1 /* ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
116 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
117 #include <openssl/evp.h>
118 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
119 #include <openssl/rand.h>
120 #include "record_locl.h"
122 #ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
123 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
126 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
127 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
128 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
129 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) || \
130 defined(__INTEL__) ) \
132 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
133 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
136 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL *s)
139 SSL3_RECORD_clear(&rl->rrec);
140 SSL3_RECORD_clear(&rl->wrec);
143 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
145 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
147 /* Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
148 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
153 rl->packet_length = 0;
155 memset(rl->alert_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->alert_fragment));
156 rl->alert_fragment_len = 0;
157 memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment));
158 rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
162 rl->wpend_buf = NULL;
164 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->rbuf);
165 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->wbuf);
166 SSL3_RECORD_clear(&rl->rrec);
167 SSL3_RECORD_clear(&rl->wrec);
169 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl);
170 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl);
173 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
176 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
178 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
179 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl->s);
180 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->wbuf))
181 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
182 SSL3_RECORD_release(&rl->rrec);
185 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
187 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->rbuf) != 0;
190 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
192 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf) != 0;
195 int RECORD_LAYER_set_data(RECORD_LAYER *rl, const unsigned char *buf, int len)
197 rl->packet_length = len;
199 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
200 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
201 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(rl->s))
205 rl->packet = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&rl->rbuf);
206 SSL3_BUFFER_set_data(&rl->rbuf, buf, len);
211 void RECORD_LAYER_dup(RECORD_LAYER *dst, RECORD_LAYER *src)
214 * Currently only called from SSL_dup...which only seems to expect the
215 * rstate to be duplicated and nothing else from the RECORD_LAYER???
217 dst->rstate = src->rstate;
220 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
222 memset(rl->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->read_sequence));
225 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
227 memset(rl->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
230 int RECORD_LAYER_setup_comp_buffer(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
232 return SSL3_RECORD_setup(&(rl)->rrec);
235 int ssl3_pending(const SSL *s)
237 if (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)
240 return (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s->rlayer.rrec) == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
241 ? SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s->rlayer.rrec) : 0;
244 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s)
248 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
249 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
252 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
255 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
265 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s)
269 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
270 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
273 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
276 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
286 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
289 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
290 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
291 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
292 * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
293 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
303 rb = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
305 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
309 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
310 align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
311 align = (0-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
315 /* start with empty packet ... */
318 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
320 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
323 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
324 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
325 && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) {
327 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
328 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
329 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
330 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
331 * overrun can be triggered.
333 memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
337 s->rlayer.packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
338 s->rlayer.packet_length = 0;
339 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
343 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
344 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
347 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
348 if (left == 0 && extend)
350 if (left > 0 && n > left)
354 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
356 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
362 /* else we need to read more data */
364 len = s->rlayer.packet_length;
365 pkt = rb->buf + align;
367 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
368 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
370 if (s->rlayer.packet != pkt) { /* len > 0 */
371 memmove(pkt, s->rlayer.packet, len + left);
372 s->rlayer.packet = pkt;
373 rb->offset = len + align;
376 if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) { /* does not happen */
377 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
381 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
382 if (!s->rlayer.read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
383 /* ignore max parameter */
388 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
389 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
394 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
395 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
400 if (s->rbio != NULL) {
401 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
402 i = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
404 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
410 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
412 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
417 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
418 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
419 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
421 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
423 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
427 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
430 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
431 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
437 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
438 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
440 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
442 const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
445 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
446 unsigned int max_send_fragment;
447 unsigned int u_len = (unsigned int)len;
449 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf;
453 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_NEGATIVE_LENGTH);
457 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
458 tot = s->rlayer.wnum;
460 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
461 * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
462 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
463 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
464 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
465 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
466 * report the error in a way the user will notice
468 if ((unsigned int)len < s->rlayer.wnum) {
469 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
476 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
477 i = s->handshake_func(s);
481 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
487 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
488 * will happen with non blocking IO
491 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->rlayer.wpend_tot);
493 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
494 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
497 tot += i; /* this might be last fragment */
499 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
501 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
502 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
503 * jumbo buffer to accomodate up to 8 records, but the
504 * compromise is considered worthy.
