2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
13 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
14 #include <openssl/evp.h>
15 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
16 #include <openssl/rand.h>
17 #include "record_locl.h"
18 #include "../packet_locl.h"
20 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
21 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
22 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
23 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \
25 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
26 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
29 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL *s)
32 RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s->rlayer);
33 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
36 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
38 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
41 * Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
42 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
47 rl->packet_length = 0;
49 memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment));
50 rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
56 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->rbuf);
57 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
59 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
61 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl);
62 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl);
65 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
68 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
70 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
71 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl->s);
72 if (rl->numwpipes > 0)
73 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
74 SSL3_RECORD_release(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
77 /* Checks if we have unprocessed read ahead data pending */
78 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
80 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->rbuf) != 0;
83 /* Checks if we have decrypted unread record data pending */
84 int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
86 size_t curr_rec = 0, num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(rl);
87 const SSL3_RECORD *rr = rl->rrec;
89 while (curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]))
92 return curr_rec < num_recs;
95 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
97 return (rl->numwpipes > 0)
98 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf[rl->numwpipes - 1]) != 0;
101 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
103 memset(rl->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->read_sequence));
106 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
108 memset(rl->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
111 size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL *s)
115 if (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)
118 for (i = 0; i < RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); i++) {
119 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s->rlayer.rrec[i])
120 != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
122 num += SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]);
128 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t len)
130 ctx->default_read_buf_len = len;
133 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL *s, size_t len)
135 SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer), len);
138 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s)
140 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
141 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
142 return "read header";
143 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
145 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
152 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s)
154 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
155 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
157 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
159 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
167 * Return values are as per SSL_read()
169 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, size_t n, size_t max, int extend, int clearold,
173 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
174 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
175 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
176 * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
177 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
178 * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if
179 * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were
181 size_t len, left, align = 0;
188 rb = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
190 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) {
191 /* SSLfatal() already called */
196 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
197 align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
198 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
202 /* start with empty packet ... */
205 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
207 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
210 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
211 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
212 && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) {
214 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
215 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
216 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
217 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
218 * overrun can be triggered.
220 memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
224 s->rlayer.packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
225 s->rlayer.packet_length = 0;
226 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
229 len = s->rlayer.packet_length;
230 pkt = rb->buf + align;
232 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
233 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
235 if (s->rlayer.packet != pkt && clearold == 1) {
236 memmove(pkt, s->rlayer.packet, len + left);
237 s->rlayer.packet = pkt;
238 rb->offset = len + align;
242 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
243 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
246 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
247 if (left == 0 && extend)
249 if (left > 0 && n > left)
253 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
255 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
262 /* else we need to read more data */
264 if (n > rb->len - rb->offset) {
265 /* does not happen */
266 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,
267 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
271 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
272 if (!s->rlayer.read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
273 /* ignore max parameter */
278 if (max > rb->len - rb->offset)
279 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
287 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
288 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
293 if (s->rbio != NULL) {
294 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
295 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
296 ret = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
300 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,
301 SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
307 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
309 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
314 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
315 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
316 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
318 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
320 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
324 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
327 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
328 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
334 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
335 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
337 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, size_t len,
340 const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
342 size_t n, max_send_fragment, split_send_fragment, maxpipes;
343 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
346 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
350 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
351 tot = s->rlayer.wnum;
353 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
354 * than the original len from a write which didn't complete for
355 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
356 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
357 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
358 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
359 * report the error in a way the user will notice
361 if ((len < s->rlayer.wnum)
362 || ((wb->left != 0) && (len < (s->rlayer.wnum + s->rlayer.wpend_tot)))) {
363 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,
368 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
369 && !early_data_count_ok(s, len, 0, 1)) {
370 /* SSLfatal() already called */
377 * When writing early data on the server side we could be "in_init" in
378 * between receiving the EoED and the CF - but we don't want to handle those
381 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)
382 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_UNAUTH_WRITING) {
383 i = s->handshake_func(s);
384 /* SSLfatal() already called */
393 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
394 * will happen with non blocking IO
397 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
398 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->rlayer.wpend_tot,
401 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
402 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
405 tot += tmpwrit; /* this might be last fragment */
407 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
409 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
410 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
411 * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the
412 * compromise is considered worthy.
