2 * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 #include "../ssl_local.h"
11 #include "internal/constant_time.h"
12 #include <openssl/trace.h>
13 #include <openssl/rand.h>
14 #include "record_local.h"
15 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 static const unsigned char ssl3_pad_1[48] = {
18 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
19 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
20 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
21 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
22 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
23 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36
26 static const unsigned char ssl3_pad_2[48] = {
27 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
28 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
29 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
30 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
31 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
32 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c
36 * Clear the contents of an SSL3_RECORD but retain any memory allocated
38 void SSL3_RECORD_clear(SSL3_RECORD *r, size_t num_recs)
43 for (i = 0; i < num_recs; i++) {
46 memset(&r[i], 0, sizeof(*r));
51 void SSL3_RECORD_release(SSL3_RECORD *r, size_t num_recs)
55 for (i = 0; i < num_recs; i++) {
56 OPENSSL_free(r[i].comp);
61 void SSL3_RECORD_set_seq_num(SSL3_RECORD *r, const unsigned char *seq_num)
63 memcpy(r->seq_num, seq_num, SEQ_NUM_SIZE);
67 * Peeks ahead into "read_ahead" data to see if we have a whole record waiting
68 * for us in the buffer.
70 static int ssl3_record_app_data_waiting(SSL *s)
76 rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer);
78 p = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(rbuf);
82 left = SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf);
84 if (left < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
87 p += SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(rbuf);
90 * We only check the type and record length, we will sanity check version
93 if (*p != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
99 if (left < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + len)
105 int early_data_count_ok(SSL *s, size_t length, size_t overhead, int send)
107 uint32_t max_early_data;
108 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
111 * If we are a client then we always use the max_early_data from the
112 * session/psksession. Otherwise we go with the lowest out of the max early
113 * data set in the session and the configured max_early_data.
115 if (!s->server && sess->ext.max_early_data == 0) {
116 if (!ossl_assert(s->psksession != NULL
117 && s->psksession->ext.max_early_data > 0)) {
118 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_EARLY_DATA_COUNT_OK,
119 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
122 sess = s->psksession;
126 max_early_data = sess->ext.max_early_data;
127 else if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED)
128 max_early_data = s->recv_max_early_data;
130 max_early_data = s->recv_max_early_data < sess->ext.max_early_data
131 ? s->recv_max_early_data : sess->ext.max_early_data;
133 if (max_early_data == 0) {
134 SSLfatal(s, send ? SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR : SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
135 SSL_F_EARLY_DATA_COUNT_OK, SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA);
139 /* If we are dealing with ciphertext we need to allow for the overhead */
140 max_early_data += overhead;
142 if (s->early_data_count + length > max_early_data) {
143 SSLfatal(s, send ? SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR : SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
144 SSL_F_EARLY_DATA_COUNT_OK, SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA);
147 s->early_data_count += length;
153 * MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that
154 * will be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an
155 * attacker could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and
156 * cause ssl3_get_record to loop forever.
158 #define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32
160 #define SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH 2
162 * Call this to get new input records.
163 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
164 * or non-blocking IO.
165 * When it finishes, |numrpipes| records have been decoded. For each record 'i':
166 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
168 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes
169 * Multiple records will only be returned if the record types are all
170 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA. The number of records returned will always be <=
173 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
174 int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
179 SSL3_RECORD *rr, *thisrr;
183 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
184 unsigned int version;
187 size_t num_recs = 0, max_recs, j;
188 PACKET pkt, sslv2pkt;
189 size_t first_rec_len;
192 rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
193 rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer);
194 is_ktls_left = (rbuf->left > 0);
195 max_recs = s->max_pipelines;
201 thisrr = &rr[num_recs];
203 /* check if we have the header */
204 if ((RECORD_LAYER_get_rstate(&s->rlayer) != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
205 (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer)
206 < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
210 rret = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
211 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf), 0,
212 num_recs == 0 ? 1 : 0, &n);
214 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
215 if (!BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio))
216 return rret; /* error or non-blocking */
219 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC,
220 SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
221 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
224 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW,
225 SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
226 SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
229 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
230 SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
231 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
239 RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_BODY);
241 p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer);
242 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer),
243 RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer))) {
244 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
245 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
249 if (!PACKET_get_net_2_len(&sslv2pkt, &sslv2len)
250 || !PACKET_get_1(&sslv2pkt, &type)) {
251 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
252 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
256 * The first record received by the server may be a V2ClientHello.
