2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
152 #include "ssl_locl.h"
153 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
154 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
155 #include <openssl/rand.h>
156 #include <openssl/objects.h>
157 #include <openssl/evp.h>
158 #include <openssl/md5.h>
159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
160 # include <openssl/dh.h>
162 #include <openssl/bn.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
164 # include <openssl/engine.h>
167 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
169 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
170 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver)
172 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
173 return (SSLv3_client_method());
178 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_client_method,
179 ssl_undefined_function,
180 ssl3_connect, ssl3_get_client_method)
182 int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
185 unsigned long Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
186 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
188 int new_state, state, skip = 0;
190 RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
194 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
195 cb = s->info_callback;
196 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
197 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
200 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
203 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
205 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
206 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
209 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
210 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
219 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
221 s->state = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
222 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
226 case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_CONNECT:
227 case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_CONNECT:
231 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
233 if ((s->version & 0xff00) != 0x0300) {
234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
239 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) {
240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
244 /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
245 s->type = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
247 if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
248 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
252 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
260 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
265 /* setup buffing BIO */
266 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 0)) {
271 /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */
273 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
275 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
276 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
278 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
280 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
282 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
285 case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
286 case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
289 ret = ssl3_client_hello(s);
292 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
295 /* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
296 if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
297 s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio);
301 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
302 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:
303 ret = ssl3_get_server_hello(s);
308 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
309 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
310 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
311 /* receive renewed session ticket */
312 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
316 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A;
320 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
321 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
322 /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH, SRP auth */
326 new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
327 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
328 ret = ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
331 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
332 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
333 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A;
335 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
338 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
344 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
349 case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A:
350 case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B:
351 ret = ssl3_get_key_exchange(s);
354 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A;
358 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
361 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
367 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A:
368 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B:
369 ret = ssl3_get_certificate_request(s);
372 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A;
376 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A:
377 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B:
378 ret = ssl3_get_server_done(s);
381 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
382 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
383 if ((ret = SRP_Calc_A_param(s)) <= 0) {
384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
385 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
390 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
391 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
393 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
398 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A:
399 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B:
400 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C:
401 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D:
402 ret = ssl3_send_client_certificate(s);
405 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
409 case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A:
410 case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B:
411 ret = ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s);
415 * EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert sent back
418 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
419 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
422 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
423 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
424 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
425 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
427 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
428 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A;
430 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
432 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
433 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
439 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A:
440 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B:
441 ret = ssl3_send_client_verify(s);
444 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
448 case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
449 case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B:
450 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
452 SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
456 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
457 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
459 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
460 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A;
462 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
466 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
467 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
468 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
470 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
471 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
473 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
475 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
480 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
481 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
489 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
490 case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A:
491 case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B:
492 ret = ssl3_send_next_proto(s);
495 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
499 case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
500 case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B:
501 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
502 SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A,
503 SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B,
505 ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
507 ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
510 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
513 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
515 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
516 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED) {
517 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
518 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
519 s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret = 0;
522 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
524 * Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected
526 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
527 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
531 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
536 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
537 case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A:
538 case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B:
539 ret = ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s);
542 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
546 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A:
547 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B:
548 ret = ssl3_get_cert_status(s);
551 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
556 case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
557 case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
558 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
559 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
560 SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
565 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
567 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
571 case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH:
572 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
573 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
577 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
578 s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
582 /* clean a few things up */
583 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
585 if (s->init_buf != NULL) {
586 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
591 * If we are not 'joining' the last two packets, remove the
594 if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER))
595 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
596 /* else do it later in ssl3_write */
602 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
604 s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
608 s->handshake_func = ssl3_connect;
609 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
612 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
618 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
624 /* did we do anything */
625 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
627 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
631 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
632 new_state = s->state;
634 cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1);
635 s->state = new_state;
645 cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret);
649 int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
652 unsigned char *p, *d;
656 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
661 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
662 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
663 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
664 if ((sess == NULL) ||
665 (sess->ssl_version != s->version) ||
666 !sess->session_id_length || (sess->not_resumable)) {
667 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
670 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
671 /* Determine which DTLS version to use */
672 int options = s->options;
673 /* If DTLS 1.2 disabled correct the version number */
674 if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2) {
675 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
676 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,
677 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
681 * Disabling all versions is silly: return an error.
