3 * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
4 * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
6 /* ====================================================================
7 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
13 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
16 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
17 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
18 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
21 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
22 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
23 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
24 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
26 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
27 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
28 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
29 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
31 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
32 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
33 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
35 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
37 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
38 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
41 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
43 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
44 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
45 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
46 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
47 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
49 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
50 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
51 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
52 * ====================================================================
54 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
55 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
56 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
59 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
60 * All rights reserved.
62 * This package is an SSL implementation written
63 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
64 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
66 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
67 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
68 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
69 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
70 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
71 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
73 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
74 * the code are not to be removed.
75 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
76 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
77 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
78 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
80 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
81 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
83 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
84 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
85 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
86 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
87 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
88 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
89 * must display the following acknowledgement:
90 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
91 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
92 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
93 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
94 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
95 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
96 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
98 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
99 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
100 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
101 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
102 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
103 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
104 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
105 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
106 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
107 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
110 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
111 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
112 * copied and put under another distribution licence
113 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
119 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 #include <openssl/evp.h>
121 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
122 #include <openssl/pqueue.h>
123 #include <openssl/rand.h>
125 /* mod 128 saturating subtract of two 64-bit values in big-endian order */
126 static int satsub64be(const unsigned char *v1, const unsigned char *v2)
128 int ret, sat, brw, i;
130 if (sizeof(long) == 8)
140 if (is_endian.little)
142 /* not reached on little-endians */
144 * following test is redundant, because input is always aligned,
145 * but I take no chances...
147 if (((size_t)v1 | (size_t)v2) & 0x7)
160 ret = (int)v1[7] - (int)v2[7];
162 brw = ret >> 8; /* brw is either 0 or -1 */
164 for (i = 6; i >= 0; i--) {
165 brw += (int)v1[i] - (int)v2[i];
170 for (i = 6; i >= 0; i--) {
171 brw += (int)v1[i] - (int)v2[i];
176 brw <<= 8; /* brw is either 0 or -256 */
181 return brw + (ret & 0xFF);
184 static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
186 static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
187 static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
188 static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
189 unsigned int *is_next_epoch);
190 static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q,
191 unsigned char *priority);
192 static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s);
194 /* copy buffered record into SSL structure */
195 static int dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item)
197 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
199 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
201 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
202 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
204 s->packet = rdata->packet;
205 s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
206 memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
207 memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
209 /* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */
210 memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), &(rdata->packet[5]), 6);
216 dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
218 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
221 /* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
222 if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100)
225 rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA));
226 item = pitem_new(priority, rdata);
227 if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL) {
233 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
237 rdata->packet = s->packet;
238 rdata->packet_length = s->packet_length;
239 memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &(s->s3->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
240 memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &(s->s3->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
244 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
245 /* Store bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
246 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
247 (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
248 || s->state == SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A)) {
249 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_RCVINFO,
250 sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
255 s->packet_length = 0;
256 memset(&(s->s3->rbuf), 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
257 memset(&(s->s3->rrec), 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
259 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
260 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
261 if (rdata->rbuf.buf != NULL)
262 OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
268 /* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
269 if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL) {
270 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
271 if (rdata->rbuf.buf != NULL)
272 OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
281 static int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue)
285 item = pqueue_pop(queue->q);
287 dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
289 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
299 * retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not
302 #define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \
303 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
304 &((s)->d1->unprocessed_rcds))
307 * retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie,
310 #define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \
311 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
312 &((s)->d1->processed_rcds))
314 static int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
318 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
320 /* Check if epoch is current. */
321 if (s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
322 return (1); /* Nothing to do. */
324 /* Process all the records. */
325 while (pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q)) {
326 dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
327 if (!dtls1_process_record(s))
329 if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds),
330 s->s3->rrec.seq_num) < 0)
336 * sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records have been
339 s->d1->processed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch;
340 s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch + 1;
345 static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
351 unsigned int mac_size;
352 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
358 * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
359 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
361 rr->input = &(s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
364 * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points
365 * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either
366 * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into
367 * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer
371 * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length
372 * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff.