258 if (s->server && RECORD_LAYER_is_first_record(&s->rlayer)
259 && (sslv2len & 0x8000) != 0
260 && (type == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) {
264 * |num_recs| here will actually always be 0 because
265 * |num_recs > 0| only ever occurs when we are processing
266 * multiple app data records - which we know isn't the case here
267 * because it is an SSLv2ClientHello. We keep it using
268 * |num_recs| for the sake of consistency
270 thisrr->type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
271 thisrr->rec_version = SSL2_VERSION;
273 thisrr->length = sslv2len & 0x7fff;
275 if (thisrr->length > SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf)
276 - SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
277 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
278 SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
282 if (thisrr->length < MIN_SSL2_RECORD_LEN) {
283 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
284 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
288 /* SSLv3+ style record */
290 s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s,
291 s->msg_callback_arg);
293 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
294 if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &type)
295 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &version)
296 || !PACKET_get_net_2_len(&pkt, &thisrr->length)) {
297 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
298 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
302 thisrr->rec_version = version;
305 * Lets check version. In TLSv1.3 we only check this field
306 * when encryption is occurring (see later check). For the
307 * ServerHello after an HRR we haven't actually selected TLSv1.3
308 * yet, but we still treat it as TLSv1.3, so we must check for
311 if (!s->first_packet && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
312 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_PENDING
313 && version != (unsigned int)s->version) {
314 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00)
315 && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
316 if (thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
318 * The record is using an incorrect version number,
319 * but what we've got appears to be an alert. We
320 * haven't read the body yet to check whether its a
321 * fatal or not - but chances are it is. We probably
322 * shouldn't send a fatal alert back. We'll just
325 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
326 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
330 * Send back error using their minor version number :-)
332 s->version = (unsigned short)version;
334 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
335 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
339 if ((version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
340 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_first_record(&s->rlayer)) {
341 /* Go back to start of packet, look at the five bytes
343 p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer);
344 if (strncmp((char *)p, "GET ", 4) == 0 ||
345 strncmp((char *)p, "POST ", 5) == 0 ||
346 strncmp((char *)p, "HEAD ", 5) == 0 ||
347 strncmp((char *)p, "PUT ", 4) == 0) {
348 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
351 } else if (strncmp((char *)p, "CONNE", 5) == 0) {
352 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
353 SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST);
357 /* Doesn't look like TLS - don't send an alert */
358 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
359 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
362 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
363 SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
364 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
369 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) {
370 if (thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
371 && (thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
372 || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
373 && (thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT
374 || s->statem.enc_read_state
375 != ENC_READ_STATE_ALLOW_PLAIN_ALERTS)) {
376 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
377 SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE);
380 if (thisrr->rec_version != TLS1_2_VERSION) {
381 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
382 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
388 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf) - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
389 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
390 SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
395 /* now s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
398 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
399 if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_TLS13_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
400 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
401 SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
405 size_t len = SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
407 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
409 * If OPENSSL_NO_COMP is defined then SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH
410 * does not include the compression overhead anyway.
412 if (s->expand == NULL)
413 len -= SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD;
416 if (thisrr->length > len && !BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio)) {
417 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
418 SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
424 * s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data.
425 * Calculate how much more data we need to read for the rest of the
428 if (thisrr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
429 more = thisrr->length + SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
430 - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
432 more = thisrr->length;
436 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
438 rret = ssl3_read_n(s, more, more, 1, 0, &n);
440 return rret; /* error or non-blocking io */
443 /* set state for later operations */
444 RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_HEADER);
447 * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
448 * + thisrr->length, or s->packet_length == SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
449 * + thisrr->length and we have that many bytes in s->packet
451 if (thisrr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
453 &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
456 &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
460 * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'thisrr' thisrr->input
461 * points at thisrr->length bytes, which need to be copied into
462 * thisrr->data by either the decryption or by the decompression When
463 * the data is 'copied' into the thisrr->data buffer, thisrr->input will
464 * be pointed at the new buffer
468 * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
469 * thisrr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff.
472 /* decrypt in place in 'thisrr->input' */
473 thisrr->data = thisrr->input;
474 thisrr->orig_len = thisrr->length;
476 /* Mark this record as not read by upper layers yet */
481 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
482 RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
483 RECORD_LAYER_clear_first_record(&s->rlayer);
484 } while (num_recs < max_recs
485 && thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
486 && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)
487 && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL
488 && (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx))
489 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)
490 && ssl3_record_app_data_waiting(s));
493 && thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
494 && (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE)
495 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
497 * CCS messages must be exactly 1 byte long, containing the value 0x01
499 if (thisrr->length != 1 || thisrr->data[0] != 0x01) {
500 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
501 SSL_R_INVALID_CCS_MESSAGE);
505 * CCS messages are ignored in TLSv1.3. We treat it like an empty
508 thisrr->type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
509 RECORD_LAYER_inc_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer);
510 if (RECORD_LAYER_get_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer)
511 > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) {
512 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
513 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_CCS_MESSAGE);
517 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 1);
523 * KTLS reads full records. If there is any data left,
524 * then it is from before enabling ktls
526 if (BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio) && !is_ktls_left)
527 goto skip_decryption;
530 * If in encrypt-then-mac mode calculate mac from encrypted record. All
531 * the details below are public so no timing details can leak.