683 if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1) {
684 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
688 * Update method so we don't use any DTLS 1.2 features.
690 s->method = DTLSv1_client_method();
691 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
694 * We only support one version: update method
696 if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)
697 s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method();
698 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
700 s->client_version = s->version;
702 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
704 p = s->s3->client_random;
707 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
708 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
710 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
713 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
722 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p,
723 sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
726 /* Do the message type and length last */
727 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
730 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
731 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
732 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
733 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
734 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
735 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
736 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
737 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
740 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
741 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
742 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
743 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
744 * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
745 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
746 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
747 * know that is maximum server supports.
748 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
749 * containing version 1.0.
751 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
752 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
753 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
754 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
755 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
756 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
757 * the negotiated version.
759 *(p++) = s->client_version >> 8;
760 *(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff;
763 memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
764 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
770 i = s->session->session_id_length;
773 if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
774 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
777 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i);
781 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
782 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
783 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
784 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
787 *(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len;
788 memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
789 p += s->d1->cookie_len;
792 /* Ciphers supported */
793 i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &(p[2]), 0);
795 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
798 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
800 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
801 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
804 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
805 && i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH)
806 i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
812 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
816 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s) || !s->ctx->comp_methods)
819 j = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
821 for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
822 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
826 *(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
828 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
830 if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
831 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
835 ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
837 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
838 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
844 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l);
845 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
848 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
849 return ssl_do_write(s);
854 int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
856 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
859 unsigned char *p, *d;
860 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ok;
863 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
867 * Hello verify request and/or server hello version may not match so set
868 * first packet if we're negotiating version.
873 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
874 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A,
875 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B, -1, 20000, &ok);
880 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
882 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
883 if (s->d1->send_cookie == 0) {
884 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
886 } else { /* already sent a cookie */
888 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
889 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
895 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
896 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
897 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
901 d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
902 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
903 /* Work out correct protocol version to use */
904 int hversion = (p[0] << 8) | p[1];
905 int options = s->options;
906 if (hversion == DTLS1_2_VERSION && !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2))
907 s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method();
908 else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
909 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
910 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
911 s->version = hversion;
912 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
914 } else if (hversion == DTLS1_VERSION && !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1))
915 s->method = DTLSv1_client_method();
917 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
918 s->version = hversion;
919 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
922 s->version = s->method->version;
925 if ((p[0] != (s->version >> 8)) || (p[1] != (s->version & 0xff))) {
926 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
927 s->version = (s->version & 0xff00) | p[1];
928 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
933 /* load the server hello data */
934 /* load the server random */
935 memcpy(s->s3->server_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
936 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
940 /* get the session-id */
943 if ((j > sizeof s->session->session_id) || (j > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE)) {
944 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
945 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
948 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
950 * check if we want to resume the session based on external pre-shared
953 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
954 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
955 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
956 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
957 &s->session->master_key_length,
959 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
960 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
961 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p + j);
965 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
967 if (!s->hit && j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length
968 && memcmp(p, s->session->session_id, j) == 0) {
969 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
970 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
971 /* actually a client application bug */
972 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
973 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
974 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
979 /* a miss or crap from the other end */
982 * If we were trying for session-id reuse, make a new SSL_SESSION so
983 * we don't stuff up other people
985 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
986 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
990 s->session->session_id_length = j;
991 memcpy(s->session->session_id, p, j); /* j could be 0 */
994 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p);
997 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
998 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1001 /* Set version disabled mask now we know version */
1002 if (!SSL_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1003 ct->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1007 * If it is a disabled cipher we didn't send it in client hello, so
1010 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) {
1011 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1012 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1015 p += ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s, NULL, NULL);
1017 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1018 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1020 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1021 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1022 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1027 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1028 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1029 * set and use it for comparison.
1031 if (s->session->cipher)
1032 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1033 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1034 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1035 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
1036 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1039 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1041 * Don't digest cached records if no sigalgs: we may need them for client
1044 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1046 /* lets get the compression algorithm */
1048 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1050 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1051 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
1052 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1056 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1057 * using compression.
