2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
152 #include "ssl_locl.h"
153 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
154 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
155 #include <openssl/rand.h>
156 #include <openssl/objects.h>
157 #include <openssl/evp.h>
158 #include <openssl/md5.h>
159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
160 # include <openssl/dh.h>
162 #include <openssl/bn.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
164 # include <openssl/engine.h>
167 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
169 static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s);
172 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
173 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver)
175 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
176 return (SSLv3_client_method());
181 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_client_method,
182 ssl_undefined_function,
183 ssl3_connect, ssl3_get_client_method)
185 int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
188 unsigned long Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
189 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
191 int new_state, state, skip = 0;
193 RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
197 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
198 cb = s->info_callback;
199 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
200 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
203 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) {
208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
210 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
211 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
214 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
215 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
224 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
226 s->state = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
227 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
231 case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_CONNECT:
232 case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_CONNECT:
236 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
238 if ((s->version & 0xff00) != 0x0300) {
239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
244 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) {
245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
249 /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
250 s->type = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
252 if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
253 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
257 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
265 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
270 /* setup buffing BIO */
271 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 0)) {
276 /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */
278 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
280 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
281 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
283 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
285 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
287 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
290 case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
291 case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
294 ret = ssl3_client_hello(s);
297 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
300 /* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
301 if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
302 s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio);
306 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
307 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:
308 ret = ssl3_get_server_hello(s);
313 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
314 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
315 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
316 /* receive renewed session ticket */
317 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
321 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A;
325 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
326 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
327 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
328 /* Noop (ret = 0) for everything but EAP-FAST. */
329 ret = ssl3_check_finished(s);
334 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
339 /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH, SRP auth */
343 new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
344 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
345 ret = ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
348 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
349 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
350 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A;
352 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
355 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
361 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
366 case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A:
367 case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B:
368 ret = ssl3_get_key_exchange(s);
371 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A;
375 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
378 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
384 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A:
385 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B:
386 ret = ssl3_get_certificate_request(s);
389 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A;
393 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A:
394 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B:
395 ret = ssl3_get_server_done(s);
398 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
399 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
400 if ((ret = SRP_Calc_A_param(s)) <= 0) {
401 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
402 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
407 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
408 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
410 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
415 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A:
416 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B:
417 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C:
418 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D:
419 ret = ssl3_send_client_certificate(s);
422 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
426 case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A:
427 case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B:
428 ret = ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s);
432 * EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert sent back
435 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
436 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
439 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
440 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
441 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
442 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
444 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
445 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A;
447 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
449 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
450 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
456 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A:
457 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B:
458 ret = ssl3_send_client_verify(s);
461 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
465 case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
466 case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B:
467 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
469 SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
473 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
474 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
476 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
477 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A;
479 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
483 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
484 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
485 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
487 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
488 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
490 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
492 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
497 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
498 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
506 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
507 case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A:
508 case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B:
509 ret = ssl3_send_next_proto(s);
512 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
516 case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
517 case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B:
518 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
519 SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A,
520 SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B,
522 ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
524 ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
527 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
530 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
532 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
533 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED) {
534 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
535 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
536 s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret = 0;
539 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
541 * Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected
543 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
544 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
548 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
553 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
554 case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A:
555 case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B:
556 ret = ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s);
559 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
563 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A:
564 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B:
565 ret = ssl3_get_cert_status(s);
568 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
573 case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
574 case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
575 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
576 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
577 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
578 SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
583 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
585 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
589 case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH:
590 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
591 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
595 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
596 s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
600 /* clean a few things up */
601 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
603 if (s->init_buf != NULL) {
604 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
609 * If we are not 'joining' the last two packets, remove the
612 if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER))
613 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
614 /* else do it later in ssl3_write */
620 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
622 s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
626 s->handshake_func = ssl3_connect;
627 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
630 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
636 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
642 /* did we do anything */
643 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
645 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
649 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
650 new_state = s->state;
652 cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1);
653 s->state = new_state;
663 cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret);
667 int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
670 unsigned char *p, *d;
674 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
679 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
680 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
681 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
682 if ((sess == NULL) || (sess->ssl_version != s->version) ||
683 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
684 !sess->session_id_length ||
687 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
688 * "ticket" without a session ID.