533 if (SSL_READ_ETM(s) && s->read_hash) {
535 /* TODO(size_t): convert this to do size_t properly */
536 imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
537 if (!ossl_assert(imac_size >= 0 && imac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
538 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
542 mac_size = (size_t)imac_size;
543 for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) {
546 if (thisrr->length < mac_size) {
547 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
548 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
551 thisrr->length -= mac_size;
552 mac = thisrr->data + thisrr->length;
553 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thisrr, md, 0 /* not send */ );
554 if (i == 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0) {
555 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
556 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
562 first_rec_len = rr[0].length;
564 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, rr, num_recs, 0);
568 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid.
569 * 1: if the padding is valid
570 * -1: if the padding is invalid
573 if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) {
574 /* SSLfatal() already got called */
577 if (num_recs == 1 && ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) {
579 * Valid early_data that we cannot decrypt might fail here as
580 * publicly invalid. We treat it like an empty record.
585 if (!early_data_count_ok(s, thisrr->length,
586 EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, 0)) {
587 /* SSLfatal() already called */
593 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 1);
594 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
597 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
598 SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
601 OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
602 BIO_printf(trc_out, "dec %lu\n", (unsigned long)rr[0].length);
603 BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, rr[0].data, rr[0].length, 4);
604 } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
606 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
607 if ((sess != NULL) &&
608 (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
609 (!SSL_READ_ETM(s) && EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) {
610 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
611 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
612 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
614 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
615 if (!ossl_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
616 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
617 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
621 for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) {
624 * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
625 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
626 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount
627 * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
629 if (thisrr->orig_len < mac_size ||
630 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
631 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
632 thisrr->orig_len < mac_size + 1)) {
633 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
634 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
638 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
640 * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be
641 * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in
642 * constant time from within the record, without leaking the
643 * contents of the padding bytes.
646 if (!ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, thisrr, mac_size)) {
647 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
648 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
651 thisrr->length -= mac_size;
654 * In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len| equals
655 * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for
658 thisrr->length -= mac_size;
659 mac = &thisrr->data[thisrr->length];
662 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thisrr, md, 0 /* not send */ );
663 if (i == 0 || mac == NULL
664 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
666 if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size)
672 if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) {
673 /* We already called SSLfatal() */
676 if (num_recs == 1 && ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) {
678 * We assume this is unreadable early_data - we treat it like an
683 * The record length may have been modified by the mac check above
684 * so we use the previously saved value
686 if (!early_data_count_ok(s, first_rec_len,
687 EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, 0)) {
688 /* SSLfatal() already called */
695 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 1);
696 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
700 * A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
701 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
702 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, we should
703 * not reveal which kind of error occurred -- this might become
704 * visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile)
706 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
707 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
713 for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) {
716 /* thisrr->length is now just compressed */
717 if (s->expand != NULL) {
718 if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) {
719 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
720 SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
723 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s, thisrr)) {
724 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
725 SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
731 && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL
732 && thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
735 if (thisrr->length == 0
736 || thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
737 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
738 SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE);
742 /* Strip trailing padding */
743 for (end = thisrr->length - 1; end > 0 && thisrr->data[end] == 0;
747 thisrr->length = end;
748 thisrr->type = thisrr->data[end];
749 if (thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
750 && thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT
751 && thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
752 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
753 SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE);
757 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE,
758 &thisrr->data[end], 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
762 * TLSv1.3 alert and handshake records are required to be non-zero in
766 && (thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
767 || thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
768 && thisrr->length == 0) {
769 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
774 if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH && !BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio)) {
775 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
776 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
780 /* If received packet overflows current Max Fragment Length setting */
781 if (s->session != NULL && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session)
782 && thisrr->length > GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(s->session)
783 && !BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio)) {
784 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
785 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
791 * So at this point the following is true
792 * thisrr->type is the type of record
793 * thisrr->length == number of bytes in record
794 * thisrr->off == offset to first valid byte
795 * thisrr->data == where to take bytes from, increment after use :-).
798 /* just read a 0 length packet */
799 if (thisrr->length == 0) {
800 RECORD_LAYER_inc_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer);
801 if (RECORD_LAYER_get_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer)
802 > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) {
803 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
804 SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
808 RECORD_LAYER_reset_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer);
812 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING) {
814 if (thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
815 && !early_data_count_ok(s, thisrr->length, 0, 0)) {
816 /* SSLfatal already called */
821 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, num_recs);
825 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rr)
827 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
830 if (rr->comp == NULL) {
831 rr->comp = (unsigned char *)
832 OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH);
834 if (rr->comp == NULL)
837 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
838 i = COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand, rr->comp,
839 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, rr->data, (int)rr->length);
849 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *wr)
851 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
854 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
855 i = COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress, wr->data,
856 (int)(wr->length + SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD),
857 wr->input, (int)wr->length);
863 wr->input = wr->data;
869 * ssl3_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| records in |inrecs|. Will call
870 * SSLfatal() for internal errors, but not otherwise.
