2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include <openssl/evp.h>
16 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
17 #include <openssl/rand.h>
18 #include "record_locl.h"
20 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
21 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
22 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
23 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \
25 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
26 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
29 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL *s)
32 RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s->rlayer);
33 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
36 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
38 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
41 * Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
42 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
47 rl->packet_length = 0;
49 memset(rl->alert_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->alert_fragment));
50 rl->alert_fragment_len = 0;
51 memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment));
52 rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
58 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->rbuf);
59 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
61 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
63 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl);
64 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl);
67 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
70 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
72 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
73 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl->s);
74 if (rl->numwpipes > 0)
75 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
76 SSL3_RECORD_release(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
79 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
81 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->rbuf) != 0;
84 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
86 return (rl->numwpipes > 0)
87 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf[rl->numwpipes - 1]) != 0;
90 int RECORD_LAYER_set_data(RECORD_LAYER *rl, const unsigned char *buf,
93 rl->packet_length = len;
95 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
96 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
97 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(rl->s))
101 rl->packet = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&rl->rbuf);
102 SSL3_BUFFER_set_data(&rl->rbuf, buf, len);
107 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
109 memset(rl->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->read_sequence));
112 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
114 memset(rl->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
117 size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL *s)
121 if (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)
124 for (i = 0; i < RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); i++) {
125 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s->rlayer.rrec[i])
126 != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
128 num += SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]);
134 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t len)
136 ctx->default_read_buf_len = len;
139 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL *s, size_t len)
141 SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer), len);
144 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s)
146 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
147 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
148 return "read header";
149 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
151 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
158 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s)
160 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
161 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
163 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
165 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
173 * Return values are as per SSL_read()
175 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, size_t n, size_t max, int extend, int clearold,
179 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
180 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
181 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
182 * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
183 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
184 * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if
185 * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were
187 size_t len, left, align = 0;
194 rb = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
196 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
200 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
201 align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
202 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
206 /* start with empty packet ... */
209 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
211 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
214 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
215 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
216 && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) {
218 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
219 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
220 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
221 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
222 * overrun can be triggered.
224 memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
228 s->rlayer.packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
229 s->rlayer.packet_length = 0;
230 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
233 len = s->rlayer.packet_length;
234 pkt = rb->buf + align;
236 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
237 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
239 if (s->rlayer.packet != pkt && clearold == 1) {
240 memmove(pkt, s->rlayer.packet, len + left);
241 s->rlayer.packet = pkt;
242 rb->offset = len + align;
246 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
247 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
250 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
251 if (left == 0 && extend)
253 if (left > 0 && n > left)
257 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
259 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
266 /* else we need to read more data */
268 if (n > rb->len - rb->offset) { /* does not happen */
269 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
273 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
274 if (!s->rlayer.read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
275 /* ignore max parameter */
280 if (max > rb->len - rb->offset)
281 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
289 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
290 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
295 if (s->rbio != NULL) {
296 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
297 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
298 ret = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
308 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
310 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
315 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
316 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
317 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
319 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
321 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
325 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
328 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
329 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
335 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
336 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
338 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, size_t len,
341 const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
343 size_t n, split_send_fragment, maxpipes;
344 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
345 size_t max_send_fragment, nw;
347 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
351 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
352 tot = s->rlayer.wnum;
354 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
355 * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
356 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
357 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
358 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
359 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
360 * report the error in a way the user will notice
362 if (len < s->rlayer.wnum) {
363 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
369 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
370 i = s->handshake_func(s);
374 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
380 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
381 * will happen with non blocking IO
384 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->rlayer.wpend_tot,
387 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
388 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
391 tot += tmpwrit; /* this might be last fragment */
393 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
395 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
396 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
397 * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the
398 * compromise is considered worthy.