690 (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
692 (sess->not_resumable)) {
693 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
696 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
697 /* Determine which DTLS version to use */
698 int options = s->options;
699 /* If DTLS 1.2 disabled correct the version number */
700 if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2) {
701 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
702 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,
703 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
707 * Disabling all versions is silly: return an error.
709 if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1) {
710 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
714 * Update method so we don't use any DTLS 1.2 features.
716 s->method = DTLSv1_client_method();
717 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
720 * We only support one version: update method
722 if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)
723 s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method();
724 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
726 s->client_version = s->version;
728 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
730 p = s->s3->client_random;
733 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
734 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
736 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
739 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
748 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p,
749 sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
752 /* Do the message type and length last */
753 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
756 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
757 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
758 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
759 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
760 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
761 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
762 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
763 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
766 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
767 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
768 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
769 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
770 * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
771 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
772 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
773 * know that is maximum server supports.
774 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
775 * containing version 1.0.
777 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
778 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
779 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
780 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
781 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
782 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
783 * the negotiated version.
785 *(p++) = s->client_version >> 8;
786 *(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff;
789 memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
790 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
796 i = s->session->session_id_length;
799 if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
800 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
803 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i);
807 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
808 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
809 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
810 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
813 *(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len;
814 memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
815 p += s->d1->cookie_len;
818 /* Ciphers supported */
819 i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &(p[2]), 0);
821 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
824 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
826 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
827 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
830 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
831 && i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH)
832 i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
838 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
842 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s) || !s->ctx->comp_methods)
845 j = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
847 for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
848 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
852 *(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
854 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
856 if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
857 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
861 ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
863 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
864 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
870 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l)) {
871 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
872 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
875 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
878 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
879 return ssl_do_write(s);
884 int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
886 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
889 unsigned char *p, *d;
890 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ok;
893 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
897 * Hello verify request and/or server hello version may not match so set
898 * first packet if we're negotiating version.
903 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
904 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A,
905 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B, -1, 20000, &ok);
910 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
912 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
913 if (s->d1->send_cookie == 0) {
914 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
916 } else { /* already sent a cookie */
918 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
919 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
925 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
926 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
927 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
931 d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
932 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
933 /* Work out correct protocol version to use */
934 int hversion = (p[0] << 8) | p[1];
935 int options = s->options;
936 if (hversion == DTLS1_2_VERSION && !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2))
937 s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method();
938 else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
939 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
940 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
941 s->version = hversion;
942 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
944 } else if (hversion == DTLS1_VERSION && !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1))
945 s->method = DTLSv1_client_method();
947 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
948 s->version = hversion;
949 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
952 s->version = s->method->version;
955 if ((p[0] != (s->version >> 8)) || (p[1] != (s->version & 0xff))) {
956 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
957 s->version = (s->version & 0xff00) | p[1];
958 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
963 /* load the server hello data */
964 /* load the server random */
965 memcpy(s->s3->server_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
966 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
970 /* get the session-id */
973 if ((j > sizeof s->session->session_id) || (j > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE)) {
974 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
975 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
978 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
980 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
981 * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
982 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
983 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
984 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
985 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
986 * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
987 * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
988 * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
989 * server wants to resume.
991 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb &&
992 s->session->tlsext_tick) {
993 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
994 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
995 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
996 &s->session->master_key_length,
998 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
999 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1000 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p + j);
1002 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1003 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1007 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
1009 if (j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length
1010 && memcmp(p, s->session->session_id, j) == 0) {
1011 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1012 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1013 /* actually a client application bug */
1014 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1015 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
1016 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1022 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1023 * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1024 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1025 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1026 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1028 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
1029 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1033 s->session->session_id_length = j;
1034 memcpy(s->session->session_id, p, j); /* j could be 0 */
1037 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p);
1039 /* unknown cipher */
1040 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1041 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1044 /* Set version disabled mask now we know version */
1045 if (!SSL_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1046 ct->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1050 * If it is a disabled cipher we didn't send it in client hello, so
1053 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) {
1054 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1055 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1058 p += ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s, NULL, NULL);
1060 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1061 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1063 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1064 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1065 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1070 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1071 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1072 * set and use it for comparison.
1074 if (s->session->cipher)
1075 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1076 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1077 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1078 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
1079 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1082 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1084 * Don't digest cached records if no sigalgs: we may need them for client
1087 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1089 /* lets get the compression algorithm */
1091 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1093 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1094 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
1095 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1099 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1100 * using compression.
