2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
152 #include "ssl_locl.h"
153 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
154 #include <openssl/rand.h>
155 #include <openssl/objects.h>
156 #include <openssl/evp.h>
157 #include <openssl/md5.h>
158 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
159 # include <openssl/dh.h>
161 #include <openssl/bn.h>
162 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
163 # include <openssl/engine.h>
166 static int ssl_set_version(SSL *s);
167 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
168 static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s);
169 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
171 int (*put_cb) (const SSL_CIPHER *,
175 int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
178 unsigned long Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
179 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
181 int new_state, state, skip = 0;
183 RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
187 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
188 cb = s->info_callback;
189 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
190 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
193 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) {
198 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
200 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
201 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
204 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
205 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
214 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
216 s->state = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
217 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
221 case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_CONNECT:
222 case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_CONNECT:
226 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
228 if ((s->version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
229 && s->version != TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
231 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
236 if (s->version != TLS_ANY_VERSION &&
237 !ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) {
238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
242 /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
243 s->type = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
245 if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
246 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
248 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
251 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
253 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
260 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
265 /* setup buffing BIO */
266 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 0)) {
268 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
272 /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */
274 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
276 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
277 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
279 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
281 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
283 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
286 case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
287 case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
290 ret = ssl3_client_hello(s);
293 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
296 /* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
297 if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
298 s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio);
302 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
303 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:
304 ret = ssl3_get_server_hello(s);
309 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
310 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
311 /* receive renewed session ticket */
312 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
315 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A;
319 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
320 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
321 /* Noop (ret = 0) for everything but EAP-FAST. */
322 ret = ssl3_check_finished(s);
327 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
332 /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH, SRP auth */
336 new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
337 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
338 ret = ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
342 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
343 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A;
345 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
348 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
354 case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A:
355 case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B:
356 ret = ssl3_get_key_exchange(s);
359 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A;
363 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
366 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
368 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
373 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A:
374 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B:
375 ret = ssl3_get_certificate_request(s);
378 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A;
382 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A:
383 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B:
384 ret = ssl3_get_server_done(s);
387 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
388 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
389 if ((ret = SRP_Calc_A_param(s)) <= 0) {
390 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
391 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
392 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
397 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
398 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
400 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
405 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A:
406 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B:
407 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C:
408 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D:
409 ret = ssl3_send_client_certificate(s);
412 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
416 case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A:
417 case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B:
418 ret = ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s);
422 * EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert sent back
425 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
426 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
429 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
430 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
431 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
432 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
434 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
435 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A;
437 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
439 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
440 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
446 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A:
447 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B:
448 ret = ssl3_send_client_verify(s);
451 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
455 case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
456 case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B:
457 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
459 SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
463 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
464 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
466 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
467 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A;
469 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
473 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
474 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
475 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
477 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
478 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
480 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
482 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
484 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
488 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
489 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
492 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
498 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
499 case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A:
500 case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B:
501 ret = ssl3_send_next_proto(s);
504 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
508 case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
509 case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B:
510 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
511 SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A,
512 SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B,
514 ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
516 ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
519 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
522 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
525 * Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected
527 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
528 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
530 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
535 case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A:
536 case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B:
537 ret = ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s);
540 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
544 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A:
545 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B:
546 ret = ssl3_get_cert_status(s);
549 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
553 case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
554 case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
555 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
556 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
557 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
558 SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
563 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
565 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
569 case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH:
570 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
571 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
575 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
576 s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
580 /* clean a few things up */
581 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
582 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
585 /* remove the buffering */
586 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
592 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
594 s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
598 s->handshake_func = ssl3_connect;
599 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
602 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
609 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
615 /* did we do anything */
616 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
618 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
622 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
623 new_state = s->state;
625 cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1);
626 s->state = new_state;
635 cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret);
640 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if
641 * the version is currently set to (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION.
642 * Returns 1 on success
645 static int ssl_set_version(SSL *s)
647 unsigned long mask, options = s->options;
649 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
651 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are
652 * some protocols below X enabled. This is required in order
653 * to maintain "version capability" vector contiguous. So
654 * that if application wants to disable TLS1.0 in favour of
655 * TLS1>=1, it would be insufficient to pass SSL_NO_TLSv1, the
656 * answer is SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3.