873 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid (i.e. too
875 * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
876 * -1: if the record's padding is invalid or, if sending, an internal error
879 int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, size_t n_recs, int sending)
884 size_t bs, mac_size = 0;
886 const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
890 * We shouldn't ever be called with more than one record in the SSLv3 case
895 ds = s->enc_write_ctx;
896 if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
899 enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
901 ds = s->enc_read_ctx;
902 if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
905 enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx);
908 if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) {
909 memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length);
910 rec->input = rec->data;
913 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
914 bs = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ds);
918 if ((bs != 1) && sending) {
921 /* we need to add 'i-1' padding bytes */
924 * the last of these zero bytes will be overwritten with the
927 memset(&rec->input[rec->length], 0, i);
929 rec->input[l - 1] = (unsigned char)(i - 1);
933 if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0)
935 /* otherwise, rec->length >= bs */
938 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
939 if (EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, (unsigned int)l) < 1)
942 if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) {
943 /* TODO(size_t): convert me */
944 imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
946 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_ENC,
947 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
950 mac_size = (size_t)imac_size;
952 if ((bs != 1) && !sending)
953 return ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(rec, bs, mac_size);
958 #define MAX_PADDING 256
960 * tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| in |recs|. Will call SSLfatal() for
961 * internal errors, but not otherwise.
964 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid (i.e. too
966 * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
967 * -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
968 * an internal error occurred.
970 int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs, int sending)
973 size_t reclen[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
974 unsigned char buf[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES][EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN];
975 int i, pad = 0, ret, tmpr;
976 size_t bs, mac_size = 0, ctr, padnum, loop;
977 unsigned char padval;
979 const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
980 int tlstree_enc = sending ? (s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_TLSTREE)
981 : (s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE);
984 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,
985 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
990 if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash)) {
991 int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
992 if (!ossl_assert(n >= 0)) {
993 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,
994 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
998 ds = s->enc_write_ctx;
999 if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
1003 enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
1004 /* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */
1005 if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)
1006 && EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
1007 ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc);
1011 for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
1012 if (recs[ctr].data != recs[ctr].input) {
1014 * we can't write into the input stream: Can this ever
1017 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,
1018 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1020 } else if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, recs[ctr].input,
1022 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,
1023 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1030 if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash)) {
1031 int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
1032 if (!ossl_assert(n >= 0)) {
1033 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,
1034 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1038 ds = s->enc_read_ctx;
1039 if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
1042 enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx);
1045 if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) {
1046 for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
1047 memmove(recs[ctr].data, recs[ctr].input, recs[ctr].length);
1048 recs[ctr].input = recs[ctr].data;
1052 bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds));
1055 if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds))
1056 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)) {
1058 * We shouldn't have been called with pipeline data if the
1059 * cipher doesn't support pipelining
1061 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,
1062 SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
1066 for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
1067 reclen[ctr] = recs[ctr].length;
1069 if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds))
1070 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) {
1073 seq = sending ? RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer)
1074 : RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
1076 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1077 /* DTLS does not support pipelining */
1078 unsigned char dtlsseq[9], *p = dtlsseq;
1080 s2n(sending ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&s->rlayer) :
1081 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&s->rlayer), p);
1082 memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
1083 memcpy(buf[ctr], dtlsseq, 8);
1085 memcpy(buf[ctr], seq, 8);
1086 for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { /* increment */
1093 buf[ctr][8] = recs[ctr].type;
1094 buf[ctr][9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
1095 buf[ctr][10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
1096 buf[ctr][11] = (unsigned char)(recs[ctr].length >> 8);
1097 buf[ctr][12] = (unsigned char)(recs[ctr].length & 0xff);
1098 pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD,
1099 EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, buf[ctr]);
1101 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,
1102 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1108 recs[ctr].length += pad;
1111 } else if ((bs != 1) && sending) {
1112 padnum = bs - (reclen[ctr] % bs);
1114 /* Add weird padding of up to 256 bytes */
1116 if (padnum > MAX_PADDING) {
1117 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,
1118 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1121 /* we need to add 'padnum' padding bytes of value padval */
1122 padval = (unsigned char)(padnum - 1);
1123 for (loop = reclen[ctr]; loop < reclen[ctr] + padnum; loop++)
1124 recs[ctr].input[loop] = padval;
1125 reclen[ctr] += padnum;
1126 recs[ctr].length += padnum;
1130 if (reclen[ctr] == 0 || reclen[ctr] % bs != 0)
1135 unsigned char *data[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
1137 /* Set the output buffers */
1138 for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
1139 data[ctr] = recs[ctr].data;
1141 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_OUTPUT_BUFS,
1142 (int)n_recs, data) <= 0) {
1143 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,
1144 SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
1147 /* Set the input buffers */
1148 for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
1149 data[ctr] = recs[ctr].input;
1151 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_BUFS,
1152 (int)n_recs, data) <= 0
1153 || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_LENS,
1154 (int)n_recs, reclen) <= 0) {
1155 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,
1156 SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
1161 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && tlstree_enc) {
1163 int decrement_seq = 0;
1166 * When sending, seq is incremented after MAC calculation.