1102 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1103 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1108 if (s->hit && j != s->session->compress_meth) {
1109 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
1111 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1116 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1117 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1118 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1121 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, j);
1123 if ((j != 0) && (comp == NULL)) {
1124 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1125 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
1126 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1129 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1133 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1134 /* TLS extensions */
1135 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n)) {
1136 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1142 /* wrong packet length */
1143 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1144 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
1150 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1155 int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
1157 int al, i, ok, ret = -1;
1158 unsigned long n, nc, llen, l;
1160 const unsigned char *q, *p;
1162 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1164 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1165 int need_cert = 1; /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth ==
1168 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1171 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
1176 if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) ||
1177 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) &&
1178 (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE))) {
1179 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
1183 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
1184 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1185 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
1188 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1190 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1191 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1196 if (llen + 3 != n) {
1197 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1201 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
1203 if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
1204 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1205 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1206 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1211 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &q, l);
1213 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1218 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1219 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1220 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1223 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1224 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1232 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1233 if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0)
1234 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1235 && !((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
1236 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
1237 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1239 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
1240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1241 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1244 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1246 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1247 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1251 sc = ssl_sess_cert_new();
1255 ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
1256 s->session->sess_cert = sc;
1258 sc->cert_chain = sk;
1260 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1261 * which we don't include in s3_srvr.c
1263 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1266 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1269 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
1271 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
1272 need_cert = ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
1273 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
1277 fprintf(stderr, "pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey, x);
1278 fprintf(stderr, "ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x, pkey));
1279 fprintf(stderr, "cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %lx, %d\n",
1280 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name,
1281 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey,
1282 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, need_cert);
1283 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1285 if (need_cert && ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))) {
1288 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1289 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1293 i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
1294 if (need_cert && i < 0) {
1297 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1298 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1303 int exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
1304 if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx) {
1306 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1307 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1308 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1311 sc->peer_cert_type = i;
1312 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
1314 * Why would the following ever happen? We just created sc a couple
1317 if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
1318 X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
1319 sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 = x;
1320 sc->peer_key = &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]);
1322 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
1323 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1324 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
1325 s->session->peer = x;
1327 sc->peer_cert_type = i;
1328 sc->peer_key = NULL;
1330 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
1331 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1332 s->session->peer = NULL;
1334 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1340 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1343 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1345 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1349 int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1351 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1352 unsigned char *q, md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
1355 unsigned char *param, *p;
1357 long i, param_len, n, alg_k, alg_a;
1358 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1359 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1360 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1363 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1366 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1367 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
1368 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1369 EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
1371 int encoded_pt_len = 0;
1374 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1377 * use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request() as
1378 * ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped
1380 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1381 SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1382 SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B,
1383 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
1387 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1389 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
1391 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
1394 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) {
1395 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1396 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1399 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1401 * In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be omitted if no
1402 * identity hint is sent. Set session->sess_cert anyway to avoid
1405 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
1406 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
1407 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
1408 OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1409 s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1412 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
1416 param = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1417 if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL) {
1418 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1419 RSA_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp);
1420 s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp = NULL;
1422 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1423 DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp);
1424 s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = NULL;
1426 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1427 EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp);
1428 s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = NULL;
1431 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
1434 /* Total length of the parameters including the length prefix */
1437 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1439 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1441 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1442 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
1443 char tmp_id_hint[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
1446 if (param_len > n) {
1447 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1453 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1454 * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1455 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1458 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1459 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1460 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1463 if (i > n - param_len) {
1464 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1465 SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH);
1471 * If received PSK identity hint contains NULL characters, the hint
1472 * is truncated from the first NULL. p may not be ending with NULL,
1473 * so create a NULL-terminated string.
1475 memcpy(tmp_id_hint, p, i);
1476 memset(tmp_id_hint + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
1477 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
1478 OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1479 s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint);
1480 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
1481 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1482 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1489 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1490 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1491 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
1493 if (param_len > n) {
1494 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1499 if (i > n - param_len) {
1500 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH);
1505 if (!(s->srp_ctx.N = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1506 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1511 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1512 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1519 if (i > n - param_len) {
1520 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH);
1525 if (!(s->srp_ctx.g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1526 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1531 if (1 > n - param_len) {
1532 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1537 i = (unsigned int)(p[0]);
1540 if (i > n - param_len) {
1541 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH);
1546 if (!(s->srp_ctx.s = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1547 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1552 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1553 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1560 if (i > n - param_len) {
1561 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH);
1566 if (!(s->srp_ctx.B = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1567 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1573 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, &al)) {
1574 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
1578 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1579 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1580 if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
1582 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1583 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
1587 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1588 else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
1590 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1591 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].