375 /* check is not needed I believe */
376 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
377 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
378 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
382 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
383 rr->data = rr->input;
384 rr->orig_len = rr->length;
386 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0);
389 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
390 * 1: if the padding is valid
391 * -1: if the padding is invalid
394 /* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */
396 s->packet_length = 0;
400 printf("dec %d\n", rr->length);
403 for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++)
404 printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
409 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
410 if ((sess != NULL) &&
411 (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) {
412 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
413 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
414 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
415 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
416 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
419 * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
420 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
421 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount
422 * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
424 if (rr->orig_len < mac_size ||
425 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
426 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
427 rr->orig_len < mac_size + 1)) {
428 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
429 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
433 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
435 * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be
436 * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in
437 * constant time from within the record, without leaking the
438 * contents of the padding bytes.
441 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size);
442 rr->length -= mac_size;
445 * In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len| equals
446 * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for
449 rr->length -= mac_size;
450 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
453 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ );
454 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL
455 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
457 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size)
462 /* decryption failed, silently discard message */
464 s->packet_length = 0;
468 /* r->length is now just compressed */
469 if (s->expand != NULL) {
470 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) {
471 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
472 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,
473 SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
476 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) {
477 al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
478 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
483 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
484 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
485 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
491 * So at this point the following is true
492 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
493 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
494 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
495 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
499 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
500 s->packet_length = 0;
504 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
510 * Call this to get a new input record.
511 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
512 * or non-blocking IO.
513 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
514 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
515 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
516 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
518 /* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */
519 int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
521 int ssl_major, ssl_minor;
524 unsigned char *p = NULL;
525 unsigned short version;
526 DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
527 unsigned int is_next_epoch;
532 * The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the pending records.
533 * This is a non-blocking operation.
535 if (dtls1_process_buffered_records(s) < 0)
538 /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
539 if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
542 /* get something from the wire */
544 /* check if we have the header */
545 if ((s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
546 (s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
547 n = ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
548 /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
550 return (n); /* error or non-blocking */
552 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
553 if (s->packet_length != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
554 s->packet_length = 0;
558 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
563 s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
564 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
566 /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
570 version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor;
572 /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
575 memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6);
580 /* Lets check version */
581 if (!s->first_packet) {
582 if (version != s->version) {
583 /* unexpected version, silently discard */
585 s->packet_length = 0;
590 if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00)) {
591 /* wrong version, silently discard record */
593 s->packet_length = 0;
597 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
598 /* record too long, silently discard it */
600 s->packet_length = 0;
604 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
607 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
609 if (rr->length > s->packet_length - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
610 /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
612 n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1);
613 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
616 s->packet_length = 0;
621 * now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length ==
622 * DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length
625 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
627 /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
628 bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
629 if (bitmap == NULL) {
631 s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
632 goto again; /* get another record */
634 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
635 /* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */
636 if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
639 * Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. Don't check if
640 * we're listening and this message is a ClientHello. They can look
641 * as if they're replayed, since they arrive from different
642 * connections and would be dropped unnecessarily.
644 if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
645 s->packet_length > DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH &&
646 s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
647 !dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap)) {
649 s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
650 goto again; /* get another record */
652 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
656 /* just read a 0 length packet */
661 * If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT), and a
662 * handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it cannot be
663 * processed at this time. However, do not buffer anything while
667 if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) && !s->d1->listen) {
668 if (dtls1_buffer_record
669 (s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num) < 0)
671 /* Mark receipt of record. */
672 dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);
675 s->packet_length = 0;
679 if (!dtls1_process_record(s)) {
681 s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
682 goto again; /* get another record */
684 dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap); /* Mark receipt of record. */
691 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
692 * 'type' is one of the following:
694 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
695 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
696 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
698 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
699 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
701 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
702 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
703 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
704 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
705 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
706 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
707 * Change cipher spec protocol
708 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
710 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
712 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
713 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
714 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
715 * Application data protocol
716 * none of our business
718 int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
723 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
725 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
726 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
729 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
730 (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) ||
731 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
732 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
737 * check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting
739 if ((ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len, peek)))
743 * Now s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
746 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
748 * Continue handshake if it had to be interrupted to read app data with
751 if ((!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) ||
752 (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
753 (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK
754 || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK)
755 && s->s3->in_read_app_data != 2))
757 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
760 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
761 i = s->handshake_func(s);
765 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
771 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
774 * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
775 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
776 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
777 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
782 * We are not handshaking and have no data yet, so process data buffered
783 * during the last handshake in advance, if any.