658 mask = SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 | SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
659 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
663 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT)
664 if (options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2) {
665 if ((options & mask) != mask) {
666 s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
668 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
672 s->version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
675 if ((options & mask) == mask) {
676 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
679 s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
682 mask &= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1;
683 if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1) && (options & mask) != mask)
684 s->version = TLS1_VERSION;
685 mask &= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1;
686 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
687 if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1) && (options & mask) != mask)
688 s->version = SSL3_VERSION;
691 if (s->version != TLS1_2_VERSION && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
692 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION,
693 SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
697 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && FIPS_mode()) {
698 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
702 } else if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
703 /* Determine which DTLS version to use */
704 /* If DTLS 1.2 disabled correct the version number */
705 if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2) {
706 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
707 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION,
708 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
712 * Disabling all versions is silly: return an error.
714 if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1) {
715 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
719 * Update method so we don't use any DTLS 1.2 features.
721 s->method = DTLSv1_client_method();
722 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
725 * We only support one version: update method
727 if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)
728 s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method();
729 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
733 s->client_version = s->version;
738 int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
741 unsigned char *p, *d;
745 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
750 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
751 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
752 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
754 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
755 if (ssl_set_version(s) == 0)
758 if ((sess == NULL) || (sess->ssl_version != s->version) ||
760 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
761 * "ticket" without a session ID.
763 (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
764 (sess->not_resumable)) {
765 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
768 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
770 p = s->s3->client_random;
773 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
774 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
776 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
779 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
788 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p,
789 sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
792 /* Do the message type and length last */
793 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
796 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
797 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
798 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
799 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
800 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
801 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
802 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
803 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
806 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
807 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
808 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
809 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
810 * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
811 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
812 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
813 * know that is maximum server supports.
814 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
815 * containing version 1.0.
817 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
818 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
819 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
820 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
821 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
822 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
823 * the negotiated version.
825 *(p++) = s->client_version >> 8;
826 *(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff;
829 memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
830 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
836 i = s->session->session_id_length;
839 if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
840 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
843 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i);
847 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
848 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
849 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
850 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
853 *(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len;
854 memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
855 p += s->d1->cookie_len;
858 /* Ciphers supported */
859 i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &(p[2]), 0);
861 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
864 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
866 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
867 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
870 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
871 && i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH)
872 i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
878 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
882 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s) || !s->ctx->comp_methods)
885 j = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
887 for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
888 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
892 *(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
895 if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
896 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
900 ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
902 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
903 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
908 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l)) {
909 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
910 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
913 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
916 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
917 return ssl_do_write(s);
919 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
923 int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
925 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
927 unsigned char *p, *d;
928 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ok;
931 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
935 * Hello verify request and/or server hello version may not match so set
936 * first packet if we're negotiating version.
940 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
941 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A,
942 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B, -1, 20000, &ok);
948 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
949 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
950 if (s->d1->send_cookie == 0) {
951 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
953 } else { /* already sent a cookie */
955 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
956 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
962 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
963 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
964 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
968 d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
970 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
971 int sversion = (p[0] << 8) | p[1];
973 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION
974 #error Code needs updating for new TLS version
976 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
977 if ((sversion == SSL3_VERSION) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)) {
979 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
980 SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
981 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
984 s->method = SSLv3_client_method();
987 if ((sversion == TLS1_VERSION) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1)) {
988 s->method = TLSv1_client_method();
989 } else if ((sversion == TLS1_1_VERSION) &&
990 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1)) {
991 s->method = TLSv1_1_client_method();
992 } else if ((sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION) &&
993 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2)) {
994 s->method = TLSv1_2_client_method();
996 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
997 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1000 s->session->ssl_version = s->version = s->method->version;
1002 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) {
1003 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
1004 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1007 } else if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1008 /* Work out correct protocol version to use */
1009 int hversion = (p[0] << 8) | p[1];
1010 int options = s->options;
1011 if (hversion == DTLS1_2_VERSION && !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2))
1012 s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method();
1013 else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1014 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
1015 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1016 s->version = hversion;
1017 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1019 } else if (hversion == DTLS1_VERSION && !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1))
1020 s->method = DTLSv1_client_method();
1022 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
1023 s->version = hversion;
1024 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1027 s->session->ssl_version = s->version = s->method->version;
1028 } else if ((p[0] != (s->version >> 8)) || (p[1] != (s->version & 0xff))) {
1029 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
1030 s->version = (s->version & 0xff00) | p[1];
1031 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1036 /* load the server hello data */
1037 /* load the server random */
1038 memcpy(s->s3->server_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1039 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1043 /* get the session-id */
1046 if ((j > sizeof s->session->session_id) || (j > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE)) {
1047 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1048 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1053 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
1054 * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1055 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1056 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1057 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1058 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
1059 * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
1060 * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
1061 * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
1062 * server wants to resume.
