2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include <openssl/evp.h>
16 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
17 #include <openssl/rand.h>
18 #include "record_locl.h"
19 #include "../packet_locl.h"
21 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
22 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
23 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
24 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \
26 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
27 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
30 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL *s)
33 RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s->rlayer);
34 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
37 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
39 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
42 * Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
43 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
48 rl->packet_length = 0;
50 memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment));
51 rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
57 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->rbuf);
58 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
60 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
62 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl);
63 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl);
66 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
69 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
71 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
72 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl->s);
73 if (rl->numwpipes > 0)
74 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
75 SSL3_RECORD_release(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
78 /* Checks if we have unprocessed read ahead data pending */
79 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
81 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->rbuf) != 0;
84 /* Checks if we have decrypted unread record data pending */
85 int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
87 size_t curr_rec = 0, num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(rl);
88 const SSL3_RECORD *rr = rl->rrec;
90 while (curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]))
93 return curr_rec < num_recs;
96 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
98 return (rl->numwpipes > 0)
99 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf[rl->numwpipes - 1]) != 0;
102 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
104 memset(rl->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->read_sequence));
107 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
109 memset(rl->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
112 size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL *s)
116 if (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)
119 for (i = 0; i < RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); i++) {
120 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s->rlayer.rrec[i])
121 != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
123 num += SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]);
129 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t len)
131 ctx->default_read_buf_len = len;
134 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL *s, size_t len)
136 SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer), len);
139 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s)
141 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
142 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
143 return "read header";
144 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
146 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
153 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s)
155 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
156 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
158 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
160 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
168 * Return values are as per SSL_read()
170 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, size_t n, size_t max, int extend, int clearold,
174 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
175 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
176 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
177 * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
178 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
179 * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if
180 * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were
182 size_t len, left, align = 0;
189 rb = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
191 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
195 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
196 align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
197 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
201 /* start with empty packet ... */
204 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
206 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
209 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
210 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
211 && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) {
213 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
214 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
215 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
216 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
217 * overrun can be triggered.
219 memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
223 s->rlayer.packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
224 s->rlayer.packet_length = 0;
225 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
228 len = s->rlayer.packet_length;
229 pkt = rb->buf + align;
231 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
232 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
234 if (s->rlayer.packet != pkt && clearold == 1) {
235 memmove(pkt, s->rlayer.packet, len + left);
236 s->rlayer.packet = pkt;
237 rb->offset = len + align;
241 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
242 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
245 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
246 if (left == 0 && extend)
248 if (left > 0 && n > left)
252 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
254 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
261 /* else we need to read more data */
263 if (n > rb->len - rb->offset) { /* does not happen */
264 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
268 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
269 if (!s->rlayer.read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
270 /* ignore max parameter */
275 if (max > rb->len - rb->offset)
276 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
284 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
285 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
290 if (s->rbio != NULL) {
291 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
292 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
293 ret = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
297 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
303 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
305 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
310 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
311 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
312 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
314 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
316 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
320 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
323 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
324 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
330 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
331 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
333 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, size_t len,
336 const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
338 size_t n, split_send_fragment, maxpipes;
339 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
340 size_t max_send_fragment, nw;
342 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
346 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
347 tot = s->rlayer.wnum;
349 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
350 * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
351 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
352 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
353 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
354 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
355 * report the error in a way the user will notice
357 if ((len < s->rlayer.wnum)
358 || ((wb->left != 0) && (len < (s->rlayer.wnum + s->rlayer.wpend_tot)))) {
359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
363 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
364 && !early_data_count_ok(s, len, 0, NULL))
370 * When writing early data on the server side we could be "in_init" in
371 * between receiving the EoED and the CF - but we don't want to handle those
374 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)
375 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_UNAUTH_WRITING) {
376 i = s->handshake_func(s);
380 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
386 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
387 * will happen with non blocking IO
390 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->rlayer.wpend_tot,
393 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
394 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
397 tot += tmpwrit; /* this might be last fragment */
399 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
401 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
402 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
403 * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the
404 * compromise is considered worthy.