1595 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
1596 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1597 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
1598 /* Temporary RSA keys only allowed in export ciphersuites */
1599 if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
1600 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1601 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1604 if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) {
1605 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1610 if (param_len > n) {
1611 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1616 if (i > n - param_len) {
1617 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH);
1622 if (!(rsa->n = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->n))) {
1623 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1628 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1629 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1636 if (i > n - param_len) {
1637 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH);
1642 if (!(rsa->e = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->e))) {
1643 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1649 /* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
1650 if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
1652 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1653 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
1655 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1658 s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp = rsa;
1661 #else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
1664 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1665 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
1666 if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) {
1667 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1672 if (param_len > n) {
1673 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1678 if (i > n - param_len) {
1679 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH);
1684 if (!(dh->p = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1685 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1690 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1691 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1698 if (i > n - param_len) {
1699 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH);
1704 if (!(dh->g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1705 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1710 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1711 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1718 if (i > n - param_len) {
1719 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH);
1724 if (!(dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1725 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1731 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
1732 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1733 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1736 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1737 if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
1739 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1740 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
1744 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1745 else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
1747 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1748 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].
1751 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1753 s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = dh;
1756 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
1758 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1759 else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
1761 const EC_GROUP *group;
1763 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
1764 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1769 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1770 * public key. Keep accumulating lengths of various components in
1771 * param_len and make sure it never exceeds n.
1775 * XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves and the
1776 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. We also need one
1777 * byte for the length of the encoded point
1780 if (param_len > n) {
1781 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1785 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1786 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1788 if (!tls1_check_curve(s, p, 3)) {
1789 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1793 if ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0) {
1794 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1795 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1796 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
1800 ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid);
1801 if (ngroup == NULL) {
1802 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1805 if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0) {
1806 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1809 EC_GROUP_free(ngroup);
1811 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);
1813 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1814 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
1815 al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
1816 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1817 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1823 /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
1824 if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) ||
1825 ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)) {
1826 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1830 encoded_pt_len = *p; /* length of encoded point */
1833 if ((encoded_pt_len > n - param_len) ||
1834 (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint,
1835 p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0)) {
1836 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
1839 param_len += encoded_pt_len;
1842 p += encoded_pt_len;
1845 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1846 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1850 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1851 else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
1853 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1854 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
1856 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1857 else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1859 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1860 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
1862 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1863 EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint);
1864 s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = ecdh;
1866 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1868 EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
1869 srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
1871 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1872 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1875 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1877 /* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */
1879 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1881 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1884 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1887 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
1894 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1902 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1907 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1910 * Check signature length. If n is 0 then signature is empty
1912 if ((i != n) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
1913 /* wrong packet length */
1914 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
1917 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1918 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1924 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
1925 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1926 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
1927 ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1928 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1930 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1932 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len);
1933 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, &size);
1937 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n, pkey->pkey.rsa);
1939 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1940 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
1945 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1946 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
1952 EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
1953 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1955 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1957 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len);
1958 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx, p, (int)n, pkey) <= 0) {
1960 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1961 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
1966 /* aNULL, aSRP or kPSK do not need public keys */
1967 if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
1968 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
1969 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s))
1970 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
1971 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1974 /* still data left over */
1976 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
1980 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1981 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1984 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1986 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1987 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1990 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1993 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1994 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1995 EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
1998 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2002 int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2005 unsigned long n, nc, l;
2006 unsigned int llen, ctype_num, i;
2007 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
2008 const unsigned char *p, *q;
2010 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
2012 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2013 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A,
2014 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B,
2015 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
2020 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
2022 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
2023 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
2025 * If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records as we
2026 * wont be doing client auth.