1064 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb &&
1065 s->session->tlsext_tick) {
1066 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1067 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1068 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1069 &s->session->master_key_length,
1071 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1072 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1073 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p + j);
1075 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1076 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1081 if (j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length
1082 && memcmp(p, s->session->session_id, j) == 0) {
1083 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1084 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1085 /* actually a client application bug */
1086 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1087 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
1088 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1094 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1095 * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1096 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1097 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1098 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1100 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
1101 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1105 s->session->session_id_length = j;
1106 memcpy(s->session->session_id, p, j); /* j could be 0 */
1109 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p);
1111 /* unknown cipher */
1112 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1113 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1116 /* Set version disabled mask now we know version */
1117 if (!SSL_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1118 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1120 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = 0;
1122 * If it is a disabled cipher we didn't send it in client hello, so
1125 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) {
1126 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1127 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1130 p += ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s, NULL, NULL);
1132 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1133 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1135 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1136 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1137 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1142 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1143 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1144 * set and use it for comparison.
1146 if (s->session->cipher)
1147 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1148 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1149 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1150 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
1151 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1154 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1156 * Don't digest cached records if no sigalgs: we may need them for client
1159 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
1161 /* lets get the compression algorithm */
1163 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1165 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1166 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
1167 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1171 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1172 * using compression.
1174 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1175 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1180 if (s->hit && j != s->session->compress_meth) {
1181 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1182 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
1183 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1188 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1189 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1190 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1193 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, j);
1195 if ((j != 0) && (comp == NULL)) {
1196 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1197 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
1198 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1201 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1205 /* TLS extensions */
1206 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n)) {
1207 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1212 /* wrong packet length */
1213 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
1220 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1222 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1226 int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
1228 int al, i, ok, ret = -1, exp_idx;
1229 unsigned long n, nc, llen, l;
1231 const unsigned char *q, *p;
1233 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1234 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1236 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1239 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
1244 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
1245 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
1249 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
1250 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
1254 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1256 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1262 if (llen + 3 != n) {
1263 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1264 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1267 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
1269 if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
1270 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1271 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1272 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1277 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &q, l);
1279 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1280 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1284 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1285 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1286 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1289 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1290 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1298 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1299 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1300 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
1301 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1302 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1305 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1307 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1308 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1312 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1314 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1315 * which we don't include in s3_srvr.c
1317 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1320 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1323 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
1325 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1328 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1329 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1333 i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
1337 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1338 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1342 exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
1343 if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx) {
1345 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1346 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1347 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1350 s->session->peer_type = i;
1352 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1353 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
1354 s->session->peer = x;
1355 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1362 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1364 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1366 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1368 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1372 int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1374 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1375 unsigned char *q, md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
1378 unsigned char *param, *p;
1380 long i, param_len, n, alg_k, alg_a;
1381 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1382 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1383 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1386 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1389 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1390 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
1391 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1392 EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
1394 int encoded_pt_len = 0;
1397 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1400 * use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request() as
1401 * ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped
1403 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1404 SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1405 SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B,
1406 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
1410 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1412 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
1414 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
1417 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) {
1418 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1419 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1423 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
1427 param = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1429 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1430 RSA_free(s->s3->peer_rsa_tmp);
1431 s->s3->peer_rsa_tmp = NULL;
1433 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1434 DH_free(s->s3->peer_dh_tmp);
1435 s->s3->peer_dh_tmp = NULL;
1437 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1438 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp);
1439 s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp = NULL;
1442 /* Total length of the parameters including the length prefix */
1445 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1447 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1449 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1450 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
1451 char tmp_id_hint[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
1454 if (param_len > n) {
1455 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1461 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1462 * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1463 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1466 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1467 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1468 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1471 if (i > n - param_len) {
1472 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1473 SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH);
1479 * If received PSK identity hint contains NULL characters, the hint
1480 * is truncated from the first NULL. p may not be ending with NULL,
1481 * so create a NULL-terminated string.