400 if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
401 len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = s->max_send_fragment) &&
402 s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL &&
403 !SSL_USE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
404 EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) &
405 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) {
406 unsigned char aad[13];
407 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
411 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
412 if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0)
413 max_send_fragment -= 512;
415 if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
416 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
418 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
419 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
420 (int)max_send_fragment, NULL);
422 if (len >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
427 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, 1, packlen)) {
428 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
431 } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */
432 /* free jumbo buffer */
433 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
440 if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) {
441 /* free jumbo buffer */
442 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
446 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
447 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
449 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
454 if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
455 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8);
457 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4);
459 memcpy(aad, s->rlayer.write_sequence, 8);
461 aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
462 aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
469 packleni = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
470 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
471 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param);
472 packlen = (size_t)packleni;
473 if (packleni <= 0 || packlen > wb->len) { /* never happens */
474 /* free jumbo buffer */
475 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
479 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
480 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
483 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
484 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
485 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0)
488 s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
489 if (s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) {
491 while (j >= 0 && (++s->rlayer.write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ;
497 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = nw;
498 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
499 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
500 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = nw;
502 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw, &tmpwrit);
504 if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) {
505 /* free jumbo buffer */
506 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
508 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
512 /* free jumbo buffer */
513 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
514 *written = tot + tmpwrit;
522 if (tot == len) { /* done? */
523 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
524 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
532 split_send_fragment = s->split_send_fragment;
534 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
535 * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined
536 * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using
539 maxpipes = s->max_pipelines;
540 if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) {
542 * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we
545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
549 || s->enc_write_ctx == NULL
550 || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx))
551 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)
552 || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s))
554 if (s->max_send_fragment == 0 || split_send_fragment > s->max_send_fragment
555 || split_send_fragment == 0) {
557 * We should have prevented this when we set the split and max send
558 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
560 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
565 size_t pipelens[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], tmppipelen, remain;
571 numpipes = ((n - 1) / split_send_fragment) + 1;
572 if (numpipes > maxpipes)
575 if (n / numpipes >= s->max_send_fragment) {
577 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
580 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
581 pipelens[j] = s->max_send_fragment;
584 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
585 tmppipelen = n / numpipes;
586 remain = n % numpipes;
587 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
588 pipelens[j] = tmppipelen;
594 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), pipelens, numpipes, 0,
597 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
598 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
603 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
604 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
606 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
607 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
609 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
611 if ((i == (int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
613 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
615 *written = tot + tmpwrit;
624 int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
625 size_t *pipelens, size_t numpipes,
626 int create_empty_fragment, size_t *written)
628 WPACKET pkt[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
629 SSL3_RECORD wr[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
632 unsigned char *recordstart;
633 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
634 size_t prefix_len = 0;
639 size_t totlen = 0, len, wpinited = 0;
642 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++)
643 totlen += pipelens[j];
645 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
646 * will happen with non blocking IO
648 if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer))
649 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written);
651 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
652 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
653 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
656 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
659 if (s->rlayer.numwpipes < numpipes)
660 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, numpipes, 0))
663 if (totlen == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
668 if ((sess == NULL) ||
669 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) {
670 clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
673 /* TODO(siz_t): Convert me */
674 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
680 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
682 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) {
684 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
685 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
688 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
690 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
691 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
692 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
695 size_t tmppipelen = 0;
698 ret = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, &tmppipelen, 1, 1, &prefix_len);
703 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) {
704 /* insufficient space */
705 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
710 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
713 if (create_empty_fragment) {
714 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
715 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
717 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
718 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
719 * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers.
721 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
722 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
724 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
725 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
726 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
727 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], align, NULL)) {
728 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
732 } else if (prefix_len) {
733 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
734 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0],
735 SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
736 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
737 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb)
738 + prefix_len, NULL)) {
739 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
744 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
747 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[j];
748 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0
749 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
750 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
752 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
753 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(thispkt, SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
754 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
755 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, align, NULL)) {
756 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
763 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
764 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
765 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
766 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
767 /* TODO(size_t): Convert me */
768 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
771 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
772 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
773 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
774 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
775 eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
780 /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */
781 memset(wr, 0, sizeof wr);
782 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
783 unsigned int version = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? TLS1_VERSION : s->version;
784 unsigned char *compressdata = NULL;
786 unsigned int rectype;
791 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, type);
793 * In TLSv1.3, once encrypting, we always use application data for the
796 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL)
797 rectype = SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA;
801 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
802 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
804 if (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
805 && !s->renegotiate && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
806 version = TLS1_VERSION;
808 maxcomplen = pipelens[j];
809 if (s->compress != NULL)
810 pipelens[j] += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD;
812 /* write the header */
813 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, rectype)
814 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(thispkt, version)
815 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(thispkt)
817 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, eivlen, NULL))
819 && !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, maxcomplen,
821 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
825 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
826 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, compressdata);
827 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, pipelens[j]);
828 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(thiswr, (unsigned char *)&buf[totlen]);
829 totlen += pipelens[j];
832 * we now 'read' from thiswr->input, thiswr->length bytes into
836 /* first we compress */
837 if (s->compress != NULL) {
839 * TODO(TLS1.3): Make sure we prevent compression!!!