1059 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1060 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1065 if (s->hit && j != s->session->compress_meth) {
1066 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1067 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
1068 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1073 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1074 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1075 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1078 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, j);
1080 if ((j != 0) && (comp == NULL)) {
1081 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1082 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
1083 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1086 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1090 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1091 /* TLS extensions */
1092 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n)) {
1093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1099 /* wrong packet length */
1100 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1101 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
1107 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1112 int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
1114 int al, i, ok, ret = -1;
1115 unsigned long n, nc, llen, l;
1117 const unsigned char *q, *p;
1119 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1121 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1122 int need_cert = 1; /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth ==
1125 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1128 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
1133 if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) ||
1134 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) &&
1135 (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE))) {
1136 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
1140 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
1141 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
1145 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1147 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1148 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1153 if (llen + 3 != n) {
1154 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1155 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1158 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
1160 if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
1161 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1162 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1163 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1168 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &q, l);
1170 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1171 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1175 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1176 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1177 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1180 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1189 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1190 if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0)
1191 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1192 && !((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
1193 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
1194 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1196 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
1197 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1198 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1201 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1203 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1204 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1208 sc = ssl_sess_cert_new();
1212 if (s->session->sess_cert)
1213 ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
1214 s->session->sess_cert = sc;
1216 sc->cert_chain = sk;
1218 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1219 * which we don't include in s3_srvr.c
1221 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1224 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1227 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
1229 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
1230 need_cert = ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
1231 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
1235 fprintf(stderr, "pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey, x);
1236 fprintf(stderr, "ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x, pkey));
1237 fprintf(stderr, "cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %lx, %d\n",
1238 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name,
1239 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey,
1240 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, need_cert);
1241 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1243 if (need_cert && ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))) {
1246 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1247 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1251 i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
1252 if (need_cert && i < 0) {
1255 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1256 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1261 int exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
1262 if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx) {
1264 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1266 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1269 sc->peer_cert_type = i;
1270 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
1272 * Why would the following ever happen? We just created sc a couple
1275 if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
1276 X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
1277 sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 = x;
1278 sc->peer_key = &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]);
1280 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
1281 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1282 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
1283 s->session->peer = x;
1285 sc->peer_cert_type = i;
1286 sc->peer_key = NULL;
1288 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
1289 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1290 s->session->peer = NULL;
1292 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1298 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1301 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1303 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1307 int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1309 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1310 unsigned char *q, md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
1313 unsigned char *param, *p;
1315 long i, param_len, n, alg_k, alg_a;
1316 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1317 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1318 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1321 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1324 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1325 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
1326 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1327 EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
1329 int encoded_pt_len = 0;
1332 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1335 * use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request() as
1336 * ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped
1338 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1339 SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1340 SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B,
1341 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
1345 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1347 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
1349 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
1352 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) {
1353 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1354 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1357 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1359 * In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be omitted if no
1360 * identity hint is sent. Set session->sess_cert anyway to avoid
1363 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
1364 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
1365 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
1366 OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1367 s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1370 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
1374 param = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1375 if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL) {
1376 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1377 if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL) {
1378 RSA_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp);
1379 s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp = NULL;
1382 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1383 if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp) {
1384 DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp);
1385 s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = NULL;
1388 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1389 if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp) {
1390 EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp);
1391 s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = NULL;
1395 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
1398 /* Total length of the parameters including the length prefix */
1401 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1403 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1406 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
1407 char tmp_id_hint[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
1410 if (param_len > n) {
1411 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1417 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1418 * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1419 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1422 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1423 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1424 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1427 if (i > n - param_len) {
1428 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1429 SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH);
1435 * If received PSK identity hint contains NULL characters, the hint
1436 * is truncated from the first NULL. p may not be ending with NULL,
1437 * so create a NULL-terminated string.
1439 memcpy(tmp_id_hint, p, i);
1440 memset(tmp_id_hint + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
1441 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
1442 OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1443 s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint);
1444 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
1445 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1446 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1453 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1454 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1455 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
1457 if (param_len > n) {
1458 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1463 if (i > n - param_len) {
1464 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH);
1469 if (!(s->srp_ctx.N = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1470 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1475 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1476 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1483 if (i > n - param_len) {
1484 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH);
1489 if (!(s->srp_ctx.g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1490 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1495 if (1 > n - param_len) {
1496 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1501 i = (unsigned int)(p[0]);
1504 if (i > n - param_len) {
1505 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH);
1510 if (!(s->srp_ctx.s = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1511 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1516 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1517 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1524 if (i > n - param_len) {
1525 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH);
1530 if (!(s->srp_ctx.B = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1531 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1537 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, &al)) {
1538 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
1542 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1543 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1544 if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
1546 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1547 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
1551 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1552 else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
1554 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1555 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].