1483 memcpy(tmp_id_hint, p, i);
1484 memset(tmp_id_hint + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
1485 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1486 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint);
1487 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
1488 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1489 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1496 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1497 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1498 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
1500 if (param_len > n) {
1501 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1506 if (i > n - param_len) {
1507 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH);
1512 if ((s->srp_ctx.N = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
1513 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1518 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1519 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1526 if (i > n - param_len) {
1527 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH);
1532 if ((s->srp_ctx.g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
1533 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1538 if (1 > n - param_len) {
1539 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1544 i = (unsigned int)(p[0]);
1547 if (i > n - param_len) {
1548 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH);
1553 if ((s->srp_ctx.s = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
1554 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1559 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1560 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1567 if (i > n - param_len) {
1568 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH);
1573 if ((s->srp_ctx.B = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
1574 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1580 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, &al)) {
1581 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
1585 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1586 if (alg_a & (SSL_aRSA|SSL_aDSS))
1587 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1589 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
1590 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1591 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
1592 /* Temporary RSA keys only allowed in export ciphersuites */
1593 if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
1594 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1595 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1598 if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) {
1599 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1604 if (param_len > n) {
1605 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1610 if (i > n - param_len) {
1611 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH);
1616 if ((rsa->n = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->n)) == NULL) {
1617 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1622 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1623 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1630 if (i > n - param_len) {
1631 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH);
1636 if ((rsa->e = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->e)) == NULL) {
1637 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1643 /* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
1644 if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
1645 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1647 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1651 if (EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey) <= SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
1652 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1653 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1657 s->s3->peer_rsa_tmp = rsa;
1660 #else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
1663 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1664 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
1665 if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) {
1666 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1671 if (param_len > n) {
1672 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1677 if (i > n - param_len) {
1678 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH);
1683 if ((dh->p = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
1684 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1689 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1690 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1697 if (i > n - param_len) {
1698 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH);
1703 if ((dh->g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
1704 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1709 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1710 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1717 if (i > n - param_len) {
1718 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH);
1723 if ((dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
1724 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1730 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
1731 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1732 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1735 if (alg_a & (SSL_aRSA|SSL_aDSS))
1736 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1737 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1739 s->s3->peer_dh_tmp = dh;
1742 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
1744 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1745 else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
1747 const EC_GROUP *group;
1749 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
1750 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1755 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1756 * public key. Keep accumulating lengths of various components in
1757 * param_len and make sure it never exceeds n.
1761 * XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves and the
1762 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. We also need one
1763 * byte for the length of the encoded point
1766 if (param_len > n) {
1767 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1771 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1772 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1774 if (!tls1_check_curve(s, p, 3)) {
1775 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1779 if ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0) {
1780 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1781 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1782 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
1786 ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid);
1787 if (ngroup == NULL) {
1788 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1791 if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0) {
1792 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1795 EC_GROUP_free(ngroup);
1797 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);
1799 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1800 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
1801 al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
1802 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1803 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1809 /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
1810 if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) ||
1811 ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)) {
1812 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1816 encoded_pt_len = *p; /* length of encoded point */
1819 if ((encoded_pt_len > n - param_len) ||
1820 (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint,
1821 p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0)) {
1822 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
1825 param_len += encoded_pt_len;
1828 p += encoded_pt_len;
1831 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1832 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1836 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1837 else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
1838 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1840 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1841 else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1842 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1844 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1845 EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint);
1846 s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp = ecdh;
1848 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1850 EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
1851 srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
1853 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1854 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1857 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1859 /* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */
1861 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1863 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1866 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1869 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
1876 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1884 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1889 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1892 * Check signature length. If n is 0 then signature is empty
1894 if ((i != n) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
1895 /* wrong packet length */
1896 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
1899 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1900 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1906 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
1907 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1908 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
1909 ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1910 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1912 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1914 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len);
1915 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, &size);
1919 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n, pkey->pkey.rsa);
1921 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1922 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
1927 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1928 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
1934 EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
1935 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1937 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1939 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len);
1940 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx, p, (int)n, pkey) <= 0) {
1942 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1943 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
1948 /* aNULL, aSRP or kPSK do not need public keys */
1949 if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
1950 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
1951 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s))
1952 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
1953 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1956 /* still data left over */
1958 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
1962 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1963 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1966 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1968 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1969 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1972 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1975 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1976 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1977 EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
1980 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1981 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1985 int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1988 unsigned long n, nc, l;
1989 unsigned int llen, ctype_num, i;
1990 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
1991 const unsigned char *p, *q;
1993 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
1995 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1996 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A,
1997 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B,
1998 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
2003 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
2005 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
2006 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
2008 * If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records as we
2009 * wont be doing client auth.