785 if (s->state == SSL_ST_OK && rr->length == 0) {
787 item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q);
789 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
790 /* Restore bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
791 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
792 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
793 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_RCVINFO,
794 sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
798 dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
800 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
805 /* Check for timeout */
806 if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0)
809 /* get new packet if necessary */
810 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) {
811 ret = dtls1_get_record(s);
813 ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret);
814 /* anything other than a timeout is an error */
822 if (s->d1->listen && rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
827 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
829 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
830 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
831 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
833 * We now have application data between CCS and Finished. Most likely
834 * the packets were reordered on their way, so buffer the application
835 * data for later processing rather than dropping the connection.
837 if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->buffered_app_data), rr->seq_num) <
839 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
847 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
850 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
852 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
856 if (type == rr->type) { /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
857 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
859 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
860 * doing a handshake for the first time
862 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
863 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
864 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
865 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
872 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
875 n = (unsigned int)len;
877 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
881 if (rr->length == 0) {
882 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
886 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
888 * We were about to renegotiate but had to read belated application
889 * data first, so retry.
891 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
892 rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
893 (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK
894 || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK)) {
895 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
896 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
897 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
901 * We might had to delay a close_notify alert because of reordered
902 * app data. If there was an alert and there is no message to read
903 * anymore, finally set shutdown.
905 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
906 s->d1->shutdown_received
907 && !BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
908 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
916 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
917 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello).
921 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
922 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
925 unsigned int k, dest_maxlen = 0;
926 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
927 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
929 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
930 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->d1->handshake_fragment;
931 dest = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
932 dest_len = &s->d1->handshake_fragment_len;
933 } else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
934 dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->d1->alert_fragment);
935 dest = s->d1->alert_fragment;
936 dest_len = &s->d1->alert_fragment_len;
938 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
939 else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) {
940 dtls1_process_heartbeat(s);
942 /* Exit and notify application to read again */
944 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
945 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
946 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
950 /* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */
951 else if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
953 * Application data while renegotiating is allowed. Try again
956 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
958 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
959 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
960 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
961 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
962 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
966 /* Not certain if this is the right error handling */
967 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
968 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
972 if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
974 * XDTLS: In a pathalogical case, the Client Hello may be
975 * fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes
977 if (rr->length < dest_maxlen) {
978 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
980 * for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while
981 * dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this
982 * non-existing alert...
986 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
991 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
992 for (k = 0; k < dest_maxlen; k++) {
993 dest[k] = rr->data[rr->off++];
996 *dest_len = dest_maxlen;
1001 * s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1002 * s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1003 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1006 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1008 (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
1009 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1010 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
1011 s->d1->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1013 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1014 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1015 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
1016 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1017 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1022 * no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages
1025 if (s->msg_callback)
1026 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1027 s->d1->handshake_fragment, 4, s,
1028 s->msg_callback_arg);
1030 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1031 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1032 !s->s3->renegotiate) {
1033 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
1035 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1036 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
1037 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1041 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,
1042 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1046 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1047 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */
1050 * In the case where we try to read application data,
1051 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1052 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1053 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world
1055 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1056 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1057 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1058 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1065 * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
1066 * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
1071 if (s->d1->alert_fragment_len >= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH) {
1072 int alert_level = s->d1->alert_fragment[0];
1073 int alert_descr = s->d1->alert_fragment[1];
1075 s->d1->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1077 if (s->msg_callback)
1078 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1079 s->d1->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1081 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1082 cb = s->info_callback;
1083 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1084 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1087 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1088 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1091 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
1092 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1093 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
1094 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1096 * With SCTP and streams the socket may deliver app data
1097 * after a close_notify alert. We have to check this first so
1098 * that nothing gets discarded.
