 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3128 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client alg %s\n",
3131 if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3132 || !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
3133 || !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) {
3134 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3140 * For extended master secret we've already digested cached
3143 if (s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
3144 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3145 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3146 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3147 } else if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3150 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3151 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
3152 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_md5, &(data[0]));
3153 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data,
3154 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
3155 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
3156 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
3163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3164 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
3165 if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
3166 &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3167 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
3168 (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.dsa)) {
3169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
3176 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3177 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3178 if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
3179 &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3180 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
3181 (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.ec)) {
3182 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
3189 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
3190 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
3191 unsigned char signbuf[64];
3193 size_t sigsize = 64;
3194 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
3195 NID_id_GostR3411_94, data);
3196 if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, signbuf, &sigsize, data, 32) <= 0) {
3197 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3200 for (i = 63, j = 0; i >= 0; j++, i--) {
3201 p[2 + j] = signbuf[i];
3206 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3209 if(!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n)) {
3210 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3213 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B;
3215 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3216 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3217 return ssl_do_write(s);
3219 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3220 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3225 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3226 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3227 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3229 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3231 unsigned long alg_k;
3232 if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey)
3234 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3235 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->cert->key->digest)
3238 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3239 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3241 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3242 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3244 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3245 /* See if we can use client certificate for fixed DH */
3246 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
3247 SESS_CERT *scert = s->session->sess_cert;
3248 int i = scert->peer_cert_type;
3249 EVP_PKEY *clkey = NULL, *spkey = NULL;
3250 clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
3251 /* If client key not DH assume it can be used */
3252 if (EVP_PKEY_id(clkey) != EVP_PKEY_DH)
3255 spkey = X509_get_pubkey(scert->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
3257 /* Compare server and client parameters */
3258 i = EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, spkey);
3259 EVP_PKEY_free(spkey);
3263 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
3268 int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3271 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3274 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A) {
3275 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3276 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3277 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3279 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3283 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3286 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3288 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3289 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
3291 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
3294 /* We need to get a client cert */
3295 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B) {
3297 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3298 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3301 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3303 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3306 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3307 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3308 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
3309 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3311 } else if (i == 1) {
3313 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3314 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3320 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3321 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3324 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3325 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3326 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3329 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3333 /* Ok, we have a cert */
3334 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
3337 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C) {
3338 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D;
3339 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,
3340 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req ==
3341 2) ? NULL : s->cert->key)) {
3342 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3343 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3347 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
3348 return ssl_do_write(s);
3351 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3353 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3357 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3359 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3362 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3366 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3367 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3369 /* we don't have a certificate */
3370 if ((alg_a & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5)) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
3373 sc = s->session->sess_cert;
3375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3378 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3379 rsa = s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
3381 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3382 dh = s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
3385 /* This is the passed certificate */
3387 idx = sc->peer_cert_type;
3388 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3389 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
3390 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, s) == 0) {
3392 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3397 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
3398 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3399 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3401 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
3402 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_ECDH_CERT);
3406 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
3407 i = X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, pkey);
3408 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3410 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3411 if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3412 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3413 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3416 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3417 else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3418 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3419 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3423 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3424 if ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) &&
3425 !(has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC) || (rsa != NULL))) {
3426 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3427 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3431 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3432 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) &&
3433 !(has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKT_EXCH) || (dh != NULL))) {
3434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY);
3436 } else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) &&
3437 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_RSA)) {
3438 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3439 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT);
3442 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3443 else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) &&
3444 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_DSA)) {
3445 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3446 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT);
3452 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PKT_EXP)) {
3453 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3454 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
3456 || RSA_size(rsa) * 8 >
3457 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
3458 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3459 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
3464 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3465 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
3467 || DH_size(dh) * 8 >
3468 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
3469 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3470 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
3476 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3477 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
3483 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
3489 * Check to see if handshake is full or resumed. Usually this is just a case
3490 * of checking to see if a cache hit has occurred. In the case of session
3491 * tickets we have to check the next message to be sure.
3494 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3495 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3496 int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s)
3498 unsigned int len, padding_len;
3501 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A) {
3502 len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
3503 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3504 d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3506 memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len);
3507 d[5 + len] = padding_len;
3508 memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len);
3509 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
3510 l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d);
3511 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B;
3512 s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len;
3516 return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
3521 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3524 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3525 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3526 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3527 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3528 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3533 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3534 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);