2011 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
2016 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
2017 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2018 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2022 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
2023 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
2024 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) {
2025 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2026 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2027 SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER);
2032 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2034 if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
2035 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2039 /* get the certificate types */
2041 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes);
2042 s->cert->ctypes = NULL;
2043 if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) {
2044 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
2045 s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num);
2046 if (s->cert->ctypes == NULL) {
2047 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2050 memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, p, ctype_num);
2051 s->cert->ctype_num = (size_t)ctype_num;
2052 ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
2054 for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++)
2055 s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = p[i];
2057 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2060 * Check we have enough room for signature algorithms and following
2063 if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen + 2) > n) {
2064 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2065 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2066 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2069 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2070 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2071 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2072 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2074 if ((llen & 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, p, llen)) {
2075 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2076 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2077 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2080 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2081 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2082 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2088 /* get the CA RDNs */
2091 if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen) != n) {
2092 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2097 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
2099 if ((l + nc + 2) > llen) {
2100 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2101 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG);
2107 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &q, l)) == NULL) {
2108 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2109 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2114 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2115 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2116 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2119 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2120 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2128 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2129 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2130 s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
2131 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2132 s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
2138 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2140 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2144 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2146 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
2149 int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
2151 int ok, al, ret = 0, ticklen;
2153 const unsigned char *p;
2156 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2157 SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A,
2158 SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B,
2159 SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, 16384, &ok);
2165 /* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */
2166 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2167 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2171 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2173 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2174 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
2175 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2177 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2180 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
2182 * Remove the old session from the cache
2184 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) {
2185 if (s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
2186 s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb(s->session_ctx,
2189 /* We carry on if this fails */
2190 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2194 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2195 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2196 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2200 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2201 s->session = new_sess;
2204 n2l(p, s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint);
2206 /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
2207 if (ticklen + 6 != n) {
2208 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2209 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2212 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
2213 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
2214 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2215 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) {
2216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2219 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, p, ticklen);
2220 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
2222 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2223 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2224 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2225 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2226 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2227 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2228 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2229 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2230 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2232 EVP_Digest(p, ticklen,
2233 s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
2234 EVP_sha256(), NULL);
2238 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2240 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2244 int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s)
2247 unsigned long resplen, n;
2248 const unsigned char *p;
2250 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2251 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A,
2252 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B,
2253 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, 16384, &ok);
2258 /* need at least status type + length */
2259 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2263 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2264 if (*p++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2265 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2270 if (resplen + 4 != n) {
2271 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2275 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2276 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = BUF_memdup(p, resplen);
2277 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) {
2278 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2279 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2282 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
2283 if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2285 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2287 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2288 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2292 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2293 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2299 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2300 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2304 int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s)
2309 /* Second to last param should be very small, like 0 :-) */
2310 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2311 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A,
2312 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B,
2313 SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 30, &ok);
2318 /* should contain no data */
2319 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2321 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2328 int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2332 unsigned long alg_k;
2333 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2335 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2337 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2338 EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
2339 const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
2340 EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL;
2341 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2342 int encoded_pt_len = 0;
2343 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2345 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2348 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
2349 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2351 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2353 /* Fool emacs indentation */
2356 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2357 else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
2359 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2360 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2364 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2366 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2368 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2369 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2373 if (s->s3->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
2374 rsa = s->s3->peer_rsa_tmp;
2376 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2377 if ((pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2378 || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
2379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2380 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2383 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
2384 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2387 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2388 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2389 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, pmslen - 2) <= 0)
2393 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2394 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