841 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, thiswr)
842 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, thiswr->length, NULL)) {
843 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
847 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(thispkt, thiswr->input, thiswr->length)) {
848 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
851 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]);
854 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) {
855 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, type)) {
856 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
859 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, 1);
861 * TODO(TLS1.3): Padding goes here. Do we need an API to add this?
862 * For now, use no padding
867 * we should still have the output to thiswr->data and the input from
868 * wr->input. Length should be thiswr->length. thiswr->data still points
872 if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
875 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac)
876 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) {
877 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
883 * Reserve some bytes for any growth that may occur during encryption.
884 * This will be at most one cipher block or the tag length if using
885 * AEAD. SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE covers either case.
887 if(!WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE,
890 * We also need next the amount of bytes written to this
893 || !WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)) {
894 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
898 /* Get a pointer to the start of this record excluding header */
899 recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len;
901 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, recordstart);
902 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(thiswr);
903 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, len);
906 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1)
909 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
915 /* Allocate bytes for the encryption overhead */
916 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &origlen)
917 /* Encryption should never shrink the data! */
918 || origlen > thiswr->length
919 || (thiswr->length > origlen
920 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt,
921 thiswr->length - origlen, NULL))) {
922 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
925 if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
928 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac)
929 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) {
930 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
933 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, mac_size);
936 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)
937 || !WPACKET_close(thispkt)) {
938 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
942 if (s->msg_callback) {
943 recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len
944 - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
945 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, recordstart,
946 SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
947 s->msg_callback_arg);
950 if (!WPACKET_finish(thispkt)) {
951 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
956 * we should now have thiswr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which
957 * is thiswr->length long
959 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, type); /* not needed but helps for
961 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
963 if (create_empty_fragment) {
965 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
969 /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */
970 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
973 *written = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr);
977 /* now let's set up wb */
978 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s->rlayer.wbuf[j],
979 prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr));
983 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
986 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = totlen;
987 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf;
988 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
989 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = totlen;
991 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
992 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written);
994 for (j = 0; j < wpinited; j++)
995 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt[j]);
999 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this
1001 * Return values are as per SSL_write()
1003 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
1007 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = s->rlayer.wbuf;
1011 if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > len)
1012 || ((s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf) &&
1013 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
1014 || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) {
1015 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
1020 /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */
1021 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]) == 0
1022 && currbuf < s->rlayer.numwpipes - 1) {
1027 if (s->wbio != NULL) {
1028 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
1029 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
1030 i = BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *)
1031 &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb[currbuf])
1032 [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb[currbuf])]),
1033 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]));
1037 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
1040 if (i > 0 && tmpwrit == SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])) {
1041 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
1042 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1043 if (currbuf + 1 < s->rlayer.numwpipes)
1045 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1046 *written = s->rlayer.wpend_ret;
1048 } else if (i <= 0) {
1049 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1051 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
1052 * using a datagram service
1054 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
1058 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1059 SSL3_BUFFER_sub_left(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1064 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1065 * 'type' is one of the following:
1067 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1068 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1069 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1071 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1072 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1074 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1075 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
1076 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
1077 * argument is non NULL.
1078 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1079 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1080 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1081 * Change cipher spec protocol
1082 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1084 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1085 * Handshake protocol
1086 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1087 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1088 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1089 * Application data protocol
1090 * none of our business
1092 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
1093 size_t len, int peek, size_t *readbytes)
1096 size_t n, curr_rec, num_recs, totalbytes;
1099 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
1101 rbuf = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
1103 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf)) {
1104 /* Not initialized yet */
1105 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
1109 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
1110 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek
1112 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
1113 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1117 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1118 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1120 unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1121 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1126 while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
1129 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--;
1132 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1133 for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1134 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1136 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1137 *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1144 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1147 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) {
1148 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1149 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1153 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1158 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1161 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
1162 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
1163 * rr[i].data, - data
1164 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1165 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
1167 rr = s->rlayer.rrec;
1168 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
1171 /* get new records if necessary */
1172 if (num_recs == 0) {
1173 ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
1176 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
1177 if (num_recs == 0) {
1178 /* Shouldn't happen */
1179 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1184 /* Skip over any records we have already read */
1186 curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]);
1188 if (curr_rec == num_recs) {
1189 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 0);
1193 } while (num_recs == 0);
1197 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
1198 * record that isn't an alert.