414 if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
415 len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s)) &&
416 s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL &&
417 !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
418 EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) &
419 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) {
420 unsigned char aad[13];
421 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
425 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
426 if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0)
427 max_send_fragment -= 512;
429 if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
430 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
432 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
433 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
434 (int)max_send_fragment, NULL);
436 if (len >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
441 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, 1, packlen)) {
442 /* SSLfatal() already called */
445 } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */
446 /* free jumbo buffer */
447 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
454 if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) {
455 /* free jumbo buffer */
456 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
460 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
461 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
463 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
464 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
469 if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
470 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8);
472 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4);
474 memcpy(aad, s->rlayer.write_sequence, 8);
476 aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
477 aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
484 packleni = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
485 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
486 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param);
487 packlen = (size_t)packleni;
488 if (packleni <= 0 || packlen > wb->len) { /* never happens */
489 /* free jumbo buffer */
490 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
494 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
495 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
498 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
499 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
500 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0)
503 s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
504 if (s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) {
506 while (j >= 0 && (++s->rlayer.write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ;
512 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = nw;
513 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
514 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
515 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = nw;
517 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw, &tmpwrit);
519 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
520 if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) {
521 /* free jumbo buffer */
522 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
524 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
528 /* free jumbo buffer */
529 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
530 *written = tot + tmpwrit;
537 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK */
538 if (tot == len) { /* done? */
539 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
540 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
548 max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s);
549 split_send_fragment = ssl_get_split_send_fragment(s);
551 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
552 * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined
553 * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using
556 maxpipes = s->max_pipelines;
557 if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) {
559 * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we
562 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,
563 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
567 || s->enc_write_ctx == NULL
568 || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx))
569 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)
570 || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s))
572 if (max_send_fragment == 0 || split_send_fragment == 0
573 || split_send_fragment > max_send_fragment) {
575 * We should have prevented this when we set/get the split and max send
576 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
578 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,
579 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
584 size_t pipelens[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], tmppipelen, remain;
590 numpipes = ((n - 1) / split_send_fragment) + 1;
591 if (numpipes > maxpipes)
594 if (n / numpipes >= max_send_fragment) {
596 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
599 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
600 pipelens[j] = max_send_fragment;
603 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
604 tmppipelen = n / numpipes;
605 remain = n % numpipes;
606 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
607 pipelens[j] = tmppipelen;
613 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), pipelens, numpipes, 0,
616 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
617 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
618 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
623 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
624 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
626 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
627 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
629 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
631 if ((i == (int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
633 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
635 *written = tot + tmpwrit;
644 int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
645 size_t *pipelens, size_t numpipes,
646 int create_empty_fragment, size_t *written)
648 WPACKET pkt[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
649 SSL3_RECORD wr[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
652 unsigned char *recordstart;
653 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
654 size_t prefix_len = 0;
659 size_t totlen = 0, len, wpinited = 0;
662 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++)
663 totlen += pipelens[j];
665 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
666 * will happen with non blocking IO
668 if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
669 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
670 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written);
673 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
674 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
675 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
677 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
680 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
683 if (s->rlayer.numwpipes < numpipes) {
684 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, numpipes, 0)) {
685 /* SSLfatal() already called */
690 if (totlen == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
695 if ((sess == NULL) ||
696 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) {
697 clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
700 /* TODO(siz_t): Convert me */
701 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
703 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
704 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
710 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
712 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) {
714 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
715 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
718 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
720 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
721 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
722 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
725 size_t tmppipelen = 0;
728 ret = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, &tmppipelen, 1, 1, &prefix_len);
730 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
735 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) {
736 /* insufficient space */
737 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
738 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
743 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
746 if (create_empty_fragment) {
747 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
748 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
750 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
751 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
752 * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers.