2396 n = RSA_public_encrypt(pmslen, pms, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2398 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
2400 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
2404 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2405 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2409 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2410 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
2416 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2417 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
2418 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt;
2419 if (s->s3->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
2420 dh_srvr = s->s3->peer_dh_tmp;
2422 /* we get them from the cert */
2423 EVP_PKEY *spkey = NULL;
2425 spkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2427 dh_srvr = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(spkey);
2428 EVP_PKEY_free(spkey);
2430 if (dh_srvr == NULL) {
2431 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2432 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2436 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
2437 /* Use client certificate key */
2438 EVP_PKEY *clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
2441 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2442 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
2443 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2444 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2448 /* generate a new random key */
2449 if ((dh_clnt = DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL) {
2450 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2453 if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt)) {
2454 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2460 pmslen = DH_size(dh_clnt);
2461 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2466 * use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but make sure to
2467 * clear it out afterwards
2470 n = DH_compute_key(pms, dh_srvr->pub_key, dh_clnt);
2471 if (s->s3->peer_dh_tmp == NULL)
2475 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2481 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY)
2484 /* send off the data */
2485 n = BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key);
2487 BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key, p);
2495 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2496 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2497 const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
2499 int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
2502 * Did we send out the client's ECDH share for use in premaster
2503 * computation as part of client certificate? If so, set
2504 * ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
2506 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL)) {
2508 * XXX: For now, we do not support client
2509 * authentication using ECDH certificates.
2510 * To add such support, one needs to add
2511 * code that checks for appropriate
2512 * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
2513 * For example, the cert have an ECC
2514 * key on the same curve as the server's
2515 * and the key should be authorized for
2518 * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
2519 * to skip sending the certificate verify
2522 * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
2523 * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
2524 * EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
2525 * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
2529 if (s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) {
2530 tkey = s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp;
2532 /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
2533 srvr_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2534 if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL)
2535 || (srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
2536 || (srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL)) {
2537 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2538 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2542 tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec;
2545 srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2546 srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey);
2548 if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL)) {
2549 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2550 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2554 if ((clnt_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
2555 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2556 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2560 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group)) {
2561 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2564 if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
2566 * Reuse key info from our certificate We only need our
2567 * private key to perform the ECDH computation.
2569 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2570 tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
2571 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2572 if (priv_key == NULL) {
2573 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2574 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2577 if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key)) {
2578 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2582 /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
2583 if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh))) {
2584 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2591 * use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but make sure to
2592 * clear it out afterwards
2595 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group);
2596 if (field_size <= 0) {
2597 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2600 pmslen = (field_size + 7) / 8;
2601 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2604 n = ECDH_compute_key(pms, pmslen, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, NULL);
2605 if (n <= 0 || pmslen != (size_t)n) {
2606 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2610 if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
2611 /* Send empty client key exch message */
2615 * First check the size of encoding and allocate memory
2619 EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
2620 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
2621 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
2624 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
2625 OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len * sizeof(unsigned char));
2626 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
2627 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
2628 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2629 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2633 /* Encode the public key */
2634 n = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
2635 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
2636 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
2637 encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx);
2639 *p = n; /* length of encoded point */
2640 /* Encoded point will be copied here */
2642 /* copy the point */
2643 memcpy(p, encodedPoint, n);
2644 /* increment n to account for length field */
2648 /* Free allocated memory */
2649 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2650 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2651 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
2652 EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
2654 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2655 else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2656 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2657 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2660 unsigned int md_len;
2661 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
2662 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash;
2666 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2671 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2673 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
2675 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2676 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
2680 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key =
2681 X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
2683 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2685 * * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2686 * certificate key for key exchange
2689 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2691 EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2692 /* Generate session key */
2693 if (RAND_bytes(pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2694 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2696 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2700 * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
2702 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) {
2703 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer
2704 (pkey_ctx, s->cert->key->privatekey) <= 0) {
2706 * If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
2713 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2716 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
2717 EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash,
2718 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94));
2719 EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
2721 EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
2723 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len);
2724 EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash);
2725 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2726 (pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8,
2728 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2732 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2734 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2736 *(p++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
2738 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) < 0) {
2739 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2743 if (msglen >= 0x80) {
2745 *(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
2748 *(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
2751 memcpy(p, tmp, msglen);
2752 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2753 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2754 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) {
2755 /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
2756 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
2758 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2759 EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key);
2762 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2763 else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2764 if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) {
2765 /* send off the data */
2766 n = BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A);
2768 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, p);
