3 * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
4 * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
6 /* ====================================================================
7 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
13 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
16 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
17 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
18 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
21 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
22 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
23 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
24 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
26 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
27 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
28 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
29 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
31 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
32 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
33 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
35 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
37 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
38 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
41 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
43 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
44 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
45 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
46 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
47 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
49 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
50 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
51 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
52 * ====================================================================
54 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
55 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
56 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
59 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
60 * All rights reserved.
62 * This package is an SSL implementation written
63 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
64 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
66 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
67 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
68 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
69 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
70 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
71 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
73 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
74 * the code are not to be removed.
75 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
76 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
77 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
78 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
80 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
81 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
83 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
84 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
85 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
86 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
87 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
88 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
89 * must display the following acknowledgement:
90 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
91 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
92 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
93 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
94 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
95 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
96 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
98 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
99 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
100 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
101 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
102 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
103 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
104 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
105 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
106 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
107 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
110 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
111 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
112 * copied and put under another distribution licence
113 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
119 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 #include <openssl/evp.h>
121 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
122 #include <openssl/pqueue.h>
123 #include <openssl/rand.h>
125 /* mod 128 saturating subtract of two 64-bit values in big-endian order */
126 static int satsub64be(const unsigned char *v1,const unsigned char *v2)
129 if (sizeof(long) == 8) do
130 { const union { long one; char little; } is_endian = {1};
133 if (is_endian.little) break;
134 /* not reached on little-endians */
135 /* following test is redundant, because input is
136 * always aligned, but I take no chances... */
137 if (((size_t)v1|(size_t)v2)&0x7) break;
141 if (l>128) return 128;
142 else if (l<-128) return -128;
146 ret = (int)v1[7]-(int)v2[7];
148 brw = ret>>8; /* brw is either 0 or -1 */
151 { brw += (int)v1[i]-(int)v2[i];
158 { brw += (int)v1[i]-(int)v2[i];
163 brw <<= 8; /* brw is either 0 or -256 */
165 if (sat&0xff) return brw | 0x80;
166 else return brw + (ret&0xFF);
169 static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
171 static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
172 static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
173 static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
174 unsigned int *is_next_epoch);
176 static int dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
177 unsigned short *priority, unsigned long *offset);
179 static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q,
180 unsigned char *priority);
181 static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s);
182 static void dtls1_clear_timeouts(SSL *s);
184 /* copy buffered record into SSL structure */
186 dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item)
188 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
190 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
192 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
193 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
195 s->packet = rdata->packet;
196 s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
197 memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
198 memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
205 dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
207 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
210 rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA));
211 item = pitem_new(priority, rdata);
212 if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL)
214 if (rdata != NULL) OPENSSL_free(rdata);
215 if (item != NULL) pitem_free(item);
217 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
221 rdata->packet = s->packet;
222 rdata->packet_length = s->packet_length;
223 memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &(s->s3->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
224 memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &(s->s3->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
228 /* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
229 if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL)
237 s->packet_length = 0;
238 memset(&(s->s3->rbuf), 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
239 memset(&(s->s3->rrec), 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
241 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
243 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
254 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue)
258 item = pqueue_pop(queue->q);
261 dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
263 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
273 /* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not processed
275 #define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \
276 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
277 &((s)->d1->unprocessed_rcds))
279 /* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie, processed */
280 #define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \
281 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
282 &((s)->d1->processed_rcds))
285 dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
289 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
292 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
293 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
295 /* Check if epoch is current. */
296 if (s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
297 return(1); /* Nothing to do. */
299 /* Process all the records. */
300 while (pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q))
302 dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
303 if ( ! dtls1_process_record(s))
305 dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds),
306 s->s3->rrec.seq_num);
310 /* sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records
311 * have been processed */
312 s->d1->processed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch;
313 s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch + 1;
322 dtls1_get_buffered_record(SSL *s)
326 (((PQ_64BIT)s->d1->handshake_read_seq) << 32) |
327 ((PQ_64BIT)s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off);
329 if ( ! SSL_in_init(s)) /* if we're not (re)negotiating,
334 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->rcvd_records);
335 if (item && item->priority == priority)
337 /* Check if we've received the record of interest. It must be
338 * a handshake record, since data records as passed up without
340 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
341 item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->rcvd_records);
342 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
344 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
345 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
347 s->packet = rdata->packet;
348 s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
349 memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
350 memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
352 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
355 /* s->d1->next_expected_seq_num++; */