1100 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
1101 BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
1102 s->d1->shutdown_received = 1;
1103 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1104 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1105 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1109 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1113 /* XXX: this is a possible improvement in the future */
1114 /* now check if it's a missing record */
1115 if (alert_descr == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE) {
1117 unsigned int frag_off;
1118 unsigned char *p = &(s->d1->alert_fragment[2]);
1123 dtls1_retransmit_message(s,
1124 dtls1_get_queue_priority
1125 (frag->msg_header.seq, 0), frag_off,
1127 if (!found && SSL_in_init(s)) {
1129 * fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL_in_init(s));
1132 * requested a message not yet sent, send an alert
1135 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING,
1136 DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
1140 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1143 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1144 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1145 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,
1146 SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1147 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
1148 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
1149 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1150 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
1153 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1154 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1161 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
1163 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1168 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1169 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
1170 unsigned int ccs_hdr_len = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
1172 dtls1_get_ccs_header(rr->data, &ccs_hdr);
1174 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1178 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know exactly
1179 * what the record payload has to look like
1181 /* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */
1182 if ((rr->length != ccs_hdr_len) ||
1183 (rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
1184 i = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1185 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1191 if (s->msg_callback)
1192 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
1193 rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1196 * We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake messages
1197 * are still missing, so just drop it.
1199 if (!s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok) {
1203 s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0;
1205 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
1206 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1209 /* do this whenever CCS is processed */
1210 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
1212 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1213 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
1215 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1217 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
1218 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
1221 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL);
1228 * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
1230 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
1232 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
1234 /* this may just be a stale retransmit */
1235 dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr);
1236 if (rr->epoch != s->d1->r_epoch) {
1242 * If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the client
1243 * here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED.
1245 if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
1246 if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0)
1249 dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
1254 if (((s->state & SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1255 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) {
1256 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1260 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1264 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1268 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1269 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */
1272 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1273 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1274 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1275 * problems in the blocking world
1277 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1278 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1279 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1280 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1289 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1290 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) {
1294 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1295 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1297 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1299 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1301 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1302 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that should not
1303 * happen when type != rr->type
1305 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1306 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1308 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1310 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1311 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1312 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1313 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1314 * started), we will indulge it.
1316 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1317 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1318 (((s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1319 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1320 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1321 ) || ((s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1322 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1323 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1326 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1329 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1330 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1337 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1342 int dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
1346 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1348 * Check if we have to continue an interrupted handshake for reading
1349 * belated app data with SCTP.
1351 if ((SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) ||
1352 (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) &&
1353 (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK
1354 || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK)))
1356 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
1359 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1363 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES,
1364 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1369 if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
1370 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES, SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG);
1374 i = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, buf_, len);
1379 * this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake
1383 have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
1387 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1388 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1390 unsigned char *src = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
1391 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1396 while ((len > 0) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
1399 s->d1->handshake_fragment_len--;
1402 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1403 for (k = 0; k < s->d1->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1404 s->d1->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1412 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
1413 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
1415 int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len)
1419 OPENSSL_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
1420 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1421 i = do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len, 0);
1425 int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
1426 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
1428 unsigned char *p, *pseq;
1429 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
1437 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
1438 * will happen with non blocking IO
1440 if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0) {
1441 OPENSSL_assert(0); /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */
1442 return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len));
1445 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
1446 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
1447 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1450 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
1453 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
1456 wr = &(s->s3->wrec);
1457 wb = &(s->s3->wbuf);
1460 if ((sess == NULL) ||
1461 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
1467 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
1472 p = wb->buf + prefix_len;
1474 /* write the header */
1476 *(p++) = type & 0xff;
1479 * Special case: for hello verify request, client version 1.0 and we
1480 * haven't decided which version to use yet send back using version 1.0
1481 * header: otherwise some clients will ignore it.