2028 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
2029 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
2035 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
2036 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2037 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2041 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
2042 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
2043 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) {
2044 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2045 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2046 SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER);
2051 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2053 if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
2054 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2058 /* get the certificate types */
2060 if (s->cert->ctypes) {
2061 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes);
2062 s->cert->ctypes = NULL;
2064 if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) {
2065 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
2066 s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num);
2067 if (s->cert->ctypes == NULL) {
2068 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2071 memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, p, ctype_num);
2072 s->cert->ctype_num = (size_t)ctype_num;
2073 ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
2075 for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++)
2076 s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = p[i];
2078 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2081 * Check we have enough room for signature algorithms and following
2084 if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen + 2) > n) {
2085 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2086 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2087 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2090 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2091 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2092 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
2093 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
2095 if ((llen & 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, p, llen)) {
2096 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2097 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2098 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2101 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2102 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2103 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2109 /* get the CA RDNs */
2112 if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen) != n) {
2113 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2114 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2118 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
2120 if ((l + nc + 2) > llen) {
2121 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2122 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG);
2128 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &q, l)) == NULL) {
2129 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2130 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2135 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2136 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2137 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2140 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2141 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2149 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2150 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2151 s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
2152 if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL)
2153 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2154 s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
2160 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2164 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2166 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
2169 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
2170 int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
2172 int ok, al, ret = 0, ticklen;
2174 const unsigned char *p;
2177 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2178 SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A,
2179 SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B,
2180 SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, 16384, &ok);
2186 /* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */
2187 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2192 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2193 n2l(p, s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint);
2195 /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
2196 if (ticklen + 6 != n) {
2197 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2201 if (s->session->tlsext_tick) {
2202 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
2203 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
2205 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2206 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) {
2207 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2210 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, p, ticklen);
2211 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
2213 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2214 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2215 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2216 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2217 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2218 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2219 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2220 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2221 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2223 EVP_Digest(p, ticklen,
2224 s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
2225 EVP_sha256(), NULL);
2229 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2234 int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s)
2237 unsigned long resplen, n;
2238 const unsigned char *p;
2240 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2241 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A,
2242 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B,
2243 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, 16384, &ok);
2248 /* need at least status type + length */
2249 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2253 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2254 if (*p++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2255 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2260 if (resplen + 4 != n) {
2261 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2262 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2265 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2266 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2267 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = BUF_memdup(p, resplen);
2268 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) {
2269 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2270 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2273 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
2274 if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2276 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2278 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2279 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2283 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2284 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2290 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2295 int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s)
2300 /* Second to last param should be very small, like 0 :-) */
2301 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2302 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A,
2303 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B,
2304 SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 30, &ok);
2309 /* should contain no data */
2310 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2311 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2318 int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2322 unsigned long alg_k;
2323 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2325 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2327 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2329 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2330 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2331 EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
2332 const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
2333 EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL;
2334 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2335 int encoded_pt_len = 0;
2336 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2338 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2341 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
2342 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2344 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2346 /* Fool emacs indentation */
2349 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2350 else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
2352 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2353 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2357 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
2359 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2361 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2362 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2366 if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
2367 rsa = s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
2370 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
2371 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].
2373 if ((pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2374 || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
2375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2376 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2379 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
2380 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2383 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2384 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2385 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, pmslen - 2) <= 0)
2389 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2390 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
2392 n = RSA_public_encrypt(pmslen, pms, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2394 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
2396 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
2400 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2401 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2405 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2406 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
2412 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2413 else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
2414 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2415 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2416 /* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */
2417 krb5_data *enc_ticket;
2418 krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL;
2419 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2420 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2421 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2422 unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2423 unsigned char epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2424 int padl, outl = sizeof(epms);
2426 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2429 fprintf(stderr, "ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
2431 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2434 # ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH
2436 authp = &authenticator;
2437 # endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */
2439 krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp, &kssl_err);
2440 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2445 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
2446 if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
2447 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n",
2450 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2453 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2454 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2459 * 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
2460 * in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
2462 * Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
2463 * n = krb5_ap_req.length;
2464 * memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
2465 * if (krb5_ap_req.data)
2466 * kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
2468 * Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
2469 * (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
2470 * Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
2471 * with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
2473 * KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
2474 * Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with
2475 * optional authenticator omitted.