1559 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
1560 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1561 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
1562 /* Temporary RSA keys only allowed in export ciphersuites */
1563 if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
1564 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1565 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1568 if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) {
1569 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1574 if (param_len > n) {
1575 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1580 if (i > n - param_len) {
1581 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH);
1586 if (!(rsa->n = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->n))) {
1587 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1592 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1593 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1600 if (i > n - param_len) {
1601 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH);
1606 if (!(rsa->e = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->e))) {
1607 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1613 /* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
1614 if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
1616 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1617 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
1619 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1622 s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp = rsa;
1625 #else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
1628 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1629 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
1630 if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) {
1631 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1636 if (param_len > n) {
1637 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1642 if (i > n - param_len) {
1643 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH);
1648 if (!(dh->p = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1649 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1654 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1655 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1662 if (i > n - param_len) {
1663 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH);
1668 if (!(dh->g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1669 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1674 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1675 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1682 if (i > n - param_len) {
1683 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH);
1688 if (!(dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1689 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1695 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
1696 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1697 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1700 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1701 if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
1703 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1704 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
1708 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1709 else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
1711 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1712 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].
1715 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1717 s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = dh;
1719 } else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) || (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)) {
1720 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1721 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1722 SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
1725 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
1727 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1728 else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
1730 const EC_GROUP *group;
1732 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
1733 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1738 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1739 * public key. Keep accumulating lengths of various components in
1740 * param_len and make sure it never exceeds n.
1744 * XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves and the
1745 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. We also need one
1746 * byte for the length of the encoded point
1749 if (param_len > n) {
1750 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1754 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1755 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1757 if (!tls1_check_curve(s, p, 3)) {
1758 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1762 if ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0) {
1763 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1764 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1765 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
1769 ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid);
1770 if (ngroup == NULL) {
1771 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1774 if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0) {
1775 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1778 EC_GROUP_free(ngroup);
1780 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);
1782 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1783 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
1784 al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
1785 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1786 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1792 /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
1793 if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) ||
1794 ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)) {
1795 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1799 encoded_pt_len = *p; /* length of encoded point */
1802 if ((encoded_pt_len > n - param_len) ||
1803 (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint,
1804 p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0)) {
1805 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
1808 param_len += encoded_pt_len;
1811 p += encoded_pt_len;
1814 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1815 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1819 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1820 else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
1822 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1823 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
1825 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1826 else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1828 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1829 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
1831 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1832 EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint);
1833 s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = ecdh;
1835 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1837 EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
1838 srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
1840 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1841 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1844 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1846 /* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */
1848 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1850 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1853 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1856 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
1863 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1871 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1876 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1879 * Check signature length. If n is 0 then signature is empty
1881 if ((i != n) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
1882 /* wrong packet length */
1883 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
1886 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1887 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1893 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
1894 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1895 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
1896 ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1897 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1899 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1901 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len);
1902 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, &size);
1906 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n, pkey->pkey.rsa);
1908 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1909 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
1914 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1915 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
1921 EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
1922 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1924 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1926 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len);
1927 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx, p, (int)n, pkey) <= 0) {
1929 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1930 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
1935 /* aNULL, aSRP or kPSK do not need public keys */
1936 if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
1937 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
1938 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s))
1939 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
1940 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1943 /* still data left over */
1945 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
1949 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1950 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1953 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1955 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1956 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1960 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1964 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1965 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1966 EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
1970 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1974 int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1977 unsigned long n, nc, l;
1978 unsigned int llen, ctype_num, i;
1979 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
1980 const unsigned char *p, *q;
1982 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
1984 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1985 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A,
1986 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B,
1987 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
1992 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
1994 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
1995 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
1997 * If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records as we
1998 * wont be doing client auth.