1167 * So if we are in ETM mode, we use seq 'as is' in the ctrl-function.
1168 * Otherwise we have to decrease it in the implementation
1170 if (sending && !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s))
1173 seq = sending ? RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer)
1174 : RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
1175 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_TLSTREE, decrement_seq, seq) <= 0) {
1176 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,
1177 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1182 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
1183 tmpr = EVP_Cipher(ds, recs[0].data, recs[0].input,
1184 (unsigned int)reclen[0]);
1185 if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds))
1186 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER)
1189 return -1; /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */
1192 if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
1193 for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
1194 recs[ctr].data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
1195 recs[ctr].input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
1196 recs[ctr].length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
1198 } else if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
1199 for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
1200 recs[ctr].data += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
1201 recs[ctr].input += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
1202 recs[ctr].length -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
1208 if (!SSL_READ_ETM(s) && EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) {
1209 imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
1210 if (imac_size < 0) {
1211 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,
1212 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1215 mac_size = (size_t)imac_size;
1217 if ((bs != 1) && !sending) {
1219 for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
1220 tmpret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, &recs[ctr], bs, mac_size);
1222 * If tmpret == 0 then this means publicly invalid so we can
1223 * short circuit things here. Otherwise we must respect constant
1228 ret = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_eq_int(tmpret, 1),
1232 if (pad && !sending) {
1233 for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
1234 recs[ctr].length -= pad;
1241 int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int sending)
1243 unsigned char *mac_sec, *seq;
1244 const EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
1245 unsigned char *p, rec_char;
1251 mac_sec = &(ssl->s3.write_mac_secret[0]);
1252 seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&ssl->rlayer);
1253 hash = ssl->write_hash;
1255 mac_sec = &(ssl->s3.read_mac_secret[0]);
1256 seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&ssl->rlayer);
1257 hash = ssl->read_hash;
1260 t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash);
1264 npad = (48 / md_size) * md_size;
1267 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
1268 ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(hash)) {
1270 * This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
1271 * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of data we
1272 * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle.
1276 * npad is, at most, 48 bytes and that's with MD5:
1277 * 16 + 48 + 8 (sequence bytes) + 1 + 2 = 75.
1279 * With SHA-1 (the largest hash speced for SSLv3) the hash size
1280 * goes up 4, but npad goes down by 8, resulting in a smaller
1283 unsigned char header[75];
1285 memcpy(header + j, mac_sec, md_size);
1287 memcpy(header + j, ssl3_pad_1, npad);
1289 memcpy(header + j, seq, 8);
1291 header[j++] = rec->type;
1292 header[j++] = (unsigned char)(rec->length >> 8);
1293 header[j++] = (unsigned char)(rec->length & 0xff);
1295 /* Final param == is SSLv3 */
1296 if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(ssl, hash,
1299 rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len,
1300 mac_sec, md_size, 1) <= 0)
1303 unsigned int md_size_u;
1304 /* Chop the digest off the end :-) */
1305 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1310 rec_char = rec->type;
1312 s2n(rec->length, p);
1313 if (EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0
1314 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0
1315 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad) <= 0
1316 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, seq, 8) <= 0
1317 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, &rec_char, 1) <= 0
1318 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, 2) <= 0
1319 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0
1320 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
1321 || EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0
1322 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0
1323 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad) <= 0
1324 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, md_size) <= 0
1325 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, &md_size_u) <= 0) {
1326 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1330 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1333 ssl3_record_sequence_update(seq);
1337 int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int sending)
1343 EVP_MD_CTX *hmac = NULL, *mac_ctx;
1344 unsigned char header[13];
1345 int stream_mac = sending ? (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM)
1346 : (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM);
1347 int tlstree_mac = sending ? (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_TLSTREE)
1348 : (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE);
1352 seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&ssl->rlayer);
1353 hash = ssl->write_hash;
1355 seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&ssl->rlayer);
1356 hash = ssl->read_hash;
1359 t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash);
1360 if (!ossl_assert(t >= 0))
1364 /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */
1368 hmac = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1369 if (hmac == NULL || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy(hmac, hash)) {
1370 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);
1376 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl) && tlstree_mac && EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mac_ctx, EVP_MD_CTRL_TLSTREE, 0, seq) <= 0) {
1377 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);
1381 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
1382 unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq;
1384 s2n(sending ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&ssl->rlayer) :
1385 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&ssl->rlayer), p);
1386 memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
1388 memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8);
1390 memcpy(header, seq, 8);
1392 header[8] = rec->type;
1393 header[9] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version >> 8);
1394 header[10] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version);
1395 header[11] = (unsigned char)(rec->length >> 8);
1396 header[12] = (unsigned char)(rec->length & 0xff);
1398 if (!sending && !SSL_READ_ETM(ssl) &&
1399 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
1400 ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) {
1402 * This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
1403 * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of data we
1404 * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle.