1200 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_ALERT
1201 && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) != 0)
1202 s->rlayer.alert_count = 0;
1204 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1206 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1207 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1208 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
1209 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1210 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1215 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1218 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
1219 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1220 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1224 if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)
1225 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1226 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL)) {
1228 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1229 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
1230 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1233 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1234 * doing a handshake for the first time
1236 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1237 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
1238 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1243 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1244 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1245 && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) {
1246 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1247 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1251 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1252 *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr);
1259 if (len - totalbytes > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
1260 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr);
1262 n = len - totalbytes;
1264 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
1267 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */
1268 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
1269 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1271 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n);
1272 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
1273 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
1274 s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1275 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0);
1276 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1279 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0
1280 || (peek && n == SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))) {
1285 } while (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && curr_rec < num_recs
1286 && totalbytes < len);
1287 if (totalbytes == 0) {
1288 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
1291 if (!peek && curr_rec == num_recs
1292 && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
1293 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0)
1294 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1295 *readbytes = totalbytes;
1300 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1301 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
1302 * were actually expecting a CCS).
1306 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
1308 if (rr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
1310 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
1311 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
1312 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
1313 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
1315 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1316 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1320 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
1321 && (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
1323 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
1324 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with
1325 * (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything
1326 * other than a ClientHello if we are a server.
1328 s->version = rr->rec_version;
1329 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1330 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1335 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
1336 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1339 size_t dest_maxlen = 0;
1340 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1341 size_t *dest_len = NULL;
1343 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1344 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1345 dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1346 dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len;
1347 } else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
1348 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.alert_fragment;
1349 dest = s->rlayer.alert_fragment;
1350 dest_len = &s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len;
1353 if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
1354 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1355 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < n)
1356 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); /* available bytes */
1358 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1360 dest[(*dest_len)++] =
1361 SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr)];
1362 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, 1);
1363 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr, -1);
1366 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen) {
1367 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1368 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1374 * TODO(TLS1.3): Temporarily we will just ignore NewSessionTicket messages.
1375 * Later we will want to process them.
1377 if (!s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4
1378 && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
1379 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1384 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1385 * s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1386 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1389 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1391 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1392 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1393 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
1394 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1396 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1397 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1398 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
1399 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1400 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1404 if (s->msg_callback)
1405 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1406 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment, 4, s,
1407 s->msg_callback_arg);
1409 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1410 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1411 !s->s3->renegotiate) {
1412 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1413 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
1414 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1418 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1422 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1423 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) {
1424 /* no read-ahead left? */
1427 * In the case where we try to read application data,
1428 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1429 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1430 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world
1432 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1433 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1434 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1435 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1440 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1443 /* Does this ever happen? */
1444 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1447 * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
1448 * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
1453 * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1454 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
1455 * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1458 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1459 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1460 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1461 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1462 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1463 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1464 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
1465 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1466 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1467 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1470 if (s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len >= 2) {
1471 int alert_level = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[0];
1472 int alert_descr = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[1];
1474 s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len = 0;
1476 if (s->msg_callback)
1477 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1478 s->rlayer.alert_fragment, 2, s,
1479 s->msg_callback_arg);
1481 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1482 cb = s->info_callback;
1483 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1484 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1487 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1488 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1491 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
1492 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1493 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1495 s->rlayer.alert_count++;
1496 if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) {
1497 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1498 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS);
1502 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
1503 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1507 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1508 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1509 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
1510 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1511 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1512 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1514 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
1515 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1516 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1519 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1520 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
1523 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1526 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1527 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1528 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1529 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
1530 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
1531 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1532 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1533 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
1536 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1537 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1544 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
1546 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1547 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1548 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1552 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1553 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1554 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1559 * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
1561 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4)
1562 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
1563 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1564 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) {
1565 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
1569 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1573 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1577 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1578 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) {
1579 /* no read-ahead left? */
1582 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1583 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1584 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1585 * problems in the blocking world
1587 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1588 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1589 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1590 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1597 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) {
1600 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
1601 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
1602 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
1603 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
1604 * record types, using up resources processing them.
1606 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1607 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1609 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1611 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1613 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1614 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1615 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1617 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1618 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1620 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1622 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1623 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1624 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1625 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1626 * started), we will indulge it.
1628 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) {
1629 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1632 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1633 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1640 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1644 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq)
1648 for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
1656 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1657 * format and false otherwise.
1659 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1661 return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl->rrec[0]);
1665 * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec
1667 size_t RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1669 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl->rrec[0]);