1483 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1484 *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8;
1485 *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff;
1487 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
1488 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
1491 /* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */
1495 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
1496 if (s->enc_write_ctx) {
1497 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
1498 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
1499 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
1503 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
1504 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
1505 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
1511 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
1512 wr->data = p + eivlen; /* make room for IV in case of CBC */
1513 wr->length = (int)len;
1514 wr->input = (unsigned char *)buf;
1517 * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data
1520 /* first we compress */
1521 if (s->compress != NULL) {
1522 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) {
1523 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
1527 memcpy(wr->data, wr->input, wr->length);
1528 wr->input = wr->data;
1532 * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from
1533 * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the
1537 if (mac_size != 0) {
1538 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &(p[wr->length + eivlen]), 1) < 0)
1540 wr->length += mac_size;
1543 /* this is true regardless of mac size */
1548 wr->length += eivlen;
1550 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 1) < 1)
1553 /* record length after mac and block padding */
1555 * if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA || (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && !
1559 /* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */
1561 s2n(s->d1->w_epoch, pseq);
1565 * else s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq);
1568 memcpy(pseq, &(s->s3->write_sequence[2]), 6);
1570 s2n(wr->length, pseq);
1572 if (s->msg_callback)
1573 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, pseq - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
1574 DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1577 * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
1580 wr->type = type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
1581 wr->length += DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1583 ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]));
1585 if (create_empty_fragment) {
1587 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
1593 /* now let's set up wb */
1594 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
1598 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
1601 s->s3->wpend_tot = len;
1602 s->s3->wpend_buf = buf;
1603 s->s3->wpend_type = type;
1604 s->s3->wpend_ret = len;
1606 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1607 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len);
1612 static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
1616 const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1618 cmp = satsub64be(seq, bitmap->max_seq_num);
1620 memcpy(s->s3->rrec.seq_num, seq, 8);
1621 return 1; /* this record in new */
1624 if (shift >= sizeof(bitmap->map) * 8)
1625 return 0; /* stale, outside the window */
1626 else if (bitmap->map & (1UL << shift))
1627 return 0; /* record previously received */
1629 memcpy(s->s3->rrec.seq_num, seq, 8);
1633 static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
1637 const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1639 cmp = satsub64be(seq, bitmap->max_seq_num);
1642 if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map) * 8)
1643 bitmap->map <<= shift, bitmap->map |= 1UL;
1646 memcpy(bitmap->max_seq_num, seq, 8);
1649 if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map) * 8)
1650 bitmap->map |= 1UL << shift;
1654 int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1657 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
1658 unsigned char buf[DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH];
1659 unsigned char *ptr = &buf[0];
1661 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0;
1663 memset(buf, 0x00, sizeof(buf));
1664 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[0];
1665 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[1];
1667 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1668 if (s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE) {
1669 s2n(s->d1->handshake_read_seq, ptr);
1670 l2n3(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off, ptr);
1674 i = do_dtls1_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &buf[0], sizeof(buf), 0);
1676 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
1677 /* fprintf( stderr, "not done with alert\n" ); */
1679 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL
1680 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1681 || s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1684 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1686 if (s->msg_callback)
1687 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert,
1688 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1690 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1691 cb = s->info_callback;
1692 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1693 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1696 j = (s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1];
1697 cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j);
1703 static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
1704 unsigned int *is_next_epoch)
1709 /* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */
1710 if (rr->epoch == s->d1->r_epoch)
1711 return &s->d1->bitmap;
1713 /* Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch */
1714 else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->d1->r_epoch + 1) &&
1715 (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
1717 return &s->d1->next_bitmap;
1723 void dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw)
1726 unsigned int seq_bytes = sizeof(s->s3->read_sequence);
1728 if (rw & SSL3_CC_READ) {
1729 seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1731 memcpy(&(s->d1->bitmap), &(s->d1->next_bitmap), sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
1732 memset(&(s->d1->next_bitmap), 0x00, sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
1734 seq = s->s3->write_sequence;
1735 memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, seq,
1736 sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
1740 memset(seq, 0x00, seq_bytes);