1406 /* Final param == not SSLv3 */
1407 if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(ssl, mac_ctx,
1410 rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len,
1411 ssl->s3.read_mac_secret,
1412 ssl->s3.read_mac_secret_size, 0) <= 0) {
1413 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);
1417 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
1418 if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)) <= 0
1419 || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0
1420 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size) <= 0) {
1421 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);
1426 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);
1428 OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
1429 BIO_printf(trc_out, "seq:\n");
1430 BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, seq, 8, 4);
1431 BIO_printf(trc_out, "rec:\n");
1432 BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, rec->data, rec->length, 4);
1433 } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
1435 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
1436 for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
1442 OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
1443 BIO_printf(trc_out, "md:\n");
1444 BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, md, md_size, 4);
1445 } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
1450 * ssl3_cbc_remove_padding removes padding from the decrypted, SSLv3, CBC
1451 * record in |rec| by updating |rec->length| in constant time.
1453 * block_size: the block size of the cipher used to encrypt the record.
1455 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid.
1456 * 1: if the padding was valid
1459 int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(SSL3_RECORD *rec,
1460 size_t block_size, size_t mac_size)
1462 size_t padding_length;
1464 const size_t overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size;
1467 * These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant time.
1469 if (overhead > rec->length)
1472 padding_length = rec->data[rec->length - 1];
1473 good = constant_time_ge_s(rec->length, padding_length + overhead);
1474 /* SSLv3 requires that the padding is minimal. */
1475 good &= constant_time_ge_s(block_size, padding_length + 1);
1476 rec->length -= good & (padding_length + 1);
1477 return constant_time_select_int_s(good, 1, -1);
1481 * tls1_cbc_remove_padding removes the CBC padding from the decrypted, TLS, CBC
1482 * record in |rec| in constant time and returns 1 if the padding is valid and
1483 * -1 otherwise. It also removes any explicit IV from the start of the record
1484 * without leaking any timing about whether there was enough space after the
1485 * padding was removed.
1487 * block_size: the block size of the cipher used to encrypt the record.
1489 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid.
1490 * 1: if the padding was valid
1493 int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s,
1495 size_t block_size, size_t mac_size)
1498 size_t padding_length, to_check, i;
1499 const size_t overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size;
1500 /* Check if version requires explicit IV */
1501 if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
1503 * These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant
1506 if (overhead + block_size > rec->length)
1508 /* We can now safely skip explicit IV */
1509 rec->data += block_size;
1510 rec->input += block_size;
1511 rec->length -= block_size;
1512 rec->orig_len -= block_size;
1513 } else if (overhead > rec->length)
1516 padding_length = rec->data[rec->length - 1];
1518 if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx)) &
1519 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) {
1520 /* padding is already verified */
1521 rec->length -= padding_length + 1;
1525 good = constant_time_ge_s(rec->length, overhead + padding_length);
1527 * The padding consists of a length byte at the end of the record and
1528 * then that many bytes of padding, all with the same value as the length
1529 * byte. Thus, with the length byte included, there are i+1 bytes of
1530 * padding. We can't check just |padding_length+1| bytes because that
1531 * leaks decrypted information. Therefore we always have to check the
1532 * maximum amount of padding possible. (Again, the length of the record
1533 * is public information so we can use it.)
1535 to_check = 256; /* maximum amount of padding, inc length byte. */
1536 if (to_check > rec->length)
1537 to_check = rec->length;
1539 for (i = 0; i < to_check; i++) {
1540 unsigned char mask = constant_time_ge_8_s(padding_length, i);
1541 unsigned char b = rec->data[rec->length - 1 - i];
1543 * The final |padding_length+1| bytes should all have the value
1544 * |padding_length|. Therefore the XOR should be zero.
1546 good &= ~(mask & (padding_length ^ b));
1550 * If any of the final |padding_length+1| bytes had the wrong value, one
1551 * or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared.
1553 good = constant_time_eq_s(0xff, good & 0xff);
1554 rec->length -= good & (padding_length + 1);
1556 return constant_time_select_int_s(good, 1, -1);
1560 * ssl3_cbc_copy_mac copies |md_size| bytes from the end of |rec| to |out| in
1561 * constant time (independent of the concrete value of rec->length, which may
1562 * vary within a 256-byte window).