2771 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2772 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2775 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2776 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2777 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2778 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2779 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2784 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2785 else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2787 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2788 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2791 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 2];
2792 size_t identity_len;
2793 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2794 unsigned int psk_len = 0;
2798 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2799 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2800 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2804 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2805 /* Allocate maximum size buffer */
2806 pmslen = PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4;
2807 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2811 psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2812 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2814 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2815 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2816 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2818 } else if (psk_len == 0) {
2819 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2820 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2823 /* Change pmslen to real length */
2824 pmslen = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
2825 identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1] = '\0';
2826 identity_len = strlen(identity);
2827 if (identity_len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2828 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2829 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2832 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2834 memmove(pms + psk_len + 4, pms, psk_len);
2836 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2840 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2841 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity);
2842 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
2843 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2844 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2848 s2n(identity_len, p);
2849 memcpy(p, identity, identity_len);
2850 n = 2 + identity_len;
2853 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2855 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2861 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2862 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2866 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) {
2867 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2868 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2872 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2875 /* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
2876 n = ssl_do_write(s);
2877 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2879 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2881 * If everything written generate master key: no need to save PMS as
2882 * srp_generate_client_master_secret generates it internally.
2885 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
2886 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2887 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2893 /* If we haven't written everything save PMS */
2895 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2896 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2898 /* If we don't have a PMS restore */
2900 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
2901 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
2904 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2905 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2908 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
2909 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2910 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2916 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2917 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2919 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2920 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
2921 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2922 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2923 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2924 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
2925 EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
2927 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2931 int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
2934 unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
2936 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2942 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2944 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A) {
2945 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2946 pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
2947 /* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */
2948 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2949 EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx);
2950 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1()) > 0) {
2951 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2952 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
2955 [MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
2960 * For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using agreed
2961 * digest and cached handshake records.
2963 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2966 const EVP_MD *md = s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys];
2967 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2968 if (hdatalen <= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
2969 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2974 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client alg %s\n",
2977 if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
2978 || !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
2979 || !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) {
2980 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2985 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
2986 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
2989 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2990 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
2991 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_md5, &(data[0]));
2992 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data,
2993 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
2994 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
2995 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
3002 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3003 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
3004 if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
3005 &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3006 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
3007 (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.dsa)) {
3008 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
3015 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3016 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3017 if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
3018 &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3019 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
3020 (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.ec)) {
3021 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
3028 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
3029 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
3030 unsigned char signbuf[64];
3032 size_t sigsize = 64;
3033 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
3034 NID_id_GostR3411_94, data);
3035 if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, signbuf, &sigsize, data, 32) <= 0) {
3036 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3039 for (i = 63, j = 0; i >= 0; j++, i--) {
3040 p[2 + j] = signbuf[i];
3045 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3048 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n)) {
3049 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3052 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B;
3054 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3055 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3056 return ssl_do_write(s);
3058 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3059 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3060 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3065 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3066 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3067 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3069 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3071 unsigned long alg_k;
3072 if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey)
3074 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3075 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys])
3078 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3079 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3081 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3082 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3084 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3085 /* See if we can use client certificate for fixed DH */
3086 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
3087 int i = s->session->peer_type;
3088 EVP_PKEY *clkey = NULL, *spkey = NULL;
3089 clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
3090 /* If client key not DH assume it can be used */
3091 if (EVP_PKEY_id(clkey) != EVP_PKEY_DH)
3094 spkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3096 /* Compare server and client parameters */
3097 i = EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, spkey);
3098 EVP_PKEY_free(spkey);
3102 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
3107 int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3110 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3113 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A) {
3114 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3115 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3116 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3118 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3122 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3123 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3126 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3128 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3129 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
3131 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
3134 /* We need to get a client cert */
3135 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B) {