754 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
755 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
757 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
758 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
759 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
760 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], align, NULL)) {
761 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
762 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
766 } else if (prefix_len) {
767 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
768 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0],
769 SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
770 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
771 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb)
772 + prefix_len, NULL)) {
773 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
774 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
779 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
782 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[j];
783 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0
784 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
785 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
787 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
788 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(thispkt, SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
789 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
790 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, align, NULL)) {
791 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
792 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
799 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
800 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && !SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s)) {
801 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
802 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
803 /* TODO(size_t): Convert me */
804 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
807 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
808 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
809 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
810 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
811 eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
816 /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */
817 memset(wr, 0, sizeof(wr));
818 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
819 unsigned int version = (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) ? TLS1_2_VERSION
821 unsigned char *compressdata = NULL;
823 unsigned int rectype;
829 * In TLSv1.3, once encrypting, we always use application data for the
832 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s)
833 && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL
834 && (s->statem.enc_write_state != ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS
835 || type != SSL3_RT_ALERT))
836 rectype = SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA;
839 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, rectype);
842 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
843 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
845 if (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
847 && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION
848 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
849 version = TLS1_VERSION;
850 SSL3_RECORD_set_rec_version(thiswr, version);
852 maxcomplen = pipelens[j];
853 if (s->compress != NULL)
854 maxcomplen += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD;
856 /* write the header */
857 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, rectype)
858 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(thispkt, version)
859 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(thispkt)
861 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, eivlen, NULL))
863 && !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, maxcomplen,
865 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
866 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
870 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
871 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, compressdata);
872 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, pipelens[j]);
873 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(thiswr, (unsigned char *)&buf[totlen]);
874 totlen += pipelens[j];
877 * we now 'read' from thiswr->input, thiswr->length bytes into
881 /* first we compress */
882 if (s->compress != NULL) {
883 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, thiswr)
884 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, thiswr->length, NULL)) {
885 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
886 SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
890 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(thispkt, thiswr->input, thiswr->length)) {
891 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
892 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
895 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]);
898 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s)
899 && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL
900 && (s->statem.enc_write_state != ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS
901 || type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
902 size_t rlen, max_send_fragment;
904 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, type)) {
905 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
906 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
909 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, 1);
911 /* Add TLS1.3 padding */
912 max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s);
913 rlen = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr);
914 if (rlen < max_send_fragment) {
916 size_t max_padding = max_send_fragment - rlen;
917 if (s->record_padding_cb != NULL) {
918 padding = s->record_padding_cb(s, type, rlen, s->record_padding_arg);
919 } else if (s->block_padding > 0) {
920 size_t mask = s->block_padding - 1;
923 /* optimize for power of 2 */
924 if ((s->block_padding & mask) == 0)
925 remainder = rlen & mask;
927 remainder = rlen % s->block_padding;
928 /* don't want to add a block of padding if we don't have to */
932 padding = s->block_padding - remainder;
935 /* do not allow the record to exceed max plaintext length */
936 if (padding > max_padding)
937 padding = max_padding;
938 if (!WPACKET_memset(thispkt, 0, padding)) {
939 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
940 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
943 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, padding);
949 * we should still have the output to thiswr->data and the input from
950 * wr->input. Length should be thiswr->length. thiswr->data still points
954 if (!SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
957 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac)
958 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) {
959 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
960 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
966 * Reserve some bytes for any growth that may occur during encryption.
967 * This will be at most one cipher block or the tag length if using
968 * AEAD. SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE covers either case.
970 if (!WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE,
973 * We also need next the amount of bytes written to this
976 || !WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)) {
977 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
978 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
982 /* Get a pointer to the start of this record excluding header */
983 recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len;
985 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, recordstart);
986 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(thiswr);
987 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, len);
990 if (s->statem.enc_write_state == ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS) {
992 * We haven't actually negotiated the version yet, but we're trying to
993 * send early data - so we need to use the tls13enc function.