406 if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
407 len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = s->max_send_fragment) &&
408 s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL &&
409 !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
410 EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) &
411 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) {
412 unsigned char aad[13];
413 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
417 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
418 if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0)
419 max_send_fragment -= 512;
421 if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
422 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
424 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
425 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
426 (int)max_send_fragment, NULL);
428 if (len >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
433 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, 1, packlen)) {
434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
437 } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */
438 /* free jumbo buffer */
439 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
446 if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) {
447 /* free jumbo buffer */
448 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
452 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
453 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
455 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
460 if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
461 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8);
463 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4);
465 memcpy(aad, s->rlayer.write_sequence, 8);
467 aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
468 aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
475 packleni = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
476 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
477 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param);
478 packlen = (size_t)packleni;
479 if (packleni <= 0 || packlen > wb->len) { /* never happens */
480 /* free jumbo buffer */
481 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
485 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
486 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
489 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
490 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
491 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0)
494 s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
495 if (s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) {
497 while (j >= 0 && (++s->rlayer.write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ;
503 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = nw;
504 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
505 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
506 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = nw;
508 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw, &tmpwrit);
510 if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) {
511 /* free jumbo buffer */
512 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
514 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
518 /* free jumbo buffer */
519 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
520 *written = tot + tmpwrit;
528 if (tot == len) { /* done? */
529 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
530 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
538 split_send_fragment = s->split_send_fragment;
540 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
541 * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined
542 * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using
545 maxpipes = s->max_pipelines;
546 if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) {
548 * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we
551 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
555 || s->enc_write_ctx == NULL
556 || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx))
557 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)
558 || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s))
560 if (s->max_send_fragment == 0 || split_send_fragment > s->max_send_fragment
561 || split_send_fragment == 0) {
563 * We should have prevented this when we set the split and max send
564 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
566 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
571 size_t pipelens[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], tmppipelen, remain;
577 numpipes = ((n - 1) / split_send_fragment) + 1;
578 if (numpipes > maxpipes)
581 if (n / numpipes >= s->max_send_fragment) {
583 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
586 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
587 pipelens[j] = s->max_send_fragment;
590 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
591 tmppipelen = n / numpipes;
592 remain = n % numpipes;
593 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
594 pipelens[j] = tmppipelen;
600 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), pipelens, numpipes, 0,
603 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
604 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
609 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
610 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
612 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
613 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
615 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
617 if ((i == (int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
619 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
621 *written = tot + tmpwrit;
630 int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
631 size_t *pipelens, size_t numpipes,
632 int create_empty_fragment, size_t *written)
634 WPACKET pkt[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
635 SSL3_RECORD wr[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
638 unsigned char *recordstart;
639 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
640 size_t prefix_len = 0;
645 size_t totlen = 0, len, wpinited = 0;
648 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++)
649 totlen += pipelens[j];
651 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
652 * will happen with non blocking IO
654 if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer))
655 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written);
657 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
658 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
659 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
662 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
665 if (s->rlayer.numwpipes < numpipes)
666 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, numpipes, 0))
669 if (totlen == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
674 if ((sess == NULL) ||
675 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) {
676 clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
679 /* TODO(siz_t): Convert me */
680 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
686 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
688 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) {
690 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
691 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
694 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
696 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
697 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
698 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
701 size_t tmppipelen = 0;
704 ret = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, &tmppipelen, 1, 1, &prefix_len);
709 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) {
710 /* insufficient space */
711 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
716 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
719 if (create_empty_fragment) {
720 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
721 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
723 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
724 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
725 * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers.