2000 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
2001 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
2007 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
2008 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2009 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2013 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
2014 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
2015 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) {
2016 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2017 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2018 SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER);
2023 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2025 if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
2026 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2030 /* get the certificate types */
2032 if (s->cert->ctypes) {
2033 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes);
2034 s->cert->ctypes = NULL;
2036 if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) {
2037 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
2038 s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num);
2039 if (s->cert->ctypes == NULL) {
2040 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2043 memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, p, ctype_num);
2044 s->cert->ctype_num = (size_t)ctype_num;
2045 ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
2047 for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++)
2048 s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = p[i];
2050 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2053 * Check we have enough room for signature algorithms and following
2056 if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen + 2) > n) {
2057 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2058 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2059 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2062 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2063 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2064 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
2065 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
2067 if ((llen & 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, p, llen)) {
2068 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2069 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2070 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2073 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2074 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2075 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2081 /* get the CA RDNs */
2084 if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen) != n) {
2085 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2086 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2090 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
2092 if ((l + nc + 2) > llen) {
2093 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2094 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG);
2100 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &q, l)) == NULL) {
2101 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2102 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2107 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2108 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2109 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2112 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2113 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2121 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2122 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2123 s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
2124 if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL)
2125 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2126 s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
2132 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2136 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2138 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
2141 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
2142 int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
2144 int ok, al, ret = 0, ticklen;
2146 const unsigned char *p;
2149 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2150 SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A,
2151 SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B,
2152 SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, 16384, &ok);
2158 /* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */
2159 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2160 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2164 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2165 n2l(p, s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint);
2167 /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
2168 if (ticklen + 6 != n) {
2169 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2170 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2173 if (s->session->tlsext_tick) {
2174 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
2175 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
2177 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2178 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) {
2179 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2182 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, p, ticklen);
2183 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
2185 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2186 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2187 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2188 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2189 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2190 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2191 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2192 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2193 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2195 EVP_Digest(p, ticklen,
2196 s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
2197 EVP_sha256(), NULL);
2201 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2206 int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s)
2209 unsigned long resplen, n;
2210 const unsigned char *p;
2212 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2213 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A,
2214 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B,
2215 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, 16384, &ok);
2220 /* need at least status type + length */
2221 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2222 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2225 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2226 if (*p++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2227 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2228 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2232 if (resplen + 4 != n) {
2233 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2237 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2238 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2239 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = BUF_memdup(p, resplen);
2240 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) {
2241 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2245 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
2246 if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2248 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2250 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2255 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2262 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2267 int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s)
2272 /* Second to last param should be very small, like 0 :-) */
2273 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2274 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A,
2275 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B,
2276 SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 30, &ok);
2281 /* should contain no data */
2282 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2283 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2290 int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2294 unsigned long alg_k;
2295 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2297 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2299 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2301 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2302 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2303 EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
2304 const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
2305 EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL;
2306 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2307 int encoded_pt_len = 0;
2308 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2310 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2313 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
2314 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2316 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2318 /* Fool emacs indentation */
2321 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2322 else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
2324 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2325 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2329 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
2331 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2333 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2334 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2338 if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
2339 rsa = s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
2342 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
2343 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].
2345 if ((pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2346 || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
2347 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2348 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2351 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
2352 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2355 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2356 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2357 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, pmslen - 2) <= 0)
2361 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2362 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
2364 n = RSA_public_encrypt(pmslen, pms, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2366 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
2368 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
2372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2373 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2377 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2378 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
2384 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2385 else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
2386 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2387 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2388 /* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */
2389 krb5_data *enc_ticket;
2390 krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL;
2391 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2392 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2393 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2394 unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2395 unsigned char epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2396 int padl, outl = sizeof(epms);
2398 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2401 fprintf(stderr, "ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
2403 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2406 # ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH
2408 authp = &authenticator;
2409 # endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */
2411 krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp, &kssl_err);
2412 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2417 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
2418 if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
2419 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n",
2422 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2425 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2426 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2431 * 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
2432 * in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
2434 * Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
2435 * n = krb5_ap_req.length;
2436 * memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
2437 * if (krb5_ap_req.data)
2438 * kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
2440 * Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
2441 * (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
2442 * Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
2443 * with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
2445 * KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
2446 * Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with
2447 * optional authenticator omitted.