365 dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
372 unsigned int mac_size;
373 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
379 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
380 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
382 rr->input= &(s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
384 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
385 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
386 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
387 * the decryption or by the decompression
388 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
389 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
391 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
392 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
394 /* check is not needed I believe */
395 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
397 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
398 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
402 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
405 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
409 /* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
412 /* otherwise enc_err == -1 */
413 goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac;
417 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
418 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
422 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
423 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
424 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
425 (s->read_hash == NULL))
430 /* !clear => s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
432 t=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
433 OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
436 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+mac_size)
438 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
439 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
440 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
443 goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac;
446 /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
447 if (rr->length < mac_size)
449 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
450 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
451 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
454 goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac;
457 rr->length-=mac_size;
458 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
459 if (i < 0 || memcmp(md,&(rr->data[rr->length]),mac_size) != 0)
461 goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac;
465 /* r->length is now just compressed */
466 if (s->expand != NULL)
468 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH)
470 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
471 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
474 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
476 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
477 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
482 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
484 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
485 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
490 /* So at this point the following is true
491 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
492 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
493 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
494 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
498 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
500 dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, &(s->d1->bitmap));/* Mark receipt of record. */
503 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac:
504 /* Separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
505 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
506 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
507 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
508 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via logfile) */
509 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
510 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
512 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
518 /* Call this to get a new input record.
519 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
520 * or non-blocking IO.
521 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
522 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
523 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
524 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
526 /* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */
527 int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
529 int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
534 unsigned short version;
535 DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
536 unsigned int is_next_epoch;
541 /* The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the
542 * pending records. This is a non-blocking operation. */
543 if ( ! dtls1_process_buffered_records(s))
546 /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
547 if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
550 /* get something from the wire */
552 /* check if we have the header */
553 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
554 (s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
556 n=ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
557 /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
558 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
560 OPENSSL_assert(s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
562 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
566 /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
570 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
572 /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
575 memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6);
580 /* Lets check version */
581 if (!s->first_packet)
583 if (version != s->version)
585 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
586 /* Send back error using their
587 * version number :-) */
589 al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
594 if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00))
596 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
600 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
602 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
603 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
607 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
610 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
612 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
614 /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
616 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
617 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
619 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
622 s->packet_length = 0;
626 /* now n == rr->length,
627 * and s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
629 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
631 /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
632 bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
635 s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
636 goto again; /* get another record */
639 /* check whether this is a repeat, or aged record */
640 if ( ! dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap))
643 s->packet_length=0; /* dump this record */
644 goto again; /* get another record */
647 /* just read a 0 length packet */
648 if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
650 /* If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT),
651 * buffer it since it cannot be processed at this time. Records
652 * from the next epoch are marked as received even though they
653 * are not processed, so as to prevent any potential resource
657 dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);
658 dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num);
659 s->packet_length = 0;
663 if ( ! dtls1_process_record(s))
666 dtls1_clear_timeouts(s); /* done waiting */
670 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
675 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
676 * 'type' is one of the following:
678 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
679 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
680 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
682 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
683 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
685 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
686 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
687 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
688 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
689 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
690 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
691 * Change cipher spec protocol
692 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
694 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
696 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
697 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
698 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
699 * Application data protocol
700 * none of our business
702 int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
707 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
709 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
710 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
713 /* XXX: check what the second '&& type' is about */
714 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
715 (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
716 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
718 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
722 /* check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting */
723 if ( (ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len, peek)))
726 /* Now s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
728 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
730 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
731 i=s->handshake_func(s);
732 if (i < 0) return(i);
735 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
741 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
743 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
744 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
745 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
746 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
749 /* We are not handshaking and have no data yet,
750 * so process data buffered during the last handshake
751 * in advance, if any.