3137 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3138 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3141 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3143 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3146 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3147 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3148 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
3149 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3151 } else if (i == 1) {
3153 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3154 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3158 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3159 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3162 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3163 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3164 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3167 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3168 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3169 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3170 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3176 /* Ok, we have a cert */
3177 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
3180 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C) {
3181 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D;
3182 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,
3183 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req ==
3184 2) ? NULL : s->cert->key)) {
3185 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3186 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3187 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3191 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
3192 return ssl_do_write(s);
3195 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3197 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3201 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3203 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3206 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3209 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3211 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3212 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3214 /* we don't have a certificate */
3215 if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
3217 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3218 rsa = s->s3->peer_rsa_tmp;
3220 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3221 dh = s->s3->peer_dh_tmp;
3224 /* This is the passed certificate */
3226 idx = s->session->peer_type;
3227 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3228 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
3229 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) {
3231 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3236 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
3237 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3238 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3240 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
3241 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_ECDH_CERT);
3245 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3246 pkey_bits = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey);
3247 i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey);
3248 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3250 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3251 if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3253 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3256 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3257 else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3259 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3263 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3264 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
3265 if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
3266 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
3267 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3268 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3270 } else if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
3271 if (pkey_bits <= SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
3272 if (!has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
3273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3274 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3278 /* server key exchange is not allowed. */
3279 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3280 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3287 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3288 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (dh == NULL)) {
3289 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3290 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3292 } else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) &&
3293 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_RSA)) {
3294 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3295 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT);
3298 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3299 else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) &&
3300 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_DSA)) {
3301 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3302 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT);
3308 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
3309 pkey_bits > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
3310 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3311 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
3313 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3314 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
3316 } else if (RSA_bits(rsa) >
3317 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
3318 /* We have a temporary RSA key but it's too large. */
3319 al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
3320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3321 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
3326 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3327 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
3329 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
3330 /* We have a temporary DH key but it's too large. */
3331 al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
3332 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3333 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
3336 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
3337 /* The cert should have had an export DH key. */
3338 al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
3339 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3340 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
3345 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3346 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
3352 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3357 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session from
3358 * the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on the next server
3359 * message after the ServerHello to determine if the server is resuming.
3360 * Therefore, we allow EAP-FAST to peek ahead.
3361 * ssl3_check_finished returns 1 if we are resuming from an external
3362 * pre-shared secret, we have a "ticket" and the next server handshake message
3363 * is Finished; and 0 otherwise. It returns -1 upon an error.
3365 static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s)
3369 if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION || !s->tls_session_secret_cb ||
3370 !s->session->tlsext_tick)
3373 /* Need to permit this temporarily, in case the next message is Finished. */
3374 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
3376 * This function is called when we might get a Certificate message instead,
3377 * so permit appropriate message length.
3378 * We ignore the return value as we're only interested in the message type
3379 * and not its length.
3381 s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3384 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
3385 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
3390 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
3392 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
3395 /* If we're not done, then the CCS arrived early and we should bail. */
3396 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
3397 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_FINISHED, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
3398 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3406 int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s)
3408 unsigned int len, padding_len;
3411 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A) {
3412 len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
3413 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3414 d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3416 memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len);
3417 d[5 + len] = padding_len;
3418 memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len);
3419 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
3420 l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d);
3421 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B;
3422 s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len;
3426 return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
3430 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3433 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3434 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3435 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3436 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3437 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3442 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3443 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3447 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
3449 int (*put_cb) (const SSL_CIPHER *,
3455 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3456 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3457 ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
3463 put_cb = s->method->put_cipher_by_char;
3465 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
3466 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3467 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3468 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED))
3470 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3471 if (c->id == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
3472 if (!empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3475 empty_reneg_info_scsv = 0;
3482 * If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error. Otherwise, add
3486 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3487 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3488 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3490 j = put_cb(&scsv, p);
3492 #ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
3494 "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV sent by client\n");
3497 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3498 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3499 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3501 j = put_cb(&scsv, p);