2450 /* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */
2451 s2n(enc_ticket->length, p);
2452 memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length);
2453 p += enc_ticket->length;
2454 n = enc_ticket->length + 2;
2456 /* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */
2457 if (authp && authp->length) {
2458 s2n(authp->length, p);
2459 memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length);
2461 n += authp->length + 2;
2467 s2n(0, p); /* null authenticator length */
2471 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2472 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2476 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2477 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2478 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, pmslen - 2) <= 0)
2482 * 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
2483 * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
2484 * EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
2485 * kssl_ctx->length);
2486 * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
2489 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2490 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv);
2491 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, epms, &outl, pms, pmslen);
2492 EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(epms[outl]), &padl);
2494 if (outl > (int)sizeof epms) {
2495 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2496 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2499 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2501 /* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */
2503 memcpy(p, epms, outl);
2506 OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl);
2509 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2510 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
2511 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt;
2512 SESS_CERT *scert = s->session->sess_cert;
2514 if (scert == NULL) {
2515 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2516 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2517 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2521 if (scert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
2522 dh_srvr = scert->peer_dh_tmp;
2524 /* we get them from the cert */
2525 int idx = scert->peer_cert_type;
2526 EVP_PKEY *spkey = NULL;
2529 spkey = X509_get_pubkey(scert->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
2531 dh_srvr = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(spkey);
2532 EVP_PKEY_free(spkey);
2534 if (dh_srvr == NULL) {
2535 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2536 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2540 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
2541 /* Use client certificate key */
2542 EVP_PKEY *clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
2545 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2546 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
2547 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2548 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2552 /* generate a new random key */
2553 if ((dh_clnt = DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL) {
2554 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2557 if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt)) {
2558 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2564 pmslen = DH_size(dh_clnt);
2565 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2570 * use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but make sure to
2571 * clear it out afterwards
2574 n = DH_compute_key(pms, dh_srvr->pub_key, dh_clnt);
2575 if (scert->peer_dh_tmp == NULL)
2579 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2584 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY)
2587 /* send off the data */
2588 n = BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key);
2590 BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key, p);
2596 /* perhaps clean things up a bit EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2600 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2601 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2602 const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
2604 int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
2607 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
2608 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2609 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2610 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2615 * Did we send out the client's ECDH share for use in premaster
2616 * computation as part of client certificate? If so, set
2617 * ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
2619 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL)) {
2621 * XXX: For now, we do not support client
2622 * authentication using ECDH certificates.
2623 * To add such support, one needs to add
2624 * code that checks for appropriate
2625 * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
2626 * For example, the cert have an ECC
2627 * key on the same curve as the server's
2628 * and the key should be authorized for
2631 * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
2632 * to skip sending the certificate verify
2635 * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
2636 * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
2637 * EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
2638 * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
2642 if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) {
2643 tkey = s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp;
2645 /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
2647 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
2648 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
2649 if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL)
2650 || (srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
2651 || (srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL)) {
2652 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2653 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2657 tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec;
2660 srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2661 srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey);
2663 if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL)) {
2664 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2665 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2669 if ((clnt_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
2670 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2671 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2675 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group)) {
2676 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2679 if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
2681 * Reuse key info from our certificate We only need our
2682 * private key to perform the ECDH computation.