727 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
728 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
730 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
731 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
732 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
733 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], align, NULL)) {
734 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
738 } else if (prefix_len) {
739 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
740 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0],
741 SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
742 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
743 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb)
744 + prefix_len, NULL)) {
745 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
750 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
753 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[j];
754 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0
755 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
756 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
758 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
759 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(thispkt, SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
760 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
761 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, align, NULL)) {
762 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
769 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
770 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && !SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s)) {
771 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
772 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
773 /* TODO(size_t): Convert me */
774 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
777 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
778 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
779 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
780 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
781 eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
786 /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */
787 memset(wr, 0, sizeof wr);
788 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
789 unsigned int version = SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) ? TLS1_VERSION : s->version;
790 unsigned char *compressdata = NULL;
792 unsigned int rectype;
797 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, type);
799 * In TLSv1.3, once encrypting, we always use application data for the
802 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL)
803 rectype = SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA;
807 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
808 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
810 if (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
811 && !s->renegotiate && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
812 version = TLS1_VERSION;
814 maxcomplen = pipelens[j];
815 if (s->compress != NULL)
816 maxcomplen += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD;
818 /* write the header */
819 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, rectype)
820 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(thispkt, version)
821 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(thispkt)
823 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, eivlen, NULL))
825 && !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, maxcomplen,
827 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
831 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
832 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, compressdata);
833 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, pipelens[j]);
834 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(thiswr, (unsigned char *)&buf[totlen]);
835 totlen += pipelens[j];
838 * we now 'read' from thiswr->input, thiswr->length bytes into
842 /* first we compress */
843 if (s->compress != NULL) {
844 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, thiswr)
845 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, thiswr->length, NULL)) {
846 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
850 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(thispkt, thiswr->input, thiswr->length)) {
851 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
854 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]);
857 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) {
860 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, type)) {
861 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
864 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, 1);
866 /* Add TLS1.3 padding */
867 rlen = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr);
868 if (rlen < SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
870 size_t max_padding = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH - rlen;
871 if (s->record_padding_cb != NULL) {
872 padding = s->record_padding_cb(s, type, rlen, s->record_padding_arg);
873 } else if (s->block_padding > 0) {
874 size_t mask = s->block_padding - 1;
877 /* optimize for power of 2 */
878 if ((s->block_padding & mask) == 0)
879 remainder = rlen & mask;
881 remainder = rlen % s->block_padding;
882 /* don't want to add a block of padding if we don't have to */
886 padding = s->block_padding - remainder;
889 /* do not allow the record to exceed max plaintext length */
890 if (padding > max_padding)
891 padding = max_padding;
892 if (!WPACKET_memset(thispkt, 0, padding)) {
893 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
896 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, padding);
902 * we should still have the output to thiswr->data and the input from
903 * wr->input. Length should be thiswr->length. thiswr->data still points
907 if (!SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
910 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac)
911 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) {
912 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
918 * Reserve some bytes for any growth that may occur during encryption.
919 * This will be at most one cipher block or the tag length if using
920 * AEAD. SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE covers either case.
922 if(!WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE,
925 * We also need next the amount of bytes written to this
928 || !WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)) {
929 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
933 /* Get a pointer to the start of this record excluding header */
934 recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len;
936 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, recordstart);
937 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(thiswr);
938 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, len);
941 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
942 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY) {
944 * We haven't actually negotiated the version yet, but we're trying to
945 * send early data - so we need to use the the tls13enc function.