506 if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
507 u_len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = s->max_send_fragment) &&
508 s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL &&
509 !SSL_USE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
510 EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher) &
511 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) {
512 unsigned char aad[13];
513 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
516 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
517 if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0)
518 max_send_fragment -= 512;
520 if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
521 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
523 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
524 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
525 max_send_fragment, NULL);
527 if (u_len >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
532 wb->buf = OPENSSL_malloc(packlen);
533 if (wb->buf == NULL) {
534 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
538 } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */
539 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
546 if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) {
547 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
552 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
553 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
555 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
560 if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
561 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8);
563 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4);
565 memcpy(aad, s->rlayer.write_sequence, 8);
567 aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
568 aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
575 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
576 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
577 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param);
579 if (packlen <= 0 || packlen > (int)wb->len) { /* never happens */
580 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
585 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
586 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
589 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
590 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
591 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0)
594 s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
595 if (s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) {
597 while (j >= 0 && (++s->rlayer.write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ;
603 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = nw;
604 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
605 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
606 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = nw;
608 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw);
610 if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) {
611 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf);
614 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
618 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
627 if (tot == len) { /* done? */
628 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
629 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
636 if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
637 nw = s->max_send_fragment;
641 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
643 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
644 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
649 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
650 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
652 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
653 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
655 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
657 if ((i == (int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
659 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
669 int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
670 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
672 unsigned char *p, *plen;
673 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
678 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf;
682 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
683 * will happen with non blocking IO
685 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(wb) != 0)
686 return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len));
688 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
689 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
690 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
693 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
696 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(wb))
697 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
700 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
703 wr = &s->rlayer.wrec;
706 if ((sess == NULL) ||
707 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
708 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) {
709 clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
712 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
718 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
720 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) {
722 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
723 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
726 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
728 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
729 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
730 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
733 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
738 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
740 /* insufficient space */
741 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
746 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
749 if (create_empty_fragment) {
750 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
752 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
753 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
754 * payload, then we can just pretent we simply have two headers.
756 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
757 align = (0-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
759 p = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + align;
760 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
761 } else if (prefix_len) {
762 p = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb) + prefix_len;
764 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
765 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
766 align = (0-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
768 p = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + align;
769 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
772 /* write the header */
774 *(p++) = type & 0xff;
775 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(wr, type);
777 *(p++) = (s->version >> 8);
779 * Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
780 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
782 if (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
783 && !s->renegotiate && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
786 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
788 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
791 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
792 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
793 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
794 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
795 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
799 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
800 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
801 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
802 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE)
803 eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
809 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
810 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(wr, p + eivlen);
811 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(wr, (int)len);
812 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(wr, (unsigned char *)buf);
816 * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data
819 /* first we compress */
820 if (s->compress != NULL) {
821 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) {
822 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
826 memcpy(wr->data, wr->input, wr->length);
827 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(wr);
831 * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from
832 * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the
836 if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
837 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &(p[wr->length + eivlen]), 1) < 0)
839 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(wr, mac_size);
842 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(wr, p);
843 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(wr);
847 * if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) goto err;
849 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(wr, eivlen);
852 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 1) < 1)
855 if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
856 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, p + wr->length, 1) < 0)
858 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(wr, mac_size);
861 /* record length after mac and block padding */
862 s2n(SSL3_RECORD_get_length(wr), plen);
865 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, plen - 5, 5, s,
866 s->msg_callback_arg);
869 * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
872 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(wr, type); /* not needed but helps for debugging */
873 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(wr, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
875 if (create_empty_fragment) {
877 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
880 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(wr);
883 /* now let's set up wb */
884 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(wb, prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(wr));
887 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
890 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = len;
891 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf;
892 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
893 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = len;
895 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
896 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len);
901 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
902 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
906 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf;
909 if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > (int)len)
910 || ((s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf) &&
911 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
912 || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) {
913 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
919 if (s->wbio != NULL) {
920 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
921 i = BIO_write(s->wbio,
922 (char *)&(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb)[SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb)]),
923 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(wb));
925 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
928 if (i == SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(wb)) {
929 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(wb, 0);
930 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(wb, i);
931 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
932 return (s->rlayer.wpend_ret);
934 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
936 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
937 * using a datagram service
939 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(wb, 0);
943 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(wb, i);
944 SSL3_BUFFER_add_left(wb, -i);
949 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
950 * 'type' is one of the following:
952 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
953 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
954 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
956 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
957 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
959 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
960 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
961 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
962 * argument is non NULL.