995 if (tls13_enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1) {
996 if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s)) {
997 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
998 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1003 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1) {
1004 if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s)) {
1005 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
1006 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1012 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
1018 /* Allocate bytes for the encryption overhead */
1019 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &origlen)
1020 /* Encryption should never shrink the data! */
1021 || origlen > thiswr->length
1022 || (thiswr->length > origlen
1023 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt,
1024 thiswr->length - origlen, NULL))) {
1025 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
1026 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1029 if (SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
1032 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac)
1033 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) {
1034 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
1035 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1038 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, mac_size);
1041 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)
1042 || !WPACKET_close(thispkt)) {
1043 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
1044 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1048 if (s->msg_callback) {
1049 recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len
1050 - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1051 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, recordstart,
1052 SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
1053 s->msg_callback_arg);
1055 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) {
1056 unsigned char ctype = type;
1058 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE,
1059 &ctype, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1063 if (!WPACKET_finish(thispkt)) {
1064 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
1065 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1070 * we should now have thiswr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which
1071 * is thiswr->length long
1073 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, type); /* not needed but helps for
1075 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
1077 if (create_empty_fragment) {
1079 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
1083 /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */
1084 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
1085 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1088 *written = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr);
1092 /* now let's set up wb */
1093 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s->rlayer.wbuf[j],
1094 prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr));
1098 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
1101 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = totlen;
1102 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf;
1103 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
1104 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = totlen;
1106 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1107 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written);
1109 for (j = 0; j < wpinited; j++)
1110 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt[j]);
1114 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this
1116 * Return values are as per SSL_write()
1118 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
1122 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = s->rlayer.wbuf;
1126 if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > len)
1127 || (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)
1128 && (s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf))
1129 || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) {
1130 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,
1131 SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
1136 /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */
1137 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]) == 0
1138 && currbuf < s->rlayer.numwpipes - 1) {
1143 if (s->wbio != NULL) {
1144 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
1145 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
1146 i = BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *)
1147 &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb[currbuf])
1148 [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb[currbuf])]),
1149 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]));
1153 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,
1157 if (i > 0 && tmpwrit == SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])) {
1158 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
1159 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1160 if (currbuf + 1 < s->rlayer.numwpipes)
1162 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1163 *written = s->rlayer.wpend_ret;
1165 } else if (i <= 0) {
1166 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1168 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
1169 * using a datagram service
1171 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
1175 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1176 SSL3_BUFFER_sub_left(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1181 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1182 * 'type' is one of the following:
1184 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1185 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1186 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1188 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1189 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1191 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1192 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
1193 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
1194 * argument is non NULL.
1195 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1196 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1197 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1198 * Change cipher spec protocol
1199 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1201 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1202 * Handshake protocol
1203 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1204 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1205 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1206 * Application data protocol
1207 * none of our business
1209 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
1210 size_t len, int peek, size_t *readbytes)
1213 size_t n, curr_rec, num_recs, totalbytes;
1216 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
1217 int is_tls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s);
1219 rbuf = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
1221 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf)) {
1222 /* Not initialized yet */
1223 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) {
1224 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1229 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
1230 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek
1232 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
1233 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1234 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1238 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1239 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1241 unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1242 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1247 while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
1250 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--;
1253 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1254 for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1255 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1257 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1258 *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1265 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1268 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) {
1269 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1270 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1271 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1278 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1281 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
1282 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
1283 * rr[i].data, - data
1284 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1285 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
1287 rr = s->rlayer.rrec;
1288 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
1291 /* get new records if necessary */
1292 if (num_recs == 0) {
1293 ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
1295 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
1298 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
1299 if (num_recs == 0) {
1300 /* Shouldn't happen */
1301 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1302 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1306 /* Skip over any records we have already read */
1308 curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]);
1310 if (curr_rec == num_recs) {
1311 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 0);
1315 } while (num_recs == 0);
1319 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
1320 * record that isn't an alert.
1322 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_ALERT
1323 && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) != 0)
1324 s->rlayer.alert_count = 0;
1326 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1328 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1329 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1330 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
1331 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1332 SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1337 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1340 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
1341 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1342 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1346 if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)
1347 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1348 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL
1351 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1352 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
1353 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1356 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1357 * doing a handshake for the first time
1359 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1360 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
1361 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1362 SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1366 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1367 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1368 && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) {
1369 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1370 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1374 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1375 *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr);
1379 * Mark a zero length record as read. This ensures multiple calls to
1380 * SSL_read() with a zero length buffer will eventually cause
1381 * SSL_pending() to report data as being available.
1383 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
1384 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1390 if (len - totalbytes > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
1391 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr);
1393 n = len - totalbytes;
1395 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
1398 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */
1399 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
1400 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1402 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n);
1403 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
1404 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
1405 s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1406 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0);
1407 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1410 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0
1411 || (peek && n == SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))) {
1416 } while (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && curr_rec < num_recs
1417 && totalbytes < len);
1418 if (totalbytes == 0) {
1419 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
1422 if (!peek && curr_rec == num_recs
1423 && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
1424 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0)
1425 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1426 *readbytes = totalbytes;
1431 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1432 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
1433 * were actually expecting a CCS).
1437 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
1439 if (rr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
1441 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
1442 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
1443 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
1444 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
1446 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1447 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1451 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
1452 && (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
1454 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
1455 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with
1456 * (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything
1457 * other than a ClientHello if we are a server.