2684 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2685 tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
2686 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2687 if (priv_key == NULL) {
2688 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2689 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2692 if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key)) {
2693 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2697 /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
2698 if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh))) {
2699 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2706 * use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but make sure to
2707 * clear it out afterwards
2710 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group);
2711 if (field_size <= 0) {
2712 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2715 pmslen = (field_size + 7) / 8;
2716 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2719 n = ECDH_compute_key(pms, pmslen, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, NULL);
2720 if (n <= 0 || pmslen != (size_t)n) {
2721 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2725 if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
2726 /* Send empty client key exch message */
2730 * First check the size of encoding and allocate memory
2734 EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
2735 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
2736 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
2739 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
2740 OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len * sizeof(unsigned char));
2741 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
2742 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
2743 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2744 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2748 /* Encode the public key */
2749 n = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
2750 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
2751 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
2752 encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx);
2754 *p = n; /* length of encoded point */
2755 /* Encoded point will be copied here */
2757 /* copy the point */
2758 memcpy((unsigned char *)p, encodedPoint, n);
2759 /* increment n to account for length field */
2763 /* Free allocated memory */
2764 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2765 if (encodedPoint != NULL)
2766 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2767 if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
2768 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
2769 EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
2771 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
2772 else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2773 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2774 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2777 unsigned int md_len;
2779 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
2780 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash;
2784 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2789 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2793 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype = SSL_PKEY_GOST01)].x509;
2797 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype = SSL_PKEY_GOST94)].x509;
2799 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2800 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
2804 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key =
2805 X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
2807 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2809 * * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2810 * certificate key for key exchange
2813 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2815 EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2816 /* Generate session key */
2817 RAND_bytes(pms, pmslen);
2819 * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
2821 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) {
2822 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer
2823 (pkey_ctx, s->cert->key->privatekey) <= 0) {
2825 * If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
2832 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2835 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
2836 EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash,
2837 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94));
2838 EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
2840 EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
2842 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len);
2843 EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash);
2844 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2845 (pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8,
2847 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2851 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2853 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2855 *(p++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
2857 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) < 0) {
2858 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2862 if (msglen >= 0x80) {
2864 *(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
2867 *(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
2870 memcpy(p, tmp, msglen);
2871 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2872 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2873 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) {
2874 /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
2875 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
2877 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2878 EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key);
2881 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2882 else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2883 if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) {
2884 /* send off the data */
2885 n = BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A);
2887 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, p);
2890 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2891 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2894 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2895 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2896 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2897 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2898 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2899 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2904 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2905 else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2907 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2908 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2911 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 2];
2912 size_t identity_len;
2913 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2914 unsigned int psk_len = 0;
2918 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2919 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2920 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2924 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2925 /* Allocate maximum size buffer */
2926 pmslen = PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4;
2927 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2931 psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
2932 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2934 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2935 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2936 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2938 } else if (psk_len == 0) {
2939 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2940 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2943 /* Change pmslen to real length */
2944 pmslen = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
2945 identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1] = '\0';
2946 identity_len = strlen(identity);
2947 if (identity_len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2948 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2949 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2952 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2954 memmove(pms + psk_len + 4, pms, psk_len);
2956 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2960 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2961 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2962 s->session->psk_identity_hint =
2963 BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2964 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL
2965 && s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
2966 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2967 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2971 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2972 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2973 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity);
2974 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
2975 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2976 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2980 s2n(identity_len, p);
2981 memcpy(p, identity, identity_len);
2982 n = 2 + identity_len;
2985 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2987 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2993 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2994 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2998 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
2999 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B;
3002 /* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
3003 n = ssl_do_write(s);
3004 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3006 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3008 * If everything written generate master key: no need to save PMS as
3009 * SRP_generate_client_master_secret generates it internally.
3012 if ((s->session->master_key_length =
3013 SRP_generate_client_master_secret(s,
3014 s->session->master_key)) <
3016 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3017 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3023 /* If we haven't written everything save PMS */
3026 s->cert->pmslen = pmslen;
3028 /* If we don't have a PMS restore */
3031 pmslen = s->cert->pmslen;
3034 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3035 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3038 s->session->master_key_length =
3039 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
3041 session->master_key,
3043 OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pmslen);
3045 s->cert->pms = NULL;
3049 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3050 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3053 OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pmslen);
3055 s->cert->pms = NULL;
3057 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
3058 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
3059 if (encodedPoint != NULL)
3060 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
3061 if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
3062 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
3063 EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
3068 int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
3071 unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
3073 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
3079 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
3081 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A) {
3082 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3083 pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
3084 /* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */
3085 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
3086 EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx);
3087 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1()) > 0) {
3088 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3089 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
3092 [MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
3097 * For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using agreed
3098 * digest and cached handshake records.