1564 * ssl3_cbc_remove_padding or tls1_cbc_remove_padding must be called prior to
1568 * rec->orig_len >= md_size
1569 * md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
1571 * If CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE is defined then the rotation is performed with
1572 * variable accesses in a 64-byte-aligned buffer. Assuming that this fits into
1573 * a single or pair of cache-lines, then the variable memory accesses don't
1574 * actually affect the timing. CPUs with smaller cache-lines [if any] are
1575 * not multi-core and are not considered vulnerable to cache-timing attacks.
1577 #define CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE
1579 int ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out,
1580 const SSL3_RECORD *rec, size_t md_size)
1582 #if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE)
1583 unsigned char rotated_mac_buf[64 + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1584 unsigned char *rotated_mac;
1586 unsigned char rotated_mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1590 * mac_end is the index of |rec->data| just after the end of the MAC.
1592 size_t mac_end = rec->length;
1593 size_t mac_start = mac_end - md_size;
1596 * scan_start contains the number of bytes that we can ignore because the
1597 * MAC's position can only vary by 255 bytes.
1599 size_t scan_start = 0;
1601 size_t rotate_offset;
1603 if (!ossl_assert(rec->orig_len >= md_size
1604 && md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE))
1607 #if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE)
1608 rotated_mac = rotated_mac_buf + ((0 - (size_t)rotated_mac_buf) & 63);
1611 /* This information is public so it's safe to branch based on it. */
1612 if (rec->orig_len > md_size + 255 + 1)
1613 scan_start = rec->orig_len - (md_size + 255 + 1);
1617 memset(rotated_mac, 0, md_size);
1618 for (i = scan_start, j = 0; i < rec->orig_len; i++) {
1619 size_t mac_started = constant_time_eq_s(i, mac_start);
1620 size_t mac_ended = constant_time_lt_s(i, mac_end);
1621 unsigned char b = rec->data[i];
1623 in_mac |= mac_started;
1624 in_mac &= mac_ended;
1625 rotate_offset |= j & mac_started;
1626 rotated_mac[j++] |= b & in_mac;
1627 j &= constant_time_lt_s(j, md_size);
1630 /* Now rotate the MAC */
1631 #if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE)
1633 for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++) {
1634 /* in case cache-line is 32 bytes, touch second line */
1635 ((volatile unsigned char *)rotated_mac)[rotate_offset ^ 32];
1636 out[j++] = rotated_mac[rotate_offset++];
1637 rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt_s(rotate_offset, md_size);
1640 memset(out, 0, md_size);
1641 rotate_offset = md_size - rotate_offset;
1642 rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt_s(rotate_offset, md_size);
1643 for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++) {
1644 for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++)
1645 out[j] |= rotated_mac[i] & constant_time_eq_8_s(j, rotate_offset);
1647 rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt_s(rotate_offset, md_size);
1654 int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
1662 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1663 size_t max_plain_length = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1665 rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
1669 * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
1670 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
1672 rr->input = &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
1675 * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points
1676 * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either
1677 * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into
1678 * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer
1682 * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length
1683 * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff.
1686 /* check is not needed I believe */
1687 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
1688 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,
1689 SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1693 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
1694 rr->data = rr->input;
1695 rr->orig_len = rr->length;
1697 if (SSL_READ_ETM(s) && s->read_hash) {
1699 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
1700 if (!ossl_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
1701 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,
1702 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1705 if (rr->orig_len < mac_size) {
1706 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,
1707 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1710 rr->length -= mac_size;
1711 mac = rr->data + rr->length;
1712 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, rr, md, 0 /* not send */ );
1713 if (i == 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) {
1714 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,
1715 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
1720 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, rr, 1, 0);
1723 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid.
1724 * 1: if the padding is valid
1725 * -1: if the padding is invalid
1728 if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) {
1729 /* SSLfatal() got called */
1732 /* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */
1734 RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
1737 OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
1738 BIO_printf(trc_out, "dec %zd\n", rr->length);
1739 BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, rr->data, rr->length, 4);
1740 } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
1742 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
1743 if ((sess != NULL) && !SSL_READ_ETM(s) &&
1744 (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) {
1745 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
1746 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
1747 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1749 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this to do size_t properly */
1750 imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
1751 if (imac_size < 0) {
1752 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,
1756 mac_size = (size_t)imac_size;
1757 if (!ossl_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
1758 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,
1759 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1764 * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
1765 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
1766 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount
1767 * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
1769 if (rr->orig_len < mac_size ||
1770 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
1771 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
1772 rr->orig_len < mac_size + 1)) {
1773 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,
1774 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1778 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
1780 * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be
1781 * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in
1782 * constant time from within the record, without leaking the
1783 * contents of the padding bytes.