2478 /* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */
2479 s2n(enc_ticket->length, p);
2480 memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length);
2481 p += enc_ticket->length;
2482 n = enc_ticket->length + 2;
2484 /* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */
2485 if (authp && authp->length) {
2486 s2n(authp->length, p);
2487 memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length);
2489 n += authp->length + 2;
2495 s2n(0, p); /* null authenticator length */
2499 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2500 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2504 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2505 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2506 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, pmslen - 2) <= 0)
2510 * 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
2511 * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
2512 * EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
2513 * kssl_ctx->length);
2514 * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
2517 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2518 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv);
2519 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, epms, &outl, pms, pmslen);
2520 EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(epms[outl]), &padl);
2522 if (outl > (int)sizeof epms) {
2523 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2524 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2527 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2529 /* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */
2531 memcpy(p, epms, outl);
2534 OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl);
2537 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2538 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
2539 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt;
2540 SESS_CERT *scert = s->session->sess_cert;
2542 if (scert == NULL) {
2543 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2544 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2545 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2549 if (scert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
2550 dh_srvr = scert->peer_dh_tmp;
2552 /* we get them from the cert */
2553 int idx = scert->peer_cert_type;
2554 EVP_PKEY *spkey = NULL;
2557 spkey = X509_get_pubkey(scert->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
2559 dh_srvr = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(spkey);
2560 EVP_PKEY_free(spkey);
2562 if (dh_srvr == NULL) {
2563 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2564 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2568 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
2569 /* Use client certificate key */
2570 EVP_PKEY *clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
2573 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2574 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
2575 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2576 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2580 /* generate a new random key */
2581 if ((dh_clnt = DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL) {
2582 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2585 if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt)) {
2586 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2592 pmslen = DH_size(dh_clnt);
2593 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2598 * use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but make sure to
2599 * clear it out afterwards
2602 n = DH_compute_key(pms, dh_srvr->pub_key, dh_clnt);
2603 if (scert->peer_dh_tmp == NULL)
2607 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2613 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY)
2616 /* send off the data */
2617 n = BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key);
2619 BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key, p);
2625 /* perhaps clean things up a bit EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2629 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2630 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2631 const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
2633 int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
2636 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
2637 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2639 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2644 * Did we send out the client's ECDH share for use in premaster
2645 * computation as part of client certificate? If so, set
2646 * ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
2648 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL)) {
2650 * XXX: For now, we do not support client
2651 * authentication using ECDH certificates.
2652 * To add such support, one needs to add
2653 * code that checks for appropriate
2654 * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
2655 * For example, the cert have an ECC
2656 * key on the same curve as the server's
2657 * and the key should be authorized for
2660 * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
2661 * to skip sending the certificate verify
2664 * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
2665 * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
2666 * EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
2667 * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
2671 if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) {
2672 tkey = s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp;
2674 /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
2676 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
2677 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
2678 if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL)
2679 || (srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
2680 || (srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL)) {
2681 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2682 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2686 tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec;
2689 srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2690 srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey);
2692 if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL)) {
2693 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2694 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2698 if ((clnt_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
2699 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2700 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2704 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group)) {
2705 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2708 if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
2710 * Reuse key info from our certificate We only need our
2711 * private key to perform the ECDH computation.
2713 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2714 tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
2715 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2716 if (priv_key == NULL) {
2717 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2718 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2721 if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key)) {
2722 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2726 /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
2727 if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh))) {
2728 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2735 * use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but make sure to
2736 * clear it out afterwards
2739 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group);
2740 if (field_size <= 0) {
2741 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2744 pmslen = (field_size + 7) / 8;
2745 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2748 n = ECDH_compute_key(pms, pmslen, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, NULL);
2749 if (n <= 0 || pmslen != (size_t)n) {
2750 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2754 if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
2755 /* Send empty client key exch message */
2759 * First check the size of encoding and allocate memory
2763 EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
2764 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
2765 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
2768 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
2769 OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len * sizeof(unsigned char));
2770 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
2771 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
2772 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2773 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2777 /* Encode the public key */
2778 n = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
2779 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
2780 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
2781 encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx);
2783 *p = n; /* length of encoded point */
2784 /* Encoded point will be copied here */
2786 /* copy the point */
2787 memcpy((unsigned char *)p, encodedPoint, n);
2788 /* increment n to account for length field */
2792 /* Free allocated memory */
2793 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2794 if (encodedPoint != NULL)
2795 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2796 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
2797 EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
2799 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2800 else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2801 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2802 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2805 unsigned int md_len;