3100 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
3103 const EVP_MD *md = s->cert->key->digest;
3104 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3105 if (hdatalen <= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
3106 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3111 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client alg %s\n",
3114 if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3115 || !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
3116 || !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) {
3117 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3123 * For extended master secret we've already digested cached
3126 if (s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
3127 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3128 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3129 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3130 } else if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3133 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3134 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
3135 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_md5, &(data[0]));
3136 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data,
3137 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
3138 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
3139 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
3146 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3147 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
3148 if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
3149 &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3150 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
3151 (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.dsa)) {
3152 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
3159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3160 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3161 if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
3162 &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3163 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
3164 (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.ec)) {
3165 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
3172 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
3173 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
3174 unsigned char signbuf[64];
3176 size_t sigsize = 64;
3177 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
3178 NID_id_GostR3411_94, data);
3179 if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, signbuf, &sigsize, data, 32) <= 0) {
3180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3183 for (i = 63, j = 0; i >= 0; j++, i--) {
3184 p[2 + j] = signbuf[i];
3189 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3192 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n);
3193 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B;
3195 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3196 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3197 return ssl_do_write(s);
3199 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3200 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3205 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3206 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3207 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3209 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3211 unsigned long alg_k;
3212 if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey)
3214 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3215 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->cert->key->digest)
3218 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3219 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3221 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3222 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3224 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3225 /* See if we can use client certificate for fixed DH */
3226 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
3227 SESS_CERT *scert = s->session->sess_cert;
3228 int i = scert->peer_cert_type;
3229 EVP_PKEY *clkey = NULL, *spkey = NULL;
3230 clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
3231 /* If client key not DH assume it can be used */
3232 if (EVP_PKEY_id(clkey) != EVP_PKEY_DH)
3235 spkey = X509_get_pubkey(scert->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
3237 /* Compare server and client parameters */
3238 i = EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, spkey);
3239 EVP_PKEY_free(spkey);
3243 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
3248 int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3251 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3254 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A) {
3255 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3256 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3257 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3259 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3263 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3266 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3268 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3269 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
3271 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
3274 /* We need to get a client cert */
3275 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B) {
3277 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3278 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3281 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3283 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3286 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3287 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3288 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
3289 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3291 } else if (i == 1) {
3293 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3294 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3300 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3301 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3304 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3305 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3306 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3309 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3313 /* Ok, we have a cert */
3314 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
3317 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C) {
3318 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D;
3319 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,
3320 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req ==
3321 2) ? NULL : s->cert->key)) {
3322 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3323 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3327 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
3328 return ssl_do_write(s);
3331 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3333 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3337 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3339 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3342 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3346 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3347 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3349 /* we don't have a certificate */
3350 if ((alg_a & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5)) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
3353 sc = s->session->sess_cert;
3355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3358 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3359 rsa = s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
3361 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3362 dh = s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
3365 /* This is the passed certificate */
3367 idx = sc->peer_cert_type;
3368 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
3369 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
3370 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, s) == 0) {
3372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3377 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
3378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3379 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3381 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
3382 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_ECDH_CERT);
3386 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
3387 i = X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, pkey);
3388 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3390 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3391 if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3392 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3393 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3396 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3397 else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3398 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3399 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3403 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3404 if ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) &&
3405 !(has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC) || (rsa != NULL))) {
3406 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3407 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3411 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3412 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) &&
3413 !(has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKT_EXCH) || (dh != NULL))) {
3414 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY);
3416 } else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) &&
3417 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_RSA)) {
3418 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3419 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT);
3422 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3423 else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) &&
3424 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_DSA)) {
3425 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3426 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT);
3432 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PKT_EXP)) {
3433 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3434 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
3436 || RSA_size(rsa) * 8 >
3437 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
3438 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3439 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
3444 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3445 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
3447 || DH_size(dh) * 8 >
3448 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
3449 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3450 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
3456 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3457 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
3463 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
3469 * Check to see if handshake is full or resumed. Usually this is just a case
3470 * of checking to see if a cache hit has occurred. In the case of session
3471 * tickets we have to check the next message to be sure.
3474 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3475 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3476 int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s)
3478 unsigned int len, padding_len;
3481 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A) {
3482 len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
3483 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3484 d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3486 memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len);
3487 d[5 + len] = padding_len;
3488 memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len);
3489 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
3490 l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d);
3491 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B;
3492 s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len;
3496 return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
3501 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3504 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3505 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3506 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3507 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3508 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3513 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3514 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);