1786 if (!ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size)) {
1787 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,
1788 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1791 rr->length -= mac_size;
1794 * In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len| equals
1795 * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for
1798 rr->length -= mac_size;
1799 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
1802 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, rr, md, 0 /* not send */ );
1803 if (i == 0 || mac == NULL
1804 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0)
1806 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size)
1811 /* decryption failed, silently discard message */
1813 RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
1817 /* r->length is now just compressed */
1818 if (s->expand != NULL) {
1819 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) {
1820 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,
1821 SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1824 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s, rr)) {
1825 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE,
1826 SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
1831 /* use current Max Fragment Length setting if applicable */
1832 if (s->session != NULL && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session))
1833 max_plain_length = GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(s->session);
1835 /* send overflow if the plaintext is too long now it has passed MAC */
1836 if (rr->length > max_plain_length) {
1837 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,
1838 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1844 * So at this point the following is true
1845 * ssl->s3.rrec.type is the type of record
1846 * ssl->s3.rrec.length == number of bytes in record
1847 * ssl->s3.rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
1848 * ssl->s3.rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
1852 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
1853 RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
1855 /* Mark receipt of record. */
1856 dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);
1862 * Retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, i.e. processed
1864 #define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \
1865 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
1866 &(DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_processed_rcds(&s->rlayer)))
1869 * Call this to get a new input record.
1870 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
1871 * or non-blocking IO.
1872 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
1873 * ssl->s3.rrec.type - is the type of record
1874 * ssl->s3.rrec.data - data
1875 * ssl->s3.rrec.length - number of bytes
1877 /* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */
1878 int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
1880 int ssl_major, ssl_minor;
1884 unsigned char *p = NULL;
1885 unsigned short version;
1886 DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
1887 unsigned int is_next_epoch;
1889 rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
1893 * The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the pending records.
1894 * This is a non-blocking operation.
1896 if (!dtls1_process_buffered_records(s)) {
1897 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1901 /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
1902 if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
1905 /* get something from the wire */
1907 /* check if we have the header */
1908 if ((RECORD_LAYER_get_rstate(&s->rlayer) != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
1909 (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1910 rret = ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
1911 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(&s->rlayer.rbuf), 0, 1, &n);
1912 /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
1914 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
1915 return rret; /* error or non-blocking */
1918 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
1919 if (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) !=
1920 DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
1921 RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
1925 RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_BODY);
1927 p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer);
1929 if (s->msg_callback)
1930 s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
1931 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1933 /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
1937 version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor;
1939 /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
1942 memcpy(&(RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer)[2]), p, 6);
1949 * Lets check the version. We tolerate alerts that don't have the exact
1950 * version number (e.g. because of protocol version errors)
1952 if (!s->first_packet && rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
1953 if (version != s->version) {
1954 /* unexpected version, silently discard */
1957 RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
1962 if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00)) {
1963 /* wrong version, silently discard record */
1966 RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
1970 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
1971 /* record too long, silently discard it */
1974 RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
1978 /* If received packet overflows own-client Max Fragment Length setting */
1979 if (s->session != NULL && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session)
1980 && rr->length > GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(s->session) + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD) {
1981 /* record too long, silently discard it */
1984 RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
1988 /* now s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
1991 /* s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
1994 RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
1995 /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
1997 rret = ssl3_read_n(s, more, more, 1, 1, &n);
1998 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
1999 if (rret <= 0 || n != more) {
2000 if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) {
2001 /* ssl3_read_n() called SSLfatal() */
2006 RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
2011 * now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length ==
2012 * DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length
2015 /* set state for later operations */
2016 RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_HEADER);
2018 /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
2019 bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
2020 if (bitmap == NULL) {
2022 RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */
2023 goto again; /* get another record */
2025 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2026 /* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */
2027 if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
2029 /* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. */
2031 * TODO: Does it make sense to have replay protection in epoch 0 where
2032 * we have no integrity negotiated yet?
2034 if (!dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap)) {
2037 RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */
2038 goto again; /* get another record */
2040 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2044 /* just read a 0 length packet */
2045 if (rr->length == 0) {
2051 * If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT), and a
2052 * handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it cannot be
2053 * processed at this time.
2055 if (is_next_epoch) {
2056 if ((SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s))) {
2057 if (dtls1_buffer_record (s,
2058 &(DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_unprocessed_rcds(&s->rlayer)),
2060 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2066 RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
2070 if (!dtls1_process_record(s, bitmap)) {
2071 if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) {
2072 /* dtls1_process_record() called SSLfatal */
2077 RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */
2078 goto again; /* get another record */
2085 int dtls_buffer_listen_record(SSL *s, size_t len, unsigned char *seq, size_t off)
2089 rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
2090 memset(rr, 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
2093 rr->type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
2094 memcpy(rr->seq_num, seq, sizeof(rr->seq_num));
2097 s->rlayer.packet = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer)->buf;
2098 s->rlayer.packet_length = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + len;
2099 rr->data = s->rlayer.packet + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
2101 if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->rlayer.d->processed_rcds),
2102 SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(s->rlayer.rrec)) <= 0) {
2103 /* SSLfatal() already called */