753 if (s->state == SSL_ST_OK && rr->length == 0)
756 item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q);
759 dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
761 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
766 /* Check for timeout */
767 if (dtls1_is_timer_expired(s))
769 if (dtls1_read_failed(s, -1) > 0);
773 /* get new packet if necessary */
774 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
776 ret=dtls1_get_record(s);
779 ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret);
780 /* anything other than a timeout is an error */
788 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
790 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
791 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
792 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
794 /* We now have application data between CCS and Finished.
795 * Most likely the packets were reordered on their way, so
796 * buffer the application data for later processing rather
797 * than dropping the connection.
799 dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->buffered_app_data), 0);
804 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
805 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
806 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
809 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
814 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
816 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
817 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
818 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
819 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
821 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
822 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
826 if (len <= 0) return(len);
828 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
831 n = (unsigned int)len;
833 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
840 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
848 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
849 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
851 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
852 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
855 unsigned int k, dest_maxlen = 0;
856 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
857 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
859 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
861 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->d1->handshake_fragment;
862 dest = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
863 dest_len = &s->d1->handshake_fragment_len;
865 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
867 dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->d1->alert_fragment);
868 dest = s->d1->alert_fragment;
869 dest_len = &s->d1->alert_fragment_len;
871 /* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */
872 else if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
874 /* Application data while renegotiating
875 * is allowed. Try again reading.
877 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
880 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
882 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
883 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
884 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
888 /* Not certain if this is the right error handling */
889 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
890 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
896 /* XDTLS: In a pathalogical case, the Client Hello
897 * may be fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes */
898 if ( rr->length < dest_maxlen)
900 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
902 * for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while
903 * dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this
904 * non-existing alert...
908 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
913 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
914 for ( k = 0; k < dest_maxlen; k++)
916 dest[k] = rr->data[rr->off++];
919 *dest_len = dest_maxlen;
923 /* s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
924 * s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
925 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
927 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
929 (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
930 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
931 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
933 s->d1->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
935 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
936 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
937 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
939 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
940 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
944 /* no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages */
947 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
948 s->d1->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
950 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
951 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
955 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
957 i=s->handshake_func(s);
958 if (i < 0) return(i);
961 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
965 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
967 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
970 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
971 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
972 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
973 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
974 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
976 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
977 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
983 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
984 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
988 if (s->d1->alert_fragment_len >= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH)
990 int alert_level = s->d1->alert_fragment[0];
991 int alert_descr = s->d1->alert_fragment[1];
993 s->d1->alert_fragment_len = 0;
996 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
997 s->d1->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
999 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1000 cb=s->info_callback;
1001 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1002 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1006 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1007 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1010 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1012 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1013 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1015 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1019 /* XXX: this is a possible improvement in the future */
1020 /* now check if it's a missing record */
1021 if (alert_descr == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE)
1024 unsigned int frag_off;
1025 unsigned char *p = &(s->d1->alert_fragment[2]);
1030 dtls1_retransmit_message(s,
1031 dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq, 0),
1033 if ( ! found && SSL_in_init(s))
1035 /* fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL_in_init(s)); */
1036 /* requested a message not yet sent,
1037 send an alert ourselves */
1038 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,
1039 DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
1044 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1048 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1049 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1050 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1051 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1052 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1053 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1054 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1059 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1060 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1067 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1069 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1074 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1076 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
1077 unsigned int ccs_hdr_len = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
1079 dtls1_get_ccs_header(rr->data, &ccs_hdr);
1081 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1084 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1085 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1086 /* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */
1087 if ( (rr->length != ccs_hdr_len) ||
1088 (rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1090 i=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1091 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1097 if (s->msg_callback)
1098 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
1099 rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1101 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1102 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1105 /* do this whenever CCS is processed */
1106 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
1108 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1109 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
1114 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1115 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
1118 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
1120 /* this may just be a stale retransmit */
1121 dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr);
1122 if( rr->epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
1128 /* If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the
1129 * client here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED.