947 if (tls13_enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1)
950 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1)
954 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
960 /* Allocate bytes for the encryption overhead */
961 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &origlen)
962 /* Encryption should never shrink the data! */
963 || origlen > thiswr->length
964 || (thiswr->length > origlen
965 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt,
966 thiswr->length - origlen, NULL))) {
967 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
970 if (SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
973 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac)
974 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) {
975 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
978 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, mac_size);
981 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)
982 || !WPACKET_close(thispkt)) {
983 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
987 if (s->msg_callback) {
988 recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len
989 - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
990 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, recordstart,
991 SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
992 s->msg_callback_arg);
994 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) {
995 unsigned char ctype = type;
997 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE,
998 &ctype, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1002 if (!WPACKET_finish(thispkt)) {
1003 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1008 * we should now have thiswr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which
1009 * is thiswr->length long
1011 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, type); /* not needed but helps for
1013 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
1015 if (create_empty_fragment) {
1017 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
1021 /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */
1022 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1025 *written = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr);
1029 /* now let's set up wb */
1030 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s->rlayer.wbuf[j],
1031 prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr));
1035 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
1038 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = totlen;
1039 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf;
1040 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
1041 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = totlen;
1043 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1044 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written);
1046 for (j = 0; j < wpinited; j++)
1047 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt[j]);
1051 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this
1053 * Return values are as per SSL_write()
1055 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
1059 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = s->rlayer.wbuf;
1063 if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > len)
1064 || ((s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf) &&
1065 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
1066 || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) {
1067 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
1072 /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */
1073 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]) == 0
1074 && currbuf < s->rlayer.numwpipes - 1) {
1079 if (s->wbio != NULL) {
1080 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
1081 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
1082 i = BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *)
1083 &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb[currbuf])
1084 [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb[currbuf])]),
1085 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]));
1089 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
1092 if (i > 0 && tmpwrit == SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])) {
1093 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
1094 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1095 if (currbuf + 1 < s->rlayer.numwpipes)
1097 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1098 *written = s->rlayer.wpend_ret;
1100 } else if (i <= 0) {
1101 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1103 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
1104 * using a datagram service
1106 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
1110 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1111 SSL3_BUFFER_sub_left(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1116 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1117 * 'type' is one of the following:
1119 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1120 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1121 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1123 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1124 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1126 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1127 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
1128 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
1129 * argument is non NULL.
1130 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1131 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1132 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1133 * Change cipher spec protocol
1134 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1136 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1137 * Handshake protocol
1138 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1139 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1140 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1141 * Application data protocol
1142 * none of our business
1144 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
1145 size_t len, int peek, size_t *readbytes)
1148 size_t n, curr_rec, num_recs, totalbytes;
1151 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
1153 rbuf = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
1155 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf)) {
1156 /* Not initialized yet */
1157 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
1161 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
1162 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek
1164 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
1165 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1169 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1170 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1172 unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1173 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1178 while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
1181 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--;
1184 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1185 for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1186 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1188 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1189 *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1196 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1199 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) {
1200 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1201 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1205 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1210 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1213 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
1214 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
1215 * rr[i].data, - data
1216 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1217 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
1219 rr = s->rlayer.rrec;
1220 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
1223 /* get new records if necessary */
1224 if (num_recs == 0) {
1225 ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
1228 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
1229 if (num_recs == 0) {
1230 /* Shouldn't happen */
1231 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1232 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1236 /* Skip over any records we have already read */
1238 curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]);
1240 if (curr_rec == num_recs) {
1241 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 0);
1245 } while (num_recs == 0);
1249 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
1250 * record that isn't an alert.
1252 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_ALERT
1253 && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) != 0)
1254 s->rlayer.alert_count = 0;
1256 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1258 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1259 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1260 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
1261 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1262 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1267 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1270 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
1271 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1272 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1276 if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)
1277 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1278 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL
1279 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
1281 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1282 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
1283 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1286 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1287 * doing a handshake for the first time
1289 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1290 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
1291 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1292 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1296 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1297 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1298 && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) {
1299 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1300 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1304 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1305 *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr);
1312 if (len - totalbytes > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
1313 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr);
1315 n = len - totalbytes;
1317 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
1320 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */
1321 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
1322 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1324 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n);
1325 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
1326 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
1327 s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1328 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0);
1329 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1332 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0
1333 || (peek && n == SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))) {
1338 } while (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && curr_rec < num_recs
1339 && totalbytes < len);
1340 if (totalbytes == 0) {
1341 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
1344 if (!peek && curr_rec == num_recs
1345 && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
1346 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0)
1347 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1348 *readbytes = totalbytes;
1353 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1354 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
1355 * were actually expecting a CCS).