1459 s->version = rr->rec_version;
1460 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1461 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1466 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1467 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1470 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
1471 unsigned int alert_level, alert_descr;
1472 unsigned char *alert_bytes = SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)
1473 + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr);
1476 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&alert, alert_bytes, SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
1477 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_level)
1478 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_descr)
1479 || PACKET_remaining(&alert) != 0) {
1480 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1481 SSL_R_INVALID_ALERT);
1485 if (s->msg_callback)
1486 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, alert_bytes, 2, s,
1487 s->msg_callback_arg);
1489 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1490 cb = s->info_callback;
1491 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1492 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1495 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1496 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1499 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING
1500 || (is_tls13 && alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED)) {
1501 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1502 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1504 s->rlayer.alert_count++;
1505 if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) {
1506 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1507 SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS);
1513 * Apart from close_notify the only other warning alert in TLSv1.3
1514 * is user_cancelled - which we just ignore.
1516 if (is_tls13 && alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED) {
1518 } else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
1519 && (is_tls13 || alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING)) {
1520 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1522 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL || is_tls13) {
1525 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1526 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1527 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1528 SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1529 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
1530 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
1531 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1532 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1533 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
1535 } else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
1537 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1538 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1539 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
1540 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1541 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1542 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1544 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1545 SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1547 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
1548 /* We ignore any other warning alert in TLSv1.2 and below */
1552 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1553 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1557 if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) {
1558 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1562 * We ignore any handshake messages sent to us unless they are
1563 * TLSv1.3 in which case we want to process them. For all other
1564 * handshake messages we can't do anything reasonable with them
1565 * because we are unable to write any response due to having already
1566 * sent close_notify.
1568 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1569 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1570 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1572 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY) != 0)
1575 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1576 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1577 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
1578 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
1583 * The peer is continuing to send application data, but we have
1584 * already sent close_notify. If this was expected we should have
1585 * been called via SSL_read() and this would have been handled
1587 * No alert sent because we already sent close_notify
1589 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1590 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1591 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1592 SSL_R_APPLICATION_DATA_AFTER_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
1598 * For handshake data we have 'fragment' storage, so fill that so that we
1599 * can process the header at a fixed place. This is done after the
1600 * "SHUTDOWN" code above to avoid filling the fragment storage with data
1601 * that we're just going to discard.
1603 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1604 size_t dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->rlayer.handshake_fragment);
1605 unsigned char *dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1606 size_t *dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len;
1608 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1609 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < n)
1610 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); /* available bytes */
1612 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1613 memcpy(dest + *dest_len,
1614 SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr) + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr), n);
1615 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
1616 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n);
1618 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
1619 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1621 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1622 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1625 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1626 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1627 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1632 * Unexpected handshake message (ClientHello, NewSessionTicket (TLS1.3) or
1633 * protocol violation)
1635 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4)
1636 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
1637 int ined = (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING);
1639 /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */
1640 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
1642 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1643 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
1651 * If we were actually trying to read early data and we found a
1652 * handshake message, then we don't want to continue to try and read
1653 * the application data any more. It won't be "early" now.
1658 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1659 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) {
1660 /* no read-ahead left? */
1663 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1664 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1665 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1666 * problems in the blocking world
1668 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1669 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1670 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1671 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1678 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) {
1681 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
1682 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
1683 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
1684 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
1685 * record types, using up resources processing them.
1687 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1688 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1690 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1692 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1694 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1695 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1696 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1698 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1699 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1701 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1703 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1704 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1705 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1706 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1707 * started), we will indulge it.
1709 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) {
1710 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1712 } else if (ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) {
1714 * This can happen after a client sends a CH followed by early_data,
1715 * but the server responds with a HelloRetryRequest. The server
1716 * reads the next record from the client expecting to find a
1717 * plaintext ClientHello but gets a record which appears to be
1718 * application data. The trial decrypt "works" because null
1719 * decryption was applied. We just skip it and move on to the next
1722 if (!early_data_count_ok(s, rr->length,
1723 EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, 0)) {
1724 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1727 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1730 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1731 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1737 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq)
1741 for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
1749 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1750 * format and false otherwise.
1752 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1754 return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl->rrec[0]);
1758 * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec
1760 size_t RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1762 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl->rrec[0]);