1131 if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
1133 dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
1138 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1139 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1141 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1142 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1143 * protocol violations): */
1144 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1148 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1152 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1153 if (i < 0) return(i);
1156 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1160 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1162 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1165 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1166 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1167 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1168 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1169 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1170 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1171 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1172 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1183 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1184 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
1190 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1191 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1193 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1195 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1196 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1197 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1198 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1199 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1200 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1202 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1203 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1204 * but have application data. If the library was
1205 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1206 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1207 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1208 * we will indulge it.
1210 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1211 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1213 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1214 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1215 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1217 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1218 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1219 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1223 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1228 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1229 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1236 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1242 dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
1247 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
1249 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1250 if (i < 0) return(i);
1253 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1263 /* dtls1_write_bytes sends one record at a time, sized according to
1264 * the currently known MTU */
1265 i = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, buf_, len);
1266 if (i <= 0) return i;
1268 if ((i == (int)n) ||
1269 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
1270 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
1272 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
1273 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
1274 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
1286 /* this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake
1289 have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
1293 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1294 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1296 unsigned char *src = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
1297 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1302 while ((len > 0) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1305 len--; s->d1->handshake_fragment_len--;
1308 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1309 for (k = 0; k < s->d1->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1310 s->d1->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1320 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
1321 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
1323 int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
1325 const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
1326 unsigned int tot,n,nw;
1330 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1335 /* handshake layer figures out MTU for itself, but data records
1336 * are also sent through this interface, so need to figure out MTU */
1338 mtu = BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_MTU, 0, NULL);
1339 mtu += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; /* HM already inserted */
1343 if (mtu > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
1344 mtu = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1351 i=do_dtls1_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
1358 if ( (int)s->s3->wnum + i == len)
1366 int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
1368 unsigned char *p,*pseq;
1369 int i,mac_size,clear=0;
1376 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
1377 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
1378 if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0)
1380 OPENSSL_assert(0); /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */
1381 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
1384 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
1385 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
1387 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1390 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
1393 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
1400 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
1401 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
1402 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
1409 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
1414 /* DTLS implements explicit IV, so no need for empty fragments */
1416 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
1417 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done
1418 && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1420 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
1421 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
1424 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
1426 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
1427 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
1428 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
1429 * together with the actual payload) */
1430 prefix_len = s->method->do_ssl_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
1431 if (prefix_len <= 0)
1434 if (s->s3->wbuf.len < (size_t)prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE)
1436 /* insufficient space */
1437 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1442 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
1445 p = wb->buf + prefix_len;
1447 /* write the header */
1452 *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
1453 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1455 /* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */
1459 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
1461 /* Make space for the explicit IV in case of CBC.
1462 * (this is a bit of a boundary violation, but what the heck).
1464 if ( s->enc_write_ctx &&
1465 (EVP_CIPHER_mode( s->enc_write_ctx->cipher ) & EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE))
1466 bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher);
1470 wr->data=p + bs; /* make room for IV in case of CBC */
1471 wr->length=(int)len;
1472 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
1474 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
1477 /* first we compress */
1478 if (s->compress != NULL)
1480 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
1482 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