2807 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
2808 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash;
2812 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2817 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2821 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype = SSL_PKEY_GOST01)].x509;
2825 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype = SSL_PKEY_GOST94)].x509;
2827 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2828 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
2832 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key =
2833 X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
2835 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2837 * * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2838 * certificate key for key exchange
2841 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2843 EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2844 /* Generate session key */
2845 if (RAND_bytes(pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2846 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2847 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2848 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2852 * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
2854 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) {
2855 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer
2856 (pkey_ctx, s->cert->key->privatekey) <= 0) {
2858 * If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
2865 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2868 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
2869 EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash,
2870 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94));
2871 EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
2873 EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
2875 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len);
2876 EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash);
2877 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2878 (pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8,
2880 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2884 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2886 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2888 *(p++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
2890 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) < 0) {
2891 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2895 if (msglen >= 0x80) {
2897 *(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
2900 *(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
2903 memcpy(p, tmp, msglen);
2904 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2905 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2906 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) {
2907 /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
2908 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
2910 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2911 EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key);
2914 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2915 else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2916 if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) {
2917 /* send off the data */
2918 n = BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A);
2920 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, p);
2923 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2924 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2927 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2928 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2929 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2930 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2931 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2932 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2937 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2938 else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2940 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2941 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2944 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 2];
2945 size_t identity_len;
2946 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2947 unsigned int psk_len = 0;
2951 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2952 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2953 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2957 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2958 /* Allocate maximum size buffer */
2959 pmslen = PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4;
2960 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2964 psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
2965 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2967 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2968 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2969 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2971 } else if (psk_len == 0) {
2972 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2973 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2976 /* Change pmslen to real length */
2977 pmslen = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
2978 identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1] = '\0';
2979 identity_len = strlen(identity);
2980 if (identity_len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2981 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2982 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2985 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2987 memmove(pms + psk_len + 4, pms, psk_len);
2989 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2993 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2994 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2995 s->session->psk_identity_hint =
2996 BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2997 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL
2998 && s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
2999 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3000 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3004 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
3005 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
3006 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity);
3007 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
3008 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3009 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3013 s2n(identity_len, p);
3014 memcpy(p, identity, identity_len);
3015 n = 2 + identity_len;
3018 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
3020 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
3026 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
3027 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3031 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) {
3032 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
3033 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3037 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B;
3040 /* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
3041 n = ssl_do_write(s);
3042 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3044 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3046 * If everything written generate master key: no need to save PMS as
3047 * SRP_generate_client_master_secret generates it internally.
3050 if ((s->session->master_key_length =
3051 SRP_generate_client_master_secret(s,
3052 s->session->master_key)) <
3054 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3055 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3061 /* If we haven't written everything save PMS */
3064 s->cert->pmslen = pmslen;
3066 /* If we don't have a PMS restore */
3069 pmslen = s->cert->pmslen;
3072 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3073 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3076 s->session->master_key_length =
3077 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
3079 session->master_key,
3081 OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pmslen);
3083 s->cert->pms = NULL;
3084 if (s->session->master_key_length < 0) {
3085 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3086 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3092 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3096 OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pmslen);
3098 s->cert->pms = NULL;
3100 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3101 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
3102 if (encodedPoint != NULL)
3103 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
3104 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
3105 EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
3110 int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
3113 unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
3115 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
3121 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
3123 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A) {
3124 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3125 pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
3126 /* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */
3127 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
3128 EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx);
3129 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1()) > 0) {
3130 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3131 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
3134 [MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
3139 * For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using agreed
3140 * digest and cached handshake records.