963 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
964 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
965 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
966 * Change cipher spec protocol
967 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
969 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
971 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
972 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
973 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
974 * Application data protocol
975 * none of our business
977 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
983 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
985 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&s->rlayer.rbuf)) {
986 /* Not initialized yet */
987 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
991 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
992 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek
994 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
995 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
999 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1000 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1002 unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1003 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1008 while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
1011 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--;
1014 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1015 for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1016 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1018 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1019 *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1025 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1028 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) {
1029 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1030 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1034 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1039 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1042 * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
1043 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
1044 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1045 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
1047 rr = &s->rlayer.rrec;
1049 /* get new packet if necessary */
1050 if ((SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
1051 || (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) {
1052 ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
1057 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1059 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1060 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1061 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
1062 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1063 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1068 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1071 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
1072 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1073 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1077 if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)
1078 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1079 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL)) {
1081 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1082 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
1083 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1086 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1087 * doing a handshake for the first time
1089 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1090 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
1091 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1092 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1096 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1097 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1098 && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) {
1099 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1100 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1104 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1105 *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr);
1110 if ((unsigned int)len > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
1111 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr);
1113 n = (unsigned int)len;
1115 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
1117 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr, -n);
1118 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
1119 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
1120 s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1121 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0);
1122 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
1123 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&s->rlayer.rbuf) == 0)
1124 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1131 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1132 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
1133 * were actually expecting a CCS).
1136 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1137 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1138 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1143 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
1145 if (rr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
1147 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
1148 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
1149 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
1150 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
1152 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1153 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1157 if(s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
1158 && (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
1160 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
1161 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with
1162 * (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything
1163 * other than a ClientHello if we are a server.
1165 s->version = rr->rec_version;
1166 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1167 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1172 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
1173 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1176 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
1177 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1178 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
1180 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1181 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1182 dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1183 dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len;
1184 } else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
1185 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.alert_fragment;
1186 dest = s->rlayer.alert_fragment;
1187 dest_len = &s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len;
1189 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1190 else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)== TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) {
1191 /* We can ignore 0 return values */
1192 if (tls1_process_heartbeat(s, SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr),
1193 SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr)) < 0) {
1197 /* Exit and notify application to read again */
1198 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1199 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1200 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1201 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1206 if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
1207 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1208 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < n)
1209 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); /* available bytes */
1211 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1213 dest[(*dest_len)++] =
1214 SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr)];
1215 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, 1);
1216 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr, -1);
1219 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1220 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1225 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1226 * s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1227 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1230 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1232 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1233 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1234 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
1235 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1237 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1238 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1239 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
1240 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1241 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1245 if (s->msg_callback)
1246 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1247 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment, 4, s,
1248 s->msg_callback_arg);
1250 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1251 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1252 !s->s3->renegotiate) {
1253 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1254 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
1255 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1259 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1260 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1264 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1265 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&s->rlayer.rbuf) == 0) {
1266 /* no read-ahead left? */
1269 * In the case where we try to read application data,
1270 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1271 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1272 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world
1274 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1275 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1276 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1277 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1284 * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
1285 * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
1290 * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1291 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
1292 * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1295 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1296 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1297 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1298 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1299 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1300 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1301 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
1302 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1303 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1306 if (s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len >= 2) {
1307 int alert_level = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[0];
1308 int alert_descr = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[1];
1310 s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len = 0;
1312 if (s->msg_callback)
1313 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1314 s->rlayer.alert_fragment, 2, s,
1315 s->msg_callback_arg);
1317 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1318 cb = s->info_callback;
1319 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1320 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1323 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1324 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1327 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
1328 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1329 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
1330 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1334 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1335 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1336 * alert because if application tried to renegotiatie it
1337 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1338 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1339 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1341 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
1342 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1343 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1346 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1347 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
1350 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1353 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1354 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1356 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
1357 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
1358 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1359 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
1362 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1363 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1370 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
1372 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1373 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1377 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1378 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1384 * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
1386 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4)
1387 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
1388 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1389 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) {
1390 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
1394 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1398 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1402 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1403 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&s->rlayer.rbuf) == 0) {
1404 /* no read-ahead left? */
1407 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1408 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1409 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1410 * problems in the blocking world
1412 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1413 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1414 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1415 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1422 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) {
1425 * TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types: TLS v1.2 give
1426 * an unexpected message alert.
1428 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION) {
1429 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1432 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1433 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1435 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1437 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1439 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1440 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1441 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1443 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1444 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1446 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1448 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1449 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1450 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1451 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1452 * started), we will indulge it.
1454 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) {
1455 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1458 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1459 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1466 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1470 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq)
1474 for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
1482 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1483 * format and false otherwise.
1485 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1487 return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl->rrec);
1491 * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec
1493 unsigned int RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1495 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl->rrec);