1488 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
1492 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
1493 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
1494 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
1498 if(s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + bs]),1) < 0)
1500 wr->length+=mac_size;
1503 /* this is true regardless of mac size */
1508 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
1509 if (bs) /* bs != 0 in case of CBC */
1511 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,bs);
1512 /* master IV and last CBC residue stand for
1513 * the rest of randomness */
1517 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
1519 /* record length after mac and block padding */
1520 /* if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ||
1521 (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && ! SSL_in_init(s))) */
1523 /* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */
1525 s2n(s->d1->w_epoch, pseq);
1529 s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq); */
1531 memcpy(pseq, &(s->s3->write_sequence[2]), 6);
1533 s2n(wr->length,pseq);
1535 /* we should now have
1536 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
1537 * wr->length long */
1538 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
1539 wr->length+=DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1541 #if 0 /* this is now done at the message layer */
1542 /* buffer the record, making it easy to handle retransmits */
1543 if ( type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1544 dtls1_buffer_record(s, wr->data, wr->length,
1545 *((PQ_64BIT *)&(s->s3->write_sequence[0])));
1548 ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]));
1550 if (create_empty_fragment)
1552 /* we are in a recursive call;
1553 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
1558 /* now let's set up wb */
1559 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
1562 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
1563 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
1564 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
1565 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
1566 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
1568 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1569 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
1576 static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
1580 const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1582 cmp = satsub64be(seq,bitmap->max_seq_num);
1585 memcpy (s->s3->rrec.seq_num,seq,8);
1586 return 1; /* this record in new */
1589 if (shift >= sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
1590 return 0; /* stale, outside the window */
1591 else if (bitmap->map & (1UL<<shift))
1592 return 0; /* record previously received */
1594 memcpy (s->s3->rrec.seq_num,seq,8);
1599 static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
1603 const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1605 cmp = satsub64be(seq,bitmap->max_seq_num);
1609 if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
1610 bitmap->map <<= shift, bitmap->map |= 1UL;
1613 memcpy(bitmap->max_seq_num,seq,8);
1617 if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
1618 bitmap->map |= 1UL<<shift;
1623 int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1626 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1627 unsigned char buf[DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH];
1628 unsigned char *ptr = &buf[0];
1630 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1632 memset(buf, 0x00, sizeof(buf));
1633 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[0];
1634 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[1];
1636 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1637 if (s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE)
1639 s2n(s->d1->handshake_read_seq, ptr);
1641 if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) /* waiting for a new msg */
1644 s2n(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq, ptr); /* partial msg read */
1648 fprintf(stderr, "s->d1->handshake_read_seq = %d, s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = %d\n",s->d1->handshake_read_seq,s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq);
1650 l2n3(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off, ptr);
1654 i = do_dtls1_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &buf[0], sizeof(buf), 0);
1657 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1658 /* fprintf( stderr, "not done with alert\n" ); */
1662 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL
1663 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1664 || s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1667 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1669 if (s->msg_callback)
1670 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert,
1671 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1673 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1674 cb=s->info_callback;
1675 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1676 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1680 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1681 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
1688 static DTLS1_BITMAP *
1689 dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned int *is_next_epoch)
1694 /* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */
1695 if (rr->epoch == s->d1->r_epoch)
1696 return &s->d1->bitmap;
1698 /* Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch */
1699 else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->d1->r_epoch + 1) &&
1700 (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE ||
1701 rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT))
1704 return &s->d1->next_bitmap;
1712 dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned short *priority,
1713 unsigned long *offset)
1716 /* alerts are passed up immediately */
1717 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ||
1718 rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1721 /* Only need to buffer if a handshake is underway.
1722 * (this implies that Hello Request and Client Hello are passed up
1724 if ( SSL_in_init(s))
1726 unsigned char *data = rr->data;
1727 /* need to extract the HM/CCS sequence number here */
1728 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE ||
1729 rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1731 unsigned short seq_num;
1732 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
1733 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
1735 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
1737 dtls1_get_message_header(data, &msg_hdr);
1738 seq_num = msg_hdr.seq;
1739 *offset = msg_hdr.frag_off;
1743 dtls1_get_ccs_header(data, &ccs_hdr);
1744 seq_num = ccs_hdr.seq;
1748 /* this is either a record we're waiting for, or a
1749 * retransmit of something we happened to previously
1750 * receive (higher layers will drop the repeat silently */
1751 if ( seq_num < s->d1->handshake_read_seq)
1753 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
1754 seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq &&
1755 msg_hdr.frag_off < s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off)
1757 else if ( seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq &&
1758 (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ||
1759 msg_hdr.frag_off == s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off))
1763 *priority = seq_num;
1767 else /* unknown record type */
1776 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw)
1779 unsigned int seq_bytes = sizeof(s->s3->read_sequence);
1781 if ( rw & SSL3_CC_READ)
1783 seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1785 memcpy(&(s->d1->bitmap), &(s->d1->next_bitmap), sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
1786 memset(&(s->d1->next_bitmap), 0x00, sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
1790 seq = s->s3->write_sequence;
1791 memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, seq, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
1795 memset(seq, 0x00, seq_bytes);
1800 dtls1_clear_timeouts(SSL *s)
1802 memset(&(s->d1->timeout), 0x00, sizeof(struct dtls1_timeout_st));