3142 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
3145 const EVP_MD *md = s->cert->key->digest;
3146 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3147 if (hdatalen <= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
3148 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3153 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client alg %s\n",
3156 if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3157 || !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
3158 || !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) {
3159 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3165 * For extended master secret we've already digested cached
3168 if (s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
3169 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3170 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3171 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3172 } else if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3175 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3176 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
3177 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_md5, &(data[0]));
3178 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data,
3179 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
3180 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
3181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
3188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3189 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
3190 if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
3191 &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3192 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
3193 (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.dsa)) {
3194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
3201 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3202 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3203 if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
3204 &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3205 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
3206 (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.ec)) {
3207 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
3214 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
3215 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
3216 unsigned char signbuf[64];
3218 size_t sigsize = 64;
3219 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
3220 NID_id_GostR3411_94, data);
3221 if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, signbuf, &sigsize, data, 32) <= 0) {
3222 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3225 for (i = 63, j = 0; i >= 0; j++, i--) {
3226 p[2 + j] = signbuf[i];
3231 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3234 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n)) {
3235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3238 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B;
3240 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3241 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3242 return ssl_do_write(s);
3244 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3245 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3250 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3251 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3252 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3254 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3256 unsigned long alg_k;
3257 if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey)
3259 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3260 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->cert->key->digest)
3263 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3264 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3266 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3267 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3269 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3270 /* See if we can use client certificate for fixed DH */
3271 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
3272 SESS_CERT *scert = s->session->sess_cert;
3273 int i = scert->peer_cert_type;
3274 EVP_PKEY *clkey = NULL, *spkey = NULL;
3275 clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
3276 /* If client key not DH assume it can be used */
3277 if (EVP_PKEY_id(clkey) != EVP_PKEY_DH)
3280 spkey = X509_get_pubkey(scert->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
3282 /* Compare server and client parameters */
3283 i = EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, spkey);
3284 EVP_PKEY_free(spkey);
3288 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
3293 int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3296 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3299 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A) {
3300 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3301 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3302 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3304 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3308 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3311 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3313 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3314 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
3316 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
3319 /* We need to get a client cert */
3320 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B) {
3322 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3323 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3326 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3328 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3331 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3332 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3333 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
3334 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3336 } else if (i == 1) {
3338 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3339 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3345 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3346 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3349 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3350 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3351 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3354 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3358 /* Ok, we have a cert */
3359 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
3362 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C) {
3363 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D;
3364 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,
3365 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req ==
3366 2) ? NULL : s->cert->key)) {
3367 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3368 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3372 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
3373 return ssl_do_write(s);
3376 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3378 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3382 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3384 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3387 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3391 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3392 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3394 /* we don't have a certificate */
3395 if ((alg_a & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5)) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
3398 sc = s->session->sess_cert;
3400 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3403 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3404 rsa = s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
3406 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3407 dh = s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
3410 /* This is the passed certificate */
3412 idx = sc->peer_cert_type;
3413 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3414 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
3415 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, s) == 0) {
3417 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3422 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
3423 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3424 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3426 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
3427 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_ECDH_CERT);
3431 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
3432 i = X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, pkey);
3433 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3435 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3436 if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3437 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3438 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3441 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3442 else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3443 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3444 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3448 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3449 if ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) &&
3450 !(has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC) || (rsa != NULL))) {
3451 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3452 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3456 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3457 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) &&
3458 !(has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKT_EXCH) || (dh != NULL))) {
3459 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY);
3461 } else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) &&
3462 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_RSA)) {
3463 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3464 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT);
3467 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3468 else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) &&
3469 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_DSA)) {
3470 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3471 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT);
3477 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PKT_EXP)) {
3478 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3479 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
3481 || RSA_size(rsa) * 8 >
3482 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
3483 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3484 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
3489 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3490 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
3492 || DH_size(dh) * 8 >
3493 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
3494 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3495 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
3501 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3502 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
3508 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
3513 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3515 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session from
3516 * the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on the next server
3517 * message after the ServerHello to determine if the server is resuming.
3518 * Therefore, we allow EAP-FAST to peek ahead.
3519 * ssl3_check_finished returns 1 if we are resuming from an external
3520 * pre-shared secret, we have a "ticket" and the next server handshake message
3521 * is Finished; and 0 otherwise. It returns -1 upon an error.
3523 static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s)
3527 if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION || !s->tls_session_secret_cb ||
3528 !s->session->tlsext_tick)
3531 /* Need to permit this temporarily, in case the next message is Finished. */
3532 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
3534 * This function is called when we might get a Certificate message instead,
3535 * so permit appropriate message length.
3536 * We ignore the return value as we're only interested in the message type
3537 * and not its length.
3539 s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3542 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
3543 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
3548 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
3550 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
3553 /* If we're not done, then the CCS arrived early and we should bail. */
3554 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
3555 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_FINISHED, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
3556 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3563 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3564 int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s)
3566 unsigned int len, padding_len;
3569 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A) {
3570 len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
3571 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3572 d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3574 memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len);
3575 d[5 + len] = padding_len;
3576 memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len);
3577 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
3578 l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d);
3579 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B;
3580 s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len;
3584 return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
3589 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3592 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3593 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3594 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3595 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3596 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3601 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3602 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);