1359 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
1361 if (rr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
1363 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
1364 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
1365 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
1366 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
1368 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1369 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1373 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
1374 && (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
1376 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
1377 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with
1378 * (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything
1379 * other than a ClientHello if we are a server.
1381 s->version = rr->rec_version;
1382 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1383 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1388 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
1389 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1392 size_t dest_maxlen = 0;
1393 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1394 size_t *dest_len = NULL;
1396 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1397 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1398 dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1399 dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len;
1402 if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
1403 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1404 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < n)
1405 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); /* available bytes */
1407 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1408 memcpy(dest + *dest_len,
1409 SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr) + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr), n);
1410 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
1411 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr, -n);
1413 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
1414 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1416 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1417 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1422 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1423 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1427 * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1428 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
1429 * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1432 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1433 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1435 (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) &&
1436 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1437 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1438 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1439 ((!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1440 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) ||
1441 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1442 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1443 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1444 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1447 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
1448 unsigned int alert_level, alert_descr;
1449 unsigned char *alert_bytes = SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)
1450 + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr);
1453 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&alert, alert_bytes, SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
1454 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_level)
1455 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_descr)
1456 || PACKET_remaining(&alert) != 0) {
1457 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1458 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_INVALID_ALERT);
1462 if (s->msg_callback)
1463 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, alert_bytes, 2, s,
1464 s->msg_callback_arg);
1466 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1467 cb = s->info_callback;
1468 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1469 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1472 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1473 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1476 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
1477 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1478 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1480 s->rlayer.alert_count++;
1481 if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) {
1482 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1483 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS);
1487 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
1488 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1492 * Apart from close_notify the only other warning alert in TLSv1.3
1493 * is user_cancelled - which we just ignore.
1495 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && alert_descr != SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED) {
1496 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1497 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1501 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1502 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1503 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
1504 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1505 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1506 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1508 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
1509 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1510 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1513 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1516 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1517 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1518 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1519 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
1520 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
1521 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1522 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1523 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
1526 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1527 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1534 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
1536 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1537 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1538 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1542 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1543 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1544 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1549 * Unexpected handshake message (ClientHello, NewSessionTicket (TLS1.3) or
1550 * protocol violation)
1552 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4)
1553 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
1554 int ined = (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING);
1556 /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */
1557 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
1559 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1563 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1568 * If we were actually trying to read early data and we found a
1569 * handshake message, then we don't want to continue to try and read
1570 * the application data any more. It won't be "early" now.
1575 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1576 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) {
1577 /* no read-ahead left? */
1580 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1581 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1582 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1583 * problems in the blocking world
1585 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1586 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1587 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1588 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1595 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) {
1598 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
1599 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
1600 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
1601 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
1602 * record types, using up resources processing them.
1604 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1605 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1607 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1609 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1611 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1612 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1613 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1615 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1616 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1618 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1620 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1621 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1622 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1623 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1624 * started), we will indulge it.
1626 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) {
1627 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1629 } else if (ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) {
1631 * This can happen after a client sends a CH followed by early_data,
1632 * but the server responds with a HelloRetryRequest. The server
1633 * reads the next record from the client expecting to find a
1634 * plaintext ClientHello but gets a record which appears to be
1635 * application data. The trial decrypt "works" because null
1636 * decryption was applied. We just skip it and move on to the next
1639 if (!early_data_count_ok(s, rr->length,
1640 EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, &al))
1642 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1645 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1646 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1653 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1657 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq)
1661 for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
1669 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1670 * format and false otherwise.
1672 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1674 return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl->rrec[0]);
1678 * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec
1680 size_t RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1682 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl->rrec[0]);